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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
R.C.S., :
:
Appellant : No. 33 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 3, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County,
Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-50-CR-0000349-2012
BEFORE: PANELLA, WECHT, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 20, 2015
R.C.S. (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
following his convictions for involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI)
with a complainant who suffers a mental disability; aggravated indecent
assault with a complainant who suffers a mental disability; statutory sexual
assault of a person under the age of 16; endangering the welfare of
children; corruption of minors; possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver; and possession of drug paraphernalia. We affirm.
Appellant was arrested in August of 2012 and charged with the
aforementioned offenses, related to allegations of ongoing sexual abuse of
his minor daughter. During the execution of a search warrant on Appellant’s
home, officers from the Penn Township police department photographed and
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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seized several sexual devices, including two vibrating dildos, a large plastic
penis, and a penis ring.
The matter proceeded to a jury trial. On May 29, 2014, Appellant
made an oral motion to preclude the admission of the sexual devices. The
trial court denied this request. The devices were admitted as evidence at
trial over Appellant’s objection and displayed to the jury during the
Commonwealth’s case-in-chief.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Appellant of the
aforementioned charges. On December 3, 2014, the sentencing court,
having determined that Appellant was not a sexually violent predator,
imposed upon Appellant an aggregate sentence of 15½ to 31 years of
imprisonment. This timely-filed appeal followed. Both the trial court and
Appellant complied with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issue on appeal: “Did the trial court
abuse its discretion by admitting various sex toys into the record, and
permitting their publication to the jury, where the prejudicial impact of such
evidence outweighed its probative value?” Appellant’s Brief at 4 (footnote
omitted).
Our standard of review is well-settled.
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of
evidence, our standard of review is one of deference. Questions
concerning the admissibility of evidence are within the sound
discretion of the trial court ... [and] we will not reverse a trial
court’s decision concerning admissibility of evidence absent an
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abuse of the trial court’s discretion. An abuse of discretion is not
merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or
misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will
or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record. [I]f in reaching
a conclusion the trial court over-rides [sic] or misapplies the law,
discretion is then abused and it is the duty of the appellate court
to correct the error.
Commonwealth v. Belknap, 105 A.3d 7, 9-10 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations
and quotations omitted).
On appeal, Appellant does not challenge the relevance of the sexual
devices.1 Rather, Appellant contends that admission of the sexual devices
was inflammatory and unduly prejudicial; thus, the trial court erred in failing
to balance the prejudicial effect of the evidence against its probative value,
and by failing to place its rationale in denying Appellant’s oral motion on the
record. Appellant’s Brief at 9. Additionally, Appellant argues that the trial
court erred in failing to consider the less prejudicial option of admitting
photographs of the sexual devices in lieu of presenting the actual items to
the jury. Id. at 10.
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403 provides that “[t]he court may
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of
one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
1
Indeed, prior to trial, defense counsel stipulated “that certain sexual toys
were seized from the residence” while maintaining her belief that “the jury
did not need to see them.” N.T., 5/29/2014, at 9.
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cumulative evidence.” The Comment to Rule 403 explains that “[u]nfair
prejudice means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or to
divert the jury’s attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence
impartially.”
Contrary to Appellant’s argument on appeal, there is no requirement
that the trial court place on the record its analysis of the aforementioned
balancing test. As this Court recently explained,
[an appellant] is entitled to no relief resulting from the trial
court’s failure to articulate its balancing test on the record. We
presume that trial courts know the law, and there is nothing in
this record to suggest that this trial court did not understand its
duty to weigh the evidence in accord with the Rules of Evidence.
Such weighing and the general consideration of the admissibility
of evidence is a discretionary ruling which trial courts routinely
engage in mentally. There is no requirement that it record these
mental deliberations on the record. We are satisfied from the
trial court’s discussion of why it considered the [] evidence
admissible that it understood the applicable criteria, and
mentally engaged in the appropriate balancing test. Appellant’s
argument that the trial court has to think out loud has no merit,
and we reject it.
Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 667 (Pa. 2014).
Moreover, a review of the record convinces us the trial court properly
concluded that admission of the sexual devices to the jury did not create a
danger of confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. Appellant was charged
with myriad crimes, including IDSI, which required the Commonwealth to
prove as an element of the offense that Appellant engaged in deviate sexual
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intercourse. The term “deviate sexual intercourse” includes “penetration,
however slight, of the genitals or anus of another person with a foreign
object for any purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic or law
enforcement procedures.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3101 (emphasis added). As the
Commonwealth explained, “[d]uring her interview at the Children’s Resource
Center […] [the victim] testified as to specific sex toys that were used on
her, those -- some of those items were seized and they’re corroborative
evidence.” N.T., 5/29/2014, at 10.
Finally, we discern no undue prejudice to Appellant. Although he
contends that the decision to publish to the jury “grotesque, highly
inflammatory sex toys” was designed to “[assail] the sensibilities of the jury,
which was already contending with graphic and disturbing testimony fraught
with credibility issues,” Appellant’s Brief at 11, we are cognizant that the rule
providing for the exclusion of unfairly prejudicial, yet relevant, evidence does
not require the court to “sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts
from the jury’s consideration where those facts are relevant to the issues at
hand and form part of the history and natural development of the events
and offenses for which the defendant is charged.” Commonwealth v. Page,
965 A.2d 1212, 1220 (Pa. Super. 2009). Based on our review of the record,
admission of the sexual devices did not have the tendency to suggest
decision on an improper basis, nor did it divert the jury’s attention away
from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially.
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Finally, we cannot conclude that it was an abuse of discretion to admit
the sexual devices themselves, as opposed to photographs of those items.
The record reflects that Appellant did not seek this alternative in his pre-trial
motion. Nonetheless, as is the case with the admission of weapons or
narcotics evidence, such evidence is clearly admissible where it can be
shown that the evidence was used in the crime charged. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Stokes, 78 A.3d 644, 654 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(discussing generally the admissibility at trial of physical evidence directly
connected to the crime charged). As outlined above, the Commonwealth met
this burden, and the trial court determined that probative value of the
evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect. Therefore, the Commonwealth
was entitled to present the sexual devices to the jury.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that Appellant is not entitled
to relief. Thus, we affirm his judgment of sentence.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/20/2015
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