ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
People v. Gomez, 2011 IL App (1st) 092185
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption CARLOS GOMEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. First District, Fifth Division
Docket No. 1-09-2185
Filed September 30, 2011
Held Defendant’s convictions and sentences for first degree murder,
(Note: This syllabus aggravated criminal sexual assault and home invasion involving a 63-
constitutes no part of year-old woman were upheld over his contentions that his motion to
the opinion of the court quash his arrest and suppress his statements was improperly denied, the
but has been prepared State failed to prove the victim was alive when she was assaulted, the
by the Reporter of trial court violated Supreme Court Rule 431(b), and the sentence of
Decisions for the natural life imprisonment for first degree murder was an abuse of
convenience of the discretion.
reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 01-CR-811; the Hon.
Review Jorge Luis Alonso, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Geoffrey Burkhart, all of
Appeal State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, John
E. Nowak, and Jessica R. Ball, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel),
for the People.
Panel JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Cahill and Garcia concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Following a jury trial, defendant Carlos Gomez was convicted of the first degree murder,
aggravated criminal sexual assault and home invasion of Joyce Ralson. The trial court
subsequently sentenced defendant to a term of natural life for first degree murder, 30 years
for aggravated criminal sexual assault and 30 years for home invasion. Defendant appeals,
arguing that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash arrest and suppress
statements because defendant was arrested before the existence of probable cause; (2) the
State failed to prove him guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault beyond a reasonable
doubt because it did not establish that Ralson was alive at the time of the sexual assault; (3)
the trial court failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff.
May 1, 2007)); and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to a term
of natural life.
¶2 In November 2004, defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence
flowing from an unlawful detention. The trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s
motion in January and February 2005. The following evidence was presented at the hearing.
¶3 Maria Gomez Bahena testified that she is defendant’s sister. On November 22, 2000, she
was living at her parent’s house, located at 3774 West 77th Place in Chicago, with her
family. On November 23, 2000, which was Thanksgiving, between 4:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m.,
Bahena was sleeping on the couch in the living room when she was awoken by “loud
banging and knocking” at the side door. She went to the door and looked through a curtain
to see “quite a number of what [she] thought were police officers.” They asked to see
defendant. She opened the door slightly and they asked about defendant. Bahena told them
he lived there and was sleeping in the basement. The officers said they needed to see him and
Bahena asked them to wait and closed the door. She turned to get her parents, but her mother
was already at the doorway to the stairs by the side door. As Bahena turned around, the
officers entered the house and walked down the stairs into the basement. Bahena denied
giving the officers permission to enter the house.
¶4 Bahena testified that at least five officers went down the stairs. She followed them with
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her mother. Bahena stated that the lights were off in the basement and it was dark so the
officers used their flashlights. Bahena said there was a bunk bed in the basement. The
officers approached the bunk bed and started questioning her brother, Jesus, who was in the
bottom bunk. They asked him if he was Carlos and made Jesus show them his identification
to prove he was not Carlos. Then, the officers grabbed defendant and pulled him down from
the top bunk. Bahena stated that they handcuffed defendant. Bahena testified that defendant
was wearing his pajamas, which were jogging pants and a white T-shirt. He was not wearing
shoes, only socks. One of the officers then read defendant his rights. The officers then
“dragged” defendant out of the house. An officer came back and took a pair of shoes for
defendant.
¶5 While the officers were there, Bahena tried to explain what was said to her mother, who
only spoke Spanish. They asked for a Spanish interpreter and Bahena stated the officers
ignored them and one said to her mother that she lives in America, she should be speaking
English. The officers also responded that the people who speak Spanish were not working
that day. Bahena stated the officers commented that “You Mexicans don’t celebrate
Thanksgiving anyway.” Bahena said the officers were laughing and telling jokes. The
officers were also taking pictures of the basement and at one point took a picture of her
mother. Bahena testified that the officers did not tell her they had a warrant to search her
house or a warrant for defendant’s arrest.
¶6 On cross-examination, when asked if there were four officers present, Bahena responded
that at least five came into the house and more were outside. She stated that the officers did
not ask to enter the house and she did not give them permission. She did not remember one
of the officers giving her his card, but said that she asked where they were going and was told
Area One. Bahena was asked why she did not tell other detectives and an assistant State’s
Attorney about the actions by the officers, and she responded that she was not asked. Bahena
was referred to part of her written statement in which she stated that the officers were “rude
to her at her home earlier and made what she believed to be racist remarks.” On redirect,
Bahena clarified that she was not asked in her statement about what occurred when the
officers came to her house, but was asked about the events that took place the night before.
In rebuttal, Bahena testified that in November 2000, she was employed by a market research
company and denied asking the police officers about the educational requirements to become
an officer.
¶7 Jesus Gomez testified that defendant is his younger brother. In November 2000, he lived
at 3774 West 77th Place with his family. He slept in the basement with defendant on a set
of bunk beds. He stated that between 4:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. on November 23, 2000, he was
awoken by a flashlight in his face and a bunch of men surrounding him asking for defendant.
He had been sleeping in the bottom bunk. He tried to get out of bed, but the officers would
not let him and asked him to show his hands. They asked for his identification and he
indicated that it was in his pants near the bed. The officers got the pants and “threw” the
pants at him and told him to get his identification. Jesus took out his identification and
showed it to the officers.
¶8 Jesus testified that the officers then went toward defendant on the top bunk. He saw two
officers drag defendant out of bed. He stated that the officers asked defendant if he was a
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Latin King and they handcuffed him and read defendant his rights. Jesus said there was a lot
of commotion because several of the officers were searching the laundry and storage rooms
and some were on radios and cell phones. The officers then took defendant upstairs without
any shoes. An officer came back and took a pair of shoes. Jesus said he never heard the
officers say they had a warrant to search the house or a warrant for defendant’s arrest.
¶9 On cross-examination, Jesus admitted that he was not near the door when the officers
entered the home and did not know how they entered the home. Jesus stated that there were
probably up to 10 officers in his house. He said the officers did not announce themselves and
he did not see their badges. Jesus testified that the officers argued with his sister.
¶ 10 Maria Gomez testified with the aid of an interpreter. She stated that she is defendant’s
mother. She stated that in November 2000, she lived at 3774 West 77th Place with her
family. On November 23, 2000, between 4:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m., she was sleeping in her
bedroom when someone knocking on the door woke her up. She got up and went to see what
was happening. She saw some officers enter through the side door and go downstairs. Her
daughter was behind the officers and Maria also went downstairs. She stated that officers
used flashlights downstairs and someone turned on the light. The officers were yelling, but
she did not understand because she does not speak English. She said the officers “threw”
defendant off the bed and handcuffed him. The officers left with defendant. When she asked
what was happening, the officers “didn’t want to tell [her] anything.”
¶ 11 The defense rested its case-in-chief on the motion. The State then called its witnesses.
¶ 12 Detective Ernest Turner testified that on November 22, 2000, he was assigned to Area
One as a homicide detective. He was working the first watch from 11 p.m. until 7 a.m.
Shortly after 11 p.m. on November 22, 2000, he received an assignment and went to a scene
located at 3777 West 77th Street. Detective Turner stated that it was a murder scene
involving an elderly woman named Joyce Ralson. He spoke with the police officers on the
scene and learned of a witness named Robert Ralson who also lived at that location and was
the brother of the victim. Detective Turner found out that Robert had seen the individual on
the premises and that while exiting the premises, the offender knocked Robert down and fled
west. He received a description of the offender as a male white, between 5 feet 9 inches and
5 feet 11 inches, dressed in a black jacket with white lettering, black pants, black hair with
a short haircut.
¶ 13 Detective Turner also learned of a battery victim that another beat officer had answered
near 3822 West 76th Street around the same time as the homicide and the battery victim had
been taken to Holy Cross Hospital. Detective Turner estimated that 3822 West 76th Street
was between 1 1/2 to 2 blocks away from the homicide location. The responding officers
noted that the battery victim fit the description of the offender in the homicide case. He
instructed the officers to recover the battery victim’s clothing and to transport him to Area
One for a further interview. He noted that the battery victim told officers that he received his
injuries two blocks away, which was within the “circumference” of the homicide. Detective
Turner learned the battery victim’s name was Gerardo Cortina. While Cortina was still at the
hospital, Robert was brought there to view Cortina, but Robert could not make a positive
identification.
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¶ 14 Detective Turner testified that Cortina was brought to Area One between 3:10 and 3:20
a.m. and placed in an interview room. Detective Turner spoke with Cortina. He advised
Cortina of his rights and stated that Cortina became “very combative and said that he didn’t
want to talk.” Detective Turner stated that Cortina asked for a cigarette and some time to
think about what happened. Detective Turner next spoke with Cortina between 4:30 and 5
a.m. At that time, Cortina told him that he did not know anything and he had been with his
friend, Carlos Gomez. Cortina gave defendant’s address to the detective. Detective Turner
then asked his sergeant to assign a couple detectives to go to defendant’s house and “see if
they could locate this Gomez and have him brought–see if he would come into the station
to back up [Cortina’s] story as to where [Cortina] was at the time of this incident.” At that
time, Detective Turner did not have any reason to believe defendant was associated with the
homicide.
¶ 15 Detective Turner stated that four detectives went to defendant’s house, but he was not
one of them. He said that defendant was brought into Area One around 5:35 a.m. and placed
in a conference room. Defendant was not handcuffed and the door was open. Detective
Turner testified that this was “absolutely not” a room that he would put offenders in because
it was not secure. Detective Turner first spoke with defendant around 6 a.m. when defendant
asked for a cigarette and a pop. Detective Turner asked defendant if he knew Cortina and
defendant responded that he did. He asked defendant if he had been with Cortina and
defendant answered that they had been drinking.
¶ 16 At approximately 6:20 a.m., another detective, Detective Romic, spoke with Cortina. She
then spoke to Detective Turner. She informed him that Cortina had said that he and
defendant had gone out with the intention of stealing a car radio, but then defendant told
Cortina that he wanted to “hit” a house, meaning enter a house and stick it up. Cortina said
that they picked a house and defendant entered while Cortina waited in the front as a lookout.
Detective Turner stated that prior to that statement, Cortina had not said anything to
implicate defendant in a crime.
¶ 17 At that time, Detective Turner went to defendant, advised him of his rights and informed
him that some allegations had been made against him. Defendant agreed to speak with him,
but said that he did not know anything about the homicide and his mother and sister could
back up his story that he was at home. Detective Turner then had detectives go to defendant’s
house to verify his alibi. Detective Turner also stated that defendant was transferred to a
locked room around 6:40 a.m., after he spoke with Detective Romic.
¶ 18 Later, at approximately 9:20 a.m., Detectives McDonnell and Posluszny spoke with
defendant. After they spoke with defendant, Detective Turner learned that defendant had
made statements incriminating himself as being at the scene. According to Detective Turner,
defendant was no longer considered a witness, but was now a suspect. Defendant was
questioned throughout the day by other officers and assistant State’s Attorneys. Defendant’s
clothing was recovered and forensic investigators were sent to defendant’s house to process
the location. Defendant also consented to give a buccal swab for DNA.
¶ 19 On cross-examination, Detective Turner stated that he was the lead detective on the case
and had been working with Detective Kowalski. He admitted that he gave defendant his
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Miranda rights when he first spoke to defendant as a precautionary measure and he “must
have had some feelings that maybe he was a suspect. But he wasn’t treated as a suspect.”
Detective Turner also testified that Cortina was drunk when Detective Turner first saw him.
Detective Turner admitted that in Cortina’s statement to Detective Romic, Cortina did not
mention Robert pulling into the driveway. He also stated that no one tried to call defendant’s
house to ask if defendant would be willing to come to the station. When asked if defendant
was free to leave when he was in the conference room, Detective Turner responded that it
never came up because defendant did not ask to leave. On redirect, Detective Turner stated
he considered defendant to be under arrest around 9:20 a.m., after he made statements to
Detective Posluszny placing himself at the scene.
¶ 20 Detectives John Farrell and David Kowalski testified that on November 23, 2000, they
received an assignment between 4:30 a.m. and 5 a.m. to pick up a witness named Carlos
Gomez. They rode in one car and two other detectives, Detective McInerney and Detective
Sesso, followed in another car. When they arrived at 3774 West 77th Place, Detectives
Farrell and Kowalski went to the side door by the driveway and knocked. Bahena,
defendant’s sister, answered the door and asked what they wanted. Detective Farrell stated
that he showed her his badge and explained he was a police officer and was looking for
defendant. Bahena told them that defendant was there and sleeping in the basement.
Detective Farrell asked if they could come in and she said yes. Bahena took them down to
the basement and she turned on the lights.
¶ 21 Both detectives described the basement as an open area and they observed a set of bunk
beds with a person in each bunk. When Bahena turned on the lights, the two males woke up.
Bahena told them that defendant was “there” and defendant responded, “here.” Detective
Farrell stated that he did not speak with the person in the bottom bunk. He informed
defendant that they were police officers and asked if he could speak with defendant.
Defendant agreed to speak with him. Detective Farrell explained that someone at the police
station had said he was with defendant earlier. Detective Kowalski asked defendant if he
knew Cortina and defendant answered that he did. They asked defendant if he would come
to the station and defendant agreed. Detective Farrell then spoke with Bahena as defendant
got dressed. He told Bahena that defendant was going to 51st and Wentworth. He also spoke
with her about the requirements to become a police officer. He gave Bahena a couple of his
business cards. Detectives Farrell and Kowalski denied raising their voices in the basement
or being confrontational with Bahena.
¶ 22 The detectives left with defendant. Both detectives stated that defendant was not
handcuffed, but Detective Farrell did pat defendant down. Detective Kowalski stated that
they transported defendant in an unmarked police car without a cage in it. They reached the
Area One offices in about 20 minutes and took defendant to the second floor. While
Detective Farrell stated that he placed defendant in an interview room, Detective Kowalski
testified that Detective Farrell led defendant to a conference room. Detective Kowalski stated
that the room is not used to hold offenders because it is not secure and cannot be locked from
the outside. Both detectives stated that the door to the room defendant was in remained open.
Detective Farrell told defendant he should call his mother, but defendant said he would call
her later. He offered defendant something to eat or drink and defendant requested a soda,
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which the detective got for him.
¶ 23 On cross-examination, Detective Farrell testified that detectives usually worked alone on
midnight shifts, but Detectives Kowalski and Sesso were new and were assigned to go with
another detective. Detective Farrell received the assignment to get defendant from his watch
commander. He stated that the watch commander said, “Ernie’s got a witness. Go see if you
can find him.” At defendant’s house, he and Detective Kowalski went to the side door and
the other detectives went to the back door. He stated that he did not tell Bahena that she had
a right to refuse the officers entry. He also did not tell defendant that he had a right to refuse
to go with them. Detective Farrell did not tell defendant that he could leave at any time. They
entered the police station from the side door adjacent to the parking lot.
¶ 24 Detective Kowalski stated on cross-examination that his notes indicated that Robert’s
description of the offender was 5 feet 6 inches to 5 feet 7 inches, thin, 17 to 18 years old,
with short black hair and wearing all black with a white insignia on a jacket, and dark pants.
Detective Kowalski also testified that defendant left the conference room “periodically to use
the washroom.”
¶ 25 Detective John Posluszny testified that on November 23, 2000, he was working from 7
a.m. to 3:30 p.m. at Area One and assisted in the homicide investigation. At approximately
9:20 a.m., he was asked to interview defendant with Detective McDonnell. Defendant was
in an interview room, but Detective Posluszny did not believe it was locked at that time. He
stated that Detective McDonnell gave defendant his Miranda rights. Detective Posluszny
identified a written copy of the Miranda warnings that was signed by defendant and both
detectives. Defendant agreed to speak with them. Defendant then gave a statement
implicating himself in the crime. Following that conversation, Detective Posluszny informed
the other detectives working on the case.
¶ 26 Assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) Leanna Rajk testified that on November 23, 2000, she
was assigned to the felony review unit and was assigned to the homicide investigation around
noon. She arrived at Area One at approximately 1 p.m. After reviewing reports, ASA Rajk
spoke with defendant’s sister and mother multiple times while at the police station. When
she spoke to them, she asked how they had been treated by the police. Both said they had
been treated fine. ASA Rajk also spoke with defendant several times. She testified that
defendant did not tell her he had been dragged out of bed by the detectives and handcuffed.
He did not tell her that he had been mistreated in any way.
¶ 27 The State rested on the motion. After arguments by the parties, the trial court denied
defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The trial court noted that the
parties agreed that probable cause did not exist at 5 a.m. when the detectives went to
defendant’s house. The court found that based on the totality of the circumstances,
defendant’s will was not overborne at 5 a.m. when he went to Area One with the detectives
and was placed in a conference room. The court further concluded that defendant was placed
under arrest at approximately 6:30 a.m. when he was moved to a second interview room as
no reasonable person could believe that he or she was not under arrest at that point. The court
held that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant because Cortina had given
statements indicating defendant’s involvement in the crime.
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¶ 28 The following evidence was presented at defendant’s March 2009 jury trial.
¶ 29 Robert Ralson (Robert) testified that on November 22, 2000, he lived with his sister
Joyce Ralson at 3777 West 77th Street in Chicago. Ralson was 63 years old in November
2000. On November 22, 2000, Robert came home from work, ate dinner and left around 6:30
p.m. He returned home around 10:45 p.m. He noticed that all the lights were on in the house,
which was unusual. When he went to enter the house, he found the side door unlocked.
Robert went into his house and saw Ralson’s legs on the floor. As he went to her, he saw that
her pants and underwear were pulled down and a knife was stuck in her neck. Robert tried
to comfort her. A few minutes later, he heard a noise and a man ran out of the back room
toward Robert. Robert tried to stop him, but the man knocked him down and ran out of the
house. Robert got up and saw the man run down the driveway and continue west down the
block. Robert went back in the house and called 911.
¶ 30 Robert stated that the house was in disarray when he arrived home that night. The
television was unplugged, drawers were open, and a jewelry box from the bedroom was in
the living room. He recognized the knife in Ralson’s neck as one of the knives from a block
on the kitchen counter. Robert testified that on November 25, 2000, he viewed a lineup at
Area One and identified defendant as the man he saw run out of his house after his sister was
killed.
¶ 31 Officers Christine Chiagkouris-Spanos and Sophia Terrones were the first police officers
at the scene. They observed the victim on the floor with a knife in her neck and the house in
disarray. Robert spoke with the officers and gave a description of the offender. He described
the offender as a male Hispanic, 5 feet 7 inches to 5 feet 9 inches, 18 to 20 years old with
short black hair and wearing a black and white jacket and dark pants. The officers put out a
flash message of the offender’s description, the location of the offense, and what had
occurred.
¶ 32 Another pair of police officers, Officers Joseph Smith and Sandra Threatt, responded to
a radio call of a battery at 3822 West 76th Street at 10:15 p.m. At that address, the officers
observed Gerardo Cortina bleeding from his head and called for an ambulance. Cortina told
the officers he received his injuries two blocks away. Officer Smith heard the flash message
about the homicide and realized that Cortina fit the description and his house was
approximately three blocks from the Ralson residence. Officer Smith notified the police
dispatch that he had a possible offender. Cortina was transported to Holy Cross Hospital.
Officers took Robert to Holy Cross Hospital to view Cortina. Robert observed Cortina at the
hospital, but Robert could not identify Cortina as the offender. After he was treated, Cortina
was taken to Area One for questioning.
¶ 33 The parties stipulated that a doctor would testify that he treated Cortina at Holy Cross
Hospital and Cortina received eight staples for the laceration to the back of the head. Cortina
was combative and placed in restraints and his blood alcohol level was 0.33.
¶ 34 Detective Ernest Turner received an assignment at approximately 11 p.m. on November
22, 2000, to investigate Ralson’s death. Detective Turner went to the scene and observed the
victim’s body on the floor with a knife stuck in her neck and her pants and underwear pulled
down. Detective Turner also walked around the house and saw drawers pulled out and the
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contents strewn around the house.
¶ 35 At Area One, Detective Turner questioned Cortina around 4:30 a.m. Cortina denied any
involvement in the crime and said he had been drinking with defendant at 3774 West 77th
Place. Detective Turner passed on this information to his supervisor, who assigned other
detectives to locate defendant to confirm Cortina’s alibi. Defendant was brought to Area One
and Detective Turner spoke with defendant at approximately 6 a.m. Defendant told the
detective that the night before he had been home drinking in the basement with Cortina and
his cousin from 7 to 10 p.m. Defendant denied any wrongdoing.
¶ 36 Detective Jean Romic spoke with Cortina around 6:30 a.m. At first, Cortina said he did
not remember anything, but then he told the detective that he went to the Ralson home with
defendant and he acted as a lookout while defendant went inside the house. Cortina stated
that defendant came out of the house 10 to 15 minutes later and said they needed to get out
of there.
¶ 37 Detectives John Posluszny and Martin McDowell spoke with defendant at approximately
9:20 a.m. in an interview room. Defendant told the detectives that he went to the Ralson
home with Cortina and that Cortina pushed the victim down while defendant looked for
valuables. Defendant also said that he saw the victim lying on the floor with Cortina on top
of her.
¶ 38 Detective David Kowalski spoke with defendant several times on November 23, 2000.
He first spoke with defendant around 11:40 a.m. During that interview, defendant repeated
his confession, but added that he may have touched one of the knives in the kitchen and he
took a change purse from the house. Later, Detective Kowalski spoke with defendant around
2:55 p.m. At this interview, defendant told the detective that he took his BB gun from under
his couch and gave it to Cortina before going to the Ralson house. When Ralson answered
the door, defendant said that Cortina pointed the BB gun at her and told her to get on the
ground. When she did not do that, Cortina pushed her down. Defendant also said that he
tripped over something in the kitchen and might have accidentally touched Ralson’s arm.
Defendant told the detective that the victim was in a pool of blood, her pants and underwear
were pulled down and she looked dead. Defendant took the BB gun home and placed it in
heating vent in the basement. Detective Kowalski later retrieved the BB gun from the heating
vent.
¶ 39 ASA Leanna Rajk testified that she arrived at Area One around 1 p.m. on November 23,
2000. She spoke with defendant at around 3:30 p.m. with Detective Turner present. During
this interview, defendant admitted that he was the person who pushed Ralson down and
raped her, but he denied knowing anything about her homicide. He said he saw the knife in
her neck, but did not know how it had happened. Following this interview, ASA Rajk viewed
the crime scene and spoke with additional witnesses including defendant’s mother, sister and
cousin as well as Cortina.
¶ 40 ASA Rajk next spoke with defendant at 7 a.m. on November 24, 2000. Defendant agreed
to memorialize his statement on videotape and signed a consent to videotape form. ASA
Rajk and Detective Kowalski were present when the videotaped statement was recorded. The
videotaped statement was admitted into evidence and played for the jury.
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¶ 41 In the videotaped statement, defendant stated that on November 22, 2000, Cortina came
over around 6 p.m. and they started drinking a type of “Mexican tequila or something like
that” that Cortina had brought over to defendant’s house. Defendant’s cousin Jesus Patino
joined them during the evening. At some point, Cortina went to use the restroom and was
gone for a while. Defendant went to check on him and Cortina was bleeding from the back
of his head. Defendant told Cortina to go home and Cortina left. Defendant’s mother then
came downstairs and saw the blood and noticed that defendant “was kind of drunk.”
Defendant’s mother got mad at defendant for drinking and poured the rest of the liquor on
defendant. Defendant was mad and left. He then decided to make some money to buy some
liquor. He returned home and got his BB gun. He walked around the block looking for a car
radio, cell phone or someone with anything he could try to get. As he walked past the Ralson
residence, he noticed “the lady” watching television inside the house. Defendant stated that
he figured she was an “easy target” because she was old and would not fight back or give him
any problems.
¶ 42 Defendant went to the side door and rang the doorbell. She answered the door, but did
not open it all the way. Defendant “charged” into the house. Defendant said the woman
reacted as though “she had a lot of money in there, like a lot of gold or something.”
Defendant figured there was something he could use. He told the woman to get down on the
floor, but she did not want to get down. Since she was not afraid of the BB gun, defendant
looked around for rope to tie her up or tape to tape her mouth. Instead, defendant found a
knife and pointed it at her throat, but she continued to struggle. Defendant saw a couple
scratches on her neck from where he had pressed the knife. Defendant realized the woman
was not scared so he pushed her to knock her down and he fell on top of her. When they fell,
the knife went slightly into her neck. Defendant stated that the woman’s face looked scared
and she was suffering. She was bleeding and defendant thought she was dying. Defendant
then pushed the knife all the way through her neck.
¶ 43 Defendant realized he had done something bad and he would get caught. He said he
started thinking he would never be with a woman again. He then pulled down her pants and
started to have sex with her. He stated that he did not have an erection, but touched himself
to get an erection. He then started having sex with her and said he also inserted his index
finger. He said his erection lasted only five seconds and he stopped when he saw blood.
Defendant stated he then started searching back bedrooms for jewelry and money, but did not
find anything. He took a green liquor bottle from the refrigerator and $4 or $5. He started to
unplug the television, but heard someone come into the house and “the old man” saw him.
He pushed past the man, ran out of the side door and left.
¶ 44 When defendant arrived home, his mother asked how he got blood on his shirt. He told
her it was from when Cortina fell. He gave her the shirt and did not know what happened to
it. Defendant stated that he previously implicated Cortina because he thought Cortina had
implicated him. He said he was telling the truth and wanted to take responsibility. He stated
that no one had threatened or promised him anything to change his story.
¶ 45 Dr. John Scott Denton testified that he performed Ralson’s autopsy. He stated that she
died from a stab wound to her neck which severed her jugular vein and cut the carotid artery
in half. He testified that the manner of death was homicide. He also testified that Ralson
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suffered four injuries to her vagina, including a laceration of the vaginal lining and a bruise
with some scraping of the back of the vaginal opening. He observed a large amount of
bleeding associated with these injuries and were consistent with an individual forcing his
penis and finger into her vagina. Dr. Denton stated that Ralson would have only lived for one
or two minutes after the knife went through her jugular vein and carotid artery. He also noted
that active bleeding stops when the heart stops beating.
¶ 46 Christine Prejean testified that she is a forensic scientist with the Illinois State Police
crime lab. She tests for the presence of biological materials and performs DNA analysis. For
this case, she received defendant’s clothing for examination. She found two stains in which
blood was indicated and two stains which were inconclusive as to the presence of vaginal
secretions on defendant’s underwear, and she cut out the stains for DNA analysis. Harold
Johnson testified that he is a forensic biologist in DNA analysis with the Illinois State Police
division of forensic services. He analyzed the samples from defendant’s underwear and
found a mixture of two people’s DNA profiles in both samples. Ralson could not be
excluded as the source of the female DNA profile in two samples. Of these two samples in
which Ralson’s DNA could not be excluded, approximately 1 in 3,700 black, 1 in 6,300
white, or 1 in 9,600 Hispanic unrelated individuals could not be excluded from having
contributed to that DNA profile from the blood sample and approximately 1 in 2.6 billion
black, 1 in 180 million white, or 1 in 170 million Hispanic unrelated individuals could not
be excluded as having contributed to the human female DNA profile from the sample that
was inconclusive for the presence of vaginal secretions.
¶ 47 Jesus Patino, defendant’s cousin, and Cortina testified about the circumstances on the
evening of November 22, 2000. Both men stated that they were drinking with defendant in
his basement that night at around 7 p.m. Cortina fell and cut the back of his head, which bled.
Cortina left. Cortina stated that he does not remember much of that night. He recalled going
home and then the next thing he remembered was being in the hospital. His next memory
was waking up in the police station. He could not remember what he told police. Patino
testified that defendant left after his mother scolded him for drinking. Defendant returned a
short time later, got his BB gun and left again. Patino then drove around the neighborhood
looking for defendant with defendant’s sister, but they did not find him and returned home.
¶ 48 The State rested its case and the defense moved for a directed finding, which was denied.
¶ 49 Defendant presented the testimony of Kimberly Hood Ryan. Ryan was a latent print
examiner and she testified that none of the fingerprints recovered from the Ralson home
matched defendant. Defendant’s brother Jesus Gomez and his sister Maria Gomez Bahena
gave testimony that was substantially similar to their previous testimony at the hearing on
defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Bahena further testified that she
drove around with her cousin Patino to look for defendant, but did not find him.
¶ 50 Following deliberations, the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder,
aggravated criminal sexual assault and home invasion. At the subsequent sentencing hearing,
the trial court held that defendant was death eligible. The parties presented evidence in
aggravation and mitigation. The trial court declined to impose the death penalty and
sentenced defendant to natural life for first degree murder, 30 years’ imprisonment for
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aggravated criminal sexual assault, and 30 years’ imprisonment for home invasion.
¶ 51 This appeal followed.
¶ 52 Initially, we note that defendant originally challenged the trial court’s compliance with
Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007)), but in his reply brief,
defendant has conceded this issue in light of the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in People
v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598 (2010). We need not consider this issue any further.
¶ 53 Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash arrest and
suppress evidence because defendant was arrested before the existence of probable cause and
the court used the wrong standard to determine whether defendant was arrested. The State
maintains that defendant was voluntarily at the police station from 5:30 a.m. to 6:45 a.m., on
November 23, 2000, when Cortina implicated defendant in the crimes. At that time, the
police had probable cause to arrest defendant, which they did, and the trial court’s ruling was
proper.
¶ 54 In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, this court applies a de novo
standard of review. People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431 (2001); see also Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). However, findings of historical fact will be
reviewed only for clear error and the reviewing court must give due weight to inferences
drawn from those facts by the fact finder. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699. Accordingly, we will
accord great deference to the trial court’s factual findings, and we will reverse those findings
only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence; however, we will review de novo
the ultimate question of the defendant’s legal challenge to the denial of his motion to
suppress. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 431. Here, defendant does not contest the trial court’s
factual findings, but claims that even accepting the detectives’ testimony at the suppression
hearing, he was arrested when the detectives came to his house at 5 a.m.
¶ 55 While defendant first asserts that the trial court used the wrong test in determining
whether he was arrested, we may affirm the trial court’s ruling on defendant’s motion to
suppress for any reason in the record, regardless of whether the trial court relied on this
reason as a basis for its conclusion. People v. Sims, 167 Ill. 2d 483, 500-01 (1995).
¶ 56 Defendant contends that he was arrested without probable cause when the detectives
came to his house at around 5 a.m. and asked him to come to the police station for an
interview. He asserts that a reasonable person in defendant’s position would not have
believed that he was free to ignore the detectives’ request.
¶ 57 “It is well settled that not every encounter between the police and a private citizen results
in a seizure.” People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 544 (2006) (citing Immigration &
Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984)). “Courts have divided police-
citizen encounters into three tiers: (1) arrests, which must be supported by probable cause;
(2) brief investigative detentions, or ‘Terry stops,’ which must be supported by a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity; and (3) encounters that involve no coercion or
detention and thus do not implicate fourth amendment interests.” Luedeman, 222 Ill. 2d at
544 (citing United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1982), and United States v.
Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 591 (5th Cir. 1982)).
¶ 58 The relevant inquiry in determining whether a suspect has been arrested is whether, under
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the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude that he was not free to leave. People
v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 437 (1992); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
554 (1980). The reasonable person test is objective and presupposes an innocent person.
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202 (2002). “When one voluntarily accompanies
police officers, he has not been arrested and has not been ‘seized’ in the fourth amendment
sense.” People v. Redmond, 341 Ill. App. 3d 498, 507 (2003).
¶ 59 Although no one factor is dispositive in making the determination of whether an arrest
occurred, the court can consider factors including: (1) the time, place, length, mood, and
mode of the encounter between the defendant and the police; (2) the number of police
officers present; (3) any indicia of formal arrest or restraint, such as the use of handcuffs or
drawing of guns; (4) the intention of the officers; (5) the subjective belief or understanding
of the defendant; (6) whether the defendant was told he could refuse to accompany the
police; (7) whether the defendant was transported in a police car; (8) whether the defendant
was told he was free to leave; (9) whether the defendant was told he was under arrest; and
(10) the language used by officers. People v. Washington, 363 Ill. App. 3d 13, 24 (2006); see
also Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at 440.
¶ 60 Our consideration of these factors support a conclusion that defendant was not in custody
prior to Cortina’s implication of defendant and defendant’s subsequent move to a secure
interview room. Though the detectives’ arrival at defendant’s house at 5 a.m. might have
suggested an arrest, the circumstances surrounding the encounter indicated otherwise. First,
defendant voluntarily agreed to accompany the detectives to Area One for questioning. The
detectives did not have their weapons drawn. Defendant was not handcuffed or otherwise
restrained and accompanied the detectives in an unmarked police car without a cage.
Defendant was not questioned for long periods of time and instead was left alone in an open
conference room. Defendant was told that he could make phone calls and smoke cigarettes
and was given a can of soda to drink. There was uncontested testimony from Detective
Kowalski that defendant was able to periodically use the washroom. Defendant was never
in the presence of an excessive amount of police officers. The record indicates that four
detectives were involved in defendant’s initial arrival at Area One and additional detectives
were present at Area One, but defendant was questioned briefly by Detective Turner at
around 6 a.m. Defendant was not restrained at any time prior to his arrest. He was not
handcuffed at the station and was kept in a room with the door open. However, defendant
was given his Miranda warnings by Detective Turner prior to his arrest. Advising a person
of the Miranda rights is recognized as a common indicia of arrest although that fact alone is
not conclusive to establishing an arrest. People v. Barlow, 273 Ill. App. 3d 943, 949 (1995).
¶ 61 The police were pursuing other suspects, specifically Cortina. Cortina fit Robert’s
description of the offender and Cortina had suffered a head injury, which he said occurred
two blocks from his house. The Ralson home was within that vicinity. Cortina gave the
police defendant’s name as his alibi and they pursued that lead. The police had little
information that would indicate any involvement of defendant, but they were following all
possible leads. The detectives testified at the suppression hearing that they did not consider
defendant a suspect when they brought him from his house to Area One to verify Cortina’s
alibi. Defendant was not told he could refuse to accompany the detectives, but he agreed to
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come willingly. Additionally, defendant was not told he was free to leave the police station,
but defendant did not ask to leave. While defendant claims he was under arrest when he was
brought into the police station via a side door, we find this factor to have little weight as the
detectives testified that the door was simply the closest entrance to the parking lot. While
defendant was not told he could leave after he verified Cortina’s alibi with Detective Turner,
the defendant remained in the conference room. Defendant was only moved after
incriminating statements were made by Cortina at around 6:30 a.m. In sum, we find the
totality of these factors signals that defendant’s presence with the police did not progress into
an illegal arrest. Defendant was only at the police station for approximately one hour before
he was moved to the secure interview room and that move was approximately 30 minutes
after his first conversation with Detective Turner.
¶ 62 We also find that the police properly arrested defendant only after probable cause
developed concerning defendant’s involvement in Ralson’s homicide. Probable cause is
defined as reasonable ground to believe that the suspect has committed a felony. Sims, 167
Ill. 2d at 500.
¶ 63 “ ‘Mere suspicion is inadequate to establish probable cause, but the evidence relied upon
by the arresting officer need not be sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or
even be admissible at trial. Technical rules do not govern the assessment of whether probable
cause existed; rather, practical, commonsense considerations guide that determination.’ ”
People v. Jackson, 391 Ill. App. 3d 11, 36 (2009) (quoting People v. Wilson, 260 Ill. App.
3d 364, 368-69 (1994)).
¶ 64 Probable cause developed in defendant’s case once Cortina implicated defendant in a
statement given to Detective Romic. Following that interview, Detective Romic informed
Detective Turner of Cortina’s statements placing defendant inside the Ralson home.
Detective Turner then moved defendant from the open conference room to a more secure
interview room. We point out that defendant had been at Area One for approximately one
hour when probable cause arose and he was arrested. We find that sufficient probable cause
arose following Cortina’s statements and defendant was subsequently arrested at
approximately 6:30 a.m. on November 23, 2000. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
denial of defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.
¶ 65 Next, defendant asserts that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of aggravated criminal sexual assault because the State did not establish that Ralson
was alive at the time of the sexual assault. The State maintains that Illinois law does not
require the State to prove a sexual assault victim was alive at the time of penetration where
the sexual assault and murder occurred during the same course of conduct.
¶ 66 We first consider whether Illinois law requires the State to prove that the victim was alive
at the time of the sexual assault. Defendant argues that the Illinois Supreme Court has
“emphasized that the crime of sexual assault is ‘an offense against a person’ ” (emphasis in
original) (People v. Segara, 126 Ill. 2d 70, 77 (1988)) and that “a defendant’s treatment of
a corpse can be ‘hateful and evil,’ but as a matter of law, incapable of inflicting pain upon
the victim: ‘One simply cannot consciously seek to inflict pain and suffering on a dead body,
as a dead body feels nothing’ ” (see People v. Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d 271, 299 (1999)).
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¶ 67 To prove aggravated criminal sexual assault, the State must prove that defendant
committed criminal sexual assault and an aggravating factor is present. 720 ILCS 5/12-14
(West 2000). Here, the State proceeded to trial on two counts of aggravated criminal sexual
assault, each based on a different aggravating factor. One count charged defendant with
aggravated criminal sexual assault with the aggravating factor as “the accused displayed,
threatened to use, or used a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm, or any object fashioned
or utilized in such a manner as to lead the victim under the circumstances reasonably to
believe it to be a dangerous weapon” (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(1) (West 2000)), and the other
charged the aggravating factor as “the victim was 60 years of age or over when the offense
was committed” (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(5) (West 2000)).
¶ 68 Essentially, defendant asks this court to read an extra element into the aggravated
criminal sexual assault statute, which is that the victim must be alive at the time of the sexual
assault. However, we point out that the Illinois sexual assault statute does not require a living
victim. See 720 ILCS 5/12-12(f), 12-13(a)(1), 12-14 (West 2000).
¶ 69 In People v. Gutierrez, 402 Ill. App. 3d 866 (2010), the third division of this court
considered and rejected the same argument that defendant raises in this case. In that case, the
victim’s body was found in a crawl space in the defendant’s apartment two days after the
victim went missing. Gutierrez, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 872. The defendant’s DNA was found on
the victim’s underwear, but the medical examiner did not find any injuries to the victim’s
vagina consistent with a sexual assault. Gutierrez, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 875. The Gutierrez
court relied on the prior decision in People v. Hendrix, 250 Ill. App. 3d 88 (1993), in its
analysis.
¶ 70 In Hendrix, the defendant asserted that the aggravated criminal sexual assault was not
properly proven because the medical examiner could not establish that the sexual assault
occurred before death. Hendrix, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 103. There, the victim was found 30 to
48 hours after her death. The medical examiner found two lacerations and bruising inside the
victim’s vagina and opined that the victim had been sexually assaulted, but could not
determine when the sexual assault occurred. Hendrix, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 90.
¶ 71 The reviewing court in Hendrix considered the holding in People v. Colley, 188 Ill. App.
3d 817 (1989). In Colley, the defendant contended that because the victim suffered bodily
harm after the sexual assault, he could not be found guilty of aggravated criminal sexual
assault. The Colley court held:
“Under the instant circumstances, we will not draw a bright line between the ending
of the sexual acts and the bodily harm occurring afterward, as that would defeat the
statutory purpose of protecting victims from sex offenders. We find that the stab
wounds occurred sufficiently close in time to the sexual acts that they can be said to
have been committed during the course of the sexual assault.” Colley, 188 Ill. App.
3d at 820.
¶ 72 Similarly, the court in Hendrix concluded that it would “not draw a bright line which
would require the State in all similar cases to establish the precise time of death in order to
prove a sexual assault upon a murder victim.” Hendrix, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 103.
¶ 73 In Gutierrez, the defendant, like the defendant in the instant case, cited several out of
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state cases in which courts have held that the victim of a sexual assault must be alive at the
time of the sexual acts. Gutierrez, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 881 (citing Doyle v. State, 921 P.2d
901, 914 (Nev. 1996), rev’d on other grounds by Kaczmarek v. State, 91 P.3d 16 (Nev.
2004); People v. Davis, 896 P.2d 119, 151 n.20 (Cal. 1995); State v. Perkins, 811 P.2d 1142,
1150 (Kan. 1991); State v. Holt, 382 N.W.2d 679, 685 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985); Commonwealth
v. Sudler, 436 A.2d 1376, 1379-80 (Pa. 1981); Rogers v. State, 890 P.2d 959, 969 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1995); People v. Hutner, 530 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (per
curiam).
¶ 74 Rather, the Gutierrez court looked to cases in which a defendant contended that he was
not eligible for the death penalty as the defendant did not commit a murder in the course of
another felony because the victim was already dead when the additional felony occurred. In
People v. Richardson, the gunman announced a “stick up” at the same time he fired his first
shot and then went through a cash register and ran from the store. Richardson, 123 Ill. 2d
322, 359 (1988). The supreme court held:
“Just as the phrase ‘in the course of’ does not require that defendant complete one of
the other felonies in order to be eligible for the death sentence [citation], we also
believe that it does not require that the armed robbery commence prior to the fatal
gunshot, since the precise timing of the offenses is not necessarily indicative of
defendant’s intent. The jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
committed both a murder and an armed robbery, which offenses occurred essentially
simultaneously. The trial testimony and verdicts sufficiently support the court’s
finding that the murder occurred ‘in the course of’ an armed robbery.” Richardson,
123 Ill. 2d at 359.
¶ 75 Similarly, in People v. Thomas, the defendant contended that he could not be found guilty
of murder in the course of arson or aggravated arson because the victim was already dead
when he started the fire. People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500, 533 (1990). The supreme court
cited its previous holding in Richardson and again found that the defendant committed
murder and arson “ ‘essentially simultaneously.’ ” Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d at 534. “It is not
imperative that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant formed the criminal
intent to commit arson or aggravated arson before committing murder. It is sufficient that the
State proved the elements of the crimes and the accompanying felonies were part of the same
criminal episode.” Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d at 534.
¶ 76 The court in Gutierrez found that the defendant committed the murder and sexual assault
“essentially simultaneously” and that it was sufficient for the State to prove that the crimes
occurred as part of the “same criminal episode.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Gutierrez, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 883. The reviewing court noted that this conclusion was
consistent with Hendrix and a majority of jurisdictions which have “adopted the ‘ongoing
criminal assault’ rule. [Citation.]” Gutierrez, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 883.
¶ 77 Gutierrez also relied on the Missouri decision of State v. McLaughlin, 265 S.W.3d 257
(Mo. 2008). In McLaughlin, the reviewing court noted that the Missouri forcible rape statute,
like the Illinois sexual assault statutes, does not address whether the victim must be alive at
the time of penetration. McLaughlin, 265 S.W.3d at 268. The McLaughlin court adopted the
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“ongoing criminal assault rule.” “Under that rule, where the forcible compulsion that leads
to the rape begins before the death of the victim, the defendant is guilty of rape even if the
jury believes defendant killed the victim before penetration or before the sexual assault was
concluded.” McLaughlin, 265 S.W.3d at 268. The court, citing a decision of the Tennessee
Supreme Court, further noted the public policy reasons behind this rule.
“ ‘We are likewise unable to embrace the notion that the fortuitous circumstance, for
the rapist, that death may have preceded penetration by an instant, negates
commission of the crime of aggravated rape and reduces it to a relatively minor
offense associated with erotic attraction to dead bodies. Reading the ‘live only’
requirement into the statute encourages rapists to kill their victims, in our opinion.’ ”
(Emphasis in original.) McLaughlin, 265 S.W.3d at 269 (quoting State v. Brobeck,
751 S.W.2d 828, 832 (Tenn. 1988)).
¶ 78 The court in McLaughlin concluded that “[i]t is rape where defendant both kills and
sexually assaults a victim in a single, continuous act, or in a series of closely related acts, and
where, as a part of the course of conduct, defendant uses forcible compulsion against the
victim, even if portions of the rape, including penetration, occur once the victim already has
been killed.” McLaughlin, 265 S.W.3d at 269.
¶ 79 After its discussion of these cases, the Gutierrez court held that “the State was not
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the victim] was alive at the time defendant
sexually assaulted her since the murder and sexual assault occurred ‘essentially
simultaneously.’ ” Gutierrez, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 885. The court pointed out that “Illinois has
been following the majority of jurisdictions to address the ongoing criminal assault rule, as
exemplified by Illinois cases involving other crimes.” Gutierrez, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 885.
¶ 80 We agree with the conclusion reached in Gutierrez. While defendant asserts that Thomas,
Richardson, and Colley are inapposite as these cases did not consider the precise issue before
this court, the reasoning from these cases, i.e., that the State only needs to prove the elements
of the crimes and that there were committed as part of a same criminal episode, is clearly
applicable to the issue before us. Here, defendant forced his way into Ralson’s home and
threatened her, first with a BB gun, then with a knife. He pushed her down and then stabbed
the knife through her neck. Defendant then sexually assaulted Ralson. The State was not
required to prove that Ralson was still alive when the actual penetration occurred “essentially
simultaneously” as the homicide and as part of the “same criminal episode.”
¶ 81 However, even if the State were required to prove that Ralson was alive when the sexual
penetration occurred, the evidence was sufficient to establish this element beyond a
reasonable doubt.
¶ 82 When this court considers a challenge to a criminal conviction based upon the sufficiency
of the evidence, it is not our function to retry the defendant. People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305,
329-30 (2000). Rather, our inquiry is limited to “whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original.) Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); accord People v. Cox, 195 Ill. 2d 378, 387 (2001). It
is the responsibility of the trier of fact to “fairly *** resolve conflicts in the testimony, to
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weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.”
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
¶ 83 The reviewing court must carefully examine the record evidence while bearing in mind
that it was the fact finder who saw and heard the witnesses. People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill.
2d 274, 280 (2004). Testimony may be found insufficient under the Jackson standard, but
only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could
accept it beyond a reasonable doubt. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280. However, the fact a
judge or jury did accept testimony does not guarantee it was reasonable to do so. Reasonable
people may on occasion act unreasonably. Therefore, the fact finder’s decision to accept
testimony is entitled to great deference but is not conclusive and does not bind the reviewing
court. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280. Only where the evidence is so improbable or
unsatisfactory as to create reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt will a conviction be set
aside. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d at 330.
¶ 84 The State presented evidence that Ralson’s DNA could not be excluded from a sample
found in defendant’s underwear. Further, defendant admitted in his videotaped statement that
he sexually assaulted Ralson after stabbing the knife through her neck. Defendant contends
that defendant was already dead because Dr. Denton testified that Ralson would have lived
for only one to two minutes after she was stabbed and defendant said in the videotaped
statement that he did not have an erection, but had to arouse himself. Defendant surmises that
this took longer than one to two minutes. However, Dr. Denton also testified that Ralson
suffered vaginal injuries including lacerations and bruises. He stated that there was a large
amount of bleeding inside Ralson’s vagina associated with these injuries. Dr. Denton
testified that a person stops bleeding when her heart stops beating. Based on this evidence,
a rational trier of fact could have found that Ralson was alive at the time of the sexual
assault. Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s conviction for aggravated criminal sexual
assault.
¶ 85 Finally, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to
natural life in prison in light of his limited, nonviolent criminal history, age and severity of
the crime. The State maintains that the sentence was appropriate and entered after the trial
court considered both aggravating and mitigating factors.
¶ 86 “It is well established that a trial court has broad discretionary authority in sentencing a
criminal defendant.” People v. Evans, 373 Ill. App. 3d 948, 967 (2007). “An appellate court
typically shows great deference to a trial court’s sentencing decision since the trial court is
in a better position to decide the appropriate sentence.” Evans, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 967.
“Accordingly, a trial court’s sentencing decision is not overturned absent an abuse of
discretion.” Evans, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 967.
¶ 87 “The Illinois Constitution mandates the balancing of both retributive and rehabilitative
purposes of punishment.” Evans, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 967; see also Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
§ 11. “The trial court is therefore required to consider both the seriousness of the offense and
the likelihood of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Evans, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 967.
However, “[a] trial court is not required to give greater weight to the rehabilitative potential
of a defendant than to the seriousness of the offense.” People v. Govea, 299 Ill. App. 3d 76,
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91 (1998). “In determining an appropriate sentence, the trial judge is further required to
consider all factors in aggravation and mitigation, which includes defendant’s credibility,
demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environments, habits, and age, as well
as the nature and circumstances of the crime.” Evans, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 967. “Generally, the
trial court is in a better position than a court of review to determine an appropriate sentence
considering the particular facts and circumstances of each individual case.” People v.
Starnes, 374 Ill. App. 3d 132, 143 (2007). “There is a strong presumption that the trial court
based its sentencing determination on proper legal reasoning, and the court is presumed to
have considered any evidence in mitigation that is before it.” People v. Bowman, 357 Ill.
App. 3d 290, 303-04 (2005). “If the sentence imposed is within the statutory range, it will
not be deemed excessive unless it is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law
or is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” Starnes, 374 Ill. App. 3d at
143 (citing People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 54 (1999)).
¶ 88 The trial court sentenced defendant to natural life for one count of first degree murder.
At the time of defendant’s sentencing hearing, the sentencing range for first degree murder
was 20 years to death. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2008).1 The trial court found defendant
to be eligible for the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(16) of the Criminal Code of 1961
because defendant had attained the age of 18, had been found guilty of first degree murder,
and “the murdered individual was 60 years of age or older and the death resulted from
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.” 720 ILCS 5/9-
1(b)(16) (West 2008).
¶ 89 At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard testimony from several of defendant’s
family members and friends in mitigation. In aggravation, the State presented Robert’s
testimony and several victim impact statements from Ralson’s nieces. Although the trial
court found that defendant was eligible for the death penalty, the court declined to impose
that sentence. The court made the following findings at defendant’s sentencing hearing:
“This case, the facts of this case do justify [the death penalty.] And I shouldn’t
even attempt to describe the crime, the attorneys have, but it is an absolute nightmare
what happened on November 22, 2000. The acts were monstrous, they speak for
themselves and I won’t try to describe them any further than to say that what
happened to Ms. Ralson that night was an absolute nightmare, a horror, so while the
facts do justify the ultimate sentence here, that’s not the whole question here.”
¶ 90 The court then stated:
“The issue is Carlos Gomez himself, and the facts regarding Carlos Gomez are
undisputed. It’s undisputed that he was a very young man at the night in question
some eight years ago, it’s undisputed that he was drinking, that he was drinking a lot,
it’s undisputed that he had no history of violence, he did have a history of criminal
activity, there were reports submitted by the mitigation expert that he was beginning
to spiral, he was just placed on probation a matter of months before this, he was
1
We acknowledge that the General Assembly in Public Act 96-1543, subsequently abolished
the death penalty in Illinois. See Pub. Act 96-1543 (eff. July 1, 2011) (adding 725 ILCS 5/119-1).
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definitely headed in the wrong way in a lot of ways, he just didn’t have time yet to
have a significant history of criminal activity.
It appears he was on his way, but that doesn’t negate the fact that he didn’t have
a significant history of criminal activity. There’s absolutely no history of violence.
And as Mr. Dosch [defense counsel] points out, not only are we talking about before
this incident but after this incident. He’s been in Cook County Jail where he should
be since this arrest, but I have not heard of any incident at Cook County Jail and I
think that does speak volumes in this case.
I’ve heard from his family, I’ve heard from his loved ones and they point out that
this is not the only Carlos Gomez, the Carlos Gomez on November 22, 2000, it’s
pretty clear that there’s another Carlos Gomez, Carlos Gomez who has value, value
to his family, value to his nephews and nieces and the rest of his family and he
apparently has made a good impression on the individuals that he’s come in contact
with in Cook County Jail. In some ways he’s made the best of his time in Cook
County Jail, so I do find that the death penalty would not be the appropriate sentence
in this case and I find that there exists mitigating factors that would preclude the
imposition of the death penalty.”
¶ 91 The trial court then concluded that the sentence of natural life in prison without parole
was the appropriate sentence. Defendant asserts on appeal that the sentence of natural life is
excessive and the trial court abused its discretion because his conduct did not rise to the level
of brutal or heinous as stated in the statutory aggravating factor and the court did not
sufficiently consider the mitigating evidence.
¶ 92 Based on the entire record before us and given the nature of the crime, we do not find that
the trial court abused its discretion. The circumstances of this crime were, as the trial court
described, “an absolute nightmare” and “monstrous.” Here, defendant began his night
consuming alcohol with his cousin and Cortina. After Cortina got injured and his mother
scolded him, defendant got angry and left his house with the intention to commit a crime. He
planned to break into a car or rob a person on the street, but instead he saw Ralson at home
and decided she would be an easy target because she was an older woman. She was 63 years
old.
¶ 93 He knocked on her door, armed with a BB gun, with the intention of scaring her into
submitting while he robbed the house. However, Ralson was not timid and did not follow
defendant’s commands to get on her knees. Defendant then looked for rope to tie her up or
something to tape her mouth shut, but ended up taking a knife from Ralson’s kitchen. He
pressed the knife to her throat to threaten her. He stated that he saw the scratches the knife
left on her neck. He pushed her down and he fell on top of her. As they fell, the knife went
partially into Ralson’s neck and began to bleed. Defendant decided to push the knife all the
way through her neck, severing her jugular vein and carotid artery.
¶ 94 Then, defendant, after realizing he had done something very bad, would likely be arrested
and unable to be with a woman again, decided to sexually assault Ralson. He forced his penis
and finger into Ralson’s vagina. Dr. Denton testified that Ralson’s vagina sustained
lacerations and bruises. After the sexual assault, defendant ransacked Ralson’s house looking
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for valuables and money. He took a bottle of liquor from the refrigerator. When Robert
arrived home, defendant pushed Robert down and ran out of the house. Defendant went
home. Ralson’s body was discovered by her brother with the knife stuck through her neck
and her pants and underwear pulled down.
¶ 95 Contrary to defendant’s contentions, the facts of this case were brutal and heinous. The
trial court clearly weighed the aggravating factors of this case against the mitigating factors.
The court noted defendant’s age and lack of violent criminal history. The court also remarked
on the testimony from his family members and friends that defendant was a good person. The
trial court found the mitigating factors to be significant enough to preclude the imposition
of the death penalty, but not enough to outweigh the aggravating factors sufficient for a
sentence of natural life. While we are cognizant of defendant’s age and criminal history, we
cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence of natural life.
¶ 96 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.
¶ 97 Affirmed.
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