UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4282
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
YOALIANG GAO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior
District Judge. (1:14-cr-00218-JCC-1)
Submitted: November 17, 2015 Decided: November 19, 2015
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark Bodner, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Jennifer Gimbert
Ballantyne, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Yoaliang Gao appeals his conviction for possession of 15 or
more counterfeit or unauthorized access devices and his 30-month
sentence. Gao’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal and acknowledging Gao’s waiver of
appellate rights but questioning the application of Sentencing
Guidelines enhancements for loss amount and for abusing a
position of trust. Gao did not file a pro se supplemental brief
despite notice of his right to do so. The Government has moved
to dismiss the appeal as barred by the appellate waiver included
in Gao’s plea agreement.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, a defendant may waive his
appellate rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2012). United States
v. Archie, 771 F.3d 217, 221 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135
S. Ct. 1579 (2015). A waiver will preclude an appeal of “a
specific issue if . . . the waiver is valid and the issue being
appealed is within the scope of the waiver.” Id. A defendant’s
waiver is valid if he agreed to it “knowingly and
intelligently.” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627
(4th Cir. 2010). Whether a defendant validly waived his right
to appeal is a question of law that we review de novo. United
States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 528 (4th Cir. 2013).
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Upon review of the plea agreement and the transcript of the
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, we conclude that Gao knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to appeal his conviction and any
sentence within the statutory maximum. The sentencing claims
raised on appeal clearly fall within the scope of this broad
waiver. Therefore, we grant the motion to dismiss and dismiss
Gao’s appeal. We have reviewed the entire record in accordance
with Anders and have found no meritorious issues for appeal
outside the scope of the waiver.
This court requires that counsel inform Gao, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Gao requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Gao. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
DISMISSED
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