In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15‐3522
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
CHARLES R. SCHRODE,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 14‐cr‐30014 — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED APRIL 12, 2016 — DECIDED OCTOBER 7, 2016
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and WILLIAMS, Cir‐
cuit Judges.
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Charles Schrode was convicted in
state court for predatory criminal assault of a four‐year‐old
family member. He later pled guilty in federal court to vide‐
otaping assaults of the same child on two other dates, and re‐
ceiving and possessing child pornography of other victims.
2 No. 15‐3522
He was sentenced to 630 months’ imprisonment for the fed‐
eral offenses, some of which was to run consecutively to his
state sentence. On appeal, Schrode argues that none of his fed‐
eral sentence should run consecutively to his state sentence.
But we affirm Schrode’s sentence. The district court did not
err in applying some of his federal sentence to run consecu‐
tively to his state sentence, because it did not clearly err in
finding that his state offense was not relevant conduct for all
of his federal offenses.
Schrode also received a life term of supervised release,
which he now challenges, along with several of the conditions
of supervised release, which he argues improperly delegate
judicial power to the probation office. However, not only did
the district court adequately justify its reasons for imposing a
life term of supervision, Schrode also waived any challenges
to his conditions of supervised release by affirmatively with‐
drawing his objections to those conditions at the sentencing
hearing. Nonetheless, we grant a limited remand to bring the
sentencing calculation for Schrode’s production offenses in
compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e).
I. BACKGROUND
A. Schrode’s Offenses
On April 7, 2013, Schrode committed predatory sexual as‐
sault against Jane Doe, a four‐year‐old family member. He
pled guilty in state court in February 2014 and was sentenced
to 18 years’ imprisonment.
In June 2013, the FBI executed a search warrant of
Schrode’s home in Springfield Illinois. The search led to the
discovery that in May 2012, Schrode sent child pornography
from Illinois to a man in Michigan. In exchange, Schrode
No. 15‐3522 3
watched the Michigan man through streaming video and di‐
rected him through web chats as he sexually assaulted his son.
The FBI discovered over 200 still images and four videos of
child pornography on Schrode’s computer in his Illinois
home. In June 2014, when Schrode was in state custody, his
wife discovered videos of him sexually assaulting Jane at the
home of a family friend in February and March 2013. She gave
the video footage to Jane’s father, who turned it over to the
FBI.
Schrode was indicted on four federal counts: first, for re‐
ceiving child pornography of the Michigan victim in May
2012; second, for producing child pornography by videotap‐
ing his sexual assault of Jane in February 2013; third, for pro‐
ducing child pornography of Jane in March 2013; and fourth,
for possessing child pornography that the FBI discovered on
his computer in June 2013. He pled guilty to all counts.
B. Application of Sentencing Guidelines
At Schrode’s sentencing hearing, the district court
grouped Schrode’s offenses pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.1. The
first group included counts one and four (receipt and posses‐
sion of child pornography), the second group contained the
single count of production of child pornography in February
2013, and the third group contained the single count of pro‐
duction of child pornography in March 2013. Production of
child pornography is not a groupable offense. U.S.S.G.
§ 3D1.2(d). The district court explicitly addressed the presen‐
tence report finding that Schrode’s state offense was relevant
conduct to the “instant offense.” The judge noted that she was
unsure the conduct which led to Schrode’s state sentence was
relevant to his federal offenses because “these were three sep‐
4 No. 15‐3522
arate rapes and two of these rapes involved child pornogra‐
phy production. Those are the two I’m dealing with. And they
were in a different period of time.” Ultimately the judge de‐
termined that although she had “grave reservations that it is
relevant conduct,” she would treat the rape for which Schrode
was serving his state court sentence as relevant conduct for
his production counts (counts 2 and 3). The judge then calcu‐
lated a sentence of 60 months for the receipt count, 363
months for each production count, and 240 months for the
possession count.
In addition to determining the prison term for each count,
the court had to decide whether the sentence for each group
would run concurrently or consecutively to the state prison
sentence by applying § 5G1.3 of the Guidelines. It concluded
that because the state prison sentence was for conduct rele‐
vant to the production counts, Schrode’s time served for the
state sentence would be credited to those sentence terms,
which would also run concurrently with the state term of im‐
prisonment. However, because the state sentence did not in‐
volve conduct that was relevant to the offenses of receipt and
possession of pornography (Jane did not appear in any of the
pornography that formed the basis of those counts), those
sentences would run consecutively to the state court sentence.
In making its ruling, the district court stated it was relying on
both § 5G1.3(b) and (d) of the Guidelines. Schrode objected to
the court’s finding that the offense underlying the state sen‐
tence was relevant conduct for some of the counts but not oth‐
ers. Ultimately, the court imposed an aggregate sentence of
630 months’ imprisonment, with an adjusted sentence of 330
months for the production counts (starting with 663 months
and then crediting the 33 months already served on state sen‐
tence), to run concurrently with Schrode’s state sentence and
No. 15‐3522 5
with each other; 240 months for the possession count, to run
consecutively with the other federal counts and his state sen‐
tence; and 60 months for the receipt count, to run consecu‐
tively with the other federal counts and the state sentence.
C. Conditions of Supervised Release
After determining Schrode’s term of imprisonment, the
court imposed a life term of supervised release. As part of his
supervised release term, the court imposed four discretionary
conditions, the relevant portions of which are included below:
Condition 3: The defendant shall follow the in‐
structions of the probation officer. He shall an‐
swer truthfully the questions of Probation as
they relate to his conditions of supervision, sub‐
ject to his right against self‐incrimination.
Condition 8: The defendant shall participate in
a sex offender treatment program as deemed
necessary by probation.
Condition 13: [The defendant] shall, at the direc‐
tion of the U.S. Probation Office, participate in a
program for substance abuse treatment includ‐
ing not more than six tests per month to deter‐
mine whether he has used controlled or psycho‐
active substances … . He shall be subject to this
condition until such time as Probation deter‐
mines that drug abuse treatment and drug test‐
ing no longer assist him to avoid committing
further crimes.
Condition 14: The defendant shall participate in
psychiatric services and/or a program of mental
6 No. 15‐3522
health counseling/treatment as directed by Pro‐
bation … . He shall be subject to this condition
until such time as Probation determines that
mental health counseling/treatment no longer
assists him to avoid committing further crimes.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Schrode argues that the district court errone‐
ously applied U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, violated 18 U.S.C. § 3583 when
it did not consider the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) in deciding to impose a life term of supervised re‐
lease, and improperly delegated Schrode’s supervised release
conditions to the probation office. We review each of his ar‐
guments in turn.
A. Judge Did Not Err in Application of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3
We review de novo whether a district court properly de‐
termined the applicable provision of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3. United
States v. Conley, 777 F.3d 910, 913 (7th Cir. 2015). Relevant con‐
duct determinations are factual determinations, which may
only be reversed for clear error. United States v. Johnson, 342
F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2003).
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) reads in relevant part as follows:
(b) if … a[n undischarged] term of imprison‐
ment resulted from another offense that is rele‐
vant conduct to the instant offense of conviction
under the provisions of (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of
1B1.3, the sentence for the instant offense shall
be imposed as follows:
No. 15‐3522 7
(1) the court shall adjust the sentence for any pe‐
riod of imprisonment already served on the un‐
discharged term of imprisonment if the court
determines that such period of imprisonment
will not be credited to the federal sentence by
the Bureau of Prisons; and
(2) the sentence for the instant offense shall be
imposed to run concurrently to the remainder
of the undischarged term of imprisonment.
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d) directs that “in any other case involv‐
ing an undischarged term of imprisonment, the sentence for
the instant offense may be imposed to run concurrently, par‐
tially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undischarged
term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable punishment for
the instant offense.”
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) defines relevant conduct as “all
acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the
defendant.” Section 1B1.3(a)(2) applies to grouped offenses,
and includes “all acts and omissions described in subdivi‐
sions (1)(A) and (1)(B) that were part of the same course of
conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of convic‐
tion.” Section 1B1.3(a)(3) additionally defines relevant con‐
duct as “all harm that resulted from acts and omissions spec‐
ified in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) above; and all harm that
was the object of such acts and omissions.”
Schrode’s argument is twofold: first, that the district court
should have found his state offense to be relevant conduct for
all of his federal offenses, and second, that the district court
erred in applying both § 5G1.3(b) and (d) when determining
8 No. 15‐3522
whether his state term of imprisonment would run concur‐
rently or consecutively to his federal sentence.
1. No Clear Error in Relevant Conduct Findings
It is the defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the con‐
duct which led to his state sentences is relevant conduct to his
federal offense. United States v. Nania, 724 F.3d 824, 833 (7th
Cir. 2013). In Nania, we held that sufficient factual overlap
must exist between the state and federal offenses for the state
conduct to be considered relevant to the federal offense under
§ 5G1.3(b). Id. at 830. We also noted that § 5G1.3 is designed
to discourage sentences that punish defendants twice for the
same conduct. Id. at 829. Schrode advances two arguments in
support of finding that the state offense counts as relevant
conduct for the receipt and possession counts.
First, Schrode argues that under the grouping rules, his of‐
fense levels for the production counts (which he argues were
partially informed by his state conduct) contributed to an in‐
crease in his combined adjusted offense level by two points.
So, he argues, his state conduct was relevant to his sentencing
calculation for possession and receipt of child pornography.
But as Schrode himself points out, § 5G1.3(b) no longer in‐
cludes a requirement that the conduct at issue be a basis for
increasing a defendant’s offense level. United States v. Orozco‐
Sanchez, 814 F.3d 844, 850 (7th Cir. 2016). The central analysis
is now only whether or not the conduct underlying the state
sentence meets the definition of “relevant conduct” under
§ 1B1.3. Id. And Schrode fails to explain why his possession
and receipt counts, in a separate group from his production
counts, meet that definition. We disagree that when an undis‐
charged sentence indirectly affects the sentence for an instant
offense by way of the grouping rules, but was not part of the
No. 15‐3522 9
same course of conduct as the federal offense, we must con‐
sider the state offense to be relevant conduct to unrelated of‐
fenses under § 1B1.3.
Second, Schrode argues that his state court offense is rele‐
vant conduct to all of his federal offenses because his com‐
bined adjusted offense level for all four federal counts was
subjected to an enhancement under § 4B1.5(b)(1), which adds
five levels when the defendant’s “instant offense is a covered
sex crime … and the defendant engaged in a pattern of activ‐
ity involving prohibited sexual conduct.” But as the govern‐
ment points out, “pattern of activity” under § 4B1.5(b)(1) is
met “if on at least two separate occasions, the defendant en‐
gaged in prohibited contact with a minor.” App. Note 4(B)(i).
Since Schrode met this requirement by engaging in the two
production offenses that were the source of his federal sen‐
tence, it is far from clear that his state offense was considered
part of the pattern. Moreover, a “pattern of activity” finding
should not be equated with “relevant conduct” under
§ 1B1.3(b), which requires not just that the defendant commit‐
ted certain types of offenses two times or more, but that the
two offenses at issue were part of the same course of conduct.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). Certainly the fact that a defendant com‐
mits a certain type of offense on multiple occasions does not
inevitably mean that each separate offense is part of the same
course of conduct.
Schrode needed to provide a factual basis for finding that
his sexual abuse of Jane was part of the same course of con‐
duct as his receipt and possession of child pornography of
other victims, such that failing to discount his state sentence
would subject him to double punishment for the same con‐
duct. See Nania, 724 F.3d at 829. But Schrode’s federal offenses
10 No. 15‐3522
for receipt and possession of child pornography did not in‐
volve images or abuse of Jane and occurred almost a year be‐
fore the conduct which led to Schrode’s state conviction. It is
clear from the record that the district court accepted (albeit
reluctantly) that Schrode’s state sentence resulted from con‐
duct relevant to his production counts because the same vic‐
tim was involved. By contrast, the same victim was not in‐
volved in the receipt and possession counts. The judge did not
clearly err in finding that offenses that did not have any vic‐
tims in common were not part of the same course of conduct,
and therefore not relevant conduct under § 1B1.3(b). Schrode
has not provided a persuasive reason to disturb this finding
under clear error review.
2. No Error in Applying Two Subsections of
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3
Schrode also argues that the district court was not permit‐
ted to apply § 5G1.3(d) to his receipt and possession counts
once it determined that § 5G1.3(b) applied to his production
counts. In other words, the court was required to take an all‐
or‐nothing approach with the separate counts once it deter‐
mined that the state court sentence entailed relevant conduct
for at least some of his federal offenses. We do not find this
reasoning persuasive, for a few reasons.
We start by looking at § 5G1.3(b) itself. Application Note
2(b) notes that § 5G1.3(b) does not apply in cases where the
prior offense was not relevant conduct to the “instant of‐
fense.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b), App. Note 2(b). So if the judge ex‐
plicitly found the state court sentence for Jane’s rape was not
relevant to the receipt and possession offenses, then it was
barred from applying subsection (b). Next, we look at the
Guidelines definition of “instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1,
No. 15‐3522 11
application note 1H. “Offense” means the offense of convic‐
tion and all relevant conduct under 1B1.3, unless a different
meaning is specified or is otherwise clear from the context. Id.
“Instant” is used in connection with “offense” to distinguish
the violation for which the defendant is being sentenced from
a prior or subsequent offense or from an offense before an‐
other court. Id.
This is a situation where the definition of “offense” must
be modified based on the context. “Offense” as it appears un‐
der § 5G1.3 cannot mean the offense of conviction plus rele‐
vant conduct, because the district court must separately de‐
termine if conduct is relevant in order to apply the appropri‐
ate subsection. So a better reading of “offense” in this context
is simply the offense of conviction. Because there are four of‐
fenses of conviction that each resulted in a separate term of
imprisonment, it makes sense that each offense must be run
through § 5G1.3’s analysis separately to determine how the
undischarged state sentence applies to the federal term of im‐
prisonment. Otherwise, § 5G1.3(b)’s requirement that the rel‐
evant conduct analysis apply to the “instant offense” would
not be met. Schrode argues that the § 5G1.3 requires every of‐
fense of conviction to be subject to the same subsection, but
he does not provide any authority for this position. As a pol‐
icy matter, to adopt his view would prevent courts from im‐
posing a fair punishment on defendants for conduct wholly
apart from the conduct that led to a prior sentence, simply be‐
cause they happened to be prosecuted for multiple unrelated
federal offenses at once. So we see no error in the district court
applying § 5G1.3(b) to the production counts, and § 5G1.3(d)
to the possession and receipt counts.
12 No. 15‐3522
3. Adequate Reasons Provided for Imposing Con‐
secutive Sentence for Counts 1 and 4
Finally, Schrode argues that the district court failed to ap‐
ply Note 4(A) under § 5G1.3, which requires considering the
§ 3553(a) factors as well as other listed factors to achieve a rea‐
sonable incremental punishment. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, App. Note
4(A). We are not persuaded. The district court noted the
amount of time already served on Schrode’s state sentence,
the need to protect the public, the differences between the
state offense and the federal offenses, the seriousness of
Schrode’s federal offenses, the continuation of Schrode’s un‐
lawful behavior after he was contacted by the FBI, and the
need to deter future offenses. All of these factors led the court
to believe that imposing a sentence which significantly added
to Schrode’s state sentence was an appropriate punishment.
The court more than adequately stated its reasons for apply‐
ing some portions of his federal sentence consecutively to his
state sentence.
B. District Court Complied with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c)
Schrode next attacks his lifetime term of supervision. He
argues that the district court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c),
which requires that a district court determine the length of a
supervised release term based on several factors listed under
§ 3553(a). United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 375 (7th Cir.
2015). We review whether a district court adequately ex‐
plained a chosen sentence de novo. United States v. Armour,
804 F.3d 859, 867 (7th Cir. 2015). Supervised release is consid‐
ered part of a given sentence for purposes of our review.
Thompson, 777 F.3d at 373.
No. 15‐3522 13
Schrode urges us to overrule our precedent that “a district
court need only provide one overarching explanation and jus‐
tification—tethered, of course, to the § 3553(a) factors—for
why it thinks a criminal sentence comprised of both terms of
imprisonment and supervised release is appropriate.” United
States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 870 (7th Cir. 2016); see also United
States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 847 (7th Cir. 2015); Armour, 804
F.3d at 867–68. We decline to do so. The district court pro‐
vided a number of reasons for imposing its sentence, which
encompassed both Schrode’s prison term and term of super‐
vised release. The judge stated on the record that she took all
of the relevant § 3553(a) factors into consideration. She
acknowledged Schrode’s lack of criminal history, his coopera‐
tion in the case, his difficult childhood, and his low intellec‐
tual capacity. She stated that the sentence would help Schrode
transition back into society, ensure he did not resume illegal
activities, protect the public, create deterrence for similar of‐
fenses, and provide Schrode with ongoing treatment and sup‐
port. These reasons were distinct from the judge’s considera‐
tion of the need for just punishment, which is only appropri‐
ate to consider in determining a term of imprisonment. 18
U.S.C. § 3583(c) (excluding from consideration factors under
§ 3553(a)(2)(A)); Kappes, 782 F.3d at 836. The district court
should be commended for providing its reasons for each con‐
dition of supervised release, and asking Schrode’s counsel
both at the outset of the hearing and after its pronouncement
of the conditions if it had addressed all relevant issues to
Schrode’s satisfaction.
Schrode argues that reviewing the sentence as a whole in‐
stead of requiring a district court to articulate separate rea‐
sons for a prison term and term of supervised release renders
18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) redundant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). But “no
14 No. 15‐3522
part of § 3553(c) requires the district court to bifurcate its con‐
sideration, discussion, and evaluation of the § 3553(a) sen‐
tencing factors, which also happens to include all the factors
a district court must consider in imposing a term of super‐
vised release.” Bloch, 825 F.3d at 869. The complementary pur‐
poses of imprisonment and supervised release require a court
to consider many § 3553(a) factors for both, and this require‐
ment is codified by § 3583(c). This does not cause redundancy,
but rather ensures that all components of a defendant’s sen‐
tence account for the individual characteristics of his case.
C. Non‐Delegation Challenge to Supervised Release
Conditions Waived
Schrode next argues that several of his conditions of su‐
pervised release violated the non‐delegation clause of the
Constitution. Specifically, he points to four conditions which
authorized varying levels of discretion by the U.S. Probation
Office. We review constitutional challenges to sentences de
novo, United States v. Tichenor, 683 F.3d 358, 362 (7th Cir. 2012),
but we review arguments that were forfeited before the dis‐
trict court for plain error, United States v. Hudson, 627 F.3d 309,
312 (7th Cir. 2010). In contrast to forfeited issues, valid waiver
of an issue forecloses any review because there is no error to
correct on appeal. See United States v. Webster, 775 F.3d 897, 902
(7th Cir. 2015).
Article III judges lack constitutional authority to delegate
judicial power to non‐Article III judges. Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (2015). So Article III of the Consti‐
tution would prevent a judge from delegating the duty of im‐
posing a defendant’s punishment to a probation officer. See,
e.g., United States v. Nash, 483 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 2006)
No. 15‐3522 15
(plain error to impose condition that defendant “shall” partic‐
ipate in mental health counseling “as deemed necessary” by
probation officer because condition would turn on judgment
of officer, not court); United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 251
(3d Cir. 2005) (plain error to impose condition that “defendant
shall participate” in a mental health treatment program “at
the discretion of the probation officer”). In addition, “a
plainly erroneous condition of supervised release will inevi‐
tably affect substantial rights, as a defendant who fails to meet
that condition will be subject to further incarceration. Pruden,
398 F.3d at 251. While we have not squarely confronted the
constitutional underpinnings of this principle in the sentenc‐
ing context, we have held that the delegation of a serious sen‐
tencing decision from “a judicial officer to another deprives
the defendant of a substantial right.” United States v. Moham‐
mad, 53 F.3d 1426, 1439 (7th Cir. 1995). Notwithstanding these
rules, probation officers have broad authority to manage and
supervise probationers. United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686, 695
(10th Cir. 2011). To determine if a condition of supervised re‐
lease violates the non‐delegation rule, courts addressing the
question have distinguished between those delegations that
“merely task the probation officer with performing ministe‐
rial acts or support services related to the punishment im‐
posed, and those that allow the officer to decide the nature or
extent of the defendant’s punishment.” Id.
On appeal, Schrode challenges the conditions of super‐
vised release which (1) mandated that he follow the instruc‐
tions of the probation officer; (2) required him to participate
in a sex offender treatment program as deemed necessary by
probation; (3) stated that he must participate in a substance
abuse program at the direction of the probation office until it
determined that drug abuse treatment and testing no longer
16 No. 15‐3522
helped him to avoid committing further crimes; and (4) dic‐
tated he must participate in various mental health treatments
as directed by probation until it determined that such treat‐
ment no longer helped him to avoid committing further
crimes. He argues each of these conditions improperly dele‐
gated judicial power to determine his sentence to a law en‐
forcement agency in violation of Article III.
The government responds that Schrode waived this issue
at the sentencing hearing by affirmatively stating that he had
no objections to the conditions he now challenges on consti‐
tutional grounds. In the context of supervised release, a de‐
fendant’s response to a general inquiry at the end of sentenc‐
ing, unaccompanied by either (1) an explicit approval of the
condition or (2) a strategic reason to forgo the argument at the
hearing, does not constitute waiver. United States v. Hinds, 770
F.3d 658, 665 (7th Cir. 2014). When a defendant affirmatively
states “I do not object” or “I withdraw my objection” to a spe‐
cific issue, waiver applies. Webster, 775 F.3d at 902 (citing
United States v. Locke, 759 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 2014)); cf.
United States v. Farmer, 755 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2014) (find‐
ing no waiver in part because defendant did not affirmatively
say “no objection” to condition of supervised release chal‐
lenged on appeal).
We agree with the government that waiver applies here.
The district court explicitly asked Schrode’s counsel at his sen‐
tencing hearing if he was withdrawing his objections to each
of the conditions of supervised release he now challenges,
identifying them individually by their paragraph number in
the presentence report. He confirmed his withdrawal of ob‐
jections to all of the conditions he now challenges, contingent
on the court’s acceptance of conditions that were agreed to by
No. 15‐3522 17
the parties. He also maintained his objection to other condi‐
tions, which are not the subject of this appeal.
Schrode’s attempt to analogize the situation to the defend‐
ants’ sentences in Thompson, 777 F.3d at 368, is misplaced. In
those sentences, there was no affirmative withdrawal of ob‐
jections. Moreover, the presentence report made no recom‐
mendation for supervised release, and the district court failed
to provide any explanation for why it imposed each condi‐
tion. Id. at 375, 380. By contrast, here all four conditions were
submitted to Schrode prior to the sentencing hearing, with
reasons set forth for each condition in the presentence report.
At the hearing itself, the district court articulated clear rea‐
sons, tethered to the factors listed under § 3553(a) and con‐
sistent with § 3583(d), for each condition that Schrode now
constitutionally challenges for the first time on appeal. The
salient circumstances in Thompson, that the defendants lacked
sufficient notice or explanation by the district court to register
objections to the conditions at the hearing, do not apply here.
See also United States v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1082 (7th Cir. 2016)
(finding waiver where “[t]here were no surprises in the sen‐
tencing hearing related to supervised release” and the de‐
fendant did not object).
Also, the conditions were not so vague that Schrode could
not determine what restrictions were actually being imposed
and whether or not any of them were so onerous that he
should object. Cf. United States v. Hill, 818 F.3d 342, 345 (7th
Cir. 2016). The issue he now raises is quite clear. The district
court should not have given the probation officer so much
power in determining whether or not the challenged condi‐
tions should apply. He cannot refashion the withdrawal of his
objections as forfeiture, and not waiver, when he had ample
18 No. 15‐3522
notice of the conditions to be imposed, a clear understanding
of the meaning of each condition, multiple opportunities to
object, was explicitly asked by the court whether he chose to
withdraw his objections or preserve them, and chose to pre‐
serve some objections and withdraw the ones he now appeals.
However, we note that we find particularly troubling the
imposition of a condition of sex offender treatment “as
deemed necessary by probation,” which unlike the other con‐
ditions, delegates to the probation office not merely the ad‐
ministration of an imposed condition, but the underlying
judgment of whether the condition will be imposed at all. Un‐
fortunately, Schrode’s affirmative withdrawal of any objection
to the condition forecloses our review of this issue. Webster,
775 F.3d at 902.
D. Limited Remand for Calculation Error
Finally, we address a calculation error. The maximum sen‐
tence for production offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) is 360
months. The district court, in what appears to have been an
inadvertent error, applied Schrode’s state court sentence to an
aggregate sentence of 663 months for the production offenses.
We remand only this issue to the district court to ensure com‐
pliance with § 2251(e).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Schrode’s sentence,
with the exception of a limited remand consistent with Sec‐
tion II.D of this opinion.