SECOND DIVISION
August 29, 2006
No. 1-05-2208
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County.
)
v. )
)
MARCHELLO SAMS, ) Honorable
) Dennis J. Porter,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE SOUTH delivered the opinion of the court:
The State appeals from an order of the trial court granting
defendant Marchello Sams's motion to suppress his statement. On
appeal, the State contends that the trial court erroneously
granted the motion where it determined that defendant's statement
was involuntary based on his prior lengthy detainment.
Briefly stated, on September 12, 2002, defendant, who was 20
years old at the time, voluntarily went to a police station in
relation to the murder investigation of the victim, George
LeVonte, who was the one-year-old son of defendant's girlfriend.
Defendant then continuously remained at the police station until
late on September 15, 2002. Throughout that time, defendant was
interviewed by numerous detectives and assistant State's
Attorneys (ASA). Initially, defendant denied involvement in the
victim's death; however, he eventually issued a verbal and
written inculpatory statement. After memorializing his statement
on September 15, 2002, defendant was charged with first degree
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murder and aggravated battery. Defendant then filed a motion to
suppress his statement on the basis that it was "obtained as a
result of psychological and mental coercion," specifically noting
his "prolonged illegal detention."
The evidence adduced at the suppression hearing demonstrated
that, around 11 p.m on September 12, defendant was initially
interviewed by Detectives Lawrence Aikin and Jamie Kane. Prior
to that, the detectives interviewed the victim's mother, Carrie
Anne Collins, her brother Kirkland Collins, and several others.
The initial interview lasted approximately one hour, during which
defendant admitted caring for the child on the day in question;
however, he denied involvement in the victim's death. At the
conclusion of the interview, Aikin and Kane requested that
defendant, Carrie Anne and Kirkland remain at the police station
overnight in order to assist in the continuing investigation the
next day. According to Aikin, they all agreed and none were
placed in handcuffs.
Early the next morning, on September 13, Aikin and Kane
returned to the police station to check on defendant, Carrie Anne
and Kirkland and to offer them coffee and food before the
detectives left to investigate the crime scene. Aikin and Kane
returned four or five hours later, and interviewed Carrie Anne,
Kirkland and defendant for several hours. Defendant again denied
involvement in the victim's death. That night, at about 10 p.m.,
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Detectives Paul Zacharias, James Gildea and Michael Cusack issued
the Miranda warnings and interviewed defendant for approximately
45 minutes. During the interview, Gildea told defendant that the
victim was being examined to determine the cause of death, and
that defendant's original statement did not explain how the
victim could have been injured. Defendant subsequently changed
his story and made an inculpatory statement describing how he may
have harmed the victim.
During the morning of September 14, the detectives contacted
Carrie Anne in light of defendant's inculpatory statement;
however, she was not available until the late afternoon. Later
that evening, after again advising him of the Miranda rights,
Zacharias and ASA Lisette Mojica interviewed defendant and he
gave essentially the same inculpatory statement. Then, very late
that night, ASA John Brassil arrived at the police station and
requested that all witnesses be contacted to make an additional
statement.
Around 1:30 a.m. on September 15, defendant was Mirandized
and reiterated essentially the same inculpatory statement to ASAs
Brassil and Mojica. Then, at about 4 p.m., after interviewing
the other witnesses, ASA Athena Farmakis reissued the Miranda
warnings and interviewed defendant with Zacharias for
approximately 45 minutes. Defendant stated that he had not been
mistreated while at the police station. Thereafter, Farmakis
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interviewed more witnesses and then spoke with defendant around
10:30 p.m. At that time, defendant indicated that he wanted to
memorialize his inculpatory statement. Farmakis wrote out the
statement on a preprinted form, which included the Miranda
warnings. Defendant signed the form, indicating that he read and
understood the Miranda rights and agreed with the statement.
Defendant was subsequently charged with first degree murder and
aggravated battery.
Detectives Aikin, Kane and Gildea and ASAs Brassil and
Farmakis all testified that defendant's statements were made
voluntarily, and that he was never physically abused or
threatened. Defendant's mother and grandmother, however,
testified that, when they visited defendant in jail on September
16, they noticed marks on his person indicative of physical
abuse.
Defendant testified that he was handcuffed at some point on
September 12, and that Detective Aikin physically abused him
throughout the time he was detained. Defendant stated that the
inculpatory version of events was suggested to him by the
officers. He further testified that he was told he could leave
the police station if he signed the statement. Defendant
admitted that he signed the statement without reading it because
he "didn't [sic] know it was going to cause me this much
trouble." On cross-examination, defendant admitted that the ASA
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read his written statement aloud; that he signed every page and
initialed two corrections; and signed the page acknowledging that
"no threats or promises [had] been made to him in return for
[the] statement" and that he gave the "statement freely and
voluntarily and because it [was] the truth."
The trial court ultimately granted defendant's motion to
suppress his statement. In its findings, the trial court noted
that defendant arrived at the police station voluntarily;
however, the court questioned whether defendant voluntarily
agreed to remain overnight. The court, therefore, concluded that
defendant was under arrest at some time on September 13, and that
his written statement was completed at 10:30 p.m. on September
15. The court then determined that there was no credible
evidence of any physical abuse or mistreatment. Further, the
court found that defendant was an adult of seemingly reasonable
intelligence with some experience in the criminal justice system
due to prior felony arrests. In addition, the court found that
defendant was advised of his constitutional rights, and that his
interrogations were intermittent and "not overly long." The
court, however, determined that defendant was detained for an
"enormously long time."
Although the court noted the "so-called 48 hour rule," it
also noted the rule that "delay alone is insufficient" as a basis
for excluding a defendant's incriminating statement. Ultimately,
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the trial court concluded that "this [was] not merely delay
alone" on the basis that the police held defendant during their
investigation despite the fact that he denied involvement in the
offense. In that regard, the court stated that the police could
have released defendant and then brought him back for further
investigation if necessary, "rather than leaving him there for
days maintaining his innocence, and then eventually, you would
think, wearing him down." Consequently, the trial court
suppressed defendant's written statement and any statement given
after his arrest on September 13. This timely appeal followed.
The trial court's factual determinations are awarded great
deference, such that we will not disturb those findings unless
they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v.
Willis, 215 Ill. 2d 517, 536 (2005).
In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 95 S.
Ct. 854 (1975), the Supreme Court found that, pursuant to the
fourth amendment, a suspect is entitled to a probable cause
hearing before or promptly after his arrest. Generally, a
probable cause hearing within 48 hours of a defendant's
warrantless arrest will satisfy this requirement. People v.
Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104, 116 (2006), citing County of Riverside
v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49, 63, 111 S. Ct.
1661, 1670 (1991). However, "if the defendant can prove
'unreasonable delay' Snchiefly, delay to gather additional
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evidence to justify the defendant's arrest," then the
Gerstein/McLaughlin rule may be violated even if the hearing is
held within 48 hours. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d at 116.
Recently, in Willis, the supreme court reiterated the well-
established rule that prolonged confinement in presenting an
arrested defendant before a judge is not enough to establish a
fourth amendment violation. See Willis, 215 Ill. 2d at 533-35.
Rather, the long-standing voluntariness test determines whether a
defendant's statement is admissible. Willis, 215 Ill. 2d at 535.
Specifically, the test is "whether the inherently coercive
atmosphere of the police station was the impetus for the
confession or whether it was a product of free will." Willis,
215 Ill. 2d at 535. Further, voluntariness is ascertained by the
totality of the circumstances, such that courts consider the
"defendant's age, intelligence, education, experience, and
physical condition at the time of the detention and
interrogation; the duration of the interrogation; the presence of
Miranda warnings; the presence of any physical or mental abuse;
and the legality and duration of the detention." Willis, 215
Ill. 2d at 536. However, "an extraordinarily long delay which
itself raises the inference of police misconduct could, at some
point, render any confession involuntary." Willis, 215 Ill. 2d
at 538.
In the instant case, defendant was held at the police
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station for over 72 hours prior to being charged. In determining
that defendant's statement was involuntary, the trial court made
numerous findings that were not against the manifest weight of
the evidence. Defendant, a seemingly intelligent 20-year-old
with some experience in the criminal justice system, was arrested
sometime within the primary 24-hour period as it was unlikely
that he would have agreed to remain at the police station
overnight. However, he was not physically or mentally abused
during his detention. Further, although he was apprised of his
constitutional rights and was interrogated sporadically for
acceptable periods of time, defendant was detained for an
"enormously long time." The trial court stated that "delay alone
is insufficient" to establish a fourth amendment violation;
however, it determined that, where defendant was continuously
held despite repeated denials of involvement in the offense,
"this [was] not merely delay alone." Rather, defendant was
unreasonably detained while the police gathered evidence. See
Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d at 116. This process eventually wore
defendant down and created a lack of free will. See Willis, 215
Ill. 2d at 535, 538.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we find that the
trial court's ruling was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant's statement
was involuntary.
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of
Cook County.
Affirmed.
WOLFSON and HALL, JJ., concur.
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