UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4479
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY SHENEER WRIGHT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (7:00-cr-00140-F-1)
Submitted: November 10, 2011 Decided: December 8, 2011
Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Anthony Shaneer Wright appeals the sixty-month
sentence imposed after the district court revoked his supervised
release. On appeal, Wright asserts that his sentence was
procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to
adequately explain its reasons for imposing a sentence above the
thirty-seven to forty-six month Guidelines range. Finding no
error, we affirm.
This court reviews a sentence imposed upon revocation
of a defendant’s supervised release to determine whether the
sentence is “plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). Reasonableness review has
both procedural and substantive components. Id. at 438-39. In
determining whether a revocation sentence is “plainly
unreasonable,” we must first determine whether the sentence is
procedurally unreasonable. 1 Id. at 438.
Although a sentencing court must consider the Chapter
Seven policy statements and the relevant 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2011) factors in fashioning its sentence, the
sentencing court retains broad discretion to revoke a
defendant’s supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment
1
Because Wright does not contend that his sentence is
substantively unreasonable, we need not address that second
component of the reasonableness inquiry.
2
up to the statutory maximum. Id. at 439. Moreover, “a court’s
statement of its reasons for going beyond non-binding policy
statements in imposing a sentence after revoking a defendant’s
supervised release term need not be as specific as has been
required when courts departed from [pre-Booker 2 mandatory]
guidelines” at sentencing for criminal offenses. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Only if the defendant demonstrates
that the sentence is unreasonable will this court consider
whether the sentence is “plainly unreasonable.” 3 Id.
With these standards in mind, we have reviewed the
record on appeal and conclude that the district court adequately
explained its reasons for rejecting Wright’s argument for a
within-Guidelines sentence and for sentencing Wright to the
statutory maximum sentence of sixty months’ imprisonment. We
are not persuaded that the sixty-month sentence imposed was
unreasonable, let alone plainly unreasonable. We therefore
affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
2
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
3
Contrary to the Government’s argument, Wright preserved
this claim by requesting a sentence lower than the one
ultimately imposed. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 578-79
(4th Cir. 2010).
3
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4