ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
Rosen v. The Larkin Center, Inc., 2012 IL App (2d) 120589
Appellate Court DONALD ROSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE LARKIN CENTER,
Caption INC., and DENNIS GRAF, Defendants-Appellees.
District & No. Second District
Docket No. 2-12-0589
Filed December 28, 2012
Held In an action arising from plaintiff’s termination from his position as chief
(Note: This syllabus financial officer of defendant school, the trial court’s orders barring
constitutes no part of plaintiff from testifying as a discovery sanction and ultimately denying
the opinion of the court him leave to file an amended complaint and entering summary judgment
but has been prepared for defendants were upheld, since plaintiff disregarded court rules, orders,
by the Reporter of and deadlines and his proposed amendment was untimely and would have
Decisions for the prejudiced defendants.
convenience of the
reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County, No. 08-L-552; the Hon.
Review Kevin T. Busch and the Hon. James R. Murphy, Judges, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Donald P. Rosen, of Carpentersville, appellant pro se.
Appeal
Michael Resis and Ellen L. Green, both of SmithAmundsen LLC, of
Chicago, and Jeffrey A. Risch and Rebecca L. Dobbs, both of
SmithAmundsen LLC, of St. Charles, for appellees.
Panel JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Hutchinson and Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiff, Donald Rosen, appeals two trial court orders that contributed to the grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendants, The Larkin Center, Inc., and Dennis Graf1; Larkin
is an agency that provides special education and care to students through its therapeutic day
school. Those orders that plaintiff appeals are: (1) the discovery sanction barring plaintiff
from testifying; and (2) the denial of plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended
complaint. We affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 The present litigation arose after defendant terminated plaintiff from his position as chief
financial officer (CFO). One of the functions of the CFO was to negotiate funding rates on
behalf of Larkin with various state agencies. On September 23, 2008, plaintiff filed a
complaint against defendant, alleging the following facts. Graf, chief executive officer of
Larkin, hired plaintiff in January 2001, to act as CFO for Larkin. In April 2003, plaintiff
became a licensed attorney. According to the complaint, Graf orally retained plaintiff to
provide legal services to Larkin, which plaintiff provided. Plaintiff sought payment for those
legal services in the amount of $94,125. Count I of the complaint alleged breach of contract,
claiming that defendant breached its oral contract with plaintiff by failing to pay him for his
legal services. Count II of the complaint alleged quantum meruit, claiming that plaintiff spent
significant time as an attorney working for defendant’s benefit. The complaint alleged that
defendant enjoyed the benefits of plaintiff’s services by receiving state funds and that
plaintiff was owed fair and reasonable value for his services. Plaintiff attached numerous
invoices on letterhead for “The Law Office of Donald Rosen.”
¶4 On February 5, 2009, plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended complaint, requesting
to add a third count, alleging a statutory claim for recovery from illegal gambling conducted
1
We refer to both defendants in the singular for purposes of this opinion.
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by defendant. This motion was denied for reasons stated on the record.2 Meanwhile,
defendant sought to quash a subpoena issued for a deposition of a Larkin employee and
overly broad document requests. The court ordered the parties to move forward on the
deposition, but it also ordered plaintiff to issue new document requests that were more
specific. A flurry of discovery motions and alleged violations of discovery rules went back
and forth for several months.
¶5 On January 14, 2010, the court ordered plaintiff to tender all outstanding discovery
answers to defendant within 14 days, and it noted that it would consider sanctions if plaintiff
failed to comply. On February 4, 2010, defendant filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c) (eff. July 1, 2002) and for dismissal with prejudice for
want of prosecution, alleging that plaintiff failed to answer interrogatories served upon him
in September 2009. Defendant alleged in its motion that: the discovery was initially due on
October 27, 2009; it made reasonable attempts by written correspondence to obtain answers
from plaintiff; on November 16, 2009, and January 4, 2010, it sent plaintiff correspondence
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(k) (eff. July 1, 2002); the trial court entered the
January 14 order advising plaintiff that discovery was due by January 28; and plaintiff had
not yet tendered any responses.
¶6 On March 10, 2010, the court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss for want of
prosecution; reserved the issues related to defendant’s motion for sanctions; and ordered both
parties to file within 21 days any motion seeking to compel discovery or seeking rulings on
any discovery matter. It further ordered that it would hear all motions regarding written
discovery on April 28. Defendant filed a motion for sanctions by March 31. On April 6,
plaintiff filed a motion to compel defendant to comply with his discovery request.
¶7 On May 26, 2010, after another flurry of discovery-related motions by both parties, the
court entered an order stating that it would continue to reserve the issues related to
defendant’s motion for sanctions. It further ordered plaintiff to tender answers to defendant’s
interrogatories within 14 days and both parties to conduct an in-person Rule 201(k)
conference within 30 days to address all outstanding discovery issues. The court continued
the case to July 21. On that day, the court ordered defendant to produce documents related
to plaintiff’s job description and his termination by July 28 and continued the matter.
¶8 On August 18, 2010, defendant again filed a motion to compel discovery and for
sanctions. It alleged that, following the court-ordered Rule 201(k) conference, plaintiff
agreed to produce certain documents and then failed to do so. Further, defendant argued that
the documents that plaintiff tendered were incomplete. The parties continued to file
additional motions to compel, resulting in a court order on October 6, 2010. On that date, the
court ordered plaintiff to produce certain documents and denied plaintiff’s motion to compel
certain documents pertaining to his termination, stating that the basis for producing those
documents was not within the scope of the matters at issue in the complaint. However, the
court ordered defendant to produce certain documents and information as requested by
plaintiff.
2
The record on appeal does not contain reports of proceedings.
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¶9 On November 23, 2010, after more motions were filed by both parties, the trial court
ordered the parties to finalize written discovery and conduct party depositions. It set the
matter for a status hearing on February 22, 2011. On March 16, 2011, defendant again moved
for sanctions and dismissal. Defendant argued that plaintiff most recently violated discovery
rules by failing to appear for his scheduled deposition. Plaintiff’s deposition was scheduled
for February 16, 2011, and he was properly notified. Defendant never received any notice or
communication from plaintiff regarding his failure to communicate, his absence from the
scheduled deposition, or dates to reschedule. On April 7, 2011, the trial court entered an
order that stated as follows: (1) defendant’s motion for sanctions and to dismiss for want of
prosecution was granted in part and denied in part; (2) defendant’s request for dismissal was
denied, but plaintiff was barred from testifying in the matter; (3) defendant was granted leave
to file a petition for costs and attorney fees related to preparing for and attending plaintiff’s
scheduled deposition on February 16, 2011, and related to the filing of defendant’s most
recent motion for sanctions; and (4) the matter was continued to April 26, 2011. It does not
appear from the record that plaintiff was present for the April 7 hearing.
¶ 10 On April 20, 2011, defendant filed its petition for costs and attorney fees, seeking
$6,956.52 related to plaintiff’s refusal to cooperate and appear for his deposition. A group
exhibit was filed to support the fees, but the exhibit was excluded from the public court file
due to the confidential nature of the documents. As such, it is not contained in the record on
appeal. On April 26, plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the April 7 order, arguing that his 80-
year-old mother’s knee collapsed the week before the April 7 hearing. Plaintiff’s mother was
scheduled for surgery on April 27, and plaintiff went to Arizona to care for her. Plaintiff
attached his airline reservations, which showed that his flight left Chicago on April 2 but
included no information related to when plaintiff returned.
¶ 11 On June 2, 2011, the court ordered that plaintiff would be permitted to testify upon
payment of the fees and costs prayed for in defendant’s petition. The court stated that, if the
fees and costs were not paid within 60 days, plaintiff’s motion to vacate the April 7 order
would be denied. The matter was continued. Plaintiff appealed the April 7 order, but on
August 15, 2011, this court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the appeal. On October
25, 2011, the trial court noted that this court dismissed plaintiff’s appeal and that plaintiff did
not pay defendant’s fees and costs within 60 days and therefore plaintiff was barred from
testifying.
¶ 12 On December 28, 2011, defendant moved for summary judgment, alleging the following.
Plaintiff’s duties as CFO included negotiating funding rates with the Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services and the Illinois State Board of Education. This duty was part
of plaintiff’s employment before he became a licensed attorney. Defendant argued that
plaintiff now sought compensation for legal services, above and beyond his annual salary,
despite never having submitted an invoice for legal services. Plaintiff’s basis for recovery
was an alleged oral contract, which defendant denied ever existed. Defendant argued that
plaintiff had no evidence supporting his allegation and that the Larkin employee handbook
refuted plaintiff’s claim because it stated that any employment agreement will not be
enforceable unless the agreement is in writing and signed by the executive director.
Defendant also submitted correspondence from plaintiff in which plaintiff stated that the
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parties had agreed that, “in lieu of additional compensation for this legal representation,
[plaintiff] would instead be allowed to take time as [plaintiff] needed, during the day, to
solicit and service [his] legal clients to build up a private law practice.” Defendant argued
that the undisputed evidence demonstrated that plaintiff agreed to perform some legal
services for Larkin as part of his employment as CFO and that in exchange he was allowed
to pursue his private practice during the day, as needed. Defendant argued that there was no
evidence suggesting that Larkin would be invoiced separately. Further, past CFOs also
negotiated funding rates with state agencies as part of their job duties. Therefore, defendant
argued, the undisputed evidence established that plaintiff was fully compensated through his
annual salary for all of the services that he rendered, including negotiating funding rates.
Defendant attached supporting documents to its motion, including Graf’s deposition and
affidavits from prior Larkin CFOs and Larkin’s human resources director.
¶ 13 On March 22, 2012, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint, pursuant
to section 2-616(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-616(c) (West
2010)), seeking to add count III, a claim for wrongful termination due to breach of contract,
and count IV, a claim for promissory estoppel. According to the motion, the admissions
included in defendant’s pending motion for summary judgment contained proof of his
wrongful-termination claim. Plaintiff alleged that defendant acknowledged that there was a
contract between the parties regarding plaintiff’s legal services to defendant in that defendant
admitted that plaintiff was allowed to take time as needed to build up his private practice
while still performing as Larkin’s CFO and receiving a full-time salary. Plaintiff
acknowledged in his motion that, because the complaint did not allege wrongful termination,
defendant refused to allow Graf to answer questions regarding plaintiff’s termination.
Defendant opposed plaintiff’s motion, arguing that the proposed claims did not cure his
pleadings and were merely a disingenuous attempt to delay the court’s ruling on the motion
for summary judgment. Defendant argued that plaintiff failed to establish that there was any
valid contract between the parties, and therefore a wrongful-termination claim was futile
given the law of employment-at-will. Further, defendant argued that it would be prejudiced
if plaintiff were now allowed to add the wrongful-termination claim, four years after the
original complaint was filed and after years of virulent litigation. Plaintiff had prior notice
that discovery was not being conducted for employment-related claims, but he had not
previously chosen to add the claims. Plaintiff had numerous opportunities to amend his
complaint and had attempted to amend it once already, and therefore his motion was
untimely.
¶ 14 On April 26, 2012, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, “for
the reasons stated in the record.” It also denied plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the
complaint, “for reasons stated in the record and in agreement with the reasons stated in
defendant’s response brief.” Plaintiff timely appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in
barring him from testifying where he missed one deposition appointment and in denying his
motion for leave to amend his complaint.
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¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 We first address plaintiff’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion in
sanctioning him pursuant to Rule 219(c) by barring his testimony. Rule 219(c) provides that,
if any party unreasonably fails to comply with discovery rules, the court, upon motion, may
enter remedial orders, including barring a witness from testifying. Ill. S. Ct. R. 219(c) (eff.
July 1, 2002). Additionally, the court may order the offending party to pay the other party
reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the misconduct, including a reasonable attorney
fee. Id. Rule 219(c) provides that the trial court shall set forth with specificity the reasons and
basis for any sanction either in the judgment order itself or in a separate written order. Id.3
The decision to impose a particular sanction is within the discretion of the trial court, and
therefore only a clear abuse of discretion will justify a reversal. Shimanovsky v. General
Motors Corp., 181 Ill. 2d 112, 120 (1998).
¶ 17 The purpose in imposing sanctions is to coerce compliance with discovery rules and
orders, not to punish the offending party. Id. at 123. A sanction ordering dismissal or that
results in a default judgment is a drastic one to be invoked only in those cases where the
party’s actions “show a deliberate, contumacious or unwarranted disregard of the court’s
authority.” Id. In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in imposing a
particular sanction, this court must look to the criteria upon which the trial court relied in
making its determination of an appropriate sanction. Id. The factors a trial court is to use in
determining a sanction include: “(1) the surprise to the adverse party; (2) the prejudicial
effect of the proffered testimony or evidence; (3) the nature of the testimony or evidence; (4)
the diligence of the adverse party in seeking discovery; (5) the timeliness of the adverse
party’s objection to the testimony or evidence; and (6) the good faith of the party offering the
testimony or evidence.” Id. at 124. No single factor in this list is determinative. Id.
¶ 18 Barring a witness from testifying is a drastic sanction, especially when that witness is the
party’s only witness, and such a sanction should be imposed sparingly. Palmer v. Minor, 211
Ill. App. 3d 1083, 1086 (1991). However, such a sanction has been upheld where the party’s
conduct has been contumacious. Id. at 1087. In Palmer, the plaintiff failed to disclose a
witness until the day of an auto negligence trial, after the trial court had barred testimony
from two other witnesses for various reasons. Id. at 1084. The witness was the plaintiff’s
live-in girlfriend whom he knew had witnessed the accident. Id. at 1084-85. The defense
moved to bar the witness from testifying pursuant to Rule 219(c) and argued that the
3
While the written order in the common-law record does not set forth the court’s specific
reasons for sanctioning plaintiff, reviewing courts have relaxed that requirement in cases where
sanctions were entered pursuant to written motions, because it is assumed that the reasons for the
sanction were those set out in the motions. See Illinois Emcasco Insurance Co. v. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co., 393 Ill. App. 3d 782, 790 (2009). Here, defendant filed a written motion. Further,
neither party raises this issue, which results in forfeiture. Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352, 369-70
(2010). Additionally, plaintiff has failed to submit reports of proceedings, which might have
contained the court’s reasoning, and any doubts arising from the incompleteness of the record are
construed against him. See Law Offices of Nye & Associates, Ltd. v. Boado, 2012 IL App (2d)
110804, ¶ 23 (citing Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984)).
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plaintiff’s conduct was a gross violation of supreme court rules because he never disclosed
the witness and did not even mention the witness during his deposition. Id. at 1085. The trial
court agreed and imposed the sanction on the plaintiff, barring the witness’s testimony. Id.
The appellate court affirmed, stating that the plaintiff lived with the witness, the witness was
the mother of his child, and he knew that she witnessed the auto accident, yet the plaintiff
never disclosed the witness’s name in an interrogatory or in his deposition. Id. at 1086. The
plaintiff explained only that the witness was a “ ‘spare.’ ” Id. at 1086-87. The appellate court
acknowledged that barring the plaintiff’s only witness was a drastic sanction but determined
that it was an appropriate one where the plaintiff’s conduct grossly violated the rules. Id. at
1087.
¶ 19 Similarly, in Dolan v. O’Callaghan, 2012 IL App (1st) 111505, ¶ 1, the defendant
refused to answer certain questions at his deposition and the trial court sanctioned him by
requiring him to pay the attorney fees incurred in connection with preparing the motion for
sanctions. The plaintiff alleged that she worked for the defendant as an associate attorney and
that the plaintiff agreed to accept a percentage of all fees in lieu of a salary. Id. ¶ 5. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant ultimately breached that agreement. Id. After months of
antagonistic discovery, the defendant was ordered to resume and complete his deposition so
he could be questioned about several topics. Id. ¶ 10. Eventually, the plaintiff moved for
sanctions after the defendant refused to answer certain questions. Id. ¶ 13. The trial court
ordered that the defendant resume the deposition and answer the questions and that, if he
refused to cooperate, he would be barred from testifying in the case. Id. ¶ 16. It further stated
that the defendant would be ordered to pay the attorney fees associated with pursuing the
sanction motions. Id. The appellate court affirmed, stating that the trial court’s sanction was
intended to encourage the defendant to cooperate with discovery and answer the questions
at his deposition. Id. ¶ 57. The trial court had noted that the defendant would be barred from
testifying if he did not answer the questions at his deposition. Id. The trial court, in delaying
the further sanction of barring the defendant as a witness, demonstrated that it was attempting
to ensure a trial on the merits. Id. The appellate court held that, for this reason, the trial
court’s order was a “ ‘just order’ ” because it was intended to combat an abuse of the
discovery process and to ensure discovery and a trial on the merits. Id.
¶ 20 Palmer and Dolan are instructive to the case at bar. Like in Palmer, plaintiff here knew
that his case rested on his testimony alone, as his complaint was based upon an oral contract
between himself and defendant. He was provided notice of his deposition scheduled for
February 16, 2011, and the record shows that he received such notice on January 10, 2011.
Between January 10 and February 16, plaintiff failed to call, e-mail, fax, send a letter, or
otherwise attempt to notify defendant of his need to reschedule the deposition. Further,
plaintiff did not leave town to assist his mother in Arizona until April 2. Instead of
attempting to change the hearing date on defendant’s motion, plaintiff chose to simply fail
to appear in court on April 7 and skip an opportunity to explain his failure to appear for his
deposition. Even when plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the April 7 order, which he did not
do until nearly three weeks after that order was entered and over a month after the scheduled
deposition date, he failed to explain why he failed to appear at the deposition. Like in
Palmer, this information was well within plaintiff’s control, and he chose not to share it with
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the trial court or defendant in a timely fashion. Upon plaintiff’s motion to vacate, the trial
court, like the trial court in Dolan, attempted to ensure a trial on the merits when it
refashioned its sanction order, stating that plaintiff could avoid being barred as a witness by
complying with the court’s order to pay within 60 days defense fees associated with the
missed deposition. Plaintiff chose not to comply with this court order and thereby incurred
the drastic sanction. Like the Palmer and Dolan trial courts, the trial court in this case acted
within its discretion by barring plaintiff as a witness where he willfully violated deadlines
and discovery rules imposed both by the court and by supreme court rules and did so over
the course of four years.
¶ 21 Plaintiff relies on two cases for his position that the trial court abused its discretion in
barring him from testifying, but we find both cases distinguishable. First, the trial court in
King v. Clay, 335 Ill. App. 3d 923 (2002), abused its discretion in barring the plaintiff from
testifying, because the plaintiff’s failure to appear for a deposition was not willful but rather
was the result of the defendant’s failure to proceed to schedule it. Id. at 926. Further, the
plaintiff had already appeared and testified at an arbitration hearing, and thus the defendant
would not have been prejudiced by the failure to depose the plaintiff in discovery if she were
allowed to testify at the trial. Id. at 927-28. Second, in Danzot v. Zabilka, 342 Ill. App. 3d
493, 497-98 (2003), the plaintiff did not breach any court rule or court order and fully
complied with discovery orders and rules during an arbitration hearing. The trial court’s basis
for barring witnesses from testifying was that the plaintiff had chosen not to call the
witnesses during the arbitration hearing. Id. at 498. The appellate court found an abuse of
discretion because the plaintiff was not obligated to call the witnesses during the arbitration
hearing, as she was entitled to make strategic decisions, and the defendant could have
subpoenaed the witnesses if she wanted them to testify. Id.
¶ 22 Here, unlike in King, defendant pursued the discovery deposition and did not have the
benefit of plaintiff’s testimony at an arbitration hearing. Further, unlike in Danzot, plaintiff
here failed to appear for his deposition, failed to attempt to reschedule, failed to comply with
other discovery orders, failed to pay defendant’s fees and costs as ordered, and failed to
explain why his conduct was anything other than willful, deliberate, contumacious, or an
unwarranted disregard for the court’s authority. Plaintiff, as demonstrated by the record,
showed a consistent pattern of disregarding court rules, orders, and deadlines throughout the
course of this litigation. Such conduct is just the type to lead to a dismissal or a barring of
witnesses. See also Chabowski v. Vacation Village Ass’n, 291 Ill. App. 3d 525, 528-29
(1997) (upholding dismissal of the plaintiff’s case where the plaintiff’s counsel showed a
disregard for the court’s authority throughout the lawsuit, including failing to show up for
hearings and failing to show up for the plaintiff’s deposition without notifying the defendant
or court or providing any reason). We therefore do not find King or Danzot binding on the
facts of this case.
¶ 23 Regarding plaintiff’s suggestion that the court failed to determine the reasonableness of
defendant’s attorney fees associated with the missed deposition and pursuit of Rule 219
sanctions, plaintiff failed to include reports of proceedings in the record. Thus, we construe
any doubts against plaintiff and presume that the trial court properly considered the
reasonableness of defendant’s attorney fees. We therefore reject plaintiff’s contention that
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“imposing those exorbitant fees in lieu of the penalty of debarment from testifying was not
a mitigation of the debarment sanction.”
¶ 24 Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for leave to file an
amended complaint, which would have added claims of wrongful termination and
promissory estoppel. The decision to grant leave to amend a complaint rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse such a decision absent an abuse of that
discretion. I.C.S. Illinois, Inc. v. Waste Management of Illinois, Inc., 403 Ill. App. 3d 211,
219 (2010). The right to amend is neither absolute nor unlimited. Id. In determining whether
a trial court has abused its discretion in granting or denying such leave, this court must
consider the following factors: (1) whether the proposed amendment would cure the
defective pleading; (2) whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of
the proposed amendment; (3) whether the proposed amendment was timely; and (4) whether
previous opportunities to amend the pleading could be identified. Id. at 220. The plaintiff
must meet all four factors, and if the proposed amendment does not state a cognizable claim,
thus failing the first factor, the reviewing court need not proceed with further analysis. Id.
¶ 25 Plaintiff argues that adding his wrongful-termination and promissory-estoppel claims
would have cured his defective pleading because it would have incorporated facts
acknowledged by defendant and would have allowed him to request additional discovery
regarding the reason for his termination. Plaintiff argues that defendant would not have been
surprised or prejudiced by the additional claims. He also claims that his proposed amendment
was timely because he could not have filed it before he had evidence, obtained through
discovery, that acknowledged the revised terms of his employment contract. We disagree
with plaintiff’s arguments.
¶ 26 As defendant argues, a trial court may consider whether a proposed amendment concerns
matters known to the plaintiff when the original pleading was filed and whether the plaintiff
provides good reason for not filing at that time. Johnson v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 238
Ill. App. 3d 898, 904 (1992). In its motion to dismiss, dated October 30, 2008, defendant
included correspondence from plaintiff in which it admitted that plaintiff would be allowed
time during the day to pursue private legal work in lieu of additional compensation for any
legal work performed for defendant’s benefit. This is the “admission” by defendant that
plaintiff claims as the basis for his additional claims. However, plaintiff provides no reason
for not filing these claims in his original complaint when they are based upon the alleged oral
contract to which he was obviously a party. The alleged facts underlying the claims were
entirely within plaintiff’s knowledge when he filed his original complaint. Even if the facts
were not within his knowledge at the time of the original complaint, plaintiff made no
attempt to amend his complaint in a timely fashion after defendant’s motion to dismiss
(October 30, 2008) or after the court limited discovery to exclude the reasons for plaintiff’s
termination (October 6, 2010). Plaintiff also fails to explain why defendant would not have
been prejudiced by these entirely new claims, which possibly would have required a different
defense strategy, four years after it commenced defending this litigation. Under these facts,
which demonstrate that plaintiff’s amendment was untimely and would have prejudiced
defendant, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s
motion seeking leave to file an amended complaint.
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¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 28 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane
County.
¶ 29 Affirmed.
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