J-S63035-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
LLOYD L. BUTLER, :
:
Appellant : No. 885 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on February 7, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division, No(s): CP-51-CR-0009687-2012;
CP-51-CR-0009689-2012
BEFORE: DONOHUE, MUNDY and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 12, 2015
Lloyd L. Butler1 (“Butler”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his convictions of two counts of murder in the first degree
and one count of possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”). See 18
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 907(a). We affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant underlying factual and procedural
history in its Opinion, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See
Trial Court Opinion, 5/15/14, at 1-9.2
On appeal, Butler raises the following questions for our review:
1
Lloyd Butler is also known as Christopher Lloyd Butler.
2
Butler was tried with codefendant, Zaiee Talbert (“Talbert”). The trial
ended with a hung jury as to Talbert’s charges. However, Talbert was
subsequently tried separately and was convicted of two counts each of
murder in the first degree and criminal conspiracy. Talbert has appealed his
judgment of sentence at 719 EDA 2015.
J-S63035-15
1. Whether the verdict was against the sufficiency of the
evidence, when [Butler’s] cell phone and cell phone tower
records demonstrated that he was not involved in the
shooting[?]
2. Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence,
when [Butler’s] cell phone and cell phone tower records
demonstrated that he was not involved in the shooting[?]
Brief for Appellant at 4.
In his first claim, Butler argues the evidence was insufficient to
support his convictions because there was no physical evidence tying him to
the homicides. Id. at 11. He contends that his cell phone and cell phone
tower records establish that he was on the phone with his girlfriend from the
time prior to shooting, during the relevant time of the shooting, and after
the shooting. Id. Butler argues he could not possibly have been shooting
guns while talking on his cell phone at the same time, without the other
person on the line hearing gunshots. Id. He asserts that his girlfriend
testified she did not hear any gunshots while on the phone with Butler. Id.
Butler claims that the cell phone records show that the phone conversation
lasted for twenty-two minutes and thirty-seven seconds. Id.
Here, the trial court set forth the relevant law and determined that the
claim is without merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/15/14, at 12-13.3 The
3
Butler does not specifically challenge his conviction of possessing an
instrument of crime. However, after a review of the record, we conclude
that the evidence is sufficient to sustain this conviction. See Trial Court
Opinion, 5/15/14, at 2-9, 13; see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a) (stating “[a]
person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses any
instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally).
-2-
J-S63035-15
jury was free to disbelieve Butler and his girlfriend’s testimony that they
were talking on their cell phones at the time of the murders. See
Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 40 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that
the fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony
presented). Thus, for this claim we adopt the sound reasoning of the trial
court for the purpose of this appeal, and conclude that its findings are
supported by competent evidence, and its legal conclusions are sound. See
Trial Court Opinion, 5/15/14, at 12-13; see also Melvin, 103 A.3d at 40.
In his second claim, Butler argues this case should shock the
conscience of the court because the verdict is contrary to the weight of the
evidence. Brief for Appellant at 12. Butler contends he was found guilty for
a crime which he has always claimed he did not commit. Id. Butler
reiterates, in his second claim, that there is no physical evidence connecting
him to the homicides. Id. He claims that eyewitness Lydia Morales
(“Morales”) stated to the police, and later recanted at trial, that she saw
Butler standing over the victim, Jonathan Stokely (“Stokely”), and shooting
him with a machine gun, and then saw Butler fleeing the scene in a purple
van immediately afterwards. Id. Butler asserts Morales is mistaken
because Butler’s cell phone and cell phone tower records demonstrate that
he remained in the area for two hours after the incident, and then went in a
northeast direction. Id. Butler contests that, in contrast, the assailants in
the purple van left the scene immediately after the shooting, and cell phone
-3-
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and cell phone tower records indicated that the van went in a southwest
direction. Id.
We apply the following standard of review for challenges to the weight
of the evidence:
A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.
Accordingly, an appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial
court’s discretion; it does not answer for itself whether the
verdict was against the weight of the evidence. It is well[-]
settled that the fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none of
the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses,
and a new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim is only
warranted where the fact-finder’s verdict is so contrary to the
evidence that it shocks one's sense of justice. In determining
whether this standard has been met, appellate review is limited
to whether the trial judge’s discretion was properly exercised,
and relief will only be granted where the facts and inferences of
record disclose a palpable abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth v. Karns, 50 A.3d 158, 165 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation
and brackets omitted).
Here, the trial court set forth the relevant law, and determined that
Butler’s claim is without merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/15/14, at 13-15.
We adopt the sound reasoning of the trial court for the purpose of this
appeal, and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Butler’s weight of the evidence claim. See id.; see also Karns, 50
A.3d at 165.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
-4-
J-S63035-15
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/12/2015
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA CP-51-CR-0009687-2012
CP-51-CR-0009689-2012
v. 885 EDA 2014
FILED CP-51-CR-0009687-2012 Comm. v. Buller, Lloyd L.
Opinion
LLOYD BUTLER MAY 15: 2014
Crim\na\ App~a\~ Unit
firstJudicia\Otstnctof PA .
:
IIIIII I Ill 111111111111111
7150681891
OPINION
McDermott, J. May 15, 2014
Procedural History
On May 4, 2012, the defendant, Lloyd Butler, was arrested and charged with two counts
of First-Degree Murder, as well as Conspiracy, Possession of an Instrument of Crime ("PIC"),
and Reckless Endangerment of Another Person ("REAP").1 On January 24, 2014, the defendant,
along with codefendant Zaiee Talbert, appeared before this Court and elected to be tried by a
jury.'
On February 7, 2014, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to both counts of First-
Degree Murder and PIC as to the defendant, but was unable to reach a verdict as to any of the
charges against Talbert. That same day, this Court imposed upon the defendant two mandatory
sentences of life imprisonment without parole for First-Degree Murder, as well as a concurrent
sentence of one to two years of incarceration for PIC.
1
The defendant is also known as Christopher Butler.
2
Zaiee Talbert was tried at CP-51-CR-0009688-2012 and CP-51-CR-0009690-2012.
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On February 17, 2014, the defendant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which this
Court denied on February 20. That same day, the defendant filed a timely Notice of Appeal, and
on April 9, 2014, the defendant filed a timely response to this Court's order pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. l 925(b ).
At approximately 8 p.m. on March 12, 2012, Philadelphia Police Officer Timothy
Stephan and his partner and brother, Officer William Stephan, were called to the 2900 block of
North 9th Street due to a report of gunshots in the area. Upon arriving at the scene, Officer
Timothy Stephan saw an all-terrain vehicle ("ATV") stopped in front of a blue van, and a black
male, later identified as Dexter Bowie, suffering from multiple gunshot wounds. Officer Stephan
went to the other side of the van, where he saw a black male, later identified as Jonathan Stokley,
also suffering from multiple gunshot wounds. Other officers transported Bowie to Temple
University Hospital, and medics arrived on the scene and pronounced Stokley to be dead on the
scene. N.T. January 27, 2014, pp. 62-69.
In the street near the shooting, Officer Stephan observed numerous fired cartridge
casings, both in 7.62 millimeter and 9 millimeter sizes. Id. at 68-69. Ballistics evidence
confirmed that the shooting was committed with 9 millimeter and 7.62 millimeter ammunition,
suggesting that there were two shooters. Casings were recovered by police from all over the
street where the shooting occurred, including on both sides of the parked van. N.T. January 29,
2014, pp. 57-59.
Joseph Johnson knew Bowie and Stokley as Bigg and Bird, respectively. He had a close
relationship with them, and described them as being like little brothers to him. In a statement
given to police, Johnson acknowledged that he was present during the shooting, and that he saw
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two men who he knew as E-Dollar and Gunna shoot Bowie and Stokley. He identified the
defendant as Gunna and his codefendant, Zaiee Talbert, as E-Dollar. He said that Talbert used
an AK-4 7 and the defendant used an automatic handgun. He said that he understood the dispute
to be motivated by competition for control of the drug trade on certain neighborhood streets. He
also identified the defendant and Talbert in successive photo spreads. C-11 7 (Statement of
Joseph Johnson).
He testified that on the night that they were shot on 9th Street, he was on 8th Street and
heard the gunshots. On March 30, 2012, weeks after the shooting, he was arrested in an
unrelated incident and was brought to the Homicide Division in order to give a statement about
this shooting. During trial, he claimed that he did not read or sign any statement during his time
there. When presented with a signed statement, he claimed not to know who made the statement.
He was held in custody prior to trial after this Court granted the Commonwealth's material
witness petition. Johnson informed the Commonwealth prior to trial that he would refuse to
attend. Id. at 132-149; C-117 (Statement of Joseph Johnson).
Lydia Santos Morales lived in the neighborhood of the shooting at the time it occurred,
and was walking home on the evening of the shooting. When she heard shots fired, she stood
against a wall so as not to get shot. She saw one of the shooters fire at Stokley as he tried to
crawl underneath the parked van, which she described as a purple van. Then she saw both
shooters get into a minivan and drive away. In a statement she gave to police, she identified the
defendant as the man she saw shoot Stokley. At trial, she indicated that she did not recognize the
defendant but eventually acknowledged that she did identify him in her statement, and that she
was extremely reluctant to testify and in fact had run from police who tried to locate her prior to
trial. N.T. January 28, 2014, pp. 14-53.
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Aimes to search for the guns in the creek, but because they were never there he did not find
them; later, the defendant admitted that he had retained the guns. C-123(A), Statement of
Raheim Aimes.
Erica Holder was in a relationship with the defendant at the time of the shooting. On the
afternoon of the shooting, she dropped him off in the neighborhood. Later that night, she
realized that she left her cell phone in her car, and when she retrieved it she saw that the
defendant had tried to call her. She called him back and he asked her to pick him up. Her
testimony indicated that this call, which lasted approximately 20 minutes, encompassed the time
of the shooting. When she came to pick up the defendant, he was with Raheim Aimes and both
of them left with her to go to her home in the northeast of Philadelphia. The defendant
mentioned a fight at the comer store, involving an ATV. Days later, she observed Aimes, the
defendant, and Talbert wrapping several guns, including an AK-47, in a blanket. Aimes had a
cold at the time, reportedly from looking for the guns in Cobbs Creek. Holder gave a statement
to police that was consistent with her testimony; in the statement, she identified Aimes, Talbert,
and the defendant. N.T. January 29, 2014 (Vol. I), pp. 49-78.
Phone records indicated that a call was placed between the phones of Holder and the
defendant from 7:38 to 8:00 on the night of the shooting. The defendant was on parole at the
time and used his aunt's address for that purpose, and would be there every night at
approximately 7:30 in order to check in with his parole officer and seem to be in compliance
with the conditions of his parole, including a curfew. After checking in, he would usually leave
and go to another address on Fillmore Street, thus violating the conditions of his parole. N .T.
January 29, 2014 (Vol. II), pp. 23-30.
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Curtis Stokes had been charged with selling drugs in the neighborhood of the shooting,
and was known to spend time there. He testified that on the night of the shooting, he heard
fifteen or more shots. When Stokes was interviewed at the Homicide Unit, he removed his
wallet to get a piece of paper with the name of a medication that he needed. At that time, the
detective with whom he was speaking discovered eight bags of crack cocaine that were also in
his wallet. He was arrested for possession of a controlled substance, but was then transported to
a hospital so that he could receive his medication. Id. at 83-93.
In his statement to police, Stokes said that he saw the decedents, who he knew as Bird
and Big[g], riding through the neighborhood on a four-wheeler shortly before they were shot.
After they rode through, he saw Talbert, who he knew as E-Man and who was standing with the
defendant and Darren Talbert, retrieve a black semiautomatic handgun from underneath a car and
stow it in the front pocket of his hoody. Then he saw all three men get into a dark-colored van
and drive away. After that night, he did not see any of the three men again. C-116, Statement of
Curtis Stokes. He acknowledged at trial that he did not want to testify, for fear of what might
happen to him as a result, and claimed that he did not see the shooting. Stokes attempted to
evade police contact prior to trial. He was held in custody prior to trial after this Court granted
the Commonwealth's material witness petition. N.T. January 29, 2014 (Vol. I), p. 170.
Dr. Aaron Rosen, associate medical examiner for the City of Philadelphia, gave expert
testimony that he examined the bodies of both decedents. Bowie's body was shot 13 times,
leaving numerous wounds including a penetrating gunshot wound to the back of his head, a
penetrating wound that entered his abdominal cavity, rupturing his colon and small intestine, and
a penetrating wound to his right chest that ruptured his lung. N.T. January 29, 2014 (Vol. II), pp.
44-68. Dr. Rosen recorded 23 gunshot wounds to Stokley's body. Penetrating gunshot wounds
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to his back punctured his lungs, aorta, and esophagus. He was also shot in the abdomen and
numerous times in the legs. Id. at 68-82.
Pursuant to a search warrant executed on March 23, 2012, on the barbershop at 3622
Warnock Street, police recovered a 9mm magazine with 9mm ammunition in it, a ballistic vest,
and Aimes' driver's license. N.T. January 30, 2014, pp. 183-184. Police also recovered data
from Aimes' cell phone, including a picture of him holding an AK-47. Id. at 191-192.4
Detective James Dunlap of the Homicide Unit gave expert testimony as to an analysis he
performed on cell phone records for the defendant, Aimes, and Talbert, in order to determine the
location of the phones at approximately 7:54 p.m. on the night of the shooting. For Aimes'
phone, there was no data during the relevant period and an analysis was impossible. The
defendant's phone records established that he was within a limited area of the city that is served
by certain cellular towers. That area is bounded by 3rd Street to the east, 10th Street to the west,
Indiana A venue to the north, and Dauphin Street to the south; the site of the shooting is within
this area. The same data shows that the defendant's phone traveled to the northeast of
Philadelphia later that evening, which is consistent with evidence that the defendant went to
Erica Holder's home after the shooting. The defendant's cell phone records reflect that on the
night of the shooting, it was in use, i.e. on a phone call, for approximately 20 minutes including
the time of the shooting. Id. at 199, 274-295; C-136, Presentation of Detective Dunlap.
Talbert's phone records reveal that he was also in the vicinity of the shooting, and that after the
shooting he left the area, relocating to southwest Philadelphia. Id. at 219, 295-298; C-136,
Presentation of Detective Dunlap.
4
Aimes has an open case in which he is charged with violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, at CP-5 l-CR-
0012739-2012.
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the apartment with the AK-47 and hide it under the bed. She also said she saw the white ballistic
vest underneath the kitchen sink. N.T. February 3, 2014, pp. 121-146.
Carlita Smith testified for the defendant, her nephew, that he was in her home on the
night of the shooting, from 6:30 p.m. to 10 p.m., when he left for his girlfriend's house. She also
testified that she had never seen him with a gun in the two months that he lived with her. He
lived with her in order to comply with his parole, for which he had a 7 p.m. curfew, though he
often left later in the evening to go to his girlfriend's house. Id. at 197-202.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the verdict was against the weight and sufficiency of
the evidence, and that this Court erred when it denied the defendant's motion to suppress his
statement.
Motion to Suppress the Defendant's Statement
On January 23, 2014, this Court litigated the defendant's suppression motion, in which he
alleged that he was threatened by detectives who told him that they would arrest his girlfriend
and charge her with being the getaway driver for a double homicide, and that they would charge
him with the homicides if he did not acknowledge that he was at the scene. The Commonwealth
showed a video recording of the defendant's statement being taken, and in that recording it is
clear that the defendant is at ease and is not discomfited in any way. Likewise, the record amply
established that the defendant was properly Mirandized prior to giving his statement, and in fact
his statement contains a signed Miranda waiver of rights. Because the defendant failed to
substantiate his allegations, and because the record indicated that his statement was voluntary,
this Court denied the motion. In its findings of fact, this Court found that the defendant
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participated actively and voluntarily in giving his statement, at no time protesting or attempting
to disengage. This Court concluded that the defendant's statement was freely and voluntarily
given. N.T. January 27, 2014, pp. 5-8.
An accused may relinquish his constitutional right to remain silent. Commonwealth v.
D'Amato, 526 A.2d 300, 306 (Pa. 1987)(citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019,
82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). A confession given as a result of custodial interrogation is admissible
only if the accused's Miranda rights have been explained to him and he has knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waived those rights. Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 526 A.2d 300,
306 (Pa. 1987)( citations omitted).
A law enforcement officer must administer Miranda warnings prior to a custodial
interrogation. Commonwealth v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2010). The
determination of whether an encounter with police is custodial is an objective one, with due
consideration given to the reasonable impression conveyed to the person interrogated rather than
the strictly subjective view of the trooper or the person being seized, and must be determined by
a totality of the circumstances. Commonwealth v. Pakacki, 901 A.2d 983, 987-88 (Pa. 2006).
Custodial interrogation has been defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [ or her] freedom of action
in any significant way." Commonwealth v. Johnson, 541 A.2d 332, 336 (Pa. Super.
1988)(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)). Police detentions become
custodial when, under the totality of the circumstances, the conditions and/or duration of the
detention become so coercive as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest.
Commonwealth v. Ellis, 549 A.2d 1323, 1332 (Pa. Super. 1988), appeal denied, 562 A.2d 824
(1989)(citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).
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Factors utilized by courts to determine whether a detention has become coercive so as to
constitute an arrest include the basis for the detention, its length, its location, whether the suspect
was transported against his will, whether restraints were used, whether law enforcement showed,
threatened, or used force and investigative methods used to confirm or dispel suspicions.
Commonwealth v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1020 (Pa. Super. 2011).
In his l 925(b) statement, the defendant does not argue that any particular factor should
mandate suppression in this case, but instead merely alleges that the defendant "felt coerced by
homicide detectives to make a statement and this statement was not voluntarily made, but was
given under duress." 1925(b) Statement, p. 4. Because the defendant has failed to support his
allegation, this argument is meritless. The statement itself, which was signed by the defendant
numerous times and bears numerous indicia of the defendant's willing participation, belies the
defendant's allegation that the defendant was coerced. The record indicates that he came to the
Homicide Unit at approximately 1 :00 p.m., began giving his statement at approximately 7:40
p.m., and was finished by approximately 11 :00 p.m. During the time he was at the Homicide
Unit, the defendant smoked several cigarettes, visited the restroom when he wished to, and ate
some pizza. There is no indication that he was at all discomfited during the process, let alone
coerced.
Further, in his statement he does not acknowledge any involvement in these murders,
acknowledging only that he was present when others committed them; therefore, the defendant
has failed to establish the "substantial harm and undue prejudice" that he feels he suffered due to
the introduction of his statement. In fact, his statement was entirely consistent with his defense,
which was that others committed the shootings and he was merely present in the neighborhood
when they occurred. Cell phone evidence established that he was in the neighborhood at the
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time of the shooting, and thus his statement does little to advance the Commonwealth's case.
This argument is meritless.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Evidence presented at trial is sufficient when, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as verdict winner, the evidence and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom
are sufficient to establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth
v. Baumhammers, 960 A.2d 59, 68 (Pa. 2008). The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17 A.3d 939, 943 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing
Commonwealth v. Brooks, 7 A.3d 852, 856-57 (Pa. Super. 2010). The fact-finder is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence, and credibility determinations rest solely within the
purview of the fact-finder. Commonwealth v. Treiber, 874 A.2d 26, 30 (Pa. 2005).
18 Pa.C.S. § 2502 establishes that Murder in the First Degree is a criminal homicide
committed by an intentional killing. In order to support a charge of murder of the first degree,
the Commonwealth must prove that "the defendant acted with a specific intent to kill; that a
human being was unlawfully killed; that the person accused did the killing; and that the killing
was done with deliberation." Commonwealth v. Smith, 861 A.2d 892, 895 (Pa. 2004). "[S]pecific
intent can be inferred where a deadly weapon is used upon a vital part of the body."
Commonwealth v. Ramtahal, 33 A.3d 602, 607 (Pa. 201 l)(citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 985
A.2d 886, 895 (Pa. 2009). Malice also may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon upon a
vital part of the victim's body. Commonwealth v. Ramtahal, 33 A.3d 602, 607-608 (Pa.
201 l)(citing Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1134 (Pa. 201 l)(finding single bullet
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fired from an inaccurate handgun at a considerable distance that struck the victim in the buttocks
was sufficient to support a finding of premeditation).
Here, there can be no debate as to the degree of homicide, where both of the decedents
were shot so many times (13 times and 23 times, respectively) and shot in vital parts of the body
such as the head and torso. The murders were manifestly committed with intent to kill.
The eyewitnesses Lydia Morales and Joseph Johnson both gave statements establishing
that they saw the defendant, who they knew as "Gunna," shoot at the decedents. Multiple
eyewitness statements are obviously sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt. Both witnesses
vacillated on the witness stand, but both also made it clear that their reluctance to testify sprung
from their fear of being involved in this case.
Further, cell phone data confirms the account ofRaheim Aimes, who indicates that the
defendant and Talbert committed the shooting and that the defendant spoke later about using his
parole curfew as an alibi in order to avoid culpability for his participation in the shooting.
Aimes' account is consistent with the ballistics evidence and with Holder's memory of the guns
used in the shooting being retained and moved afterward. Put simply, the Commonwealth
presented ample evidence to establish that the defendant shot the two victims in this matter,
killing them. Because the evidence was more than sufficient, this argument is meritless.
Weight of the Evidence
Weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are discrete inquiries. An
argument that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is
sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict but contends, nevertheless, that the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Davis, 799 A.2d 860, 865 (Pa. Super. 2002). An
allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the sound
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Commonwealth v. Lloyd Butler, CP-51-CR-0009687-2012
PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am this day serving the foregoing Court Order upon the person(s), and
in the manner indicated below, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa. R. Crim. P. 114:
Philadelphia District Attorney's Office
Three South Penn Square
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Attn: Hugh Burns, ADA
Type of Service: Interoffice Mail
Earl G. Kauffman, Esquire
The Bourse Suite 755
111 S Independence Mall East
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Type of Service: First Class Mail
Lloyd Butler-EZ-4076
SCI Graterford
P.O. Box 244
Graterford, PA 19426
Type of Service: Certified Mail
Dated: May 15, 2014
Bates, Delores r
Administrative Assistant to the
Honorable Barbara A. McDermott