Filed 11/26/08 NO. 4-07-0723
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Macon County
SHAUNESSY GRIMES, ) No. 06CF1346
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Katherine M.
) McCarthy,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a June 2007 trial, a jury convicted defen-
dant, Shaunessy Grimes, of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1
(a)(2) (West 2006)). In August 2007, the trial court sentenced
him to 35 years in prison.
Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court
erred by denying his request to instruct the jury on (a) the
lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter and (b) the
issue of causation, and (2) the State failed to present suffi-
cient evidence to prove that he was accountable for first degree
murder. We disagree and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In October 2006, the State charged defendant with first
degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2006)), alleging that
he and two codefendants, Demetrice C. Phillips and Stephanie
Boyd, were accountable for Jeremiah Maclin's death. In May 2007,
the trial court severed defendant's case from those of his co-
defendants.
A summary of the evidence from defendant's June 2007
trial showed, in pertinent part, the following.
On September 21, 2007, Breanna Turner, defendant's
girlfriend and mother of his child, got into an argument with
Quinishia Frazier because Turner believed she was having a
relationship with defendant. Later that day, Turner and Boyd
confronted Frazier near Van Dyke Street in Decatur, Illinois.
Turner and Frazier began fighting, and a crowd gathered. Someone
in the crowd threw a brick, which hit Boyd in the head. Frazier
then knocked Turner to the ground and several people from the
crowd began to kick and stomp Turner. Turner's cousin pulled
Turner away from the group.
That same evening, Turner and Boyd told Phillips and
defendant about the fight, which made defendant angry. Phillips
asked defendant whether he wanted to "shoot it up" and defendant
replied, "Come on." Turner, Boyd, Phillips, and defendant then
proceeded to defendant's house, where defendant retrieved his
.22-caliber, single-shot rifle. Defendant placed the rifle on
the back floorboard of Boyd's car, and the group headed back to
Van Dyke Street.
Once they arrived near the scene of the earlier fight,
- 2 -
Phillips instructed Boyd to pull into a nearby alley. Defendant
handed Phillips the rifle as they walked down the alley toward
Van Dyke Street. Several minutes later, out of defendant's line
of sight, witnesses from the crowd heard a shot fired in their
direction. Maclin fell to the ground, bleeding from a fatal
wound to the back of his neck. Defendant and Phillips ran back
to the car, where Turner and Boyd were waiting. Before the group
drove away, Phillips said that he "thought he saw someone fall."
The next day, defendant and Phillips threw the rifle into the
Sangamon River.
An autopsy performed by forensic pathologist Travis
Hindman revealed that Maclin died from a gunshot wound to the
right side of the back of his neck. However, due to a typograph-
ical error, Hindman's autopsy report indicated that the gunshot
wound was to the left side of the back of Maclin's neck.
Hindman's report also showed that (1) no bullet exit wound was
found on Maclin's body and (2) two metallic fragments, which had
a combined weight of 1.11 grams, were lodged at the base of
Maclin's neck.
At trial, defendant vigorously cross-examined (1)
Hindman regarding (a) the cause of Maclin's death and (b) his
degree of certainty that the metallic fragments had actually come
from defendant's .22-caliber rifle and (2) Detective Charles
Hendricks, to determine whether he investigated other people who
- 3 -
may have been in the crowd with a gun.
Following the presentation of evidence and argument,
the trial court conducted a hearing on the parties' proposed jury
instructions outside the presence of the jury. At that hearing,
defendant tendered (1) an involuntary manslaughter instruction as
a lesser-included offense and (2) an instruction on causation,
arguing that the State proved only that a shot was fired, but not
that Phillips fired the shot that caused Maclin's death. The
court denied defendant's requests.
The jury thereafter convicted defendant of first degree
murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2006)), and the trial court
sentenced him as stated.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Defendant's Claim That the Trial Court Erred
By Refusing His Proffered Jury Instructions
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing
his request to instruct the jury on the (1) lesser-included
offense of involuntary manslaughter and (2) issue of causation.
We address defendant's arguments in turn.
1. Standard for Giving a Lesser-Included Instruction
A jury instruction on a lesser-included offense is
justified only when some evidence exists to support giving it to
the jury. People v. Jones, 219 Ill. 2d 1, 31, 845 N.E.2d 598,
614 (2006). Whether an instruction on a lesser-included offense
- 4 -
is warranted depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Jones, 219 Ill. 2d at 31, 845 N.E.2d at 614. The giving of a
jury instruction on a lesser-included offense lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court. People v. Jackson, 372 Ill.
App. 3d 605, 613, 874 N.E.2d 123, 130 (2007), citing Jones, 219
Ill. 2d at 31, 845 N.E.2d at 614.
2. General Standard for Giving Jury Instructions
A party normally is entitled to a jury instruction when
the evidence presented supports giving it. People v. Evans, 369
Ill. App. 3d 366, 380, 859 N.E.2d 642, 653 (2006). The evidence
upon which a party relies to justify his request for an instruc-
tion must be more than a mere factual reference or witness's
comment. Otherwise, a defendant could force the trial court to
include unlimited instructions unrelated to the case. Evans, 369
Ill. App. 3d at 380, 859 N.E.2d at 653. We review a court's
refusal to give a jury instruction for an abuse of discretion.
People v. Dorn, 378 Ill. App. 3d 693, 698, 883 N.E.2d 584, 588
(2008).
3. Instruction on Involuntary Manslaughter
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing
to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of involun-
tary manslaughter. Specifically, defendant contends that he
presented sufficient evidence that Phillips' conduct was reck-
less, rather than intentional, which justified an instruction on
- 5 -
involuntary manslaughter. In support of his contention, defen-
dant asserts that the cumulative evidence was enough to suggest
that his mental state and, subsequently, his actions, were
reckless, rather than intentional. The State responds that the
evidence was not sufficient to warrant an instruction on involun-
tary manslaughter because Phillips did not act recklessly. We
agree with the State.
a. Defendant's Intent
Initially, we note defendant's assertion that his
intent is somehow relevant to our inquiry into whether he was
entitled to an involuntary manslaughter instruction. This
assertion is not correct. To prove accountability, the State
must demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that either (1)
defendant shared the principal's criminal intent or (2) there was
a common criminal design. People v. Perez, 189 Ill. 2d 254, 266,
725 N.E.2d 1258, 1264-65 (2000).
As the supreme court explained in Perez, when two or
more persons engage in a common criminal design, any acts commit-
ted by one party to further the common design are attributable to
all parties to the common design, rendering each party individu-
ally responsible for the consequences of the others' acts.
Perez, 189 Ill. 2d at 267, 725 N.E.2d at 1265. A defendant need
not affirmatively act when a common criminal plan or purpose
exists. People v. Turner, 375 Ill. App. 3d 1101, 1104, 875
- 6 -
N.E.2d 175, 180 (2007). "A common criminal plan or design can be
inferred from the circumstances, and a defendant need not express
'[w]ords of agreement' to be held accountable for a codefendant's
criminal acts." Turner, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 1104, 875 N.E.2d at
180, quoting People v. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d 131, 141, 646 N.E.2d
567, 571 (1995).
In this case, the State tried defendant for first
degree murder on an accountability theory premised upon the fact
that he and Phillips engaged in a common criminal design.
Therefore, the State was not required to prove defendant shared
Phillips' intent, a fact that the trial court explained when it
denied defendant's request to instruct the jury on involuntary
manslaughter as follows:
"The only thing we have here is the
defendant himself testifying that [his ac-
tions were] intended to scare, and that he
didn't have intent.
* * *
When [Phillips] intend[ed] to fire a
gun, point[ed] it in the general direction of
his *** intended victim, and [shot], such
conduct [was] not merely reckless and does
not warrant an involuntary manslaughter in-
struction, regardless of [Phillips'] asser-
- 7 -
tion that he *** did not intend to kill any-
one.
*** [T]hat also applies in this case
even on accountability theory, even though
defendant wasn't the shooter."
Thus, the trial court essentially found that (1) defendant's
intent was irrelevant because he was tried on the theory that
defendant and Phillips engaged in a common criminal design and
(2) the focus should have been on Phillips' intent, which could
not have been reckless under the circumstances. We agree with
the trial court. That defendant may have possessed some lesser
intent, such as recklessness, is not relevant to our inquiry.
b. Sufficiency of the Evidence To Justify
an Involuntary Manslaughter Instruction
We now turn to the underlying issue of whether the
trial court correctly found that defendant failed to present
sufficient evidence to justify an involuntary manslaughter
instruction. A person commits first degree murder when in per-
forming the acts that cause another's death, "he knows that such
acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to
that individual or another." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2006).
On the other hand, a person commits involuntary manslaughter when
he unintentionally kills another by recklessly performing an act
that is likely to cause death or great bodily harm. 720 ILCS
5/9-3(a) (West 2006).
- 8 -
"It is well established that proof that a death re-
sulted from a defendant's act of deliberately firing a gun in the
general direction of his victim is sufficient to sustain a
conviction for first-degree murder." People v. Lemke, 384 Ill.
App. 3d 437, 446, 892 N.E.2d 1213, 1220 (2008); see Jackson, 372
Ill. App. 3d at 613-14, 874 N.E.2d at 130 ("when the defendant
intends to fire a gun, points it in the general direction of his
or her intended victim, and shoots, such conduct is not merely
reckless ***, regardless of the defendant's assertion that he or
she did not intend to kill anyone").
Looking to Phillips' conduct (because he was the
primary actor in this case), the record reveals that defendant
failed to present any evidence that Phillips acted recklessly.
Phillips did not testify at defendant's trial, leaving the trial
court to make its ruling based on the following circumstantial
evidence of Phillips' intent: (1) getting out of the car; (2)
asking defendant to hand him the rifle; (3) walking around the
corner of a house; (4) firing a rifle in the direction of the
crowd; (5) running back to the car; (6) telling the group that he
"thought he saw someone fall"; and (7) throwing the rifle into
the Sangamon River the next day. We conclude that a lesser-
included offense instruction on involuntary manslaughter was not
justified. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by refusing defendant's request to present such an
- 9 -
instruction to the jury.
4. Instruction on Causation
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by
refusing his proffered causation instruction pursuant to Illinois
Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 7.15 (4th ed. 2000)
(hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th No. 7.15). Specifically, defendant
contends that an instruction on the element of causation was
required because (1) the State failed to prove that Phillips ever
fired the rifle and (2) even if Phillips had fired the rifle, the
State failed to prove that Phillips' bullet was the same bullet
that (a) hit Maclin or (b) caused his death. The State responds
that a causation instruction was not required because the evi-
dence showed that (1) a single shot was fired, (2) Phillips fired
that shot, and (3) the shot caused Maclin's death. We agree with
the State.
The instruction on causation in homicide cases reads as
follows:
"In order for you to find that the acts
of the defendant caused the death of [the
victim], the State must prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that defendant's acts were a
contributing cause of the death and that the
death did not result from a cause unconnected
with the defendant. However, it is not nec-
- 10 -
essary that you find the acts of the defen-
dant were the sole immediate cause of death."
IPI Criminal 4th No. 7.15.
The homicide-causation instruction should be given when an
alternative explanation for the cause of death is argued by the
defense. People v. Pinkney, 322 Ill. App. 3d 707, 718, 750
N.E.2d 673, 681 (2000). However, trial courts should be espe-
cially cautious about giving the homicide-causation instruction
when a defendant is tried on a common-design theory because the
instruction could confuse the jury. Pinkney, 322 Ill. App. 3d at
720, 750 N.E.2d at 683.
In response to defendant's request to instruct the jury
on the issue of causation, the trial court found the following:
"I don't find any evidence *** that the death
resulted from any cause other than the shoot-
ing by *** Phillips for which the defendant
is accountable. So I find mere speculation
that another gun was involved. I just don't
think there is any evidence in the record
that the gun shot that killed *** Maclin came
from some other source.
* * *
With a jury instruction, it is only the
[c]ourt's responsibility to determine if
- 11 -
there is sufficient evidence that warrants a
jury instruction on it, which is a higher
level than [defendant] being able to argue
reasonable inferences from the evidence which
is what [defendant] want[s] to do in this
case. [The court] is merely stating that
there is insufficient evidence to warrant a
jury instruction [on causation]."
In this case, defendant did not argue any other re-
motely plausible explanation for Maclin's death. The evidence
presented at trial revealed that (1) Phillips walked around the
corner of a house, (2) Phillips fired in the direction of the
crowd, and (3) Maclin fell to the ground with a fatal gunshot
wound to the back of the neck. The fact that defendant vigor-
ously cross-examined (1) Hindman about the type and weight of the
bullet fragments retrieved from Maclin's neck and (2) Hendricks
regarding whether they questioned other persons who may or may
not have been at the scene with a gun falls short of a plausible
explanation for a cause unconnected to defendant sufficient to
warrant an instruction on the element of causation.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by refusing defendant's request to instruct
the jury on the element of causation.
B. Defendant's Claim That the State's Evidence Was Insufficient
To Prove Him Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
- 12 -
Defendant next argues that the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Maclin died from a gunshot
wound or (2) Phillips caused Maclin's death. Essentially,
defendant contends that the State's evidence was insufficient to
prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.
1. Standard of Review
We review a defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 114, 871
N.E.2d 728, 740 (2007). "This same standard of review applies
regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial
***." People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431, 743 N.E.2d 32, 40
(2000). Because the jury is in the best position to judge the
credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, its findings are
entitled to great weight. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 114-15, 871
N.E.2d at 740.
2. Defendant's Accountability for the Common Criminal Design
A defendant is accountable for the conduct of another
when "[e]ither before or during the commission of an offense, and
with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he
solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other
person in the planning or commission of the offense." 720 ILCS
- 13 -
5/5-2(c) (West 2006). To prove accountability, the State must
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that either (1) defendant
shared the principal's criminal intent or (2) there was a common
criminal design. Perez, 189 Ill. 2d at 266, 725 N.E.2d at 1264-
65. "A defendant's mental state is ordinarily proved circumstan-
tially by inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence." People
v. Jones, 376 Ill. App. 3d 372, 383, 876 N.E.2d 15, 25 (2007).
The following nonexhaustive circumstances may be
considered by the factfinder when determining a defendant's legal
accountability: (1) his presence at the scene without disap-
proval; (2) flight from the scene; (3) failure to report the
crime; (4) his close affiliation with the codefendant after the
crime is committed; (5) the sharing of any proceeds from the
criminal act; and (6) the destroying or disposing of evidence.
Turner, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 1104, 875 N.E.2d at 180-81.
In this case, defendant (1) was present at the scene
without disapproval, (2) fled the scene with Phillips, (3) did
not report the crime until pressured by law enforcement, (4)
worked with Phillips after the shooting to dispose of the rifle,
and (5) attempted to dispose of the rifle by throwing into the
Sangamon River. Further, defendant intended for, and conspired
with, Phillips to confront the crowd, brandish the rifle, and
"shoot it up." Therefore, defendant was responsible for Phillip-
s' conduct in furtherance of that common criminal design.
- 14 -
3. The Murder for Which Defendant Was Accountable
"[W]hen [an individual] intends to fire a gun, points
it in the general direction of his or her intended victim, and
shoots, such conduct is not merely reckless ***, regardless of
the defendant's assertion that he or she did not intend to kill
anyone." Jackson, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 613-14, 874 N.E.2d at 130.
Indeed, "[i]t is well established" that such conduct can never be
reckless. Lemke, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 446, 892 N.E.2d at 1220
(affirming the defendant's conviction for first degree murder).
Here, Phillips agreed with defendant to confront the
crowd, brandish the rifle, and "shoot it up," a common criminal
design that resulted in Maclin's murder. Given the evidence
presented by the State--which we have previously summarized--the
jury could have reasonably inferred that (1) Phillips murdered
Maclin and (2) defendant was accountable for Phillips' actions in
that regard.
Accordingly, we conclude that the State presented
sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant was accountable for the first degree murder of Maclin,
which resulted from defendant's common criminal design.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment. As part of our judgment, we grant the State's request
that defendant be assessed $50 as costs for this appeal.
- 15 -
Affirmed.
KNECHT and COOK, JJ., concur.
- 16 -