Northern Investments, L.C., Third-Party v. Arthur Renander, Third-Party Rai, L.L.C. and Zara Renander, Third-Party Arthur Renander and Zara Renander, Third-Party v. Gary Aamodt, Third-Party
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1454
Filed October 28, 2015
NORTHERN INVESTMENTS, L.C.,
Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARTHUR RENANDER,
Third-Party Defendant-Appellant.
RAI, L.L.C. and ZARA RENANDER,
Third-Party Defendants,
___________________________
ARTHUR RENANDER and ZARA RENANDER,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
GARY AAMODT,
Third-Party Defendant-Appellee,
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Douglas S.
Russell, Judge.
Arthur Renander appeals the district court’s order enforcing a settlement
agreement. AFFIRMED.
Christopher J. Foster of Foster Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant Arthur
Renander.
Thomas Hobart of Meardon, Sueppel & Downer P.L.C., Iowa City, for
appellees Northern Investments, L.C., and Gary Aamodt.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ.
2
MULLINS, Judge.
Arthur Renander appeals the district court’s decision enforcing a
settlement agreement for the sale of certain property in Johnson County. Arthur
contends the district court incorrectly determined Northern Investments, L.C.’s,
exercise of its right to purchase was in compliance with the settlement
agreement, arguing the closing date was beyond the date provided in the
settlement agreement. Because we agree the exercise of the right to purchase
was in compliance with the settlement agreement, we affirm the decision of the
district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
High Country Development Company filed a petition to foreclose a
mortgage on real estate belonging to RAI, L.L.C. and Northern. Various
counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party petitions were filed by the parties
involved in the foreclosure action, but the case was mediated and settled on
February 27, 2013. RAI and its owners, Arthur and Zara Renander, and
Northern and its owner, Gary Aamodt, agreed to list the property for sale for one
year beginning on May 28, 2013, and ending May 28, 2014, during which the
Renanders had an exclusive right to purchase the property for the first 180 days.
For the second 180 days of the listing agreement, both Northern and the
Renanders had the right to purchase. The Renanders also had a right of first
refusal during the entire year the property was listed for sale if an offer to
purchase met or exceeded a set price.
3
On May 15, 2014, Northern delivered a document entitled “Exercise of
Option to Acquire Real Estate,” which triggered the Renanders’ right of first
refusal to purchase the property. Because the right of first refusal gave the
Renanders thirty days to match Northern’s offer, the closing date on the sale of
the property to Northern was set for June 16, 2014. On June 13, 2014, Arthur
delivered to Northern’s attorney a document entitled “Residential Lots/Vacant
Land Purchase Agreement.” Due to confusion over whether this was the
exercise of Arthur’s right of first refusal or an entirely new offer, Northern delayed
the closing, and on June 18, 2014, it filed a motion to enforce the settlement
agreement.
A hearing was held on July 23, 2014, and the district court filed its order a
few days later, concluding Northern’s exercise of its option to purchase the
property was in compliance with the settlement agreement. The court further
found Arthur’s document was incomplete, not in compliance with the settlement
agreement, and was not an exercise of its right of first refusal.1 The court
ordered the parties to close on the property in accordance with Northern’s option
to purchase and ordered RAI to deliver the deed to the property to Northern. The
court denied Arthur’s motion to reconsider, and he now appeals.
1
Arthur conceded in his testimony at the hearing that the offer was not an exercise of his
right of first refusal but was an entirely new offer he was working on with another
investor. We note the offer was made outside the time frame allowed for Arthur to
purchase the property, and as such, it was not in compliance with the settlement
agreement.
4
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
An action to enforce a settlement agreement is reviewed for correction of
errors at law. Wende v. Orv Rocker Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 92,
95 (Iowa 1995). The factual findings made by the district court are binding if
supported by substantial evidence. Id.
III. Settlement Agreement.
Arthur maintains on appeal the district court incorrectly concluded
Northern’s exercise of its option to purchase was a valid action under the
settlement agreement because the date set for closing on the property was June
16, 2014. It is Arthur’s position that in order to be a proper exercise of Northern’s
option to purchase the property the closing had to take place on or before May
28, 2014, the date the sale period for the property ended. In support of this
interpretation of the settlement agreement, Arthur points to the district court’s
June 2013 prior rejection of his attempt to purchase the property where the court
required the property to remain on the market until he closed on the property
“which must occur within the time set forth in the Settlement Agreement.” A
subsequent attempt by Arthur was also rejected by the court in October 2013
where the court found the offer to purchase violated the settlement agreement
because it again attempted to delay the closing on the property beyond the
prescribed time. Because the court required him to close by May 28, 2014, to be
in compliance with the settlement agreement, Arthur claims Northern’s offer is
likewise invalid because the closing date went beyond May 28, 2014.
5
Unlike Arthur’s ability to purchase the property under the settlement by
tendering a set price, Northern’s right to purchase was conditioned on Arthur’s
right of first refusal. Before Northern could close on the property, it was required
to give Arthur thirty days so that Arthur could tender a “‘take-out’ (approval)” letter
from a financial institution that matched the offer made by Northern. Closing was
set on June 16, 2014, in order to give Arthur his contractual thirty days to
exercise his right of first refusal.2 It was for Arthur’s benefit, not Northern’s, that
the closing date was set on June 16. At the hearing on Northern’s motion to
enforce the settlement agreement, there was no evidence that failure to close by
May 28 was necessary for Northern to be prepared to close the transaction.
When Northern exercised its option to purchase on May 15, it was ready and
able to close on the property by the May 28 deadline.
We agree with the district court’s conclusion Northern’s exercise of its
option to purchase was in compliance with the settlement agreement. It gave
each party what it bargained for in the agreement, and avoided broker fees and
an auction, which both parties wanted to avoid. We therefore affirm the district
court’s decision.
AFFIRMED.
2
Under the settlement agreement, Arthur’s right of first refusal expired “at the
termination of the listing agreement or 365 days after the last signature to this
agreement, whichever is later.” Thus, it is unclear whether Northern had to give Arthur a
full thirty days to exercise his right of first refusal. However, this issue was not
contested, and Northern erred on the side of safety by granting Arthur the full thirty days
to exercise his right.