Bank of America, N.A. v. Adeyiga

Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

Bank of America, N.A. v. Adeyiga, 2014 IL App (1st) 131252

Appellate Court BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OLUFEMI A.
Caption ADEYIGA and BOLA E. ADEYIGA, Defendants-Appellants.

District & No. First District, Fifth Division
Docket No. 1-13-1252

Filed September 30, 2014
Rehearing denied April 8, 2015

Held A mortgage foreclosure proceeding was remanded to the trial court for
(Note: This syllabus an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the grace period notice
constitutes no part of the was sent to defendants and whether plaintiff bank waited past 30 days
opinion of the court but to file its foreclosure complaint, and if no such notice was sent, the
has been prepared by the confirmation of the judicial sale and all subsequent orders would be
Reporter of Decisions deemed an abuse of discretion by the trial court and would require the
for the convenience of vacation of the judicial sale and dismissal of the case.
the reader.)

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11-CH-2979; the
Review Hon. Mathias Delort, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
 Counsel on Robert D. Shearer, Jr., of Chicago, for appellants.
Appeal
Phoebe N. Coddington and Robine K. Morrison, both of Winston &
Strawn LLP, of Chicago, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Presiding Justice Palmer and Justice McBride concurred in the
judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 This is a case of first impression.
¶2 On January 24, 2011, BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans
Servicing, LP (BAC), brought this mortgage foreclosure action against defendants Olufemi
A. Adeyiga (Olufemi) and Bola E. Adeyiga (Bola), his wife. Bank of America, N.A. (Bank),
was later substituted as plaintiff after it merged with BAC and became its successor.
¶3 On December 8, 2011, the trial court denied Olufemi and Bola’s motion to dismiss and
granted the Bank’s motions: (1) for summary judgment against Olufemi; (2) for default
against Bola; and (3) for judgment of foreclosure pursuant to the Illinois
Mortgage Foreclosure Law (the Foreclosure Law) (735 ILCS 5/15-1101 et seq. (West 2010)).
¶4 On this direct appeal, Olufemi and Bola raise, essentially, three issues: (1) whether the
Bank has standing; (2) whether the Bank committed fraud when it concealed that BAC did
not have standing when it filed its complaint; and (3) whether the trial court erred in denying
Olufemi and Bola’s motion to dismiss based upon the Bank’s failure to send a “grace period
notice” as required by section 15-1502.5 of the Foreclosure Law, which is commonly known
as the Homeowner Protection Act.1 735 ILCS 5/15-1502.5 (West 2010).
¶5 Since there is no evidence in the record that the Bank sent a grace period notice prior to
filing its complaint, which is required before any foreclosure action may be instituted under
the Foreclosure Law, by sections 15-1502.5(b) and (c) of the Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS
5/15-1502.5(b), (c) (West 2010)), we remand to the trial court to determine in an evidentiary
hearing whether the grace period notice was sent. If the trial court finds that no grace period
notice was sent, then we find that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in confirming the
judicial sale and all subsequent orders; (2) and in that event, the judicial sale must be vacated
in accordance with section 15-1508(b) of the Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b)

1
Section 15-1502.5 of the Foreclosure Law is a temporary provision that is scheduled to expire on
July 1, 2016. 735 ILCS 5/15-1502.5(k) (West 2012).

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 (West 2010)); and (3) the case must be dismissed. If the trial court finds that a grace period
notice was sent, but plaintiff did not wait 30 days to file its lawsuit, we find that: (1) the trial
court abused its discretion in confirming the judicial sale and all subsequent orders; (2) and
in that event, the judicial sale must be vacated in accordance with section 15-1508(b) of the
Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b) (West 2010)); and (3) the case must be dismissed.
If the trial court finds that a grace period notice was sent and plaintiff waited 30 days before
filing suit, then the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

¶6 BACKGROUND
¶7 I. The Complaint
¶8 Olufemi and Bola are the mortgagors of an owner-occupied, single-family, residential
property located in Lansing, Illinois. The mortgage was executed on February 2, 2007. The
mortgage defines defendants as the borrowers, Aegis Wholesale Corporation (Aegis) as the
lender, and “Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems” (MERS) as the mortgagee. The note
secured by the mortgage provided that the lender could transfer the note and that anyone who
received the note by transfer was entitled to receive payments under the note. The mortgage
and promissory note were attached to the complaint.
¶9 On January 24, 2011, BAC filed a verified complaint to foreclose the mortgage, alleging
that Olufemi, Bola, and “unknown owners and nonrecord claimants” were in default of the
mortgage loan in the amount of $123,368.29 in unpaid principal, interest, costs, advances and
fees. The complaint alleged that Olufemi and Bola had not paid the monthly installments of
principal, interest, taxes, and insurance since December 1, 2009.
¶ 10 Paragraph 3(N) of the complaint states: “Capacity in which Plaintiff brings this
foreclosure: Plaintiff is the Mortgagee under 735 ILCS 5/15-1208 [(West 2010)].” Section
15-1208 of the Foreclosure Law reads:
“ ‘Mortgagee’ means (i) the holder of an indebtedness or obligee of a non-monetary
obligation secured by a mortgage or any person designated or authorized to act on
behalf of such holder and (ii) any person claiming through a mortgagee as successor.”
735 ILCS 5/15-1208 (West 2010).
¶ 11 The complaint did not allege that the Bank had mailed a grace period notice, which is
required before any foreclosure action may be instituted. 735 ILCS 5/15-1502.5(b), (c) (West
2010).
¶ 12 On November 24, 2010, the trial court appointed ProVest LLC to serve process. In an
affidavit dated February 7, 2011, Darletha Smith, an employee of ProVest, stated that she had
personally served Olufemi on January 26, 2011, at the subject property, and had served Bola
by substitute service on the same date, by giving Olufemi a copy of the complaint and
summons at the subject property.

¶ 13 II. Defendants’ Pro se Filings
¶ 14 On February 8, 2011, Olufemi filed a pro se appearance and verified answer. In his
answer, Olufemi listed under “other affirmative matter,” that: “[Paragraph] 3(N)–The note
was not endorsed and no assignment or allonge was attached or recorded.”
¶ 15 On March 18, 2011, Olufemi filed three pro se discovery motions: (1) a request to
produce pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 214 (eff. Jan. 1, 1996); (2) Illinois Supreme

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 Court Rule 213 (eff. Jan. 1, 2007) written interrogatories; and (3) a request to admit pursuant
to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). On that same date, Olufemi filed a
pro se motion for leave to file instanter: (1) an amended appearance with a jury demand; (2)
an amended answer to the Bank’s complaint; and (3) an affirmative defense and
counterclaim. Also on March 18, 2011, Olufemi filed an amended appearance with a jury
demand, an amended answer, an affirmative defense and counterclaim, and a motion for
leave to file a change of address instanter.
¶ 16 On March 25, 2011, the trial court ordered that: (1) Olufemi’s motion to file an amended
answer, affirmative defenses, jury demand and counterclaim was denied without prejudice,
finding they were not appropriate; (2) all discovery would be stayed pending further review
of the court and that the court would consider opening discovery “when and if Olufemi
meaningfully participates” in the Cook County mediation program; (3) the request for
production of documents, interrogatories and request to admit facts were stricken; and (4)
both Olufemi and Bola forfeited their right to bring a motion to quash service by virtue of
Olufemi filing an answer and substantive motion.
¶ 17 In support of its order, the trial court noted that, although Olufemi should be given
“liberal authority” to amend his answer and file new affirmative defenses and counterclaims,
“the court is unwilling to do so at this time” because his proposed amended pleadings were
prepared in such a haphazard way that they would “unduly burden the plaintiff in any attempt
to meaningfully respond to them.” It then cited several aspects of the documents, calling
them “inexplicable,” “confusing” and “bizarre.” The trial court stated that it was clear that
the documents had been prepared by someone unlicensed to practice law and that Olufemi
himself did not understand their nature or content.

¶ 18 III. The Bank’s Motion for Summary Judgment
¶ 19 On September 22, 2011, BAC filed a motion to substitute the Bank, successor by merger
to BAC, as plaintiff. The motion claimed that, subsequent to BAC filing the complaint on
January 24, 2011, BAC merged with the Bank. The trial court granted the motion on
December 8, 2011.
¶ 20 Also on September 22, 2011, the Bank filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to
section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2010)). In support
of its motion, the Bank asserted in an affidavit that Olufemi’s general denials and affirmative
defenses, as pleaded, “fail to sufficiently set forth facts and supporting documentation which
tend to indicate that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Further, the Bank asserted that
Olufemi failed to submit any counteraffidavit refuting the facts contained in its affidavit in
support of its motion for summary judgment. The Bank requested: (1) an entry of an order of
summary judgment; and (2) the entry of a judgment of foreclosure and sale.
¶ 21 Attached to the Bank’s motion for summary judgment was: (1) the affidavit of Acee
Fuller, Jr.; and (2) a certificate of prove-up of foreclosure fees and costs.
¶ 22 Fuller’s affidavit stated that, according to the Bank’s records for “the Loan,” Olufemi and
Bola “defaulted by failing to make required payments” and that, as of July 1, 2011, the
amount in default was $142,995.92. The itemized sums of money included: the principal
balance of $132,638.29; interest due through July 1, 2011, of $13,136.30; escrow advance
total of $6,532.60; and additional fees and credits. Attached to Fuller’s affidavit was a

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 printout of the business records regarding the loan that were maintained electronically by the
Bank.
¶ 23 The attached certificate of prove-up of foreclosure fees and costs listed costs and
expenses incurred by the Bank, including filing fees, service of summons, recording costs,
title charges and foreclosure attorney fees, totaling $2,225, which the Bank stated “ought to
be assessed as costs and expenses as provided in the subject mortgage and note.”

¶ 24 IV. Defendants’ Response to the Bank’s Motion for Summary Judgment
¶ 25 Olufemi and Bola retained attorneys from the Illinois Foreclosure Defense, LLC, who
filed, on November 9, 2011, a response in opposition to the Bank’s motion for summary
judgment and a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2010)) that included the same subject matter.
¶ 26 In their response, defendants argued that the motion for summary judgment should be
denied because there were questions of material fact that could not be answered by the
pleading and affidavits submitted, including whether the mortgagee is authorized to sue for
foreclosure. Specifically, defendants argued that the Bank had not met its burden of proof to
show that it had mailed a grace period notice prior to the filing of the complaint, which is
required by sections 15-1502.5(b) and (c) of the Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15-1502.5(b),
(c) (West 2010)). Attached to the response were the affidavits of Olufemi and Bola. Each
stated that they signed the note and mortgage provided by Aegis in February 2007, and that
Aegis was the holder of the note and mortgage on the property at that time. Both Olufemi and
Bola stated that they did not receive a notice of default or a grace period notice.
¶ 27 Defendants’ response also contested plaintiff’s allegation that it is the holder of the note
and the mortgagee under section 15-1208 of the Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15-1208
(West 2010)), arguing that the original plaintiff, BAC, was not the mortgagee on January 24,
2011, because the assignment of mortgage to BAC was not recorded with the Cook County
recorder of deeds until January 31, 2011, and therefore it did not own the note or mortgage
attached to its complaint. Defendants argued that, as a result, plaintiff lacked standing to
bring the foreclosure action because plaintiff did not establish that on the day the mortgage
was filed it was the mortgagee under section 15-1208 of the Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS
5/15-1208 (West 2010)), which defines a mortgagee as a “holder of an indebtedness or
obligee of a non-monetary obligation secured by a mortgage” or “any person claiming
through a mortgagee as successor,” because it did not produce any assignment of mortgage
on the date of filing.
¶ 28 Also, defendants contested plaintiff’s allegation that it presented its motion for summary
judgment to the court with an affidavit of mortgage in accordance with Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 191(a) (eff. July 1, 2002). Defendants argued that Fuller’s affidavit does not meet
the requirements of Rule 191(a) because the affiant does not attest to personal knowledge of
the facts he recites but, rather, states: “by persons with personal knowledge of the
information in the business record, or form information transmitted by persons with personal
knowledge.” Defendants thus concluded that the affiant’s assertions are hearsay and not
based on personal knowledge. They further asserted that the affidavit is defective because it
was notarized on August 16, 2011, seven months after the foreclosure complaint was filed.
¶ 29 On November 28, 2011, Olufemi and Bola’s attorneys, Illinois Foreclosure Defense,
LLC, filed a motion to withdraw their appearance for Olufemi and Bola. On December 14,

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 2011, the trial court granted the attorneys leave to withdraw their representation.

¶ 30 V. The Bank’s Reply to the Motion to Dismiss
¶ 31 On November 22, 2011, the Bank filed its reply and did not deny that it failed to send the
grace period notice. The Bank argued that since Olufemi did not raise a defense with regard
to failure to send a grace period notice in his answer, and Bola filed no answer, they had
admitted to receiving the grace period notice. It further argued that it was improper for
Olufemi and Bola to raise the claim that a grace period notice was not sent in a motion to
dismiss, as the claim “merely refutes a well-plead [sic] allegation of the Complaint.”2

¶ 32 VI. The Trial Court’s Judgment on December 8, 2011
¶ 33 On December 8, 2011, the trial court: (1) denied the motion to dismiss; (2) granted
summary judgment against Olufemi; (3) entered an order of default against Bola; and (4)
entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale. In its order, the trial court considered defendants’
claim that the plaintiff lacked standing and found that defendants waived the argument since
Olufemi did not plead lack of standing as an affirmative defense in his answer.3 The trial
court also stated that, even if defendants did not waive the argument, they did not prove that
the Bank lacked standing because the fact that the assignment of the mortgage had not been
recorded until after the present case was filed was “not problematic.”
¶ 34 In a written judgment order, the trial court responded to Olufemi and Bola’s claim in their
response to the Bank’s motion for summary judgment that the Bank did not mail the grace
period notice required by section 15-1502.5 of the Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15-1502.5
(West 2010)) and therefore did not meet the condition precedent for filing the present suit.
¶ 35 In its decision-making process, the trial court found that section 15-1504(c) of the
Foreclosure Law states that, if the Bank used “substantially” the specified form complaint,
set out in section 15-1504(a), the complaint should be construed to include 12 additional
statutorily specified allegations, including “that any and all notices of default or election to
declare the indebtedness due and payable or other notices required to be given have been
duly and properly given.” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/15-1504(a), (c), (c)(9) (West 2010).
Citing U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Olavarria, No. 10-CH-32532 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co.), the trial court
stated that the grace period notice required by section 15-1502.5 of the Foreclosure Law is
covered by the statutory language “other notices required to be given,” and the notices were
deemed given.
¶ 36 Section 15-1504(a) provides the following form complaint, which was followed by the
original plaintiff, BAC, in its complaint:
“(a) Form of Complaint. A foreclosure complaint may be in substantially the
following form:

2
There was no such written allegation in the complaint.
3
The trial court did not clarify why Olufemi’s statement in his answer was insufficient to raise the
affirmative defense of lack of standing. Olufemi stated under “other affirmative matters,” that:
“[Section] 3(N)–The note was not endorsed and no assignment or allonge was attached or recorded.”
This referred to plaintiff’s statement of capacity in its complaint.

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 (1) Plaintiff files this complaint to foreclose the mortgage (or other
conveyance in the nature of a mortgage) (hereinafter called ‘mortgage’)
hereinafter described and joins the following person as defendants: (here insert
names of all defendants).
(2) Attached as Exhibit ‘A’ is a copy of the mortgage and as Exhibit ‘B’ is a
copy of the note secured thereby.
(3) Information concerning mortgage:
(A) Nature of instrument: ***
(B) Date of mortgage:
(C) Name of mortgagor:
(D) Name of mortgagee:
(E) Date and place of recording:
(F) Identification of recording: ***
(G) Interest subject to the mortgage: ***
(H) Amount of original indebtedness *** :
(I) Both the legal description of the mortgaged real estate and the common
address ***:
(J) Statement as to defaults *** :
(K) Name of present owner of the real estate:
(L) Names of other persons who are joined as defendants and whose
interest in or lien on the mortgaged real estate is sought to be terminated:
(M) Names of defendants claimed to be personally liable for deficiency, if
any:
(N) Capacity in which plaintiff brings this foreclosure *** :
(O) Facts in support of redemption period *** :
(P) Statement that the right of redemption has been waived by all owners
of redemption, if applicable:
(Q) Facts in support of request for attorneys’ fees and of costs and
expenses, if applicable:
(R) Facts in support of a request for appointment of mortgagee in
possession or for appointment of receiver, and identity of such receiver, if
sought:
(S) Offer to mortgagor in accordance with Section 15-1402 to accept title
to the real estate in satisfaction of all indebtedness and obligations secured by
the mortgage without judicial sale, if sought:
(T) Name or names of defendants whose right to possess the mortgaged
real estate, after the confirmation of a foreclosure sale, is sought to be
terminated and, if not elsewhere stated, the facts in support thereof[.]” 735
ILCS 5/15-1504(a) (West 2010).
Accordingly, the trial court found that the complaint was “substantially” in the form provided
in section 15-1504(a) of the Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15-1504(a) (West 2010)), and
therefore the complaint included the “deemed” allegation that “other notices required to be

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 given” had been given, which the trial court held to include a grace period notice. Thus, the
court found that Olufemi and Bola admitted that grace period notice was sent, because
Olufemi did not address the grace period notice in his answer, and Bola made no answer at
all. Thus, the trial court found that the Bank was not required to present evidence regarding
the grace period notice.
¶ 37 The trial court also responded to Olufemi and Bola’s claim that the affidavit attached to
the Bank’s motion for summary judgment did not meet the requirements of Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 191(a) (eff. July 1, 2002), because it was not made based on the personal
knowledge of the affiant. The trial court noted that the affiant stated that he had personal
knowledge of the procedures for creating the records discussed in the affidavit, and that,
considering the statements of the affidavit as a whole, the affidavit satisfies the business
records exception to the hearsay rule enunciated in Champaign National Bank v. Babcock,
273 Ill. App. 3d. 292, 298 (1995).
¶ 38 Accordingly, the trial court found that Olufemi and Bola’s arguments did not raise a
genuine issue of material fact and granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank.
¶ 39 The trial court then turned to Olufemi and Bola’s motion to dismiss, stating that it was
premised “solely” on the claim that the Bank failed to send a grace period notice as required
by section 15-1502.5 of the Foreclosure Law. The trial court stated that, as it had previously
observed, Olufemi and Bola had admitted in effect that the grace period notice was sent, and
any further argument had been waived, when the Olufemi’s answer failed to bring up the
claim that no grace period notice was sent. Further, the trial court noted that “the time for
filing a motion to dismiss as a responsive pleading is long passed,” because the case stood
before the court on a fully briefed motion for summary judgment. The trial court accordingly
denied Olufemi and Bola’s motion to dismiss.

¶ 40 VII. Defendants’ Motion to Vacate
¶ 41 On March 3, 2012, the Bank sent a notice of sale to Olufemi and Bola, specifying the
date of public auction on April 10, 2012. On March 23, 2012, the trial court granted Olufemi
and Bola’s motion to stay the sale until April 26, 2012.
¶ 42 On March 23, 2012, by and through his new attorney, Robert D. Shearer, Jr., who entered
an appearance on that same date, Olufemi filed an emergency section 2-1301 motion to
vacate the judgment of foreclosure, the sale, the confirmation of sale, and the order for
possession based on unclean hands, bad faith, unfair dealing and fraud upon the court. 735
ILCS 5/2-1301 (West 2010). However, on April 6, 2012, the motion was voluntarily
withdrawn and the trial court granted Shearer leave to file an additional appearance for
Olufemi and Bola and to reply during the period in which the sale was stayed, ending on
April 26, 2012.
¶ 43 On April 24, 2012, Olufemi and Bola filed a motion to vacate the summary judgment,
order of default, and the judgment of foreclosure and sale, pursuant to section 2-1301 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1301 (West 2010)). The motion argued that the
judgment orders must be vacated because the Bank lacked standing and therefore the trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the orders. Olufemi and Bola presented three
alternative reasons why the original plaintiff, BAC, lacked standing: (1) when Aegis was
dissolved on August 13, 2007, by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Delaware, its principal-agency relationship with MERS was terminated and, therefore, the

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 purported assignment of Aegis’s interest in the subject mortgage to BAC was void; or (2) in
the alternative, BAC lacked standing because it did not hold title to both the promissory note
and mortgage, nor was it a nominee of an entity that held both interests; or (3) in the
alternative, the purported assignment of the interest in the mortgage by MERS to BAC was
invalid because it was created by an attorney representing BAC, not an independent agent of
MERS.
¶ 44 Attached to Olufemi and Bola’s motion was the affidavit of Tony Hernandez, who
testified that he engaged in research pertaining to the present suit. Hernandez stated that
during his research he discovered that the assignment of the mortgage from MERS, as
nominee for Aegis, to BAC, the original plaintiff, purports to have an authorized signer for
MERS named William McAllister. He stated that there are six people named William
McAllister in the State of Illinois, and only one had a connection with MERS, and that
William McAllister is a supervising attorney for Codilis & Associates, P.C. (Codilis), which
is counsel for the Bank. He stated that, based on his research and the verbiage of the
assignment documents, the assignment was created by Codilis and signed by McAllister,
“which may present a quandary for all parties as it appears that the foreclosing attorney has
prepared evidence in favor of its defunct client BAC.” He stated that this might be a violation
of the “Code of Ethical Conduct” for attorneys. The assignment was also attached to Olufemi
and Bola’s motion.
¶ 45 On July 31, 2012, the trial court denied Olufemi and Bola’s motion to vacate, “the court
explaining its reasoning before a court reporter.” However, this transcript is not in the
appellate record.
¶ 46 On August 30, 2012, Olufemi and Bola filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial
court’s July 31, 2012, judgment order denying Olufemi and Bola’s motion to vacate the
summary judgment and judgment of foreclosure and sale. The motion argued that the trial
court erred in its application of existing law when it denied its motion to vacate; again raising
the argument that the original plaintiff, BAC, lacked standing when it filed its complaint, and
further arguing that the Bank had fraudulently concealed that fact from the court. Therefore,
Olufemi and Bola concluded that their motion to vacate should be granted, and accordingly,
the trial court’s entry of summary judgment and judgment of foreclosure and sale in favor of
the Bank should be vacated. On September 21, 2012, following a hearing, the trial court
denied Olufemi and Bola’s motion for reconsideration.
¶ 47 On October 23, 2012, the Bank filed a motion for an order approving the report of sale
and distribution. The report of sale and distribution stated that on September 10, 2012, and
continued to October 15, 2012, the subject property was sold at public auction to the highest
bidder for cash. The Bank offered a bid of $159,543.56, and that being the highest bid, the
Judicial Sales Corporation sold the subject property to it. The Bank also attached to its
motion the certificate of sale signed by the Judicial Sales Corporation on October 15, 2012.
¶ 48 On December 20, 2012, the trial court entered an order approving the report of sale and
distribution, and confirming the sale and the order of possession. The court further ordered
that the successful bidder, any insurers, investors and agents of the Bank “are entitled to and
shall have possession” 60 days after the entry of the order.
¶ 49 On January 3, 2013, Olufemi and Bola filed a notice of appeal, and this direct appeal
followed.

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¶ 50 ANALYSIS
¶ 51 On this direct appeal, Olufemi and Bola raise, essentially, three issues: (1) whether the
Bank has standing; (2) whether the Bank committed fraud on the court when it concealed that
BAC did not have standing when it filed its complaint; and (3) whether the trial court erred
when it found that Olufemi and Bola admitted in effect to receiving a grace period notice by
failing to deny an unstated allegation in the Bank’s complaint that such notice had been sent.
¶ 52 Since there is no evidence in the record that the Bank sent a grace period notice prior to
filing its complaint, which is required before any foreclosure action may be instituted under
the Foreclosure Law, by sections 15-1502.5(b) and (c) of the Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS
5/15-1502.5(b), (c) (West 2010)), we remand to the trial court to determine in an evidentiary
hearing whether the grace period notice was sent. If the trial court finds that no grace period
notice was sent, then we find that the trial court abused its discretion in confirming the
judicial sale and all subsequent orders, the judicial sale must be vacated in accordance with
section 15-1508(b) of the Foreclosure Law, and the case must be dismissed. 735 ILCS
5/15-1508(b) (West 2010).

¶ 53 I. Standard of Review
¶ 54 On appeal, Olufemi and Bola ask us to reverse the trial court’s order granting the Bank’s
motion for summary judgment and the denial of Olufemi and Bola’s motion to dismiss, filed
pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West
2010)). The purpose of summary judgment is not to try an issue of fact, but to determine
whether a triable issue of fact exists. Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 335 (2002);
Schrager v. North Community Bank, 328 Ill. App. 3d 696, 708 (2002). “Although a plaintiff
is not required to prove his [or her] case at the summary judgment stage, in order to survive a
motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present a factual basis that would
arguably entitle the party to a judgment.” Robidoux, 201 Ill. 2d at 335.
¶ 55 A trial court is permitted to grant summary judgment only “if the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2010). The trial court must consider documents and
exhibits filed in support of or opposition to a motion for summary judgment in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Home Insurance Co. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 213 Ill.
2d 307, 315 (2004); see also Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill. 2d 107, 113
(1995) (a court “must construe [documents and exhibits] strictly against the movant and
liberally in favor of the nonmoving party”). Summary judgment is a drastic measure and
should be granted only if the movant’s right to judgment is clear and free from doubt.
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992).
¶ 56 We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo. Outboard
Marine Corp., 154 Ill. 2d at 102; Hernandez v. Alexian Brothers Health System, 384 Ill. App.
3d 510, 519 (2008). Under the de novo standard of review, the reviewing court does not need
to defer to the trial court’s judgment or reasoning. People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 14 (2007).
De novo review is completely independent of the trial court’s decision. United States Steel
Corp. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 384 Ill. App. 3d 457, 461 (2008). De novo
consideration means that the reviewing court performs the same analysis that a trial judge
would perform. Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 408 Ill. App. 3d 564, 578 (2011).

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¶ 57 “A motion to dismiss, pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code, admits the legal sufficiency
of the plaintiffs’ complaint, but asserts an affirmative defense or other matter that avoids or
defeats the plaintiffs’ claim.” DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59 (2006); Solaia
Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558, 578-79 (2006). When
reviewing a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, “a court must accept as true all well-pleaded
facts in plaintiffs’ complaint and all inferences that can reasonably be drawn in plaintiffs’
favor.” Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich, 231 Ill. 2d 474, 488 (2008). “In ruling on a motion to
dismiss under section 2-619, the trial court may consider pleadings, depositions, and
affidavits.” Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 209 Ill. 2d 248, 262 (2004). We
review a court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo. Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty
Publishing Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558, 579 (2006); Blagojevich, 231 Ill. 2d at 488.

¶ 58 II. Standing
¶ 59 Olufemi and Bola first argue that the Bank lacked standing to file a foreclosure action,
arguing that: (1) MERS did not have the authority to assign the mortgage to BAC because
MERS’ agency powers terminated when Aegis was dissolved in bankruptcy court on August
13, 2007; (2) MERS never received title to the promissory note and could not assign it to
BAC; and (3) BAC did not hold the promissory note and mortgage when the foreclosure
lawsuit was filed on January 20, 2011. In response, the Bank argues that Olufemi and Bola
waived the issue since Olufemi did not raise it as an affirmative and Bola did not file an
answer, and that, even if the issue was not waived, the Bank sufficiently proved that it had
standing to sue.

¶ 60 A. Waiver
¶ 61 When a plaintiff lacks standing in a foreclosure action, the trial court’s entry of summary
judgment and orders of foreclosure and sale are improper as a matter of law. Bayview Loan
Servicing, L.L.C. v. Nelson, 382 Ill. App. 3d 1184, 1188 (2008). “The doctrine of standing is
designed to preclude persons who have no interest in a controversy from bringing suit” and
“assures that issues are raised only by those parties with a real interest in the outcome of the
controversy.” Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 221 (1999). “[S]tanding requires
some injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest ***.” Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d at 221. Our
Illinois Supreme Court has stated that the “lack of standing in a civil case is an affirmative
defense, which will be forfeited if not raised in a timely fashion in the trial court.” Greer v.
Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 508 (1988); People v. Kelly, 397 Ill.
App. 3d 232 (2009). As an affirmative defense, the lack of standing is the defendant’s burden
to plead and prove. Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 252-53 (2010).
¶ 62 In its order for summary judgment, the court rejected Olufemi’s argument that the Bank
lacked standing, because he did not plead lack of standing as an affirmative defense in his
answer and, therefore, the argument was waived. On appeal, the Bank relies on the reasoning
of the trial court, arguing that Olufemi and Bola have waived the argument that the Bank
lacks standing. The Bank relies on Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Barnes,
406 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6-7 (2010), which found that when a defendant mortgagor fails to argue a
lack of standing before a foreclosure judgment, that argument is forfeited and the defendant
is barred from litigating the issue later.

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¶ 63 However, Olufemi did plead lack of standing as an affirmative defense in his answer.
Because his motion for leave to file an amended answer was denied, the only answer on file
is his original pro se answer. His pro se answer states under “other affirmative matter,” the
following: “3(N)–The note was not endorsed and no assignment or allonge was attached or
recorded.” Section 3(N) of the complaint, to which the answer refers, states that: “Capacity in
which Plaintiff brings this foreclosure: Plaintiff is the Mortgagee under 735 ILCS
5/15-1208.”
¶ 64 Section 2-603(c) of the Code provides that “pleadings shall be liberally construed with a
view to doing substantial justice between the parties.” 735 ILCS 5/2-603(c) (West 2010).
Construing Olufemi’s answer with the view of doing substantial justice, we find that Olufemi
adequately pled standing in his answer such that the argument has not been waived, and we
will address each of defendants’ arguments in turn.

¶ 65 B. Dissolution of Aegis
¶ 66 Olufemi and Bola first argue that the dissolution of the original lender, Aegis, terminated
MERS’ agency powers as to the assignment of the mortgage and consequently the
assignment of Aegis’s interest in the mortgage to BAC was rendered void. Olufemi and Bola
claim that, on August 13, 2007, Aegis was dissolved by the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Delaware pursuant to Title 11 of chapter 11 of the United States Code, and
that the principal-agency relationship between MERS and Aegis terminated on that day. As a
result, Olufemi and Bola argue that MERS no longer had the agency power to assign Aegis’s
interest in the mortgage to BAC on January 20, 2011, and that the Bank does not have
standing because that assignment was void.
¶ 67 To establish a prima facie case of foreclosure in accordance with section 15-1504, a
plaintiff is required to introduce evidence of the mortgage and promissory note, at which
time the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove any affirmative defenses. Farm
Credit Bank of St. Louis v. Biethman, 262 Ill. App. 3d 614, 622 (1994). Section 15-1504 does
not require that a foreclosure be filed by the owner of the note and mortgage, and instead
states that the legal holder of the indebtedness, a pledge, an agent, or a trustee may file the
lawsuit. 735 ILCS 5/15-1504(a)(3)(N) (West 2010).
¶ 68 In the instant case, the Bank met the requirements to maintain a foreclosure action
because it filed copies of the mortgage and note attached to the complaint. In its motion for
summary judgment, the Bank attachment an affidavit of Acee Fuller, an officer of the Bank,
who stated that BAC holds the promissory note and that the Bank is successor by merger to
BAC. The Bank also submitted a copy of the assignment from MERS to BAC, which was
signed and notarized prior to the filing of the instant action.
¶ 69 Once the Bank filed its motion for summary judgment with its supporting affidavits, the
burden shifted to Olufemi and Bola to prove that there was no genuine issue of material fact.
In re Marriage of Palacios, 275 Ill. App. 3d 561, 568 (1995) (“The mere suggestion that a
genuine issue of material fact exists, without supporting documentation does not create an
issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.”); Prather v. Decatur Memorial
Hospital, 95 Ill. App. 3d 470, 472 (1981) (“Where facts contained in an affidavit in support
of a motion for summary judgment are not contradicted by counteraffidavit, such facts are
admitted and must be taken as true.”).

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¶ 70 Here, the only evidence that Olufemi and Bola presented in favor of their argument was a
one-page Internet printout reporting that the United State Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Delaware entered a chapter 11 order on August 13, 2007, which is insufficient to prove that
the Bank lacked standing since it says nothing concerning what happened to the assets and
liabilities following Aegis’s purported dissolution. Furthermore, Olufemi and Bola’s brief
does not cite to any additional facts in the appellate record and does not cite to any case law
beyond the general rule that an agent’s authority does not extend beyond the dissolution of
the principal. As a result, Olufemi and Bola failed to prove that the Bank lacked standing,
and the trial court’s rejection of this argument was not improper, and the trial court did not
err in granting the Bank’s motion for summary judgment and denying Olufemi and Bola’s
motion to dismiss.

¶ 71 C. MERS’ Agency Powers
¶ 72 Olufemi and Bola next argue that MERS, the original mortgagee, could not assign the
debt instrument from the original lender, Aegis, to BAC because MERS never received title
to the promissory note. Olufemi and Bola claim that MERS is a private corporation that
merely tracks the transfer of ownership interests and servicing rights to mortgage loans, and
that MERS has no independent right to collect on any debt since MERS itself does not extend
credit and mortgage debtors do not owe it money. As a result, Olufemi and Bola argue that,
since there was no evidence in the mortgage documents attached to the foreclosure complaint
that demonstrated that MERS held the promissory note or was given authority by Aegis to
assign the note to BAC, the assignment on January 20, 2011, was void and the Bank does not
have standing.
¶ 73 However, as we have explained, the Bank filed an affidavit of Acee Fuller, an officer of
the Bank, who stated that BAC holds the promissory note and that the Bank is successor by
merger to BAC. In addition, the Bank has a copy of the assignment from MERS to BAC,
which was signed and notarized prior to the instant lawsuit. The burden then shifted to
Olufemi and Bola to prove that the Bank did not have standing (In re Marriage of Palacios,
275 Ill. App. 3d at 568), and they failed to submit sufficient evidence to support their claim.
Olufemi and Bola’s brief does not cite to any evidence in the record concerning MERS’
agency powers, and instead quotes from cases in Nebraska, New York, Missouri, and an
unpublished opinion in California, all of which contain significantly different factual
backgrounds. As a result, the trial court did not err in granting the Bank’s motion for
summary judgment and denying Olufemi and Bola’s motion to dismiss since the Bank
presented evidence that it held the note and mortgage.

¶ 74 D. Holder of the Promissory Note and Mortgage
¶ 75 Last, Olufemi and Bola argue that the Bank does not have standing because BAC did not
hold title to the promissory note and mortgage at the time of the suit and did not qualify as a
holder, agent, trustee or pledgee. Here, Olufemi and Bola largely restate their previous
arguments that the Bank cannot hold the note and mortgage because Aegis was dissolved in
2007 and MERS never held title to the promissory note, which they also point out lists Aegis
as the payee, not BAC. Olufemi and Bola additionally argue that, since the Bank did not have
standing to file the foreclosure lawsuit, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
enter its order of summary judgment and all subsequent orders, citing People v. Capital

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 News, Inc., 137 Ill. 2d 162, 170 (1990) (when a plaintiff lacks standing to assert a claim, the
trial court’s judgment must be set aside for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
¶ 76 Olufemi and Bola’s argument that BAC never held the note and mortgage relies on the
implication from their previous arguments that BAC could not have held the note and
mortgage since MERS’ agency powers were terminated when Aegis was dissolved in 2007
and MERS never held the note. However, the Bank presented evidence that BAC held the
note when the instant action was filed, and Olufemi and Bola failed to present any evidence
to support their argument that the Bank lacked standing. As a result, the trial court did not err
in granting the Bank’s motion for summary judgment and denying Olufemi and Bola’s
motion to dismiss.

¶ 77 III. Fraud on the Court
¶ 78 Next, Olufemi and Bola argue that the Bank’s attorneys fraudulently created standing to
file the instant action by creating and executing the assignment from MERS to BAC.
Manufacturing evidence favorable to a plaintiff, or concealing evidence favorable to a
defendant, and the concealment of that scheme would constitute fraud on the court. People v.
Ranson, 4 Ill. App. 3d 953, 956 (1972). A trial court would lack subject matter jurisdiction
where there was fraud upon the court. In re Petition to Annex Certain Territory to the Village
of Willowbrook, 37 Ill. App. 2d 393 (1962).
¶ 79 Here, Olufemi and Bola argue the assignment of the mortgage by MERS to BAC is void
since the “authorized signator” for MERS was William McAllister, who they claim is the
same Bill McAllister who is a supervising attorney for the Bank’s counsel, Codilis &
Associates. Olufemi and Bola argue that, as a general rule, an agent may not act for two
principals whose interests are adverse (Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Schwartz, 339 Ill. 184,
193-94 (1930)), and that an agent’s representation of both the buyer and seller of a parcel of
real estate is an improper agency since the buyer and seller are adverse to each other
(Warrick v. Smith, 137 Ill. 504, 508 (1891)).
¶ 80 However, Olufemi and Bola’s argument relies on the Bank’s alleged lack of standing,
which they failed to show. Furthermore, Olufemi and Bola did not present evidence of the
claimed fraud and its subsequent cover up, and they do not cite to the appellate record in their
brief in support of their argument.
¶ 81 We do note that Olufemi and Bola attached to their motion to vacate the affidavit of Tony
Hernandez, who stated that he researched the lawsuit and found that there are six people
named William McAllister in the State of Illinois, one of whom is a supervising attorney for
the Bank’s counsel, Codilis, and that he believed the assignment was created by Codilis and
signed by McAllister, “which may present a quandary for all parties as it appears that the
foreclosing attorney has prepared evidence in favor of its defunct client BAC,” and
potentially a violation of the “Code of Ethical Conduct” for attorneys. However, Olufemi and
Bola have not submitted any evidence supporting Hernandez’s claims.
¶ 82 Moreover, Olufemi and Bola have not presented any evidence that McAllister was not an
authorized signatory for MERS, and they do not cite any relevant case law in their briefs that
show that MERS acted improperly. Since Olufemi and Bola failed to show the Bank lacked
standing and they did not present evidence of fraud, the trial court did not err when it granted
the Bank’s motion for summary judgment and denied Olufemi and Bola’s motion to dismiss.

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¶ 83 IV. Grace Period Notice
¶ 84 Olufemi and Bola next argue that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it
interpreted section 15-1504 of the Foreclosure Law such that Olufemi and Bola admitted in
effect to receiving a grace period notice, by not denying such in their answer, even though
the complaint failed to allege it.
¶ 85 The Bank argues, in a short three-paragraph response, that the trial court did not err in
denying Olufemi and Bola’s motion to dismiss; that the Foreclosure Law does not require
that Olufemi and Bola receive a grace period notice only that the Bank send it; and that the
court should not depart from the Foreclosure Law’s “long established procedures.” The Bank
cites only one unpublished order in support of its argument.

¶ 86 A. Section 15-1502.5
¶ 87 Section 15-1502.5 of the Foreclosure Law, commonly known as the Homeowner
Protection Act (the Act), became effective on April 6, 2009. 735 ILCS 5/15-1502.5 (West
2010). The Act was written to provide owners of single-family, owner-occupied properties an
additional last-minute escape valve to rescue their mortgages before the lender files a suit
under the Foreclosure Law. The grace period notice required by the Act directs the borrower
to various resources available for counseling and loan modification assistance. 735 ILCS
5/15-1502.5(c) (West 2010). If a counseling agency approved by the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development notifies the lender within the 30-day period
that the borrower is seeking approved counseling services, the lender cannot file suit until an
additional 30 days has passed. 735 ILCS 5/15-1502.5(e) (West 2010).
¶ 88 A grace period notice is required before any foreclosure action may be instituted.
Subsection 15-1502.5(c) of the Foreclosure Law provides:
“No foreclosure action under Part 15 of Article XV of the Code of Civil
Procedure shall be instituted on a mortgage secured by residential real estate before
mailing the notice described in this subsection (c).
The notice required in this subsection (c) shall state the date on which the notice
was mailed, shall be headed in bold 14-point type ‘GRACE PERIOD NOTICE’, and
shall state the following in 14-point type: ‘YOUR LOAN IS MORE THAN 30 DAYS
PAST DUE. YOU MAY BE EXPERIENCING FINANCIAL DIFFICULTY. IT
MAY BE IN YOUR BEST INTEREST TO SEEK APPROVED HOUSING
COUNSELING. YOU HAVE A GRACE PERIOD OF 30 DAYS FROM THE
DATE OF THIS NOTICE TO OBTAIN APPROVED HOUSING COUNSELING.
DURING THE GRACE PERIOD, THE LAW PROHIBITS US FROM TAKING
ANY LEGAL ACTION AGAINST YOU. YOU MAY BE ENTITLED TO AN
ADDITIONAL 30 DAY GRACE PERIOD IF YOU OBTAIN HOUSING
COUNSELING FROM AN APPROVED HOUSING COUNSELING AGENCY. A
LIST OF APPROVED COUNSELING AGENCIES MAY BE OBTAINED FROM
THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION.’ ” 735 ILCS 5/15-1502.5(c) (West 2010).
¶ 89 On appeal, Olufemi and Bola argue that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the
Foreclosure Law when it held, under section 15-1504(c) of the Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS
5/15-1504(c) (West 2010)), that Olufemi and Bola had admitted in effect that the Bank had

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 sent the grace period notice required by section 15-1502.5 of the Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS
5/15-1502.5 (West 2010)). However, under de novo review, we need not give any deference
to the judgment or reasoning of the trial court. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 14.
¶ 90 The facts related to a grace period notice are undisputed and in the record. Olufemi and
Bola swore in their affidavits in response to the Bank’s motion for summary judgment that
they never received a grace period notice. The Bank does not contest this fact but, rather,
argues that the Foreclosure Law does not require that Olufemi and Bola receive a grace
period notice but, rather, all that is required is that the Bank send the notice, and that the
sending “is presumed when a plaintiff files a complaint that follows the form for pleadings
set forth in 735 ILCS 5/[15]-1504(a) [(West 2010)].” This argument relies upon the
reasoning of the trial court, which found that, because the original complaint looked
“substantially” like the form set forth in section 15-1504(a) of the Foreclosure Law, the
complaint included the allegation that “other notices required to be given,” i.e., the grace
period notice, had been sent. The trial court concluded that, since Olufemi’s answer had not
denied this unstated allegation, which the trial court construed to be included in the
complaint as part of the “other notices required to be given,” he had admitted it, and therefore
this argument was waived.

¶ 91 B. Relevant Case Law
¶ 92 Citing only an unpublished order in U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Olavarria, No. 10-CH-32532 (Cir.
Ct. Cook Co.) (Olavarria), the trial court found that “other notices required to be given”
includes the grace period notice required by sections 15-1502.5(b) and (c) of the Foreclosure
Law (735 ILCS 5/15-1502.5(b), (c) (West 2010)). In Olavarria, the circuit court, as in the
present case, denied the defendant’s section 2-619 motion to dismiss based on lack of a grace
period notice. The court in Olavarria stated that since the plaintiff’s complaint followed the
form laid out in section 15-1504(a) of the Foreclosure Law, it was automatically construed
under section 15-1504(c) to include the allegation that “other notices required to be given
have been duly and properly given.” Citing no authority other than the Foreclosure Law, the
court in Olavarria held that the clause “other notices required to be given” in section
15-1504(c) includes the grace period notice. Thus, the court in the instant case held that,
because on a motion to dismiss the court must accept all well-pled allegations in the
complaint, “the court must accept the allegation that the grace period notice was sent by U.S.
Bank to the defendant as true,” and therefore it denied Olufemi and Bola’s motion to dismiss.
¶ 93 However, under Illinois law, decisions of the circuit courts have no precedential value, so
the circuit court’s decision in Olavarria, cited by the trial court, has no precedential value
here. See Delgado v. Board of Election Commissioners, 224 Ill. 2d 481, 488 (2007).
¶ 94 Binding case law regarding the grace period notice also does not resolve the current
dispute. This court has held that a “flawless” grace period notice is not required before a
foreclosure complaint can be filed and that, where there is a technical defect in the notice and
the mortgagor has not alleged prejudice, dismissal of the complaint would be “futile.” Bank
of America, N.A. v. Luca, 2013 IL App (3d) 120601, ¶ 16; Aurora Loan Services, LLC v.
Pajor, 2012 IL App (2d) 110899, ¶ 27. In Bank of America, N.A. v. Luca, 2013 IL App (3d)
120601, ¶ 8, the defendants argued that since the grace period notice was addressed to only
one of the two defendants, the notice was defective and the foreclosure action could not
commence. The appellate court found, however, that since both defendants had knowledge of

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 the notice, had in fact discussed loan modification with the plaintiff, and had failed to allege
any prejudice based on defective notice, their claim was meritless. Luca, 2013 IL App (3d)
120601, ¶ 17. Similarly, in Aurora Loan Services, LLC v. Pajor, 2012 IL App (2d) 110899,
¶¶ 26-28, the court held that although the plaintiff had sent a grace period notice before it
was technically the mortgagee, the substantive requirements of section 15-1502.5 were met,
and thus this “irregularity” did not warrant dismissal of the foreclosure action. In each of
these cases, there was evidence in the record that the grace period notice was sent and that
the defendants had knowledge of the notice. See Pajor, 2012 IL App (2d) 110899, ¶ 27;
Luca, 2013 IL App (3d) 120601, ¶ 17. In the present case, however, Olufemi and Bola do not
allege that the grace period notice was defective but, rather, that they did not receive any
notice at all. Further, evidence of a grace period notice being sent is not found within the
record, nor did the Bank claim it sent it. Neither this court nor the Illinois Supreme Court has
ever held that a sale may be confirmed on appeal without any grace period notice being sent.
Indeed, section 15-1502.5(h) of the Foreclosure Law states that there can be no waiver of this
prerequisite. 735 ILCS 5/15-1502.5(h) (West 2010).
¶ 95 The trial court’s holding on this issue and the Bank’s argument on appeal both rely on a
specific interpretation of section 15-1504 of the Foreclosure Law. Since the case law does
not speak to this issue, the resolution of this issue is a case of first impression and turns upon
a question of statutory interpretation.

¶ 96 C. Statutory Interpretation
¶ 97 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. See Ryan v. Board of
Trustees of the General Assembly Retirement System, 236 Ill. 2d 315, 319 (2010); McNamara
v. Oak Lawn Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 356 Ill. App. 3d 961, 964 (2005);
Cullerton v. Du Page County Officers Electoral Board, 384 Ill. App. 3d 989, 991 (2008). As
we have indicated, de novo consideration means we perform the same analysis that a trial
judge would perform. Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 408 Ill. App. 3d 564, 578 (2011).
¶ 98 The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the
legislature’s intent. People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 36, 45 (2002). The
best indication of legislative intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory
language. Birkett, 202 Ill. 2d at 45. Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must
apply the statute without resort to other aids of statutory construction. Birkett, 202 Ill. 2d at
45-46. If the statutory language is ambiguous, we look to other sources to decide the
legislature’s intent. Birkett, 202 Ill. 2d at 46. We must view all provisions of a statutory
enactment as a whole and “[a]ccordingly, words and phrases should not be construed in
isolation, but must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute.”
Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006)
(citing Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000)).
Statutes are interpreted with the presumption that the legislative intent was not to create
“absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results.” In re Application of the County Treasurer & ex
officio County Collector, 2013 IL App (1st) 130103, ¶ 9 (citing Fisher v. Waldrop, 221 Ill. 2d
102, 112 (2006)). “Furthermore, reviewing courts have a duty to construe a statute in a
manner that upholds its validity and constitutionality.” In re Application of the County
Treasurer, 2013 IL App (1st) 130103, ¶ 9 (citing Fisher, 221 Ill. 2d at 112).

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¶ 99 This issue requires the resolution of two sections of the Foreclosure Law: sections
15-1502.5 and 15-1504. Section 15-1502.5 of the Foreclosure Law reads in pertinent part:
“(b) *** [N]o mortgagee shall file a complaint to foreclose a mortgage secured by
residential real estate until the requirements of this Section have been satisfied.
***
[(c)] No foreclosure action under Part 15 of Article XV of the Code of Civil
Procedure shall be instituted on a mortgage secured by residential real estate before
mailing the notice described in this subsection (c).
The notice required in this subsection (c) shall state the date on which the notice
was mailed, shall be headed in bold 14-point type ‘GRACE PERIOD NOTICE ***.’
***
The sending of the notice required under this subsection (c) means depositing or
causing to be deposited into the United States mail an envelope with first-class
postage prepaid that contains the document to be delivered. ***
(d) Until 30 days after mailing the notice provided for under subsection (c) of this
Section, no legal action shall be instituted under Part 15 of Article XV of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
***
(h) There shall be no waiver of any provision of this Section.” 735 ILCS
5/15-1502.5(b), (c), (d), (h) (West 2010).
¶ 100 The plain language of this section indicates that the legislature intended for the grace
period notice to be sent prior to any foreclosure action under the Foreclosure Law, as
indicated by sections 15-1502.5(b) (“[N]o mortgagee shall file a complaint to foreclose a
mortgage secured by residential real estate until the requirements of this Section have been
satisfied.”), 15-1502.5(c) (“No foreclosure action under Part 15 of Article XV of the Code of
Civil Procedure shall be instituted on a mortgage secured by residential real estate before
mailing the notice described in this subsection (c).”), and 15-1502.5(d) (“Until 30 days after
mailing the notice provided for under subsection (c) of this Section, no legal action shall be
instituted under Part 15 of Article XV of the Code of Civil Procedure.”). 735 ILCS
5/15-1502.5(b), (c), (d) (West 2010). These requirements are mandatory, because section
15-1105(b) defines the word “shall” as used in the Foreclosure Law as “mandatory and not
permissive.” 735 ILCS 15-1105(b) (West 2010). “A mortgagee cannot comply with these
requirements while a foreclosure suit is pending. The notice must come before the suit.”
Pajor, 2012 IL App (2d) 110899, ¶ 23.
¶ 101 The Bank contends, however, relying on the logic of the trial court, that Olufemi and
Bola lost the ability to challenge a lack of grace period notice by not denying in an answer
that it was sent, despite the fact that the complaint failed to state that this notice was sent, and
regardless of whether the notice was actually sent. The Bank’s argument relies on a specific
reading of section 15-1504 of the Foreclosure Law. 735 ILCS 5/15-1504 (West 2010). This
section reads in pertinent part:
“(c) *** The statements contained in a complaint in the form set forth in
subsection (a) of Section 15-1504 are deemed and construed to include allegations as
follows:
***

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 (9) that any and all notices of default or election to declare the indebtedness
due and payable or other notices required to be given have been duly and properly
given.” 735 ILCS 5/15-1504(c)(9) (West 2010).
¶ 102 The trial court interpreted “other notices required to be given” to include the grace period
notice described in section 15-1502.5 of the Foreclosure Law. Under this interpretation of the
Foreclosure Law, it is deemed alleged in any complaint in the form set forth in section
15-1504(a) that the grace period notice was sent. If a defendant does not deny this unstated
allegation, it is therefore admitted. In the trial court’s assessment, cited approvingly by the
Bank, the issue has therefore been waived. This admission and waiver would apply
regardless of whether the mortgagee had actually sent a grace period notice, and there is no
burden on the mortgagee to provide any proof that it was sent. However, as we explain
below, we find that the trial court’s interpretation of the Foreclosure Law does not reflect the
intent of the legislature and find that the language “other notices required to be given” in
section 15-1504 does not include the grace period notice required by section 15-1502.5.
¶ 103 First, we observe that section 15-1504 was enacted in 1990, 19 years prior to the
enactment of section 15-1502.5 in 2009. Therefore, when the legislature wrote in section
15-1504 of the Foreclosure Law that, “the statements contained in a complaint in the form set
forth in subsection (a) of Section 15-1504 are deemed and construed to include allegations
*** that *** other notices required to be given have been duly and properly given,” it could
not have intended for “other notices required to be given” to include the grace period notice,
because the grace period notice was not a required notice at the time of drafting of that
provision. Instead, the most recent enunciation of the legislature controls, that “[t]here shall
be no waiver” of the requirement of a grace period notice prior to the filing of a suit under
the Foreclosure Law. 735 ILCS 5/15-1502.5(h) (West 2010).
¶ 104 Further, the interpretation of the statute by the trial court and the Bank creates an (1)
absurd; (2) unjust; and (3) inconvenient result, and therefore is presumed not to be the intent
of the legislature. See In re Application of the County Treasurer, 2013 IL App (1st) 130103,
¶ 9 (citing Fisher, 221 Ill. 2d at 112).
¶ 105 This interpretation creates an absurd result when viewed in light of the other relevant
statutory provisions. Subsection 15-1502.5(h) states that no provision within that section,
which includes the requirement of a grace period notice, can be waived. 735 ILCS
5/15-1502.5(h) (West 2010). To read the “other notices required to be given” to include grace
period notice would create the absurd result that a defendant’s inaction in response to an
unwritten allegation could waive the need for such notice, which the statute states cannot be
waived. To allow this section to be so easily waived would render it nearly unenforceable, an
absurd result in light of the emphasis the statute places on the need for such notice to be sent
prior to any action under the Foreclosure Law. See 735 ILCS 5/15-1502.5(b), (c), (d) (West
2010).
¶ 106 This interpretation also leads to an unjust result for Olufemi and Bola, and for future
defendants. The Homeowner Protection Act was written to provide owners of single-family,
owner-occupied properties an additional last-minute escape valve to rescue their mortgages
before the lender files a suit under the Foreclosure Law. The grace period notice required by
the Act directs the borrower to various resources available for counseling and loan
modification assistance. 735 ILCS 5/15-1502.5(c) (West 2010). If a Housing and Urban
Development (HUD)-approved counseling agency notifies the lender within the 30-day

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 period that the borrower is seeking approved counseling services, the lender cannot file suit
until an additional 30 days has passed. 735 ILCS 5/15-1502.5(e) (West 2010).
¶ 107 In Pajor, 2012 IL App (2d) 110899, ¶ 24, the appellate court held that the purpose of
section 15-1502.5 is to “encourage workouts for mortgages in default.” This is achieved by
allowing for a 30-day extension, during which the mortgagor may not file suit, if the
mortgagor obtains approved housing counseling and the creation of a “sustainable loan
workout plan.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pajor, 2012 IL App (2d) 110899, ¶ 24;
735 ILCS 5/15-1502.5(e) (West 2010). The events in the present case illustrate the potential
injustice under the Bank’s interpretation of the statute. In affidavits attached to their response
to the Bank’s motion for summary judgment, Olufemi and Bola insist that they did not
receive any grace period notice. The Bank does not contend that this notice was sent. Instead,
the Bank argues that Olufemi and Bola have waived their ability to raise the issue after
Olufemi’s pro se response to the complaint, in which he supposedly admitted an unstated
allegation by failing to deny it. Olufemi states in his motion for leave to file instanter, that he
filed his pro se answer to preserve his rights. Instead, under the Bank’s interpretation of the
statute, he lost his right to a grace period notice. We cannot assume that had Olufemi and
Bola received such notice, they necessarily would have been able to create a workout plan;
however, it is the intent of the legislature for each mortgagor to have this opportunity prior to
any foreclosure action, and this opportunity was never given to them, creating an unjust
result.
¶ 108 Lastly, this interpretation is inconvenient. As stated above, the legislature intends for
mortgages to be worked out prior to the filing of a foreclosure suit. By allowing this
provision to be so easily admitted, it creates a disincentive for mortgagees to send a grace
period notice and create a workout plan with the mortgagor, which would lead to the
inconvenience of additional foreclosure cases filed in the courts.
¶ 109 The Bank also points out that Olufemi and Bola’s affidavits, attached to their response to
the motion for summary judgment, stated only that they did not receive a grace period notice,
while the statute requires only that the mortgagee send a grace period notice. However,
Olufemi and Bola’s affidavits, which state that that they did not receive a grace period notice
can imply that the Bank did not send such notice, particularly where it is not within Olufemi
and Bola’s knowledge whether the notice was sent and where the Bank never claimed that
such a notice was sent.
¶ 110 The Bank also argues that any departure from the “long-established” procedures of the
Foreclosure Law defies logic. In support of this contention, the Bank cites a circuit court’s
unpublished order describing the Foreclosure Law:
“Enacted and codified in 1987, it is an obvious compromise between lenders and
borrowers. Lenders benefit from the law’s establishment of a form complaint which is
fairly immune from attack through pleading motions, and from the streamlined
procedure the lender may use to prove up its case. Borrowers benefit from the many
windows of opportunity the law provides them to rescue their properties out of the
foreclosure process and the extraordinary length of time it takes to litigate even an
uncontested case.” (Emphasis added.) Citimortgage v. Schroedter, No. 11-CH-7639
(Cir. Ct. Cook Co.).
First, this description of the Foreclosure Law only emphasizes the importance of the grace
period notice, which is a “window of opportunity” for homeowners to prevent foreclosures.

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 Second, and foremost, unpublished orders have no precedential value. Burnette v. Stroger,
389 Ill. App. 3d 321, 329 (2009) (citing Ill. S. Ct. R. 23 (eff. May 30, 2008)).
¶ 111 Finally, we note that, even if section 15-1504 presumes that a grace period notice was
sent, that section does not presume an allegation in the complaint that a plaintiff waits 30
days to file an action pursuant to section 15-1502.5. 735 ILCS 5/15-1502.5(d) (West 2010).
However, since there is no evidence that the Bank actually sent the grace period notice to
Olufemi and Bola, it is impossible to determine whether the Bank waited 30 days to file the
instant foreclosure action.
¶ 112 Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it deemed that Olufemi and
Bola admitted to receiving the grace period notice, even though the Bank never showed
evidence that it mailed or served a notice, and thus we remand to the trial court to determine
in an evidentiary hearing whether the grace period notice was sent, and whether the Bank
waited past 30 days before they filed suit.

¶ 113 V. Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale
¶ 114 On December 8, 2011, the trial court entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale against
Olufemi and Bola. On December 20, 2012, it entered an order approving the report of sale
and distribution, confirming the sale, and the order of possession. Olufemi and Bola request
that this court vacate the judicial sale. We find that since a grace period notice is required to
be sent and that the Bank must wait 30 days before a foreclosure action is filed, and there is
no evidence in the record that this notice was sent, we must remand to the trial court to
determine in an evidentiary hearing whether the grace period notice was sent and whether the
Bank waited past 30 days before they filed suit. If the trial court finds that no grace period
notice was sent or the Bank did not wait past 30 days before filing suit, we find that the trial
court abused its discretion in confirming the judicial sale and all subsequent orders, and the
judicial sale must be vacated in accordance with section 15-1508(b) of the Foreclosure Law
(735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b) (West 2010)), and the case must be dismissed.

¶ 115 A. Standard of Review
¶ 116 “Under the Foreclosure Law, after a judicial sale and a motion to confirm the sale has
been filed, the court’s discretion to vacate the sale is governed by the mandatory provisions
of section 15-1508(b).” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. McCluskey, 2013 IL 115469, ¶ 18. Section
15-1508(b) of the Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b) (West 2010)) grants the court
broad discretion to approve or disapprove judicial sales. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v.
Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380, ¶ 15. We review the approval of judicial sales under an
abuse of discretion standard. Parkway, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380, ¶ 15. A circuit court
abuses its discretion when its ruling “is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” People v. Caffey, 205 Ill.
2d 52, 89 (2001). An abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential to the circuit court.
Davis v. Kraff, 405 Ill. App. 3d 20, 28 (2010).

¶ 117 B. Section 15-1508(b) of the Foreclosure Law
¶ 118 Section 15-1508(b) of the Foreclosure Law requires that the sale shall not be confirmed
unless the court finds that: “(i) a notice required in accordance with subsection (c) of Section

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 15-1507 was not given,[4] (ii) the terms of sale were unconscionable, (iii) the sale was
conducted fraudulently, or (iv) justice was otherwise not done.” 735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b)
(West 2010).
¶ 119 “A court is justified in refusing to approve a judicial sale if unfairness is shown that is
prejudicial to an interested party.” Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v.
Thompson, 368 Ill. App. 3d 1035, 1037 (2006) (citing Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. First
Chicago Trust Co. of Illinois, 269 Ill. App. 3d 293, 300 (1999)).
¶ 120 The Foreclosure Law does not define “injustice” under section 15-1508(b)(iv). 735 ILCS
5/15-1508(b)(iv) (West 2010). Although NAB Bank v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 2013 IL App (1st)
121147, ¶ 9, attempted to narrow this provision, our supreme court in Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. v. McCluskey, 2013 IL 115469, subsequently defined its use. Our supreme court
describes the injustice clause as a codification of “the long-standing discretion of the courts
of equity to refuse to confirm a judicial sale.” McCluskey, 2013 IL 115469, ¶ 19. “[T]he
justice provision under section 15-1508(b)(iv) acts as a safety valve to allow the court to
vacate the judicial sale and, in rare cases, the underlying judgment, based on traditional
equitable principles.” McCluskey, 2013 IL 115469, ¶ 25.
¶ 121 Our supreme court has stated that in order to vacate a sale and the underlying judgment, a
defendant must: (1) have a meritorious defense; and (2) “establish under section
15-1508(b)(iv) that justice was not otherwise done because either the lender, through fraud or
misrepresentation, prevented the borrower from raising his meritorious defenses to the
complaint at an earlier time in the proceedings, or [that] the borrower has equitable defenses
that reveal he was otherwise prevented from protecting his property interests.” (Emphasis
added.) McCluskey, 2013 IL 115469, ¶ 26.

¶ 122 C. Application
¶ 123 Since we are remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Bank sent
the grace period notice and waited past 30 days to file its suit, we turn to the vacation of the
sale. To vacate a sale, Olufemi and Bola must show that either: (1) fraud or misrepresentation
prevented them from raising their meritorious defenses; or (2) an equitable defense reveals
they were prevented from protecting their property interests. McCluskey, 2013 IL 115469,
¶ 26. Although in asking this court to vacate the sale, Olufemi and Bola do not cite
specifically to one of the four provisions of section 15-1508(b), they do directly challenge
their lack of grace period notice, and argue that the interpretation of the trial court was
“fundamentally unfair” and constitutes a due process violation. Both of these claims speak to
the fourth provision of section 15-1508(b), that “justice was otherwise not done.” 735 ILCS
5/15-1508(b) (West 2010).
¶ 124 A grace period notice provides homeowners a mechanism to prevent foreclosure and stay
in their homes. As stated earlier, a grace period notice has the purpose of encouraging
workouts for mortgages, by giving mortgagors the opportunity to obtain “APPROVED
HOUSING COUNSELING.” See Pajor, 2012 IL App (2d) 110899, ¶ 24; 735 ILCS
5/15-1502.5(b) (West 2010). If the mortgagor obtains HUD-approved counseling within 30

4
Subsection (c) of section 15-1507 requires that mortgagees give notice of the sale of the property
to the mortgagor and to the public, prior to the judicial sale. 735 ILCS 5/15-1507(c) (West 2010). This
is separate from the grace period notice required by section 15-1502.5.

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 days, and gives notice to the mortgagee, the mortgagor has an additional 30 days after
sending such notice before the mortgagee may institute a foreclosure action. 735 ILCS
5/15-1502.5(a), (e) (West 2010). During this 30-day period, the mortgagor or the counselor,
or both, may “prepare and proffer to the mortgagee a proposed sustainable loan workout
plan.” 735 ILCS 5/15-1502.5(e) (West 2010). A “sustainable loan workout plan” under this
section is defined as: “a plan that the mortgagor and approved counseling agency believe
shall enable the mortgagor to stay current on his or her mortgage payments for the
foreseeable future.” 735 ILCS 5/15-1502.5(a) (West 2010). In other words, such a plan
would allow mortgagors to retain their interest in the property and remain in their home. If
the mortgagor and mortgagee agree to a workout plan, then no foreclosure action can be
instituted under the Foreclosure Law while the mortgagor adheres to such plan. 735 ILCS
5/15-1502.5(e) (West 2010). These provisions of the Homeowner Protection Act provide
homeowners with a powerful mechanism to prevent foreclosure on their homes and therefore
protect their property interest. Thus, where the required grace period notice has not been sent
prior to the commencement of a foreclosure action or where the plaintiff has not waited past
30 days to file suit, mortgagors have been “prevented from protecting their property
interests,” and justice has not been done under subsection 15-1508(b)(iv) of the Foreclosure
Law.
¶ 125 In the present case, there is no evidence on the record that a grace period notice was
actually sent; Olufemi and Bola have claimed that they have not received such notice, and the
Bank does not contend that the notice was sent or not sent. The Bank argues that the section
15-1508(b) factors have been met; however, it does not present any evidence concerning the
grace period notice. Accordingly, since a grace period notice is required to be sent and the
plaintiff must wait past 30 days before a foreclosure action is filed, and there is no evidence
in the record that this notice was sent or how long the Bank waited to file suit, we must
remand to the trial court to determine in an evidentiary hearing whether the grace period
notice was sent and whether the Bank waited past 30 days to file its suit. If the trial court
finds that no grace period notice was sent, then we find that: (1) the trial court abused its
discretion in confirming the judicial sale and all subsequent orders; (2) and in that event, the
judicial sale must be vacated in accordance with section 15-1508(b) of the Foreclosure Law
(735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b) (West 2010)); and (3) the case must be dismissed. If the trial court
finds that a grace period notice was sent, but plaintiff did not wait 30 days to file its lawsuit,
we find that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in confirming the judicial sale and all
subsequent orders; (2) and in that event, the judicial sale must be vacated in accordance with
section 15-1508(b) of the Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b) (West 2010)); and (3)
the case must be dismissed. If the trial court finds that a grace period notice was sent and
plaintiff waited 30 days before filing suit, then the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

¶ 126 CONCLUSION
¶ 127 For the reasons set forth above, we remand to the trial court to determine in an
evidentiary hearing whether the grace period notice was sent and whether the Bank waited
past 30 days to file its suit. If the trial court finds that no grace period notice was sent, then
we find that the trial court abused its discretion in confirming the judicial sale and all
subsequent orders, and the judicial sale must be vacated in accordance with section
15-1508(b) of the Foreclosure Law, and the case must be dismissed. 735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b)

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 (West 2010).

¶ 128 Remanded for an evidentiary hearing.

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