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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
STEPHEN FREDERICK BAKER, JR.
Appellant No. 476 MDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order November 19, 2009
In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-31-CR-0000013-2005
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., WECHT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2015
Appellant, Stephen Frederick Baker, Jr., appeals from the PCRA1 order
entered on November 19, 2009, in the Court of Common Pleas of
Huntingdon County. We affirm.
On September 11, 2006, Appellant entered a guilty plea to two counts
of murder of the second degree and one count of persons not to possess
firearms2 and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On September 20, 2006,
Appellant filed a post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the
trial court denied. On appeal, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of
sentence, and ordered that Appellant’s remaining claims of ineffective
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b) and 6105(a)(1), respectively.
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assistance of trial counsel should be deferred until collateral review. See
Commonwealth v. Baker, 738 MDA 2007 (Pa. Super., filed Feb. 12, 2008)
(unpublished mem.).
Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition, after which counsel was
appointed. Following a hearing, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition.
Appellant did not pursue a timely appeal with this Court; however, years
later, the PCRA court reinstated Appellant’s appeal rights nunc pro tunc by
agreement with the Commonwealth. This timely appeal followed.
“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard and scope of
review is limited to determining whether the PCRA court’s findings are
supported by the record and without legal error.” Commonwealth v.
Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 345 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted), cert. denied,
Edmiston v. Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 639 (2013). “[Our] scope of review
is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record,
viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA court
level.” Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 131 (Pa. 2012) (citation
omitted). “[T]his Court applies a de novo standard of review to the PCRA
court’s legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 259
(Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).
In order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence
arose from one or more of the errors listed at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2).
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These issues must be neither previously litigated nor waived. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3).
Initially, we are obliged to note that Appellant offers only a cursory
argument in support of issues two through six raised on appeal. The
argument sections dedicated to issues two, three and five consist of only a
single, brief paragraph each. Most egregiously, Appellant cites to no
relevant case law, statute or rule of procedure in support of these claims. As
Appellant simply provides no discussion of pertinent legal authority to
support his argument for issues two through six, we are constrained to find
these issues waived. See Commonwealth v. Love, 896 A.2d 1276, 1278
(Pa. Super. 2005) (“Arguments not appropriately developed are waived.”);
Commonwealth v. Russell, 665 A.2d 1239 (Pa. Super. 1995) (Superior
Court would not review argument that contained no citation to or discussion
of relevant legal authority).
We will, however, address Appellant’s first issue raised on appeal,
which he does develop with discussion of relevant legal authority. He argues
that the ineffective assistance of trial counsel rendered his guilty plea
involuntary. We disagree.
“A criminal defendant has the right to effective counsel during a plea
process as well as during trial.” Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 899 A.2d
365, 369 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quotation omitted). “Allegations of
ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a
basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an
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involuntary or unknowing plea.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d
136, 141 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). “Where the defendant enters
his plea on the advice of counsel, ‘the voluntariness of the plea depends on
whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases.’” Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
In reviewing an ineffectiveness claim, we begin with the presumption
that counsel was effective. See Commonwealth v. Duda, 831 A.2d 728,
732 (Pa. Super. 2003).
To plead and prove ineffective assistance of counsel a petitioner
must establish: (1) that the underlying issue has arguable merit;
(2) counsel's actions lacked an objective reasonable basis; and
(3) actual prejudice resulted from counsel's act or failure to act.
Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1189-1190 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citation omitted), appeal denied, 64 A.3d 631 (Pa. 2013).
“Generally, where matters of strategy and tactics are concerned,
counsel's assistance is deemed constitutionally effective if he chose a
particular course that had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his
client’s interests.” Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 887 (Pa.
2010) (citation omitted). A failure to satisfy any prong of the test will
require rejection of the claim. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294,
311 (Pa. 2014).
In assessing the voluntariness of a guilty plea, we note that “[t]he law
does not require that appellant be pleased with the outcome of his decision
to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is that [appellant’s] decision to
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plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.”
Commonwealth v. Yager, 685 A.2d 1000, 1004 (Pa. Super. 1996) (en
banc) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A person who elects
to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes in open court while
under oath and he may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea
which contradict the statements he made at his plea colloquy.”
Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted).
Appellant argues that he was of “limited mental capacity” and
therefore unable to understand the crimes to which he was pleading guilty.
Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant further attributes his alleged inability to
understand the charges against him to trial counsel’s failure to provide
copies of discovery to Appellant or to discuss discovery with him prior to his
guilty plea. The record flatly contradicts these claims.
Appellant completed a written Guilty Plea Colloquy on September 11,
2006, wherein he affirmed that he understood the factual nature of the
offenses to which he was pleading guilty and that his lawyer had explained
the elements of the criminal offenses to him. See Guilty Plea Colloquy,
9/11/06 at ¶¶ 14-15. During the oral guilty plea colloquy, the trial court
clearly explained to Appellant the elements of the crimes of second degree
murder and the firearms offense to which Appellant was pleading guilty, and
the Commonwealth recited the factual basis for the plea. See N.T., Plea
Hearing and Sentencing, 9/11/06 at 3-9. Thereafter, Appellant
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acknowledged his understanding of the information relayed to him and
indicated his wish to proceed with the guilty plea. See id. at 11. Appellant
further admitted that he was entering his plea voluntarily and without
coercion and that he had all of the information needed in order to make the
decision to enter a guilty plea. See id. at 17-18. Based upon these
statements, the trial court accepted Appellant’s guilty plea.
At no time – either in the written or oral colloquy – did Appellant allege
that he was of “limited mental capacity” or that he was without the
necessary information needed to enter a knowing plea. Appellant expressly
indicated his understanding of the crimes to which he was pleading guilty
and the factual basis for his plea. Appellant cannot now baldly recant his
representations made under oath to the court. See Pollard, supra.
We further find no evidence to support Appellant’s claim that trial
counsel failed to provide him with discovery prior to the entry of the guilty
plea. Tellingly, Appellant does not detail what necessary information or facts
counsel allegedly withheld from his consideration. At the PCRA hearing, trial
counsel testified that, subsequent to the denial of a suppression motion, he
provided Appellant with copies of discovery and reviewed the discovery with
Appellant on numerous occasions. See N.T., PCRA Hearing, 4/14/09 at 4.
More importantly, as noted, Appellant responded affirmatively when the trial
court questioned whether he had all of the necessary information in order to
make the decision to enter a guilty plea. See N.T., Plea Hearing and
Sentencing, 9/11/06 at 17-18. Appellant is not entitled to withdraw his
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guilty plea by simply retracting or contradicting his statements made during
the colloquy. See Pollard, supra.
In light of the comprehensive written and oral plea colloquy, which
Appellant fully and willingly completed, we find no factual basis to support
Appellant’s claim that his plea was in any manner unknowingly, involuntarily,
or unintelligently given, or that the ineffective assistance of trial counsel
rendered his plea as such. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the PCRA
court.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/30/2015
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