UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4163
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
KAMAU SUVINER WRIGHT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (4:07-cr-00002-FL-2)
Submitted: November 13, 2015 Decided: November 30, 2015
Before SHEDD and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P.
May-Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kamau Suviner Wright appeals the district court’s order
revoking his supervised release and imposing a 32-month term of
imprisonment. Wright claims that his sentence is plainly
unreasonable because the district court failed to address
arguments raised at sentencing and did not adequately explain
the chosen sentence. We affirm.
Because Wright did not raise this issue in the district
court, our review is for plain error. See United States v.
Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). Under plain error
review, Wright must show that the court erred, the error was
clear or obvious, and the error affected his substantial rights.
Id. at 640-41. Even if Wright meets this burden, “we retain
discretion whether to recognize the error and will deny relief
unless the . . . error seriously affects the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 641
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” Id. at 640.
We “will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the
statutory maximum and is not ‘plainly unreasonable.’” Id.
(quoting United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir.
2
2006)). 1 “When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is
plainly unreasonable, we must first determine whether it is
unreasonable at all.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544,
546 (4th Cir. 2010). “This initial inquiry takes a more
deferential posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise
of discretion than reasonableness review for guideline
sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th
Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). We will affirm
if the sentence is not unreasonable. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.
Only if a sentence is found procedurally or substantively
unreasonable will we “decide if it is plainly unreasonable.”
Id.
A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the
district court expressly considered the Chapter Seven policy
statement range and the applicable statutory sentencing factors.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. A revocation sentence is substantively
reasonable if the court stated a proper basis for concluding
that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to
the statutory maximum. Id. “A court need not be as detailed or
specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when
imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still ‘must provide
1
Wright does not contend that the 32-month sentence was
above the statutory maximum. We note that the maximum sentence
that could have been imposed was five years.
3
a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.’” United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (quoting United States v.
Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657).
Here, the court properly calculated a policy statement
range of 30-37 months and imposed a sentence within that range.
Although the court did not specifically address mitigating
factors when imposing sentence, those factors were discussed at
sentencing during the court’s colloquy with both defense counsel
and Wright. A court need not directly address each of a
defendant’s arguments at sentencing. See Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). The court took note of Wright’s long
history of drug offenses and observed that he had committed a
Grade A release violation. The court also stated that Wright’s
repeated criminal conduct while on release constituted a breach
of the court’s trust. Finally, the court stated that it had
taken into consideration statutory sentencing factors, including
the need to afford adequate deterrence and promote respect for
the law. 2
2Wright correctly states that promoting respect for the law
is not among those sentencing factors to be considered when
imposing a revocation sentence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e),
3553(a)(2)(A). However, considering this non-enumerated factor
does not constitute plain error requiring resentencing. We have
found that, “[a]lthough § 3583(e) enumerates the factors a
district court should consider when formulating a revocation
sentence, it does not expressly prohibit a court from
referencing other relevant factors omitted from the statute.”
(Continued)
4
We conclude that the 32-month revocation sentence was not
plainly unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal arguments are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d at 641. Thus, if the revocation
sentence is not predominately based on non-enumerated factors,
“mere reference to such considerations does not render a
revocation sentence procedurally unreasonable when those factors
are relevant to, and considered in conjunction with, the
enumerated § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 642. Given the court’s
reliance on other, permitted statutory factors, we find no plain
error in the court’s consideration of the need for the sentence
to promote respect for the law.
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