In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15‐1208
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
RONALD DOUGLAS,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois.
No. 3:14‐CR‐30069‐001 — David R. Herndon, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 22, 2015 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 25, 2015
____________________
Before FLAUM, WILLIAMS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Appellant Ronald Douglas was
convicted of failing to register as a sex offender. He does not
challenge his conviction or his prison sentence of thirty
months, but he challenges several conditions of his five‐year
term of supervised release. We affirm.
2 No. 15‐1208
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Douglas has two prior convictions for criminal sexual
abuse of children. He was convicted in 1992 of aggravated
criminal sexual abuse of a young relative when he was
babysitting her and other children. For that first offense,
Douglas was sentenced to two years of probation but was
also required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Of‐
fender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). In 1997,
he was sentenced to one year of unsupervised probation for
failing to register as a sex offender.
In 1999, Douglas was convicted of aggravated criminal
sexual abuse. The victim was another young relative. The
crime occurred while Douglas was babysitting her and her
brothers overnight at his home. That time he was sentenced
to four years in prison.
After he was paroled in 2000, Douglas registered as a sex
offender until January 2009. He let his registration lapse,
then registered again in 2011 and 2012 but not after that. He
has claimed he was confused about whether he was required
to register for only ten years or for the rest of his life. Doug‐
las was never given a notice that he was no longer required
to register.
The present offense, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a),
stems from Douglas’s move in 2012 from Illinois to Tennes‐
see without notifying his Illinois probation officer and with‐
out registering as a sex offender in Tennessee. After Douglas
was convicted in this case for his failure to register, the dis‐
trict court sentenced him to thirty months in prison, five
years of supervised release, a $100 special assessment, and a
fine of $250.
No. 15‐1208 3
As part of the federal sentence, the district court imposed
several special conditions of supervised release, including
requirements that Douglas undergo assessment as a sex of‐
fender, stay out of establishments that primarily sell alcohol,
avoid knowing association with felons, allow a U.S. Proba‐
tion Officer to visit him at any time, and answer truthfully
any questions asked by the probation officer. All of the chal‐
lenged conditions had been set forth in the Probation Office’s
recommendations for sentencing that were filed with the
presentence report and provided to the defense well in ad‐
vance of the sentencing hearing. In the district court, Doug‐
las did not object to any of these conditions, but he challeng‐
es them on appeal as unjustified restrictions on his liberty.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Over the past two years, this Court has addressed condi‐
tions of supervised release in an unusually large number of
appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 848
(7th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases). We recently explained:
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), a sentencing court
has discretion to impose appropriate condi‐
tions of supervised release, to the extent that
such conditions (1) are reasonably related to
factors identified in § 3553(a), including the na‐
ture and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2)
involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is
reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth
in § 3553(a); and (3) are consistent with the pol‐
icy statements issued by the Sentencing Com‐
4 No. 15‐1208
mission. Policies emphasized by the Sentencing
Commission include deterrence, rehabilitation,
and protecting the public.
United States v. Armour, 804 F.3d 859, 867 (7th Cir. 2015),
quoting United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2007).
When a defendant has objected to a condition of super‐
vised release in the district court, we review for an abuse of
discretion, but if no timely objection was raised in the district
court, we review only for plain error. Armour, 804 F.3d at
867; Kappes, 782 F.3d at 844; Ross, 475 F.3d at 873. “The sen‐
tencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge
their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case and dis‐
trict courts have an institutional advantage over appellate
courts in making these sorts of determinations … .” Kappes,
782 F.3d at 844, quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51–
52 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). This reasoning
extends to the conditions of supervised release.
In this case, Douglas received advance notice that the dis‐
trict court might impose all of the challenged conditions of
supervised release. They were filed with the presentence re‐
port as recommendations of the probation officer. Douglas
did not register any objections to the conditions at the sen‐
tencing hearing. When such advance notice is not provided
and the court springs the conditions of supervised release on
the defense at the sentencing hearing itself, as for example in
United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 378–79 (7th Cir. 2015),
we will not fault a defendant or his counsel for failure to ob‐
ject. On the other hand, when ample notice is given, as it was
in this case, and the defense raises no objection to the pro‐
posed conditions of supervised release, it is appropriate to
review on appeal only for plain error.
No. 15‐1208 5
“To correct a plain error, the appellant must establish that
there is: ‘(1) an error or defect (2) that is clear or obvious (3)
affecting the defendant’s substantial rights (4) and seriously
impugning the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of ju‐
dicial proceedings.’” United States v. Cary, 775 F.3d 919, 923
(7th Cir. 2015), quoting United States v. Goodwin, 717 F.3d 511,
518 (7th Cir. 2013). We address the conditions in turn.
B. The Challenged Conditions
1. Sex‐Offender Assessment and Potential Treatment
The first challenged condition orders Douglas to submit
to a sex‐offender assessment upon release from prison. If the
assessment recommends sex‐offender treatment, he will be
required to “comply with the sex‐offender specific treatment
that is recommended.” The district court explained that it
was imposing this condition based on Douglas’s recidivism
in sexual abuse of children and the belief that he “will not be
rehabilitated in prison and will need close supervision while
on supervised release, as history demonstrates [and] con‐
gress mandates.”
Douglas argues that requiring a sex‐offender assessment
is not justified because his sex offenses occurred so long ago
and he is now sixty years old. He relies on United States v.
Johnson, 756 F.3d 532, 540–42 (7th Cir. 2014) to support his
argument. In Johnson, we set aside a supervised release con‐
dition for sex‐offender treatment, finding no link between
the defendant’s misdemeanor sex offense fifteen years earlier
and the applicable § 3553(a) factors for the drug and firearm
offenses at issue. 756 F.3d at 541. There was no suggestion
that the defendant had engaged in any sexual misconduct
since the single misdemeanor. The government had not ex‐
6 No. 15‐1208
plained why sex‐offender treatment was needed to rehabili‐
tate the defendant or to protect the public. We further noted
that other circuits have “upheld sex‐offender treatment con‐
ditions when the sexual misconduct was so recent as to be a
contemporary characteristic of the defendant’s offender pro‐
file at the time of sentencing; they have vacated such condi‐
tions if the defendant’s last incident of sexual misconduct is
so remote in time that it does not support any present need
to rehabilitate the defendant or protect the public.” Id., quot‐
ing United States v. Evans, 727 F.3d 730, 734 (7th Cir. 2013).
Johnson is instructive, but the significant factual differ‐
ences persuade us that the district court did not commit a
plain error here. First, the condition here calls only for sex‐
offender assessment, not treatment. Sex‐offender treatment
will be ordered only if recommended based on the assess‐
ment. Second, Douglas is a repeat sex offender. The seven
years that passed between his first and second convictions
for sexually abusing children in his care suggest that the
passage of time did not sufficiently reduce the risk of recidi‐
vism for this defendant. There is also no indication in this
record that Douglas has undergone sex‐offender assessment
before, let alone treatment. Third, unlike Johnson, the district
court explained sufficiently why this condition is appropri‐
ate based on Douglas’s criminal sexual conduct and the need
to protect the public. We find no plain error in the district
court’s decision to order this first‐ever assessment for a de‐
fendant who has twice been convicted of sexually abusing
children in his care.
Douglas raises two additional points regarding this con‐
dition. He worries that allowing the entity performing the
assessment to provide any follow‐up treatment poses a con‐
No. 15‐1208 7
flict of interest, and he argues that if treatment is ordered, he
is being ordered to comply with unspecified and unknown
restrictions. Neither challenge is ripe for prudent disposition
at this time. Neither could be addressed based on anything
other than speculation unless and until Douglas and the
court know whether sex‐offender treatment will be ordered
and if so with what restrictions. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2),
a sentencing judge “may modify, reduce, or enlarge the con‐
ditions of supervised release, at any time prior to the expira‐
tion or termination of the term of supervised release.” If and
when these other issues that trouble Douglas become ripe,
he may raise any challenges to them under § 3583(e)(2).
2. Establishments That Sell Primarily Alcohol
The district court also ordered that Douglas “not enter or
patronize establishments where intoxicants are the primary
item of sale, such as bars, lounges, and night clubs.” When
imposing the condition, the court pointed out that Douglas
committed at least one of his sexual crimes when he was
abusing alcohol. The court also said that “Douglas’s primary
problem is his alcohol abuse,” and that “it’s quite clear, from
the notations throughout his criminal history and other
places in the presentence report, that he has a serious alcohol
abuse problem.”
While acknowledging a connection between his alcohol
use and his past sexual crimes against children, Douglas
contends that this condition imposed on top of conditions to
refrain from alcohol use and to comply with testing and
treatment for alcohol abuse is not sufficiently justified. He
also argues that the condition will hinder his ability to work
because he has often worked in restaurants.
8 No. 15‐1208
We find no plain error. As required by 18 U.S.C. §
3583(d), this condition is reasonably related to factors identi‐
fied in § 3553(a), particularly the history and characteristics
of the defendant. The district judge could reasonably find
that this condition will impose no greater deprivation of lib‐
erty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes of super‐
vised release. See Armour, 804 F.3d at 867, quoting Ross, 475
F.3d at 873. The condition does not prohibit Douglas from
entering, patronizing, or working in restaurants. It applies
only to establishments where alcohol is the primary item of
sale. The condition will bar Douglas from working in liquor
stores, bars, lounges, and nightclubs, but it should leave am‐
ple room to seek work, including restaurant work he has
done before.
3. Conditions for Effective Supervision
Douglas also challenges the conditions that he must
“permit a probation officer to visit him at any time at home
or elsewhere,” “not knowingly associate with any persons
engaged in criminal activity and shall not knowingly associ‐
ate with any person convicted of a felony, unless having first
been granted permission to do so by the probation officer,”
and that “truthfully and completely answer all verbal ques‐
tions of the probation officer and … follow the instructions
of the probation officer.” Douglas argues that these condi‐
tions will unduly restrict his constitutional liberties while he
is on supervised release.
We reject these challenges. We are talking about super‐
vised release, not complete release. This is not the first time
Douglas has been under court‐ordered supervision. By the
time he was sentenced in this case, Douglas had put together
a record of resistant and criminal conduct that earned these
No. 15‐1208 9
conditions. The judge explained that these conditions were
imposed to “assure that the probation officer is able to insure
compliance from a defendant who’s resistant to comply with
his requirements under the sex‐offender registration laws
and who is a recidivist generally … .” These conditions of
supervision were imposed to “do more for protecting the
public as we go down the road.”
The Supreme Court has made clear that persons on pro‐
bation, parole, supervised release, or other forms of criminal
justice supervision short of full‐time custody are not entitled
to the full range of constitutional liberties. “To a greater or
lesser degree, it is always true of probationers (as we have
said it to be true of parolees) that they do not enjoy ‘the ab‐
solute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but on‐
ly … conditional liberty properly dependent on observance
of special [probation] restrictions.’” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 874 (1987), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
480 (1972). “These same goals require and justify the exercise
of supervision to assure that the restrictions are in fact ob‐
served.” Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875. “Supervision, then, is a ‘spe‐
cial need’ of the State permitting a degree of impingement
upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to
the public at large.” Id. In light of these considerations, we
address each challenged condition in turn.
a. Probation Officer Visits
The district court must take care to ensure that super‐
vised release conditions are supported by the applicable
§ 3553(a) factors. See Kappes, 782 F.3d at 845; United States v.
Siegel, 753 F.3d 705, 707–08 (7th Cir. 2014); Ross, 475 F.3d at
873. In United States v. Thompson, this Court held that a con‐
dition of supervised release permitting the probation officer
10 No. 15‐1208
to visit at any time at home or elsewhere was “too broad in
the absence of any effort by the district court to explain why
[it is] needed.” 777 F.3d 368, 379–80 (7th Cir. 2015); see also
Kappes, 782 F.3d at 850–51; United States v. Sewell, 780 F.3d
839, 850–52 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Sandidge, 784 F.3d
1055, 1068–69 (7th Cir. 2015) (vacating similar conditions).
On the other hand, when the court provides an adequate ex‐
planation and the condition is related to the goals of proba‐
tion and rehabilitation, we have upheld similar conditions.
See Armour, 804 F.3d at 870 (holding similar condition rea‐
sonably related to rehabilitation and protecting the public);
United States v. Monteiro, 270 F.3d 465, 469 (7th Cir. 2001)
(upholding condition permitting a warrantless search at any
time because it related to goals of rehabilitation and protec‐
tion).
Here, the district court explained sufficiently why these
conditions for supervised release were necessary. Douglas
has been very resistant to supervision, as shown by his recid‐
ivism, continued failure to register, and alcohol abuse while
on supervised release. This stringent visiting condition will
enable close supervision, without loopholes. If it turns out
that the visiting condition is abused, Douglas can seek relief,
but as a rule, United States Probation Offices are not so over‐
staffed that they have time to waste on pointless harassment.
The problem in Thompson, where no explanation was pro‐
vided, is not present here. This condition of supervised re‐
lease reflects the court’s careful consideration advised in
Siegel and Thompson and applies the statutory sentencing fac‐
tors set forth in § 3553(a). To the extent Douglas argues the
judge’s explanation of his reasons for imposing this condi‐
tion was not sufficient, recall that Douglas did not object to
it. Given Douglas’s well‐documented record of trouble with
No. 15‐1208 11
the criminal justice system, including similar forms of non‐
custodial supervision, we have no doubt the judge could
have explained his reasons in even greater and more com‐
pelling detail. The court did not plainly err by requiring
Douglas to permit visits by the probation officer at any time.
b. Associating with Felons
In Thompson, we found fatally vague a condition forbid‐
ding the defendant from “associat[ing] with any person con‐
victed of a felony, unless granted permission to do so by the
probation officer.” 777 F.3d at 376–77. We reached this con‐
clusion because there was no stated requirement that the de‐
fendant know that a person was a convicted felon. Id. at 377.
In Thompson, we said that, “to protect himself [the defend‐
ant] would have to submit the name of any person he met to
his probation officer” and that the word “association” was
unclear. Id. Similarly, in Kappes, we found the condition for‐
bidding a defendant from “associating with any persons en‐
gaged in criminal activity and associating with any person
convicted of a felony, unless granted permission to do so by
the probation officer … fatally vague because it appears to
impose strict liability and does not define ‘associate.’” 782
F.3d at 848–49 (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted).
The strict liability concerns from Thompson and Kappes
are not present here. The condition imposed for Douglas
states that he shall not knowingly associate with any persons
engaged in criminal activity or with any person convicted of
a felony. The condition also specifies that Douglas may seek
permission from his probation officer if he wants to associate
with convicted felons. Consider, for example, the possibility
that he might want to associate with others with felony rec‐
12 No. 15‐1208
ords in a job, a church, or an alcohol abuse treatment pro‐
gram. Similarly, if Douglas genuinely did not understand
what is meant by “associate,” he should have raised the is‐
sue with the district court. He did not. With the knowledge
requirement and ample room for exceptions, the district
court did not plainly err by imposing this condition.
c. Answer Questions
Finally, Douglas argues that the supervised release condi‐
tion requiring him to answer the probation officer’s ques‐
tions violates his Fifth Amendment privilege against self‐
incrimination. We disagree.
The Supreme Court has held that a probationer’s “gen‐
eral obligation to appear and answer questions truthfully
did not in itself convert … otherwise voluntary statements
into compelled ones.” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427
(1984). The Court compared a probationer’s duty to answer
questions by a probation officer to an ordinary witness’s du‐
ty to answer questions under oath at a trial or before a grand
jury. If a witness is asked a question that will elicit incrimi‐
nating evidence, the witness himself must ordinarily assert
the privilege against self‐incrimination. See id.
So too here. Douglas may invoke the privilege against
self‐incrimination if he wishes not to incriminate himself. If
he chooses not to invoke the privilege and answers, his re‐
sponses will be considered voluntary. This condition does
not eliminate Douglas’s right to invoke the privilege against
self‐incrimination and was not imposed in error.
In Thompson, this court held that conditions providing
that “the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by
the probation officer and that he shall permit a probation of‐
No. 15‐1208 13
ficer to visit him or her at any time at home or elsewhere”
were too broad in the absence of any effort by the district
court to explain why they were needed. 777 F.3d at 379–80
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also
Sewell, 780 F.3d at 851; Sandidge, 784 F.3d at 1068–69.
Here, unlike in Thompson, the district court explained suf‐
ficiently why Douglas needs close supervision. He has re‐
peatedly failed to follow the law and to report information
(e.g., his relocation to Tennessee) to those supervising him.
The district court explained the need for this condition based
on Douglas’s recidivism, resistance to supervision, and lack
of rehabilitation. The district court did not plainly err by im‐
posing this condition.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment,
with the challenged conditions of supervised release, is
AFFIRMED.