FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 01 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RALPH RODRIGUEZ, No. 14-15304
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01373-NVW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SHARON MALCOLM; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 18, 2015**
Before: TASHIMA, OWENS, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Former Arizona state prisoner Ralph Rodriguez appeals from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for McMorran and
Malcolm because Rodriguez failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether these defendants were personally involved or responsible for any of the
alleged inadequate care. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (a
supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he or she is personally involved in the
constitutional deprivation or there is a “sufficient causal connection between the
supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir.
1988) (the causation analysis under § 1983 is “individualized and focus[es] on the
duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions
are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation”). Moreover, Rodriguez
failed to raise a triable dispute as to any constitutionally deficient policy
implemented by these defendants. See Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d
1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (supervisors are liable if they “implement a
policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and
is the moving force of the constitutional violation” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825
(1994).
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The district court properly granted summary judgment for Macabuhay and
Martinez because Rodriguez failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether these
defendants knew that Rodriguez’s numerous complaints of chest pain and
shortness of breath presented an excessive risk to Rodriguez’s health, and
disregarded this risk. See Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d
1062, 1082 (9th Cir. 2013) (a prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she
is subjectively aware of the serious medical need and fails to adequately respond;
even gross negligence does not constitute deliberate indifference).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for King because
Rodriguez failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether King was deliberately
indifferent to Rodriguez’s complaints of chest pain and shortness of breath and the
growing lump in his chest. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (to be deliberately
indifferent, treatment must be medically unacceptable under the circumstances and
chosen in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to a prisoner’s health).
We reject Rodriguez’s contentions regarding King’s reconsideration motion
because the district court construed the motion as one for summary judgment and
granted it on that basis.
AFFIRMED.
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