131 Nev., Advance Opinion go
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
WPH ARCHITECTURE, INC., A
NEVADA CORPORATION,
Appellant,
vs.
VEGAS VP, LP, A NEVADA LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP,
Respondent.
Appeal from a district court order denying a motion to confirm
in part, modify, or correct an arbitration award. Eighth Judicial District
Court, Clark County; Jessie Elizabeth Walsh, Judge.
Affirmed.
Weil & Drage, APC, and Jean A. Weil and Trevor 0. Resurreccion,
Henderson,
for Appellant.
Greenberg Traurig and Tami D. Cowden and Mark E. Ferrario, Las Vegas,
for Respondent.
BEFORE SAITTA, GIBBONS and PICKERING, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, SAITTA, J.:
In Nevada, it is well settled that a party who makes an
unimproved upon offer of judgment in a district court action may recover
attorney fees and costs incurred after the offer of judgment was made.
This opinion addresses whether this is also true when the statutory offer
of judgment takes place in an arbitration proceeding.
We hold that because the award of fees and costs by an
arbitrator is discretionary, appellant WPH Architecture, Inc., has not
demonstrated that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded Nevada law by
refusing to award it fees and costs.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Respondent Vegas VP, LP, hired WPH to perform
architectural services for a condominium project that Vegas VP was
building in Las Vegas. Vegas VP brought an action against WPH for
professional negligence relating to the services that WPH performed for
Vegas VP. The contract provided that any disagreement between Vegas
VP and WPH would be resolved by mediation and, if that were
unsuccessful, binding arbitration before the American Arbitration
Association (AAA).
After an unsuccessful attempt at mediation, Vegas VP filed a
demand for arbitration. Prior to arbitration, WPH submitted what it
claimed to be two statutory offers of judgment under NRCP 68 and NRS
17.115 to Vegas VP. 1 Vegas VP did not accept either offer.
The case proceeded to arbitration, and an AAA panel of
arbitrators ruled in favor of WPH. The arbitration order also stated that
1NRS 17.115 was repealed by the 2015 Nevada Legislature. 2015
Nev. Stat., ch. 442, § , at ; A.B. 69, 78th Leg. (Nev. 2015). Because
NRS 17.115 was still in effect at the time of the arbitration, its subsequent
repeal does not affect our disposition in this case.
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each party would bear its own fees and costs. WPH then filed a post-
award motion for costs, fees, and interest, claiming that as the prevailing
party it was entitled to fees and costs under Nevada law. The arbitration
panel denied WPH's motion, stating that no caselaw existed which held
that offers of judgment are available in arbitration proceedings in Nevada.
Therefore, "[w]ithout express authority to grant fees and costs incidental
to a declined offer of judgment, [the arbitration] Panel [was] disinclined to
rule in favor of WPH."
WPH subsequently filed a motion in the district court to
confirm in part, modify, or correct the arbitration award to order Vegas VP
to pay WPH's attorney fees, costs, and interest. The district court denied
WPH's motion. This appeal follows.
DISCUSSION
WPH argues that because the arbitration panel manifestly
disregarded Nevada law regarding the awarding of attorney fees and
costs, the district court erred in denying WPH's motion to confirm in part,
modify, or correct the arbitration award. Specifically, WPH argues that
the arbitration panel disregarded NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115, which
provide for a party who makes an offer of judgment that its adversary does
not improve upon to recover the reasonable attorney fees and costs it
incurs, see NRCP 68(f)(2); NRS 17.115(4)(c)-(d), and NRS 18.020, which
requires costs to be awarded to the prevailing party in an action alleging
more than $2,500 in damages, see NRS 18.020(3).
"We review a district court's confirmation of an arbitration
award de novo." Sylver v. Regents Bank, N.A., 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 30, 300
P.3d 718, 721 (2013). An arbitration award "may be vacated based on
statutory grounds and certain limited common-law grounds." Bohlmann
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v. Printz, 120 Nev. 543, 546, 96 P.3d 1155, 1157 (2004), overruled on other
grounds by Bass Davis v. Davis, 122 Nev. 442, 452 n.32, 134 P.3d 103, 109
-
n.32 (2006). At common law, "an arbitration award may be vacated if it is
'arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by the agreement' or when an
arbitrator has 'manifestly disregard[ed] the law." Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Wichinsky v. Mosa, 109 Nev. 84, 89-90, 847 P.2d 727,
731 (1993)).
The arbitration was substantively governed by Nevada law
WPH argues that the contract between it and Vegas VP
contained a choice-of-law agreement stating that any arbitration arising
from the contract would be substantively governed by Nevada law. Vegas
VP argues that the contract contained a choice-of-law agreement stating
that the arbitration would be substantively governed by AAA rules.
Contract interpretation is reviewed de novo. Bielar v. Washoe Health Sys.,
Inc., 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 49, 306 P.3d 360, 364 (2013).
The contract between Vegas VP and WPH contains two choice-
of-law clauses. The first clause (AAA rules clause), found under the
contract's "Arbitration" section, states that the arbitration, "unless the
parties mutually agree otherwise, shall be in accordance with the
Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the [AAA]." The second clause
(Nevada laws clause), found in the contract's "Miscellaneous Provisions"
section, states that the contract itself would be "governed by the law of the
principal place of business of the Architect, unless otherwise provided."
The principle place of business of WPH is Nevada.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled on this issue in a
case with facts very similar to the current case. In Mastrobuono V.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., two parties disputed how a choice-of-law
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provision applied to their arbitration. 514 U.S. 52, 53 (1995). The
contract governing the parties' dispute had both a clause stating that "any
controversy' arising out of the transactions between the parties 'shall be
settled by arbitration' in accordance with the rules of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)" and a clause stating that "the
entire agreement 'shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York."
Id. at 58-59. The Court reasoned that reading the agreement as choosing
New York law to apply for both the procedural and substantive law
governing the arbitration would violate a "cardinal principle of contract
construction: that a document should be read to give effect to all its
provisions and to render them consistent with each other." Id. at 63.
Thus, the Court found that "the best way to harmonize the choice-of-law
provision with the arbitration provision is to read the laws of the State of
New York to encompass substantive principles" and the NASD rules to
govern the procedural aspect of the arbitration. Id. at 63-64 (internal
quotations omitted).
Similar to Mastrobuono, a finding here that the Nevada law
clause supersedes the AAA rules clause would require this court to violate
a well-established tenet of contract interpretation by rendering the AAA
rules clause meaningless. See Bielar, 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 49, 306 P.3d at
364 (holding that this court interprets a contract so as to give effect to
each of its words and to not render any terms meaningless). We also find
that such a finding would not express the parties' intentions when they
entered into the Agreement. See Galardi v. Naples Polaris, LLC, 129
Nev., Adv. Op. 33, 301 P.3d 364, 367 (2013) ("Contract interpretation
strives to discern and give effect to the parties' intended meaning."). The
parties' extensively blacked out portions of the contract, which was
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originally a boilerplate architecture agreement entitled "Abbreviated
Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Architect." By blacking
out portions of the contract, the parties indicated that they did not intend
for those portions to be part of the contract. Yet the AAA rules clause was
not similarly repudiated, indicating that the parties intended for that
clause to be included in the contract. Therefore, we hold that the
arbitration was substantively governed by Nevada law and procedurally
governed by the AAA rules.
NRCP 68, NRS 17.115, and NRS 18.020 are substantive laws
Vegas VP argues that this court previously held attorney fees
to be procedural in Tipton v. Heeren, 109 Nev. 920, 859 P.2d 465 (1993).
In Tipton, the court stated in a footnote that it agreed with the parties'
assessment that under a choice-of-law provision in a promissory note,
Wyoming law would govern substantive issues and Nevada law would
govern procedural issues. Id. at 922 n.3, 859 P.2d at 466 n.3. The court
then, without making an express finding or performing any analysis on
the issue of whether attorney fees is a procedural issue, applied Nevada
law to the issue of attorney fees. Id. at 924, 859 P.2d at 467. Because the
court in Tipton did not analyze the issue of whether attorney fees statutes
are substantive law, we hold that Tipton is not controlling in this case.
Thus, the issue of whether attorney fees laws are procedural or
substantive is one of first impression.
Federal courts have found state laws awarding attorney fees
to be substantive. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
stated that "[s]tate laws awarding attorney[ ] fees are generally considered
to be substantive laws." Northon v. Rule, 637 F.3d 937, 938 (9th Cir.
2011). Indeed, federal district courts in Nevada have found NRCP 68,
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NRS 17.115, and NRS 18.020 to all be substantive laws. See Walsh v.
Kelly, 203 F.R.D. 597, 598-99 (D. Nev. 2001) (holding that NRCP 68 and
NRS 17.115 are substantive laws); see also In re USA Commercial Mortg.
Co., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1178 (D. Nev. 2011) (holding NRS 18.020 to be
a substantive law).
We see no reason to disagree with the federal courts on this
issue. Therefore, we hold that NRCP 68, NRS 17.115, and NRS 18.020 are
substantive laws that apply to the arbitration proceedings in the current
case.
The award of attorney fees and costs is discretionary by an arbitrator
It is well settled that NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 provide that
attorney fees and costs may be awarded when a party fails to improve
upon a rejected statutory offer of judgment in an action before the district
court. See RTTC Commc'ns, LLC v. Saratoga Flier, Inc., 121 Nev. 34, 40 -
41, 110 P.3d 24, 28 (2005). We have similarly ruled that NRS 18.020
requires the award of costs to the prevailing party in several types of
district court actions. See Schwartz v. Estate of Greenspun, 110 Nev. 1042,
1050, 881 P.2d 638, 643 (1994); see also Campbell v. Campbell, 101 Nev.
380, 383, 705 P.2d 154, 156 (1985). However, we have never ruled as to
whether the statutes or the rule create a similar requirement when a
dispute is decided in private arbitration proceedings.
NRCP 68 and NRS 117.115 contain no references to
arbitration, awards, or arbitrators. Similarly, NRS 18.020 also contains
no reference to arbitration proceedings. Therefore, NRCP 68, NRS 17.115,
and NRS 18.020(3) by their plain language do not expressly require the
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award of fees and costs in an arbitration proceeding. 2 Furthermore, no
Nevada caselaw exists holding that those statutes apply to arbitration
proceedings. Therefore, we conclude that these statutes do not require an
arbitrator to award attorney fees or costs.
NRS 38.238(1) states that "[am n arbitrator may award
reasonable attorney's fees and other reasonable expenses of arbitration if
such an award is authorized by law in a civil action involving the same
claim or by the agreement of the parties to the arbitral proceeding." WPH
argues that because NRS 38.238(1) expressly allows an arbitrator to
award any attorney fees and costs that would be authorized by law in a
civil action involving the same claim, the AAA panel was therefore
required to award attorney fees and costs mandated by NRCP 68, NRS
17.115, and NRS 18.020. However, in making its argument, WPH ignores
the operative word in NRS 38.238(1): that "[a]n arbitrator may award"
fees and costs. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the statute merely gives an
arbitrator the discretion to award fees; it is not a requirement to do so.
See NRS 0.025(1)(a) ("May' confers a right, privilege or power."); see also
Tarango v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 117 Nev. 444, 451 n.20, 25 P.3d 175, 180
n.20 (2001) ("In statutes, 'may' is permissive and 'shall' is mandatory
unless the statute demands a different construction to carry out the clear
intent of the legislature." (internal quotations omitted)).
2 E1contrast, California's offer of judgment statute explicitly states
that it applies to both trial and arbitration proceedings. See Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code § 998 (West 2009).
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WPH has not shown that the AAA panel manifestly disregarded Nevada
law
In determining whether an arbitrator has manifestly
disregarded the law, "the issue is not whether the arbitrator correctly
interpreted the law, but whether the arbitrator, knowing the law and
recognizing that the law required a particular result, simply disregarded
the law." Clark Cnty. Educ. Ass'n v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 122 Nev. 337,
342, 131 P.3d 5, 8 (2006) (internal quotations omitted).
Here, the arbitration panel considered whether Nevada's offer
of judgment and costs statutes required the award of fees and costs in an
arbitration proceeding before finding that no judicial or statutory
authority mandated such an award. The arbitration panel also considered
whether it had the authority under AAA rules to grant post-award fees
and costs incidental to a declined offer of judgment, and it concluded that
AAA rules did not grant that authority.
As discussed above, NRCP 68, NRS 17.115, and NRS 18.020(3)
do not by their plain language require the award of fees and costs in an
arbitration proceeding. Furthermore, no Nevada caselaw exists holding
that those statutes apply to arbitration proceedings. Lastly, NRS
38.238(1) provides an arbitrator with the discretion to award attorney fees
and costs in an arbitration proceeding but does not require the arbitrator
to do so. Therefore, no clear statute or authority exists that would require
the award of attorney fees and costs in an arbitration proceeding. As such,
WPH has not demonstrated that the arbitration panel knew of any statute
or authority that required the panel to award attorney fees and costs to
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WPH. We therefore hold that WPH has failed to demonstrate that the
arbitrator manifestly disregarded Nevada law.
CONCLUSION
Because the award of fees and costs by an arbitrator is
discretionary, WPH has not demonstrated that the AAA panel manifestly
disregarded Nevada law when it refused to award them to WPH. Thus,
we affirm the district court's denial of WPH's motion to confirm in part,
modify, or correct the arbitration award.
J
Saitta
Gibbons
10
PICKERING, J., concurring:
I concur but only in the result. The arbitrators considered and
rejected the limited arguments the appellant made to them to support its
post-award request for attorney fees and costs. Those arguments did not
include the choice-of-law and Erie-based substance v. procedure
distinctions on which the majority focuses. Since no authority was cited to
the arbitrators to suggest, much less establish, that NRS 17.115 and
NRCP 68 apply in the arbitration setting, the arbitrators did not act in
manifest disregard of law in declining to award fees and costs based on
those provisions of Nevada law. See Graber v. Comstock Bank, 111 Nev.
1421, 1428, 905 P.2d 1112, 1116 (1995) ("[When searching for a manifest
disregard for the law, a court should attempt to locate arbitrators who
appreciate the significance of clearly governing legal principles but decide
to ignore or pay no attention to those principles."). The record before the
arbitrators likewise does not establish appellant's entitlement to costs
pursuant to "NRS 18.010, et. seq.," to which appellant generically referred
the arbitrators. While I would affirm, therefore, I would do so on the
grounds that the arbitrators did not manifestly disregard the law that was
presented to them, without reaching the more complex and uncertain
questions the majority undertakes to resolve.
Pida2,1 my'
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