Filed 7/18/08
NO. 4-07-0889
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Douglas County
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS, ) No. 06CF8
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Michael G. Carroll,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:
On February 2, 2006, the State charged defendant,
Christopher Williams, with unlawful possession with intent to
deliver cannabis, a Class 3 felony (720 ILCS 550/5(d) (West
2006)) (count I), and unlawful possession of cannabis, a Class 4
felony (720 ILCS 550/4(d) (West 2006)) (count II). On October
22, 2007, after a stipulated bench trial, the trial court con-
victed defendant on count I, unlawful possession with intent to
deliver. The court sentenced defendant to 24 months' probation
with 60 days in jail as a condition, no presentence credit, and
payment of various fines and costs. Defendant appeals, arguing
(1) he is entitled to two days' sentencing credit and (2) a $5-
per-day credit against his fines. We affirm.
On February 1, 2006, Heather Welch, an officer with the
Illinois State Police, stopped a car on Interstate 57 after a
random check showed the car's plates were suspended for lack of
insurance. During the stop, Officer Welch noticed an excessive
odor of air freshener as well as a green leafy substance on the
floor. Welch called a canine unit to sniff the car. The canine
did not alert to the vehicle, but it showed a strong interest in
the trunk of the vehicle. Officer Welch completed the traffic
stop and cited defendant for operation of a vehicle with sus-
pended registration. Welch advised the driver he was free to go
and asked for consent to search the vehicle. Defendant consented
to the search, exited his car, and sat in the squad car passenger
seat.
During the search, officers found cannabis scattered
throughout the vehicle, and a blue plastic bag behind the speaker
in the trunk containing 432 grams or approximately a pound of
cannabis. Welch read defendant his Miranda rights (Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966))
at the scene. Williams was held in Douglas County jail that day,
February 1, 2006. He posted bond on February 2, 2006.
Defense counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence.
After a hearing, the trial court denied it by order. Defendant
proceeded to a stipulated bench trial and was found guilty of
unlawful possession with intent to deliver cannabis. Both
parties waived preparation of a presentencing report. The State
presented an agreed sentence of 24 months' probation, 60 days in
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Douglas County jail, "with no days['] pre-sentence credit," a
substance-abuse evaluation and treatment, and the payment of
enumerated fines, costs, and fees. Defense counsel agreed the
sentence included a 60-day jail term, "no credit for previous
time in custody." The court agreed to the sentencing agreement
and sentenced defendant consistent with the parties' agreement to
24 months' probation, 60 days in jail, "with no credit." This
appeal followed.
Defendant argues the trial court failed to grant
defendant credit for at least the two days of time served prior
to sentencing, February 1 and 2, 2006, and also a $5-per-day
credit against his fines.
The Unified Code of Corrections provides: "The offender
shall be given credit on the determinate sentence or maximum term
and the minimum period of imprisonment for time spent in custody
as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed."
730 ILCS 5/5-8-7(b) (West 2006). Although it is unclear how many
days defendant spent in jail, he was in custody on February 1 and
February 2, 2006. Defendant requests the cause be remanded for a
hearing to determine the proper amount of sentencing credit and
credit against fines.
The State argues defendant is not entitled to sentenc-
ing credit because the defendant agreed to a sentence that did
not reflect credit for time served. At sentencing, the State
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represented to the court that the parties had agreed to a sen-
tence of 24 months' probation, 60 days in jail, no presentence
credit, substance-abuse treatment, and a delayed sentencing
judgment. Defense counsel joined in the recommendation and
stated there was agreement on the sentence. The State contends
that under the doctrine of invited error, defendant is not
entitled to sentence credit. Defendant "'may not request to
proceed in one manner and then later contend on appeal that the
course of action was in error.'" People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d
368, 385, 813 N.E.2d 181, 192 (2004), quoting People v. Carter,
208 Ill. 2d 309, 319, 802 N.E.2d 1185, 1190 (2003). Allowing
defendant to agree to a sentence that included consideration of
his presentencing credit, then on appeal get his agreed-upon
sentence reduced, would be unfair. See In re Detention of Swope,
213 Ill. 2d 210, 217, 821 N.E.2d 283, 287 (2004). We agree.
Defendant received benefits in this bargain. At
sentencing, the trial court stated, "[I]t's a very favorable
disposition for your client [(defense counsel)], but the court is
going to concur. The State's Attorney is a very diligent prose-
cutor and he feels this is adequate, then it's adequate for this
court." The agreement not only provided for a term of probation
with minimal jail time, but the State agreed to a delayed sen-
tencing judgment, allowing defendant to begin serving his sen-
tence two weeks after sentencing. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d
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435, 677 N.E.2d 935 (1997), is not applicable in this case; the
State did not argue defendant had forfeited the issue via proce-
dural default. A defendant has the right to first request
sentencing credit at any time unless, as here, he agreed to
forego it as part of a plea or other sentencing agreement. See
People v. Maltimore, 268 Ill. App. 3d 532, 535, 644 N.E.2d 478,
481 (1994) (a defendant who received the benefit of his bargain
cannot be heard to repudiate it).
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment. As part of our judgment, we grant the State its $50
statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal.
Affirmed.
TURNER and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.
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