IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
)
STATE OF DELAWARE )
) I.D. No. 1407018228 RRC
v. )
)
MICHAEL J. ATKINSON, )
)
Defendant. )
Submitted: August 12, 2015
Decided: October 23, 2015
On Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief.
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
ORDER
James K. McCloskey, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of
Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
Michael J. Atkinson, Wilmington, Delaware, pro se.
COOCH, R.J.
This 23rd day of October, 2015, upon consideration of Defendant’s
Motion for Postconviction Relief, it appears to the Court that:
1. On March 25, 2015, this Court accepted Michael J. Atkinson’s
(“Defendant”) guilty plea for Assault First Degree and
Possession of a Deadly Weapon during the Commission of a
Felony. On June 24, 2015, Defendant was sentenced to 25 years
at Level V, suspended after two years for 23 years Level IV
Halfway House, suspended after six months for Level IV Home
Confinement, suspended after six months for 18 months at
Level III for Assault First Degree, and six years at Level IV for
Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a
Felony.
2. On July 27, 2015, Defendant filed the instant Motion pursuant
to Superior Court Rule 61. Defendant asserts two grounds in his
Motion. First, he claims that counsel was ineffective in his
representation, because his attorney did not represent him
aggressively. Second, Defendant claims that his guilty plea was
coerced, because he claims to have been mislead into thinking
his family wanted him to plead guilty.
3. Defendant’s argument of ineffective assistance of counsel is
without merit. Defendant’s argument supporting this claim is
grounded in the assertion that his appointed counsel acted
timidly and never investigated his case prior to the plea
agreement.1
4. To successfully bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
a claimant must demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance was
deficient; and (2) the deficiencies prejudiced the claimant by
depriving him or her of a fair trial with reliable results. 2 To
prove counsel’s deficiency, a defendant must show that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.3 Moreover, a defendant must make concrete
allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk
summary dismissal.4 “[A] court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.”5 A successful Sixth
Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a
showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.”6 Furthermore, when a defendant
voluntarily signs a plea agreement, that defendant is “bound by
1
Def.’s Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 3.
2
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
3
Id. at 667-68.
4
Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996).
5
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
6
Id. at 694.
2
those statements in the absence of clear and convincing proof to
the contrary and he bears the burden of presenting such proof.” 7
5. Defendant’s contentions that counsel met with the Defendant
only once before the guilty plea and did not represent him
“zealously” are vague, conclusory, and do not satisfy either
prong of Strickland. Defendant has failed to substantiate any
concrete showing of actual prejudice. Therefore, without more,
this Court can find no basis for relief on Defendant’s claim.
6. Next, Defendant contends that defense counsel coerced
Defendant into taking the guilty plea.8 Defendant asserts that
counsel stated this was the “plea his family wanted,” but counsel
allegedly never spoke with Defendant’s family. This contention
is also without merit. During the plea colloquy, Defendant stated:
THE COURT: Have you freely and voluntarily decided
to plead guilty to the charges listed in your written plea
agreement?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Have you been promised anything that’s
not stated in your written plea agreement?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Has your lawyer, the State, or anyone
threatened or forced you to enter this plea?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. . . .
THE COURT: Do you understand that what’s being done
today is final, meaning that you will not be able to come
back at any later time to seek to withdraw this guilty plea?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.9
7
Smith v. State, 1990 WL 1475 at* 1 (Del. Supr. Jan. 4, 1990) (citing State v. Insley, 141
A.2d 619, 622 (Del. 1958).
8
Def.’s Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 3.
9
Tr. of Plea Hr’g at 4, 8.
3
7. During the plea colloquy Defendant stated that his decision to
enter a guilty plea was done without force or coercion.
However, now Defendant claims that he was coerced into
entering his plea. Defendant has failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he should not be bound by his
admission of guilt in the plea agreement. Without more than
the simple assertion that Defendant was coerced, this Court
cannot find merit in his claim.
Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________
Richard R. Cooch, R.J.
cc: Prothonotary
Investigative Services
Michael J. Atkinson
4