FILED
DEC 8, 2015
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 32827-9-111
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
DAVID PRESTON WOOD, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
KORSMO, 1. - David Wood (DW) appeals from a juvenile court decision
adjudicating him guilty on two counts of second degree assault, contending that his
confession to a detective was not voluntary. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
Mr. Wood, 17, and his girlfriend, JL, 16, were the parents of two month old PL.
On June 2, 2014, PL had what appeared to be a seizure and was taken to Kadlec Hospital.
Authorities there eventually alerted police that the injured child, who suffered from
multiple skull fractures, was not an accident victim.
Mr. Wood accompanied his son to the hospital and stayed the night until the next
day when he had to leave to work a shift at the Subway sandwich shop, a position he had
held for two weeks. Mr. Wood had a ninth grade education. He returned to the hospital
No. 32827·9-II1
State v. Wood
about 9:00 p.m. A police officer was waiting to speak about the child's injuries. Mr.
Wood first consulted with the child's doctor and learned that PL had injured legs and
head trauma. The officer knocked on the door and asked if Mr. Wood was willing to go
to the police station. He agreed and rode in the front seat of a patrol car on the short trip
to the station.
When he first arrived at the police station around 9:30 p.m., he was placed in one
room, and then around 10:00 moved to an interrogation room. Before he was moved to
this second room, he could hear JL crying outside the door. Once in the second room,
Detective Robert Benson eventually met him and asked if it their interview could be
recorded; Mr. Wood consented. The interview began at 10:45 p.m.! Ex. 18 2 at 22:45:12.
The contents and conduct of the interview are detailed at some length in view of the issue
presented.
Prior to questioning, Detective Benson told Mr. Wood that he was not under
arrest, but did read Mr. Wood his Miranda 3 rights, including the juvenile rights. Ex. Cat
2-3. Mr. Wood indicated that he understood his rights, and that "ya" he did want to talk.
Detective Benson stated that if Wood was too tired, or needed water or to go to the
! The time-stamp appears to be faster than the time stated by the detective's
telephone by about eight minutes.
2 Exhibit 18 is the video, while Exhibit C is the transcript of the video.
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
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No. 32827-9-III
State v. Wood
bathroom, to let him know and he would be accommodated. At the outset, Mr. Wood
admitted to being tired, and the two joked that if one of them fell asleep during the
interview the other should wake up the sleeper.
During the first hour of questioning, the detective asked general questions, trying
to get a timeline. Wood described what had happened the previous night with the seizure
as well as his and JL's usual routine with the baby. During the first part of this hour, JL
was being questioned in the adjacent room. DW later testified that he could hear her
crying in the next room. The detective could hear only muffled conversations from the
next room, but about 10-20 minutes into the interview he texted the other officer to move
JL to a different room away from DW On the recording, the only time crying is audible
is around 10:59 pm. Ex. 18 at 22:58:57-22:59:06. Immediately after the crying,
Detective Benson pulls out his cell phone and uses it briefly. Id. at 22:59:35. After an
I
hour, the detective asked if anything was needed. Mr. Wood requested some water and !
the detective returned with some seven minutes later. t
The detective then left for 45 minutes. Ex. 18 at 23:52:05-00:37:40. Mr. Wood
spent some of that time with his head down and his arms crossed, possibly asleep. At one
I
point, the lights shut off and another officer came in to explain that he needs to move to
tum them back on. Ex. C at 17. When the officer entered the room, DW stood up and
gathered his stuff as if to leave. However, the officer told Mr. Wood that he is "almost
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No. 32827-9-III
State v. Wood
done" and asks him to "just hang tight." Id. When asked, "do I stay hereT' the officer
responds "Ya." It is 12:27 a.m. at this point.
Detective Benson returned briefly at 12:37 a.m. He asked Mr. Wood ifhe needs
"any more water or anything." Ex. C at 18. DW said he was good and the detective then
told him that it'll be about five more minutes. DW says that's fine. Detective Benson
returns 19 minutes later. Ex. 18 at 00:56:57.
The second round of questioning begins at 12:57 a.m. At first it involved more
background and questioning regarding the care of PL, but eventually the detective
focused on Mr. Wood. He asked him to demonstrate how he held PL when they were
trying to help the child poop. The detective then challenged DW's explanation by telling
him what JL said. The detective also showed DW where the doctor said the child's legs
were broken within the last couple of days. The detective then described one of the
baby's skull fractures. He also told DW that there were other, older injuries to the skull.
The questioning begins to culminate at 1:25 a.m. See Ex. 18 at 01 :25: 10. With
some deletions, the questioning prior to the confession is included below:
DET: If you were investigating this case, D[].
SUSP:Mhmm.
DET: What are you thinking?
SUP: Urn ...
DET: If you're sittin' in my shoes, and I've got a baby with five different
injuries and potentially four injuries to the brain over a period of
time.
SUSP: I would think that there was abuse.
DET: Who's abusing [P.L.]?
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No. 32827-9-III
State v. Wood
SUSP:I don't know. That's definitely not [J.L.] and it's not me 'cause I'm
not - I - I and I know it's not her dad so I don't ...
DET: I mean you're the only three.
SUSP:Ya I know.
DET: Do you know who King Solomon is?
SUSP:Kind of. I know he's [sic] in the bible.
DET: Ya considered the wisest man on earth.
SUSP:Ya I didn't know that.
DET: Va. I had to deal with a dilemma like that [sic] once. I mean it's
either you, [1.L.] ...
SUSP: Or her dad.
DET: Or her dad right?
SUSP:Ya.
DET: I'm thinkin' it's probably not the dad 'cause dad doesn't have a lot
of contact with the baby right?
SUSP:Ya.
[ ... ]
Det: So If you're in my shoes and I know the baby's being abused and
it's being abused by one maybe both of you, right?
SUSP:Mhmm.
DET: Urn would you allow [P.L.] to go back into that environment?
SUSP: That's a tough question. [...]
DET: Right. How do you think we're gonna' find out for sure what caused
those injuries?
SUSP:I don't know. Probably either if one of us did [sic], one of us
confesses or I don't know.
DET: Ya I would agree. We know this for a fact that those five injuries
are non-accidental.
·SUSP:Mhmm.
DET: Do you know what that means?
SUSP: That they were done on purpose?
DET: Ya there wasn't an accident. Accident meaning you know baby's
trying to crawl, trying to get up on something and falls over. That's
what I'm talking about an accident ok. Urn do you think the person
who caused these injuries to [P.L.] deserves a second chance?
SUSP: *Pause* Hm *Pause* that's a hard question.
DET: Why is it a hard question?
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No. 32827-9-III
State v. Wood
SUSP: 'Cause [...] depending [...] on who it is and who was doing it, why
they did it [...] Until he proved himself that he was worthy enough
to be able to see him again. I would say no but until then no.
[ ... ]
DET: You think that the person would have to come clean?
SUSP:Ya.
DET: Tell everything that happened. So what you're telling me is that the
person would truly have to be sorry.
SUSP:Ya.
DET: Right.
SUSP:Ya.
DET: I mean I don't think anybody ever wakes up and ...
SUSP: Decides they want to abuse a baby?
DET: Right.
SUSP:Ya.
DET: I mean I don't think that happens unless you're a truly evil sadistic
person right?
SUSP:Ya.
DET: I don't think you're a truly evil sadistic person urn so person would
have to be truly sorry and not only promise not to do it again but
somehow prove that they weren't going to do that again.
SUSP:Mhmm.
[ ... ]
SUSP: I have a question.
DET: Va.
SUSP: Would you go to jail?
DET: What do you mean?
SUSP: If. .. ok.
*Pause*
DET: You got something to tell me D[]?
SUSP: Ya I do.
DET: This is how I get this out if you're sorry.
Ex. C at 25-27. At this point, it is 1:36 a.m.
Mr. Wood then confessed. Ex. C at 27 ("I'm the one who did it."). The detective
had him describe exactly how he did it; the explanation took about twenty-five minutes.
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No. 32827-9-111
State v. Wood
Ex 18 at 01 :37:05-01 :51 :00. Detective Benson then left once more, asking again ifDW
needed water or anything; DW requested more water.
The detective returned eight minutes later with a piece of paper, and asked DW to
write-out a statement and an apology letter to his son. Id. at 29-30. Shortly thereafter, he
left again and returned with the cup of water. Ex. 18 at 02:04:56. DW spent forty
minutes working on the statement and letter. Ex. 18 at 02:02:46-02:43:49. At around
2:45 a.m., Detective Benson returns and says they are going to transport him to "juvi'."
Id. at 02:48:22. The video ends with DW still sitting in the room at 2:48 a.m. Id. at
02:48:40.
The day after the interrogation, Mr. Wood met with his caseworker. In her
presence, he retracted his confession: "I have admitted to all of the injuries, even the ones
I didn't do to my son." Report of Proceedings at 102.
The State charged Mr. Wood in Juvenile Court with two counts of second degree
assault. A CrR 3.5 hearing was held concerning the admissibility of the confession. The
court heard testimony and reviewed a transcript of the interrogation and the video itself.
Ultimately, the court ruled that the confession was voluntary and admissible.
The matter proceeded to bench trial. JL testified that she did not harm PL. DW
testified that he had twice lashed out against the child, but denied the remainder of the
behavior related in his confession. Mr. Wood was adjudicated guilty on both charges.
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No. 32827-9-111
State v. Wood
The court declared a manifest injustice upwards and committed Mr. Wood until age 21.
He promptly appealed to this court.
ANALYSIS
The sole issue presented by this appeal concerns whether the confession was t
voluntary. Mr. Wood contends that it was not and asks that his confession be suppressed
!
and the convictions reversed and dismissed. Mr. Wood challenges both his waiver of his
,i
!
Miranda rights and the overall voluntariness of the confession based on his youth, tired t
condition, the length of the interrogation process, and allegedly coercive questioning.
We agree with the trial court that the confession was voluntary and affirm the
convictions.
Established precedent guides our consideration of these arguments. Miranda
requires that prior to conducting a custodial interrogation, police must first advise a
suspect (1) of his right to remain silent and provide notice that anything said to the police
might be used against him, (2) of the right to consult with an attorney prior to answering
any questions and have the attorney present for questioning, (3) that counsel will be
appointed for him if desired, and (4) that he can end questioning at any time. Miranda,
384 U.S. at 444. The United States Supreme Court extended the protections of Miranda
to juveniles in In re Application ofGault, 387 U.S. 1,42-57, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d
527 (1967). The court did not require any additional juvenile-specific language be added
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No. 32827-9-111
State v. Wood
to supplement the rights identified in Miranda, although it noted that "there may well be
some differences in technique." Id. at 55.
"Whether a juvenile has knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights is
determined by a 'totality-of-the-circumstances' approach." State v. Jones, 95 Wn.2d 616,
625,628 P.2d 472 (1981) (quoting Fare v. Michael c., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S. Ct. 2560,
61 L. Ed. 2d 197 (1979».
[This approach] permits-indeed, it mandates-inquiry into all the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of
the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and
into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the
nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving
those rights.
Id. (quoting Fare, 442 U.S. at 725). However, where a trial court has determined that a
Miranda waiver was voluntary, appellate courts will not disturb the finding if the record
reflects substantial evidence by which the court could have reached that conclusion.
State v. Ng, 110 Wn.2d 32,37, 750 P.2d 632 (1988).
In addition to whether a defendant properly waived his or her right to remain
silent, a confession can still be involuntary due to the process by which it was obtained.
Massey v. Rhay, 76 Wn.2d 78, 79, 455 P.2d 367 (1969) (confession coerced by police is
not admissible). Courts also apply a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine if an
individual knowingly and voluntarily confessed or instead confessed as product of police
9
No. 32827-9-III
State v. Wood
coercIon. State v. Unga, 165 Wn.2d 95, 101, 196 P.3d 645 (2008). The totality-of-the
circumstances test also applies to juveniles. Id. at 103.
Under that test, a confession induced by threats or promises that overbear the
defendant's will constitutes coercion and must be excluded. Id. at 101-102. In addition
to the previously noted factors, a court also considers factors relating to the interrogation
itself, including its length, location, and continuity. Id. at 101, 103 (including both
general factors and juvenile factors). An appellate court reviews a trial court's finding
that the confession was voluntary and not coercive for substantial evidence. State v.
Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118, 133,942 P.2d 363 (1997).
There was substantial evidence that the waiver of Miranda rights at 10:45 p.m.
was knowing and voluntary. Mr. Wood had returned to the hospital after work, spoke
with the doctor, and then agreed to speak with officers at the police station. While he
cites to evidence showing that he slept later in the evening, nothing suggests that he was
that tired three hours earlier or that he did not understand what he was doing when he
waived his rights. The trial court viewed the videotape of the interview and could assess
Mr. Wood's condition at the time of the waiver. Substantial evidence supports the
determination that Mr. Wood validly waived his constitutional rights.
For support of his coercion claim, Mr. Wood argues that juveniles are less mature
and less capable of resisting interrogation, that he was fatigued and isolated during a
lengthy interrogation that lasted until 2:40 a.m., that JL also was being interrogated, and
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No. 32827-9-III
State v. Wood
that the detective threatened not to return PL to a parent's custody without a
determination who had harmed the child. 4 Like the trial court, we do not agree with all of
Mr. Wood's contentions here. Juvenile maturity, the defendant's fatigue, and the fact
that he knew JL also was being questioned were considered part of the circumstances by
the trial court. With the exception of fatigue, none of those factors suggested police
coercion was taking place. The trial court aptly noted that while the interview took place
over a lengthy period of time, there were long periods of time when no questioning was
taking place while the officers consulted with each other and with the medical doctor.
Indeed, there was nothing accusatory about the interview until the second session was
underway. This was not an extended interrogation designed to challenge or break a
defendant's story. Instead, it was a slow build up that revealed the relevant information
about the incident that gave the detective a basis to elicit a confession.
We likewise agree with the trial judge that the detective did not employ any
threats. Pointing out that the adult occupants of the house where the baby lived were
suspects and that the baby was not going to be returned until it could be determined who
harmed the child did not constitute a threat. It was a simple and logical statement of the
problem facing the police, who then asked Mr. Wood's help resolving it.
4To this end, appellant assigns error to five findings of fact that he contends were
not supported by substantial evidence. We address those challenges indirectly in the
course of the remaining analysis.
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No. 32827-9-III
State v. Wood
This case has many factual similarities to Unga. That case dealt with a 16 Y2 year
old juvenile with a ninth grade education who was interrogated by police for a brief
period. 165 Wn.2d at 108-109. While the interrogation was only about 30 minutes, there
was some suggestion of a promise from the officer not to charge the youth. Id. at 107,
109. Unga was given Miranda warnings, and the court noted that no evidence suggested
he did not understand the consequences of waiving his rights. Id. at 108. The court
found that the confession was voluntary and not the product of coercion from the
promise. Id. at 113. The court specifically noted that there was no evidence to suggest
the officer "used a threatening tone, raised his voice, badgered Unga, attempted to
intimidate him, or engaged in other similar tactics." Id. at 109. The court also put weight
on the brevity of the interrogation, and the fact that there were not multiple rounds of
questioning. Id.
While this case did not involve a brief interrogation, it also was less confrontational
and there was no suggestion of any promises such as occurred there. Like Unga, there
was a valid waiver of Miranda rights. As in Unga, DW had a ninth grade education, was
given his Miranda warnings, appeared to understand his rights, and agreed to talk anyway.
Further, the video showed that Detective Benson never used a threatening tone, raised his
voice, badgered, or attempted to intimidate DW In fact, the detective told DW that he was
not under arrest and they could stop if he got too tired. The detective also offered to get
him anything he needed including water on more than one occasion. Finally, Detective
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No. 32827-9-II1
State v. Wood
Benson's questions here appear to have led DW to want to confess. "[S]o long as that
decision is a product of the suspect's own balancing of competing considerations, the
confession is voluntary." Unga, 165 Wn.2d at 102 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d
598, 605 (3d Cir. 1986).
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we agree that substantial evidence
supported the trial court's determination that the confession was voluntarily given. Most
certainly, it was not the product of coercion. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
court did not err in admitting the defendant's confession at trial.
The judgment is affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
~tU~,
Siddoway, C.J.
C-C+-
-0
Lawrence-Berrey,
13