District of Columbia
Court of Appeals
Nos. 14-AA-343 & 14-AA-801
NOV 25 2015
ROYSTON CLEMENT and MARIE EASON ,
Petitioners,
v.
CRB-134-13
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES,
Respondent,
&
CENTER RADIOLOGY, et al.,
Intervenors.
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the District of Columbia Compensation Review Board
BEFORE: Glickman and Blackburne-Rigsby, Associate Judges; and Newman,
Senior Judge.
JUDGMENT
This case came to be heard on the administrative record, certified copy of the
agency hearing transcript, the briefs filed, and was argued by counsel. On consideration
whereof, and as set forth in the opinion filed this date, it is now hereby
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the petitions for review of the Compensation
Review Board‟s determination are denied.
For the Court:
Dated: November 25, 2015.
Opinion by Senior Judge Theodore Newman.
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the
Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound
volumes go to press.
11/25/15
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
Nos. 14-AA-343 and 14-AA-801
ROYSTON CLEMENT AND MARIE EASON, PETITIONERS,
V.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, RESPONDENT.
AND
CENTER RADIOLOGY, et al., INTERVENORS.
On Petitions for Review of Decisions of the
Compensation Review Board
(CRB-134-13)
(Argued October 1, 2015 Decided November 25, 2015)
Matthew Peffer and David M. Snyder, were on the brief for petitioners.
Karl A. Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, with whom
Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Loren L. Alikhan, Deputy Solicitor General,
were on the brief for respondent.
Joseph C. Veith, was on the brief for Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox, et al.
Theresa M. Colwell entered an appearance for Center Radiology, et al.
Mary G. Weidner was on the brief for intervenors.
Before GLICKMAN and BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Associate Judges, and
NEWMAN, Senior Judge.
2
NEWMAN, Senior Judge: This consolidated appeal concerns the
interpretation of D.C. Code § 32-1505 (b) (2012 Repl.), specifically whether the
phrase “temporary or permanent partial disability” refers to “temporary total” or
“temporary partial” disability. Petitioners Royston Clement and Marie Eason
requested that the Department of Employment Services (“DOES”) enforce their
Workers‟ Compensation orders after their employers stopped paying their
temporary total disability benefits after 500 weeks. In both cases, the
Compensation Review Board (“CRB”) construed § 32-1505 (b) to include a 500-
week limit on the payment of temporary total disability benefits and denied
petitioners‟ request. We affirm the CRB‟s interpretation of the statute and deny
Mr. Clement‟s and Ms. Eason‟s petitions for review.
I. Facts and Procedural History
A. Petitioner Clement
Mr. Clement injured his left leg while working as a copy clerk in April 2000
and was awarded temporary total disability benefits. In November 2009, his
employer issued a notice stating that it would soon stop paying because Mr.
Clement‟s temporary total disability benefits payment was subject to a 500-week
3
cap. Mr. Clement filed a motion seeking a declaration that his employer was in
default. A DOES Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) concluded that his
employer‟s obligation to pay temporary total disability benefits was not subject to
the 500-week cap and granted his motion.
Nevertheless, the CRB reversed the ALJ‟s order on appeal, finding that
“[w]hile the actual language of [§ 32-1505 (b)] is susceptible to alternative
constructions, the rationale accompanying [the] amending language makes it clear
that the Council intended to limit the payment of temporary total benefits to 500
weeks.” On remand, another ALJ, bound by the CRB‟s interpretation of the
statute, concluded that the employer‟s obligation to pay temporary total disability
benefits had lawfully ceased in November 2009 and denied Mr. Clement‟s request.
The CRB affirmed this subsequent order.
B. Petitioner Eason
Ms. Eason was awarded temporary total disability benefits as of May 2003.
In May 2013, her employer issued a Notice of Final Payment. On March 10, 2014,
the ALJ held, consistent with her recent decision in Clement, that the employer‟s
4
obligation to pay benefits had ceased after 500 weeks and denied Ms. Eason‟s
request to hold her employer in default. The CRB affirmed this order.
II. Relevant Law
The Workers‟ Compensation Act (“WCA”), D.C. Code § 32-1501 et seq.,
provides compensation to private-sector workers who suffer disabilities as a result
of workplace injuries. The WCA classifies a disability as either permanent or
temporary, and also as either total or partial. Section 32-1508 provides that in the
cases of permanent total disability and temporary total disability, “66 2/3% of the
employee‟s average weekly wages shall be paid to the employee during the
continuance thereof.” D.C. Code § 32-1508 (1), (2) (emphasis added). In
addition, “[i]n the case of temporary partial disability, the compensation shall be
66 2/3% of the injured employee‟s wage loss to be paid during the continuance of
such disability, but shall not be paid for a period exceeding 5 years.” D.C. Code §
32-1508 (5) (emphasis added).
In 1999, a statute amending the WCA was enacted. It states in relevant part:
“[f]or any one injury causing temporary or permanent partial disability, the
payment for disability benefits shall not continue for more than a total of 500
5
weeks.” D.C. Code § 32-1505 (b) (emphasis added). The issue on appeal is
whether the CRB erred in construing § 32-1505 (b) to set a 500-week limit on the
payment of temporary total disability benefits.
III. Standard of Review
We review the CRB‟s decision that affirmed the ALJ‟s compensation
order—we do not directly review the ALJ‟s determination on appeal. Jones v.
District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 41 A.3d 1219, 1221 (D.C. 2012). “We
will affirm the CRB‟s decision unless it was „[a]rbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.‟” Id. (quoting D.C. Code § 2-
510 (a)(3)(A) (2001)). Given the CRB‟s expertise in administering the WCA, even
though we review the CRB‟s legal conclusions de novo, we will defer to the CRB‟s
reasonable interpretations of WCA ambiguous provisions. Howard Univ. Hosp. v.
District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 960 A.2d 603, 606 (D.C. 2008). In
fact, we have said that the CRB‟s “interpretation is binding unless plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the enabling statute.” Hiligh v. District of Columbia
Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 935 A.2d 1070, 1073 (D.C. 2007).
6
IV. Discussion
Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to its
plain meaning. Mazanderan v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Pub. Works, 94 A.3d
770, 774 (D.C. 2014). However, “we recognize that even where statutory language
has a superficial clarity, a detailed consideration of other factors, such as the
specific context in which that language is used and the broader context of the
statute as a whole, when viewed in light of the statute's legislative history, may
reveal ambiguities that this court must resolve.” Id. Where a statute is ambiguous,
the statute‟s legislative history is relevant in determining its appropriate meaning.
See United States v. Great N. Ry. Co., 287 U.S. 144, 154-55 (1932); District of
Columbia v. Acme Reporting Co., 530 A.2d 708, 713 (D.C. 1987).
Here, the language of § 32-1505 (b) as written is ambiguous, especially
when read in conjunction with § 32-1508 (5). As defined by the WCA, temporary
disability benefits are categorized as either total or partial. However, § 32-1505 (b)
does not state as to which of these temporary disability benefits it applies; it simply
states “temporary or permanent partial disability.” D.C. Code § 32-1505 (b); cf.
Hiligh, supra, 935 A.2d at 1074 (upholding the CRB‟s determination that the term
7
“total disability” is ambiguous because it does not specify “temporary total” or
“permanent total” disability).
Petitioners insist that a plain reading of § 32-1505 (b) indicates that it applies
only to partial disability benefits, either temporary or permanent. Petitioners,
however, fail to address the statutory conflict created by their interpretation. The
WCA already has a provision limiting the payment of temporary partial disability
benefits to five years. D.C. Code § 32-1508 (5). If § 32-1505 (b) also applies to
temporary partial disability benefits, we would have two conflicting statutory
provisions—one of which has a five-year cap while the other one has a 500-week
cap on the same type of benefits.
Petitioners attempt to resolve this statutory conflict by suggesting a
“combined” interpretation of these two provisions, in which “an injured worker is
entitled to receive a maximum of 500 weeks‟ worth of partial wage loss benefits,
whether they be temporary or permanent, for which a maximum of 5 years‟ worth
can be temporary partial disability benefits.” Petitioners, however, provide no
legislative support for their interpretation.
8
We find petitioners‟ “combined” interpretation unpersuasive. Basic
statutory interpretation requires that statutes should be construed “so as to avoid
rendering superfluous” any statutory language. Astoria Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n v.
Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991). Here, petitioners‟ “combined” interpretation
suggests that the 500-week cap applies to both temporary partial and permanent
partial disability, but temporary partial disability benefits payment would still be
subject to the five-year cap in § 32-1508 (5). This interpretation renders the term
“temporary” in § 32-1505 (b) essentially unnecessary, or “superfluous,” because
the 500-week cap would have no effect on temporary partial disability benefits
payment. Therefore, we reject petitioner‟s “combined” interpretation. Even if
defensible, such a reading does not render the CRB‟s alternative interpretation
“plainly erroneous” or inconsistent with the WCA. Hiligh, supra, 935 A.2d at
1073.
Having determined that § 32-1505 (b) is in fact ambiguous, the CRB
properly relied on legislative history to interpret the statute. We hold that the
CRB‟s interpretation of § 32-1505 (b) is reasonable and not otherwise “plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the enabling statute.” Hiligh, supra, 935 A.2d at
1073. The CRB rested its decision on the legislative history of § 32-1505 (b),
namely the written rationale to the proposed amendment—which later was adopted
9
as § 32-1505 (b)—and the preamble and purposes of the amending bill. The
relevant written rationale is as follows:
The unlimited duration of payments in the District for
temporary total and permanent partial injuries
encourages people to stay on disability and provides a
disincentive to return to work. The open-ended nature of
potential payments also significantly drives up settlement
costs for permanent partial disabilities. The average
permanent partial disability case costs more than twice
the national average and significantly more than either
Maryland and Virginia. Both Maryland and Virginia
limit benefits to 500 weeks (though Maryland raises this
amount to 667 weeks for workers who are more than 50
percent impaired). This amendment would bring the
District closer in line with those neighboring
jurisdictions. It also provides for the opportunity to
continue the benefit period to provide three years of
extended benefits for workers whose disability remains
severe, and allows an injured employee up to three years
after termination of non-scheduled benefits to re-open his
or her case due to change in condition.
Considering that the written rationale to § 32-1505 (b) indicates that its goal
was to reduce the costs associated with “[t]he unlimited duration of payments in
the District for temporary total [disability benefits],” it is clearly, if not perfectly,
reasonable for the CRB to construe that this provision applies to temporary total
disability benefits payment, especially given that temporary total benefits had no
durational limit before this amendment was adopted. See D.C. Code § 32-1508 (2)
(“during the continuance thereof”).
10
Furthermore, other legislative history of § 32-1505 (b) points to the same
goal of addressing the “unlimited” nature of temporary total disability benefits
payment. First, the amending bill‟s preamble listed several purposes, including
“establish[ing] a maximum length of time during which an injured worker may
receive workers‟ compensation benefits for total temporary and permanent partial
disabilities.” Second, the Committee that recommended adoption of the
amendment stated in its report that one of its goals was “to contain workers‟
compensation costs.” Given the substantial legislative evidence of the Council‟s
intent to reduce costs associated with temporary total disability benefits payment,
the CRB‟s construction of the statutory provision is an entirely reasonable one.
We affirm the CRB‟s determination that the 500-week limit in § 32-1505 (b)
applies to temporary total disability benefits.1
For the foregoing reasons, petitions for review are denied.
So ordered.
1
Petitioners also argue that the CRB is estopped from construing the 500-
week cap to apply to temporary total disability given its decision in Holland v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., (No. 10-142) Comp. Rev. Bd., 2010 WL 5115166, at *1
(Nov. 5, 2010). We do not find this argument persuasive. Holland mentions § 32-
1505 (b) only in the context of permanent partial disability benefits and at no point
discusses temporary total disability benefits.