14‐4445(L)
Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER
JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER
THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
Square, in the City of New York, on the 27th day of October, two thousand fifteen.
PRESENT: CHESTER J. STRAUB,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
Circuit Judges.
____________________________________________
THE SHINNECOCK INDIAN NATION,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
‐v.‐ Nos. 14‐4445(L), 14‐4447(CON)
THE STATE OF NEW YORK, ANDREW
CUOMO, in his individual capacity and as
Governor of the State of New York, COUNTY OF
SUFFOLK, NEW YORK, TOWN OF
SOUTHAMPTON, NEW YORK, TRUSTEES OF
THE PROPRIETORS OF THE COMMON AND
UNDIVIDED LANDS OF THE TOWN OF
SOUTHAMPTON, AKA TRUSTEES OF THE
PROPRIETORS OF THE COMMON AND
UNDIVIDED LANDS AND MARSHES (OR
MEADOWS), IN THE TOWN OF
SOUTHAMPTON, TRUSTEES OF THE
FREEHOLDERS AND COMMONALITY OF THE
TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON, AKA TRUSTEES
OF THE COMMONALITY OF THE TOWN OF
SOUTHAMPTON, SHINNECOCK HILLS GOLF
CLUB, NATIONAL GOLF LINKS OF AMERICA,
PARRISH POND ASSOCIATES, LLC, PARRISH
POND CONSTRUCTION COROPRATION, PP
DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, LLC, SEBONAC
NECK PROPERTY, LLC, SOUTHAMPTON
GOLF CLUB INCORPORATED, 409 MONTAUK,
LLC, SOUTHAMPTON MEADOWS
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, LONG
ISLAND RAILROAD COMPANY, LONG
ISLAND UNIVERSITY,
Defendants‐Appellees.
____________________________________________
FOR APPELLANT: DARCIE L. HOUCK, (Steven J. Bloxham, on the brief),
Fredericks Peebles & Morgan LLP, Sacramento, CA.
FOR APPELLEES: JEFFREY W. LANG, Assistant Solicitor General
(Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Andrew D.
Bing, Deputy Solicitor General, on the brief), for Eric T.
Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New
York, Albany, NY, for State Defendants-Appellees.
Michael S. Cohen, Nixon Peabody LLP, Jericho, NY, for
All Defendants‐Appellees Other Than State Defendants‐
Appellees and Long Island Railroad Company.
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Dwight A. Healy, Holwell Shuster & Goldberg LLP,
New York, NY, for Defendant‐Appellee Long Island
Railroad Company.
____________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York (Platt, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court be and
hereby is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff‐Appellant the Shinnecock Indian Nation (“Nation”) appeals from
a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York, granting Defendants‐Appellees’ motion to dismiss the Nation’s action
arising under federal common law and the Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177
(“NIA”). See Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, No. 05‐CV‐2887 TCP, 2006 WL
3501099 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.1
1
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all well‐pled
factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002).
Dismissal is appropriate if the complaint fails to state a claim that is “plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
When the district court takes notice of facts outside a complaint, we review that
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The District Court held that the Nation’s claims are foreclosed by the
equitable considerations, including laches, crystallized in City of Sherrill v. Oneida
Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197 (2005), and Cayuga Indian Nation of New
York v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005). See Oneida Indian Nation of New York v.
Cnty. of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 2010) (confirming applicability of
equitable defenses to ancient possessory land claims). We find no error in the
District Court’s holding.
The Nation argues that Cayuga, 413 F.3d 266, and Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, are
abrogated by Petrella v. Metro‐Goldwyn‐Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014). This
argument is foreclosed by Stockbridge‐Munsee Community v. New York, 756 F.3d
163, 166 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1492 (2015), which
specifically addressed this question.
decision for abuse of discretion. Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 547 F.3d 406, 424
(2d Cir. 2008).
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We have considered all of the Nation’s remaining arguments and find
them to be without merit. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the
judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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