People v. Higgenbotham

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court

People v. Higgenbotham, 2012 IL App (1st) 110434

Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
Caption JOANN HIGGENBOTHAM, Defendant-Appellee.

District & No. First District, Fourth Division
Docket No. 1-11-0434

Filed June 28, 2012
Rehearing denied July 24, 2012

Held A defendant’s absence from court due to physical incapacitation
(Note: This syllabus supported a temporary suspension of the running of the speedy trial
constitutes no part of period, but her subsequent failures to appear without prior
the opinion of the court communication with her counsel or the court operated as a waiver of the
but has been prepared demand such that a new term began to run when she next appeared and
by the Reporter of demanded a speedy trial.
Decisions for the
convenience of the
reader.)

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Nos. TP-311029, TP-
Review 311030, TP-311031, TP-311032, TP-311033; the Hon. Thomas Lyons,
Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed and remanded.
Counsel on Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg,
Appeal Veronica Calderon Malavia, and Kalia M. Coleman, Assistant State’s
Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Abishi C. Cunningham, Jr., Public Defender, of Chicago (Harold J.
Winston, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Lavin and Justice Sterba concurred in the judgment and
opinion.

OPINION

¶1 The State appeals an order of the circuit court granting defendant Joann Higgenbotham’s
motion to dismiss multiple traffic law violations on speedy trial grounds. On appeal, the State
argues that the circuit court’s order fails to accord with the plain language of the speedy trial
statute (725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 2008)) as well as relevant case law interpreting that
provision. For the reasons explained herein, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On February 23, 2008, defendant was arrested and charged with multiple traffic law
violations, including: failure to render aid (625 ILCS 5/11-403 (West 2008)); operating a
motor vehicle without insurance (625 ILCS 5/3-707 (West 2008)); driving under the
influence (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(4) (West 2008)); driving on a suspended license (625 ILCS
5/6-303(a) (West 2008)); and leaving the scene of an accident involving an unattended
vehicle (625 ILCS 5/11-404 (West 2008)).
¶4 Following her arrest, defendant was released on her own recognizance with bail set at
$3,000. Defendant failed to appear in court on March, 20, 2008, her initial court date, and
the court issued a bond forfeiture warrant (BFW). The trial court subsequently quashed and
recalled the BFW when defendant appeared on the judgment date. Another BFW was entered
on July 10, 2008, when defendant failed to appear in court a second time, but was later
quashed and recalled when she appeared on the judgment date. Thereafter, the cause was set
for trial on October 30, 2008. Defendant, however, failed to appear on the trial date and the
trial court issued a third BFW. This BFW was also subsequently quashed and recalled when
defendant appeared in court on the judgment date. The trial date was then rescheduled for
January 21, 2009. On that date, both parties entered appearances but neither party answered
ready for trial, and a new trial date of March 25, 2009, was set by agreement. On that date,
the trial court called the case but defendant was not present and the court issued yet another
BFW. Defendant did appear in court later that day, however, and at that time the BFW was
quashed and recalled and the parties agreed to a new trial date: June 9, 2009. Defendant,

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 however, failed to appear on the June 9, 2009, trial date and another BFW was entered and
the cause continued to June 23, 2009. Defendant also failed to appear in court on June 23,
2009, and the court issued a sixth BFW.
¶5 By agreement, the parties set a new trial date for November 20, 2009. On this court date,
defendant answered ready for trial but the State answered not ready. Defendant immediately
filed her first demand for a speedy trial and the cause was continued to January 5, 2010. On
that date, both parties appeared in court but the State answered not ready for trial and
defendant filed her second written demand for a speedy trial. The cause was then continued
to April 23, 2010, at the request of the State. On that date, defendant was not present and
defense counsel informed the court that she had been hospitalized in the intensive care unit
at Mercy Hospital. Defense counsel then provided the court and the State with a note written
by defendant’s treating physician that stated: “To whom it may concern: This letter is to
certify that Ms. Joann Higgenbotham (DOB 11/29/42) is currently admitted to Mercy
Hospital Intensive Care Unit and will [be] unable to participate in scheduled court case.”
Defense counsel thus sought a continuance pursuant to section 114-4(i) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Criminal Code) (725 ILCS 5/114-4(i) (West 2008)), as a result
of defendant’s documented physical incapacity. Given defendant’s medical state, the trial
court granted defendant’s motion for a continuance until May 18, 2010. Because the case was
“on term” the State also sought leave for an additional 21 days to be added to the speedy trial
term, and the court instructed the State to “argue it on the next court date.”1
¶6 On May 18, 2010, defendant failed to appear in court. Defense counsel informed the
court that she had been unable to reach defendant or any member of defendant’s family since
defendant’s hospitalization and requested the court to continue the cause for one week. The
State objected to defense counsel’s request for a continuance and requested the court to issue
another BFW. The trial court denied the State’s warrant request but indicated it would issue
a warrant if defendant failed to appear on the next court date. The court then continued the
case to May 25, 2010. On that date, defendant failed to appear in court once again. Defense
counsel had no information about defendant’s whereabouts and the State renewed its request
for a BFW. The court instructed defense counsel to “[g]et letters out to everybody” and
entered and continued the State’s request for a BFW. The court indicated that the warrant
would be issued on the next court date if defendant failed to appear. The trial court then
continued the cause to June 22, 2010.
¶7 On that date, defendant appeared and presented the court with another doctor’s note that
stated that she had been hospitalized at RML Specialty Hospital for acute respiratory failure
from May 4, 2010, to June 2, 2010, which served to explain her two most recent absences
from court. The parties then agreed to a new trial date: September 1, 2010. On that date,

1
The 21-day extension was never argued at a subsequent court date; however, it does not
impact the decision as both parties agree that an additional 21 days would have had no effect on the
calculations that are part of the instant appeal. By defendant’s calculation, the State exceeded the
speedy trial term by 57 days, rendering a 21-day extension immaterial. Pursuant to the State’s
argument, the defendant waived her speedy trial demand and a new term commenced on September
1, 2010, when she filed her third demand, and thus its prior request for an extension was of no
consequence.

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 however, the State again answered not ready for trial and defendant filed her third demand
for a speedy trial. At the State’s request, the cause was continued to October 28, 2010. On
the October 28, 2010, trial date, the State answered ready but defendant filed a motion to
dismiss, alleging that her right to a speedy trial had been violated. In her motion, defendant
observed that she had filed her first demand for a speedy trial on November 20, 2009, and
that as of October 28, 2010, 210 days had passed since her first demand, which far exceeded
the 160-day time limitation set forth in the speedy trial statute. Defendant calculated her
speedy trial term as follows:
“November 20, 2009 to January 5, 2010 (46 days)
January 5, 2010 to April 23, 2010 (107 days)
September 1, 2010 to October 28, 2010 (57 days)
Total: 210 days”
¶8 The trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s motion that day. At the hearing, the
State calculated defendant’s speedy trial term to be 57 days. The State argued that the term
had started over on September 1, 2010, when defendant made her third demand for a speedy
trial. To support its calculation, the State cited section 103-5 of the speedy trial statute (725
ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2008)) and this court’s decision in People v. Zakarauskas, 398 Ill. App.
3d 451 (2010), and argued that a defendant’s failure to appear in court operates as a waiver
of her demand for a speedy trial. Because defendant failed to appear at three scheduled court
dates during her illness, the State argued that defendant’s prior speedy trial demands were
waived.
¶9 Defendant disputed the State’s interpretation of relevant case law and statutory authority.
Specifically, defendant argued that pursuant to this court’s ruling in Zakarauskas, waiver
only occurs where a defendant’s absence is unexplained. Because defendant provided the
court with doctors’ notes and explained her failures to appear, defendant argued that her
speedy trial term was merely tolled during the dates of her hospitalization. To further support
her argument, defendant directed the court to section 114-4(i) of the Criminal Code (725
ILCS 5/114-4(i) (West 2008)) and argued that pursuant to that provision, a defendant’s
physical incapacity merely suspends, rather than waives, a defendant’s demand for a speedy
trial.
¶ 10 After hearing the arguments of the parties, the court granted defendant’s motion to
dismiss. In doing so, the court stated:
“[Defendant] was hospitalized. *** And I have no reason to believe she was belingering
[sic]. I think she probably was in dire need of serious medical treatment. State, I know
this is a draconian, that the relief sought by the Defense is very draconian in this case but
I can also see why [defendant] in her fragile state would have been anxious to get this
case released and at her attorneys urging get the case for trial. I do have, I have been
satisfied with the documentation provided *** on behalf of [defendant] that she was
incapacitated and hospitalized and to no fault of her own missed court. And therefore,
I am reluctant to find that the delay was occasioned by the defendant.”
¶ 11 The State subsequently filed a motion to reconsider the court’s dismissal. After hearing
the arguments of the parties, the court denied the State’s motion. The court explained its
rationale as follows:

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 “[T]he State is urging me to feel [sic] that [defendant’s] failure to appear when she was
in the intensive care unit should operate at the effect of a bond forfeiture warrant where
she voluntarily relinquished her right to a speedy trial by failing to appear in court, and
that the [S]tate should get a[n] entire new term.
The Defense urges me to treat that failure to appear because she was in the intensive
care unit as a motion defendant something that would simply toll the term. I think that
accurately describes both parties[’] positions and I think that was discussed last time.
There are a couple of unusual twists in this case. The fact that there was a repeated
request for a bond forfeiture warrant, it was entered and continued but the warrant was
never issued. We also had at one point a request by the State for an extension of the term.
***
Never the less [sic], after carefully considering all of the evidence and the arguments
made by counsel and carefully reviewing the State’s motion to reconsider, and again
reviewing the appropriate case law, I see nothing new, no new arguments to persuade me
that I have erred, my initial inclination was in error.
I do feel that the defendant’s failure to appear because she was in the intensive care
unit and the physical observation, the in-court observation made by this Court about the
defendant’s obvious physical difficulties in health concerns which prevented her from
coming to court we’re [sic] not willful and she did not voluntarily relinquish the right to
a speedy trial.”
¶ 12 This appeal followed.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 On appeal, the State argues that defendant waived her demand for a speedy trial when she
failed to appear in court on three consecutive court dates, and thus, the trial court erred in
granting defendant’s motion to dismiss. In support, the State cites to section 103-5(b) of the
speedy trial statute (725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 2008)) and this court’s decisions in People
v. Zakarauskas, 398 Ill. App. 3d 451 (2010), and People v. Minor, 2011 IL App (1st)
101097.2 The State maintains that “[t]he unambiguous language of the [speedy trial statute]
and this court’s interpretation of it in Zakarauskas [and Minor] establish that a defendant’s
failure to appear, explained or otherwise, waives his or her speedy trial demand.”
¶ 15 In response, defendant argues that the trial court did not err in granting her motion to
dismiss because she “had a valid reason for missing court dates,” namely, the decline of her
health that resulted in her hospitalization. Because her absence from court was the “result of
a genuine hospitalization,” defendant argues that it should not be treated like the absences
discussed in Zakarauskas and Minor. Instead, defendant urges this court to treat her failure
to appear in court as an”unavoidable absence” which was a “delay occasioned by the
defendant as provided for by Section 103-5(f) of the [speedy trial statute]” that merely

2
Our decision in People v. Minor was issued while the instant appeal was pending, and thus
neither party initially addressed the opinion in their opening briefs. Because this opinion is relevant
to the appeal, defendant filed a supplemental brief in which she discussed the implication of that
decision while the State addressed its implications in its reply brief.

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 suspended, rather than waived, her prior speedy trial demand.
¶ 16 A criminal defendant has both a constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial. U.S.
Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8; 725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2008); People
v. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d 419, 426 (1994). The Illinois speedy trial statute is codified in section
103-5 of the Criminal Code (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2008)). This statute enforces a
defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial and courts have held that its protections are
to be liberally construed in a defendant’s favor. People v. Zeleny, 396 Ill. App. 3d 917, 919-
20 (2009); People v. Patterson, 392 Ill. App. 3d 461, 465 (2009). To establish a violation of
a defendant’s right to a speedy trial, it only needs to be established that the defendant has not
been tried within the statutory period and that the defendant has not caused or contributed
to the delay. Zeleny, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 920; Patterson, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 465. Ultimately,
the defendant bears the burden of establishing a violation of his or her speedy trial rights.
Patterson, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 467.
¶ 17 The instant appeal requires this court to interpret several provisions of the Criminal Code.
When called upon to construe a statute, the goal of a reviewing court is to ascertain and
effectuate the legislature’s intent. People v. Garcia, 241 Ill. 2d 416, 421 (2011); People v.
Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d 380, 389 (2006). The best indication of the legislature’s intent is found
in the plain language of the statute and, accordingly, statutory language should be given its
plain and ordinary meaning. Garcia, 241 Ill. 2d at 421; Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d at 389. Statutory
interpretation is a question of law, which is subject to de novo review. Garcia, 241 Ill. 2d at
421; Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d at 385-86.
¶ 18 The statutory provisions at issue here are subsections (b) and (f) of the Illinois speedy
trial statute as well as section 114-4(i) of the Criminal Code. The aforementioned speedy trial
provisions, in pertinent part, provide as follows:
“(b) Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the court having
jurisdiction within 160 days from the date defendant demands trial unless delay is
occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to Section
104-13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by
a continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after a court’s determination
of the defendant’s physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal. The
defendant’s failure to appear for any court date set by the court operates to waive the
defendant’s demand for trial made under this subsection.
***
(f) Delay occasioned by the defendant shall temporarily suspend for the time of the
delay the period within which a person shall be tried as prescribed by subsection[ ]***
(b) of this Section and on the day of expiration of the delay the said period shall continue
at the point at which it was suspended.” (Emphases added.) 725 ILCS 5/103-5(b), (f)
(West 2008).
The last sentence in subsection (b) of the speedy trial statute that addresses waiver was added
to the statute by amendment in 2000. Pub. Act 91-123 (eff. Jan. 1, 2000); Zakarauskas, 398
Ill. App. 3d at 453; Patterson, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 466.
¶ 19 Section 114-4(i) of the Criminal Code, referenced by subsection (b) of the speedy trial
statute, in turn, provides:

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 “(i) Physical incapacity of a defendant may be grounds for a continuance at any time.
If, upon written motion of the defendant or the State or upon the court’s own motion, and
after presentation of affidavits or evidence, the court determines that the defendant is
physically unable to appear in court or to assist in his defense, or that such appearance
would endanger his health or result in substantial prejudice, a continuance shall be
granted. *** Such continuance shall suspend the provisions of Section 103-5 of this Act,
which periods of time limitation shall commence anew when the court, after presentation
of additional affidavits or evidence, has determined that such physical incapacity has
been substantially removed.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/114-4(i) (West 2008).
¶ 20 Although no court has yet been called upon to examine the interplay between the Illinois
speedy trial statute and section 114-4(i) of the Criminal Code, this court has interpreted the
amended speedy trial statute and its effect on a defendant’s failure to appear in two recent
cases: People v. Zakarauskas, 398 Ill. App. 3d 451 (2010), and People v. Minor, 2011 IL
App (1st) 101097. In Zakarauskas, the defendant was arrested and charged with DUI and
was released on his own recognizance. The defendant made a demand for a speedy trial in
April 2006, and the cause was continued by agreement several times. On October 6, 2006,
the date the cause was set for trial, the defendant failed to appear. Defense counsel indicated
that there had been a “mix up,” but the court issued a BFW. The defendant appeared on the
next court date, October 11, 2006, filed a second demand for a speedy trial and a new trial
date was set for March 20, 2007. On that date, the defendant appeared and moved to dismiss
the case, arguing that his 160-day speedy trial term, which had commenced in April 2006,
had elapsed. The State argued that the defendant waived his April 2006 demand when he
failed to appear on October 6, 2006, and that a new term began on October 11, 2006, when
the defendant filed his second demand for a speedy trial. The trial court initially denied
defendant’s motion, but then reversed its decision upon reconsideration. The State appealed.
¶ 21 On appeal we reviewed the language of the speedy trial statute and the 2000 amendment
thereto and concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing the charges against defendant,
explaining:
“From 1977 until the 2000 amendment of section 103-5(b), a delay occasioned by a
defendant’s failure to appear in court suspended the 160-day speedy trial term.
[Citations.]
The plain language of section 103-5(b) as amended in 2000 manifested the
legislature’s intent to distinguish between a defendant’s failure to appear in court from
other types of delay, a motion for a continuance, for example, either by the defendant or
by agreement. We believe the 2000 ‘waiver’ amendment to section 103-5 controls the
disposition of this case. Waiver includes the notion of relinquishment. [Citation.]
Defendant here voluntarily relinquished his right to a trial within 160 days of his first
speedy trial demand on April 3, 2006. When defendant failed to appear he was no longer
on bail. The posted security was forfeited and a warrant was outstanding for his arrest.
*** A defendant’s failure to appear as required by recognizance constitutes a criminal
offense. [Citation.] If we were to treat a BFW incident as comparable to a request for a
continuance or other delay, a fugitive defendant would be entitled to a benefit of an
earlier speedy trial demand when apprehended and again brought before the court.”
Zakarauskas, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 454.

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¶ 22 Thereafter, this court next considered the speedy trial statute in Minor. In that case, the
defendant was also charged with driving under the influence and was released on her own
recognizance. She made her first speedy trial demand on April 21, 2009, and the trial date
was set for June 5, 2009. On that date, however, the State was not ready and requested a
continuance, and the defendant filed her second demand for a speedy trial. On August 4,
2009, the next court date, the State answered ready for trial, but the defendant failed to
appear and the court issued a BFW. The defendant appeared in court the following day,
informed the court that she had been at a doctor’s appointment and had “mixed up” the court
date, and the trial court quashed and recalled the BFW, and continued the case until October
19, 2009, on the defendant’s motion. On that date, the State sought a continuance until
January 6, 2010, which the trial court granted. On January 4, 2010, before the next court date,
the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The defendant argued that
her right to a speedy trial had been violated when the State failed to commence trial within
160 days of her first April 21, 2009, speedy trial demand. In response, the State argued that
the defendant waived her right to a speedy trial when she failed to appear on August 4, 2009,
and that the term restarted on October 29, 2009, when she filed her second demand. The trial
court ultimately granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the State filed a motion to
reconsider, citing this court’s decision in Zakarauskas. The trial court, however, denied the
State’s motion, finding Zakarauskas distinguishable because the defendant was not a fugitive
when she appeared one day after her scheduled trial date and she provided an explanation for
her failure to appear. Because the defendant explained her absence, the trial court found that
her speedy trial period was tolled and, thus, her right to a speedy trial was violated when trial
did not commence within 160 days of her April 21, 2009, demand.
¶ 23 On appeal, we reversed the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
In doing so, we reiterated that the “2000 amendment to the speedy trial statute clarified that
a defendant’s failure to appear in court operates as a waiver to a prior demand. [Citation.]
The legislature, therefore, distinguished failures to appear from other ‘[d]elays occasioned
by the defendant.’ ” Minor, 2011 IL App (1st) 101097, ¶ 16. Accordingly, we found that
when the defendant failed to appear in court on August 4, 2009, she waived her initial speedy
trial term that began on April 21, 2009, and that her new speedy trial term began on October
29, 2009, when she filed her new demand. Id. ¶ 15. Because the January 6, 2010, trial date
fell within 160 days of the October 29, 2009, trial demand, we concluded that the defendant’s
right to a speedy trial was not violated. Id. In doing so, we rejected the defendant’s attempt
to distinguish Zakarauskas and clarified our prior ruling, stating: “ ‘explained’ failures to
appear and ‘unexplained’ failures to appear hold no relevance where there is no such
distinction in the language of the statute. *** [I]n Zakarauskas, this court did not hold that
an explained absence was relieved of the waiver result provided by subsection (b) of the
speedy trial statute.” Id. ¶ 17. Accordingly, relying on the plain language of subsection (b)
of the speedy trial statute, we found that the fact that the defendant was able to provide the
court with an explanation for her failure to appear was not a relevant consideration in our
speedy trial waiver analysis. Id.
¶ 24 Keeping this precedent in mind, we turn to the relevant facts in the instant appeal and
find that defendant, like the defendants in Zakarauskas and Minor, waived her speedy trial
demand due to her failure to appear in court. Here, defendant made her first speedy trial

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 demand on November 20, 2009, and the cause was set for trial on January 5, 2010. On that
date, however, the State was not ready for trial, and defendant filed her second demand for
a speedy trial. The trial court, at the request of the State, continued the cause to April 23,
2010. On that date, defendant was not present in court, but defense counsel addressed the
court and provided the court with a doctor’s note that stated that defendant had been admitted
to the intensive care unit at Mercy Hospital and was unable to participate in court
proceedings. Counsel then requested a continuance pursuant to section 114-4(i) of the
Criminal Code due to defendant’s documented physical incapacity, which the court granted.
Although the State suggests this was defendant’s first failure to appear that resulted in the
waiver of her speedy trial demand, we disagree. We acknowledge that defendant was not
physically present; however, defense counsel appeared on her behalf, indicated he had been
in communication with her, apprised the court and the State of defendant’s health problems,
presented a doctor’s note attesting to defendant’s impaired medical state, and requested a
continuance, which was granted without the objection of the State. Accordingly, this was not
a “failure to appear, but an absence and the grant of a motion to continue the matter, one of
the types of delay that the [Zakarauskas] court specifically addressed as not causing a waiver
under section 103-5(b).” People v. Kohler, 2012 IL App (2d) 100513, ¶ 38 (finding that the
defendant’s absence from court due to illness was not a failure to appear where defense
counsel appeared on his behalf, apprised the court and the village of the defendant’s illness,
and requested a continuance, which was granted without an objection made by the village).
¶ 25 More problematic, however, were defendant’s next two failures to appear in court on
May 18, 2010, and May 25, 2010. On both of these occasions, counsel had not been able to
communicate with defendant and did not know the reason for defendant’s absence. As a
result, the State requested the court to enter a BFW on each of the missed court dates.
Although the trial court denied the State’s request on the May 18, 2010, court date, it later
entered and continued the State’s request on the May 25, 2010, court date. The trial court
explained that it declined to issue the warrant at that time, but indicated that a warrant would
be issued if defendant failed to appear on the next court date. After these two absences,
defendant did appear at the next June 22, 2010, court date. At that time, she provided the
court with a second doctor’s note that detailed her hospitalization at RML Specialty Hospital
to treat her acute respiratory failure and explained her court absences on May 18, 2010, and
May 25, 2010.
¶ 26 In considering the merits of defendant’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, the
trial court found the second doctor’s note to be credible and indicated that it believed that her
absences from court were “not willful”; rather, they were caused by the onset of various
health complications. Because defendant was able to explain her absences, the court granted
defendant’s motion. Although we are sympathetic to defendant’s health problems, we
reiterate that pursuant to the plain language of the speedy trial statute as well as our decisions
in Zakarauskas and Minor, when a defendant fails to appear in court for any reason,
regardless of whether he or she provides an explanation for her absence at a subsequent court
date, the defendant waives his or her demand for a speedy trial. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West
2008); Minor, 2011 IL App (1st) 101097, ¶ 17; Zakarauskas, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 454. Indeed,
a defendant cannot transform a “failure to appear” pursuant to subsection (b) of the speedy
trial statute into a “delay occasioned by defendant” outlined in subsection (f) and avoid the

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 effects of waiver, simply by providing an explanation for her absence at a later court date.
See Minor, 2011 IL App (1st) 101097, ¶ 17 (“ ‘[E]xplained’ failures to appear and
‘unexplained’ failures to appear hold no relevance where there is no such distinction in the
language of the statute.”).
¶ 27 To avoid the effect of waiver, defendant should have communicated with counsel prior
to the May 18, 2010, and May 25, 2010, court dates like she did before the April 23, 2010,
court date. Indeed, section 114-4(i) of the Criminal Code expressly provides that a trial court
shall grant continuance on the grounds of physical incapacity “after presentation of affidavits
or evidence” attesting to a defendant’s physical incapacity. (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS
5/114-4(i) (West 2008). This, defendant failed to do. Although defendant argues that she
should have been able to present the court with documentation of physical infirmity after
missing court dates due to illness, the language of section 114-4(i) is clear that continuance
may only be granted after the court receives evidence of incapacity. If this court were to
accept defendant’s argument that documentation could be presented at any time, we would
essentially have to add language to section 114-4(i). A reviewing court, however, may not
rewrite an otherwise clear statutory mandate. See In re Marriage of Rosenbaum-Golden, 381
Ill. App. 3d 65, 72 (2008) (recognizing that “[a] court may not supply omissions, remedy
defects, substitute different provisions, add exceptions, limitations, or conditions, or
otherwise change the law so as to depart from the plain meaning of the language employed
in the statute”). Accordingly, we find that when defendant failed to appear in court on May
18, 2010, and May 25, 2010, she waived her prior speedy trial demands. A new speedy trial
term commenced on September 1, 2010, when defendant filed her third demand, and the term
had not expired on October 28, 2010, when the defendant filed, and the court granted, her
motion to dismiss. Because the speedy trial term had not expired, we conclude that the trial
court erred in granting defendant’s motion.
¶ 28 In so holding, we find defendant’s efforts to distinguish Zakarauskas and Minor
unavailing. She correctly observes that the defendants in both cases were not hospitalized and
that their failures to appear in court resulted in the issuance of BFWs, which were quashed
when their absences were subsequently explained to be the result of “mix ups.” However,
we decline to categorize defendant’s failure to appear as an “unavoidable absence” rather
than an “explained absence” to bypass the speedy trial statute’s waiver provision. Just as the
speedy trial statute does not provide an exception for explained absences, the statute also
makes no mention of unavoidable absences. “ ‘We will not rewrite a statute under the guise
of statutory construction or depart from a statute’s plain language by reading into it
conditions, exceptions, or limitations not expressed by the legislature.’ ” Minor, 2011 IL App
(1st) 101097, ¶ 17 (quoting In re M.A., 356 Ill. App. 3d 733, 737 (2005)).
¶ 29 We similarly reject defendant’s argument that this court should reach a different result
based on the interplay between the speedy trial statute and section114-4(i) of the Criminal
Code. As we stated above, the speedy trial statute of the Criminal Code, in pertinent part,
provides as follows:
“(b) Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the court having
jurisdiction within 160 days from the date defendant demands trial unless delay is
occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to Section
104-13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by

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 a continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after a court’s determination
of the defendant’s physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal.” (Emphases
added.) 725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 2008).
Section 114-4(i) of the Criminal Code, in turn, states:
“(i) Physical incapacity of a defendant may be grounds for a continuance at any time.
If, upon written motion of the defendant or the State or upon the court’s own motion, and
after presentation of affidavits or evidence, the court determines that the defendant is
physically unable to appear in court or to assist in his defense, or that such appearance
would endanger his health or result in substantial prejudice, a continuance shall be
granted. *** Such continuance shall suspend the provisions of Section 103-5 of this Act,
which periods of time limitations shall commence anew when the court, after presentation
of additional affidavits or evidence, has determined that such physical incapacity has
been substantially removed.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/114-4(i) (West 2008).
¶ 30 Defendant seizes upon the language in section 114-4(i) that provides that a continuance
granted as a result of a defendant’s physical incapacity “shall suspend the provisions of
Sections 103-5 of this Act,” and argues that her failure to appear in court as a result of her
health problems, merely suspended, rather than waived her speedy trial demand. Therefore,
when she returned to court on June 22, 2010, defendant argues, her speedy trial term began
to run again from April 23, 2010, the point at which it was initially suspended. The State,
however, responds that defendant relies upon only a portion of the language in section 114-
4(i) and ignores the remaining language in that subsection which specifies that the speedy
trial term “shall commence anew when the court *** has determined that such physical
incapacity has been substantially removed.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/114-4(i) (West
2008). Based on the legislature’s inclusion of the phrase “commence anew,” the State
maintains that the legislature clearly intended for a defendant’s speedy trial term to start over
in circumstances where a defendant is granted a continuance due to physical incapacitation.
Accordingly, pursuant to the State’s interpretation, defendant’s speedy trial demand term
stopped on April 23, 2010, when she first failed to appear in court due to hospitalization and
obtained a continuance, and a new term commenced on September 1, 2010, after she
recuperated from her illness and filed a third speedy trial demand.
¶ 31 We acknowledge section 114-4(i) of the Criminal Code was perhaps inartfully drafted
and that the language contained therein is ambiguous and can be subject to multiple
interpretations, namely, the two interpretations offered by the parties. Given the ambiguity
of the statute, it is permissible to look to extrinsic statutory construction aids, including
common dictionary definitions, to construe the statute. County of Du Page v. Illinois Labor
Relations Board, 231 Ill. 2d 593, 604-06 (2008). Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word
“suspend” as follows: “to interrupt; postpone; defer” and “[t]o temporarily keep (a person)
from performing a function, occupying an office, holding a job, or exercising a right or
privilege.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1584 (9th ed. 2009). Black’s Law Dictionary does not
define the phrase “commence anew” or the word “anew”; however, a definition for “anew”
can be found in Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary which defines the word as follows: “for an
additional time” and “in a new or different form.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/anew. Ultimately, we find the dictionary
definitions do not resolve the statute’s ambiguity. The statute’s use of the word “suspend”

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 suggests a mere postponement or interruption of a defendant’s speedy trial demand when a
defendant becomes physically incapacitated. However, the inclusion of the phrase
“commence anew” suggests that a speedy trial demand is not simply postponed; rather, it
ends and begins in a “new or different form” when the defendant’s physical incapacity is
found to be removed. While neither the word “suspend” nor the phrase “commence anew”
is ambiguous on its own, their use in the same sentence creates ambiguity as to the
legislature’s intent on the effect of a section 114-4(i) continuance on a defendant’s speedy
trial demand.
¶ 32 We believe that the legislature’s intent is more clearly revealed by referring back to the
speedy trial statute. See People v. Rhinehart, 2012 IL 111719, ¶ 26 (recognizing that under
the doctrine of in pari materia, two statutes or two parts of one statute must be considered
with reference to each other to allow for a “ ‘harmonious’ ” interpretation of the relevant
provisions, and words and phrases should be construed with reference to other relevant
provisions and not in isolation). The word “suspend” is also used in subsection (f) of the
speedy trial statute, which details the impact on a speedy trial term as a result of delays
occasioned by a defendant. It contains the following language: “Delay occasioned by the
defendant shall temporarily suspend for the time of the delay the period within which a
person shall be tried as prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e) of this Section and on the
day of expiration of the delay the said period shall continue at the point at which it was
suspended.” (Emphases added.) 725 ILCS 5/103-5(f) (West 2008). It is clear that the speedy
trial statute’s use of the word “suspend” in subsection (f) means that a delay occasioned by
a defendant merely tolls the speedy trial term.
¶ 33 We find that inconsistent results would be produced if section 114-4(i) of the Criminal
Code were interpreted to mean that a speedy trial term ends, rather than is tolled, when a
defendant receives a continuance on the grounds of physical incapacity as opposed to a
continuance on any other grounds. Given that the speedy trial statute characterizes a
continuance on the grounds of physical incapacity as a “delay occasioned by the defendant”
(725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 2008)), and that subsection (f) provides that such delays result
in the speedy trial period “continu[ing] at the point it was suspended” (725 ILCS 5/103-5(f)
(West 2008)), when the reason for the delay expires, the only logical interpretation of the two
statutes is that defendant’s speedy trial term was tolled on April 23, 2010, when the court
was presented with documentation that defendant was ill. When read in context with the
speedy trial statute, section 114-4(i)’s use of the phrase “commence anew” only makes sense
if it is interpreted to mean that a defendant’s speedy trial term continues from the date at
which it was stopped when her physical incapacity has been removed.
¶ 34 Accordingly, we agree with defendant’s interpretation of the relevant statutory
provisions; however, we disagree with their applicability to her case. As we stated above,
defendant received a continuance pursuant to section 114-4(i) on April 23, 2010, when
defense counsel presented the court with a doctor’s note attesting to her physical incapacity.
At this point, defendant’s speedy trial demand was temporarily suspended; however, by
failing to appear or communicate with her counsel or the trial court on the next two court
dates, she effectively waived her speedy trial demand that had been tolled and, thus, she was
no longer able to avail herself of the benefits of section 114-4(i). A defendant must comply
with the requirements of section 114-4(i) and provide the court with pertinent documentation

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 attesting to her incapacity prior to receiving a continuance in order to avoid waiving a prior
speedy trial demand. Because defendant did not do so until after failing to appear on two
scheduled court dates, we find that defendant’s prior speedy trial demand was thereby waived
and that a new term began to run on September 1, 2010, when she was released from the
hospital, appeared in court and filed a new demand. Therefore, when the trial court granted
defendant’s motion to dismiss on October 28, 2010, the parties were only 57 days into the
new speedy trial term. We thus conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the case on
speedy trial grounds.

¶ 35 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 36 Because we find that the speedy trial statute was not violated, we reverse the judgment
of the trial court and remand the cause with instructions to reinstate the charges against
defendant and proceed with trial.

¶ 37 Reversed and remanded.

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