Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC13-244
____________
LUCIOUS BOYD,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
____________
No. SC13-1959
____________
LUCIOUS BOYD,
Petitioner,
vs.
JULIE L. JONES, etc.,
Respondent.
[December 17, 2015]
PER CURIAM.
Lucious Boyd appeals a final order of the circuit court denying his motion to
vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Boyd also petitions this Court for a writ
of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For
the reasons discussed below, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Boyd’s rule
3.851 motion and deny relief on his petition for writ of habeas corpus.
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS
Lucious Boyd was convicted for the first-degree murder, armed kidnapping,
and sexual battery of Dawnia Dacosta and sentenced to the penalties of death, life
imprisonment, and fifteen years’ imprisonment, respectively. Boyd v. State, 910
So. 2d 167, 176-77 (Fla. 2005).
A. Trial and Direct Appeal Proceedings
On direct appeal, we set forth the relevant factual and procedural
background as follows:
The evidence presented at trial revealed the following facts. In
the early morning hours of December 5, 1998, Dawnia Dacosta’s car
ran out of gas while she was on her way to her home in Deerfield
Beach, Florida, from a midnight church service. She had just exited
from Interstate 95 (I–95) onto Hillsboro Beach Boulevard and pulled
onto the shoulder. She then took a red gas can she kept in her car,
walked about a block east to a nearby Texaco gas station, and bought
a gallon of gas. At approximately 2 a.m., during the time she was at
the gas station, Dacosta spoke with two other customers, Lisa Bell and
Johnnie Mae Harris. She asked Bell for a ride back to her car, but
Bell had walked to the station and so could not give Dacosta a ride.
Bell and Harris then watched Dacosta speak with a black male in a
van in the station’s parking lot. Harris asked the man if he was going
to help Dacosta, and the man nodded, indicating yes. Bell later told
the police that the van she saw was greenish-blue in color, while
Harris said that she thought the van was burgundy. Though somewhat
unsure about the van’s color, Harris was certain that she saw the word
-2-
“Hope” on its side. In a photo lineup and at trial, Harris identified the
man she saw in the van that night as Lucious Boyd.
Boyd spent the evening of December 4 with Geneva Lewis, his
girlfriend, at her mother’s home. Boyd left the house around 10 or 11
p.m., and Lewis did not see him again until the morning of December
5, at around 9 or 10 a.m. Lewis testified that on December 4 and 5,
Boyd was driving a green church van with writing on its side and that
the van belonged to Reverend Frank Lloyd of the Hope Outreach
Ministry Church, for whom Boyd performed occasional maintenance
work.
Dacosta’s family began searching for her after she did not
return home on December 5. They found her car at an I–95 exit and
began circulating fliers with Dacosta’s photograph, indicating that she
was missing, throughout the area. Bell and Harris saw the fliers,
recognized Dacosta as the woman with the gas can at the Texaco
station on December 5, and contacted the police with their
information.
On December 7, Dacosta’s body was discovered in an alley
behind a warehouse on 42nd Street in Deerfield Beach. The body was
wrapped in a shower curtain liner, a brown, flat bed sheet, and a
yellow, flat bed sheet. A purple duffel bag and two large black trash
bags covered her head. It was determined that she had been dead for
between thirty-six and seventy-two hours.
At trial, it was stipulated that Dacosta died due to a penetrating
head wound and that the bruising on her head was consistent with but
not exclusive to the face plate of a reciprocating saw. Wounds to her
chest, arms, and head were consistent with but not exclusive to a Torx
brand torque screwdriver, and she had defensive wounds on her arms
and hands. There was bruising to her vagina that was consistent with
sexual intercourse, although the medical examiner could not
determine whether the intercourse was consensual or nonconsensual.
Dacosta had thirty-six superficial wounds on her chest, four on the
right side of her head, and twelve on her right hand, some being
consistent with defensive wounds and some being consistent with bite
marks. One fatal wound to the head perforated the skull and
penetrated Dacosta’s brain.
On March 17, 1999, while Detectives Bukata and Kaminsky of
the Broward County Sheriff’s Office were investigating another crime
unrelated to Dacosta’s death, they saw a green van in the Hope
Outreach Ministry Church parking lot. The van had burgundy writing
-3-
on it that read “Here’s Hope.” Bell would later identify the church’s
van as the same van she had seen on the morning of December 5 at
the Texaco station. The detectives decided to investigate, and their
inquiries as to the owner of the van led them to Reverend Lloyd.
When the detectives questioned Lloyd about the location of the van on
the night of December 4, Lloyd’s secretary, who was present at the
questioning, remarked that Lucious Boyd had driven the van on that
weekend. On December 4, Boyd had taken Reverend Lloyd to pick
up a rental car in the church’s green 1994 Ford van. Reverend Lloyd
further testified that he instructed Boyd to take the van back to the
church but that Boyd did not return the van until Monday, December
7. Reverend Lloyd also stated that when he left the van with Boyd,
various tools owned by the church, including a set of Torx brand
screwdrivers and a reciprocating saw, were in the van, as well as a
purple laundry bag that the pastor used to deliver his laundry to the
cleaners. When Reverend Lloyd returned on December 15, he
discovered that the screwdrivers, the saw, and the laundry bag were
missing.
Boyd was arrested for Dacosta’s murder on March 26, 1999.
Seminal fluid taken from Dacosta’s inner thigh matched the DNA
profile of Boyd. Tests also did not eliminate Boyd as a match for a
hair found on Dacosta’s chest. A DNA profile consistent with Boyd’s
was found in material taken from under Dacosta’s fingernails. In
addition, fingerprints taken from the trash bag found around the
victim’s head matched fingerprints of Boyd’s girlfriend, Geneva
Lewis, and her son, Zeffrey Lewis. Tire marks on a sheet covering
the victim’s body were consistent with the tires on the church van,
although trial expert Terrell Kingery, a senior crime laboratory analyst
for the Orlando Regional Crime Laboratory, testified that he could not
say for certain that the van’s tires made the marks because over 1.5
million tires could have made the tracks on the sheet. Dr. Steven
Rifkin, a private dentist and a forensic odontologist with the Broward
County Medical Examiner’s Office, testified that bite marks on
Dacosta’s arm were, within a reasonable degree of certainty, made by
Boyd’s teeth.
On April 1, Detective Bukata obtained a warrant to search the
apartment of Boyd and Lewis, which was a block east of the Texaco
station. Detective Bukata arrived at the apartment and told Lewis to
leave with her children for a few days so that the officers could fully
search the apartment. The investigators found blood at various
-4-
locations throughout the apartment. Blood found on the underside of
the carpet and on the armoire matched Dacosta’s DNA profile. The
shower curtain rings were unsnapped, and there was no liner to the
shower curtain. Carpet fibers taken from the yellow sheet in which
Dacosta’s body was wrapped matched characteristics of carpet
samples taken from Boyd’s apartment.
Lewis had previously lived with Boyd at his apartment but had
moved out in October of 1998. While living with Boyd, Lewis had
purchased a queen-size bed, which she left at the apartment when she
moved. Lewis and her three children moved back in with Boyd in
February of 1999 and discovered that the bed was no longer at Boyd’s
apartment. When she asked about it, Boyd told her that he had given
it away but would get it back. When she inquired about it again, Boyd
told her that she would not want that bed and that he would get her
another one. Lewis also identified the flat bed sheets, one brown and
one a “loud yellow,” that were found around Dacosta’s body as
similar to ones she had owned while living at Boyd’s apartment but
that she no longer knew where they were or if they were at Boyd’s
apartment or at her mother’s home.
A jury convicted Boyd of first-degree murder, sexual battery,
and armed kidnapping. The trial court subsequently conducted a
penalty phase proceeding, during which both sides presented
evidence. The jury unanimously recommended that Boyd be
sentenced to death. The trial court followed the jury’s
recommendation and imposed a death sentence, finding and weighing
two aggravating factors, one statutory mitigating factor, and five
nonstatutory mitigating factors. State v. Boyd, No. 99–5809 (Fla.
17th Cir. Ct. order filed June 21, 2002) (sentencing order). The trial
court also sentenced Boyd to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the
sexual battery and to life imprisonment for the armed kidnapping
charges.
Id. at 174-77 (footnotes omitted). This Court affirmed Boyd’s convictions and
sentence of death. Id. at 194.
B. Postconviction Relief Proceedings
-5-
On February 14, 2007, Boyd filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment of
Conviction and Sentences with Special Request for Leave to Amend, pursuant to
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. He raised the following claims: (1)
denial of access to public records; (2) violation of his rights of due process and
equal protection by failing to apply rule 3.851; (3) counsel was ineffective by
failing to adequately conduct voir dire, challenge the admissibility of forensic
evidence pursuant to Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and
utilize forensic experts; (4) juror misconduct; (5) denial of adversarial testing
during the sentencing phase, including counsel’s ineffectiveness for failure to
move for a mistrial based on inflammatory and prejudicial comments; (6) denial of
rights under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); (7) denial of the right to
interview jurors; (8) cumulative error; and (9) the unconstitutionality of Florida’s
lethal injection statute and procedure.
On May 29, 2009, Boyd filed an amended motion to vacate his convictions
and sentences, adding claims that newly discovered evidence undermined the
reliance of the forensic evidence used to convict and sentence, and that the State
committed a Brady1 violation. Boyd subsequently filed a second amended rule
3.851 motion on March 23, 2012.
1. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
-6-
On June 5, 2012, the circuit court granted an evidentiary hearing on some of
Boyd’s claims. On August 28 and 29, 2012, the circuit court held an evidentiary
hearing on Boyd’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to conduct
adequate voir dire concerning jurors’ prior criminal histories, juror misconduct,
and ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel for failure to move for a
mistrial based on inflammatory and prejudicial comments. In a sixty-two page
order, dated January 2, 2013, the circuit court denied these three claims and
summarily denied Boyd’s remaining claims. Boyd now appeals the lower court’s
order denying postconviction relief and also petitions for a writ of habeas corpus.
II. POSTCONVICTION RELIEF CLAIMS
A. Actual Juror Bias Claims
Boyd asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because two jurors failed to
disclose information pertinent to his decision to retain them for jury service,
thereby denying him a fair and impartial jury. The present appellate claim
involves issues of fact considered and conclusions of law made by the circuit court.
This Court employs a mixed standard in reviewing a postconviction court’s denial
of postconviction relief, “deferring to the postconviction court’s factual findings
that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing legal
conclusions de novo.” Victorino v. State, 127 So. 3d 478, 486 (Fla. 2013) (citing
Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004)); Jackson v. State, 127 So. 3d
-7-
447, 460 (Fla. 2013) (“This Court accords deference to the postconviction court’s
factual findings following its denial of a claim after an evidentiary hearing.”).
Boyd argues that jurors Tonja Striggles and Kevin Rebstock failed to
disclose information concerning their criminal histories, which denied Boyd a fair
and impartial jury at trial. According to Boyd, the presence of Juror Striggles and
Juror Rebstock—one, a convicted felon who had not timely had her civil rights
restored; the other, a former misdemeanor defendant for whom adjudication had
been withheld—on the jury of his criminal trial was inherently prejudicial to his
legal interests. Consequently, Boyd asserts, because his constitutional right to a
fair trial was denied when he was convicted by a jury that consisted of said jurors,
a new trial must be granted without any further showing of actual bias or prejudice.
We disagree.
As an initial matter, Boyd’s reliance on our decision in Lowrey v. State, 705
So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 1998), is misplaced. In Lowrey, the First District affirmed the
defendant’s conviction for carrying a concealed firearm but certified for review the
following question as one of great public importance:
MUST A CONVICTED DEFENDANT SEEKING A
NEW TRIAL DEMONSTRATE ACTUAL HARM
FROM THE SEATING OF A JUROR WHO WAS
UNDER CRIMINAL PROSECUTION WHEN HE
SERVED BUT THOUGH ASKED, FAILED TO
REVEAL THIS PROSECUTION?
-8-
Id. at 1368 (emphasis added) (quoting Lowrey v. State, 682 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla.
1st DCA 1996)). In answering the question in the negative, we distinguished our
decision in State v. Rodgers, 347 So. 2d 610, 613 (Fla. 1977), where we held that
the presence of a minor on the criminal defendant’s jury did not require a new trial
absent a showing that the minor’s age affected the verdict or prevented a fair trial.
Specifically, we explained that in Rodgers, “no evidence or perception existed to
indicate that the disqualified juror rendered an unfair or impartial vote,” whereas in
Lowrey, “there [was] a clear perception of unfairness, and the integrity and
credibility of the justice system [was] patently affected.” Lowrey, 705 So. 2d at
1369-70. In concluding, we emphasized that we were not overruling Rodgers, but
“simply carving out an exception based on the unique circumstances presented.”
Id. at 1370. Accordingly, we quashed the First District’s decision and remanded
with directions to grant a new trial. Id.
Juror Striggles’ criminal history consisted of the following incidents: (1)
making a bomb threat and committing extortion (August 1979); (2) making a
threatening phone call (December 1980); (3) twice pleading guilty to reporting
false bombings (August 1983 and October 1986), and violating the probation order
associated with each conviction; (4) pleading guilty to the misdemeanor of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor in Georgia (March 1986); and (5)
pleading guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and
-9-
one count of carrying a concealed firearm (March 1988). According to the record,
Striggles was about nineteen years old at the time of her first false-bombing
reporting in August 1983, and twenty-four at the time of her last known
adjudication in March 1988. Certified records indicate that Striggles’ civil rights
were restored on April 4, 2008—more than six years after she served on the jury of
Boyd’s 2002 trial. When asked by the trial court how long ago she was involved
with the criminal justice system, Striggles responded that she was a juvenile. She
did not otherwise apprise the court or counsel of her series of convictions as an
adult (beginning in August 1983).
The record also reflects that Juror Rebstock was arrested in Broward County
in November 1991 and charged with misdemeanor solicitation of prostitution;
however, the presiding court withheld adjudication. During voir dire in the present
case, Rebstock reported on the voir dire questionnaire form that he did not have
any family or friends involved in the legal system. He did not report his own
encounter with law enforcement, and no further inquiries were made by the trial
judge or counsel for either party concerning Rebstock’s answer to this question.
The circumstances found in the present case do not implicate the “clear
perception of unfairness” as contemplated in Lowrey. As the Second District
cogently explained, “[t]he purpose of disqualifying a person who has a pending
prosecution is to avoid the possibility that that person might vote to convict in the
- 10 -
hope of getting more favorable treatment from the prosecution in [his or her] own
case.” Thompson v. State, 300 So. 2d 301, 303 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). Conversely,
persons who have already undergone criminal prosecution and been convicted are
no longer in a position to curry favor from the State. This is especially true with
regard to Juror Striggles since her last known adjudication was approximately
fourteen years before Boyd’s trial, and with Juror Rebstock, for whom adjudication
had already been withheld on his misdemeanor charge approximately a decade
before Boyd’s trial. Moreover, we see no practical reason to believe that those
who, for instance, have not become rehabilitated since being prosecuted over a
decade before serving on the jury of a criminal trial are more likely than similarly
situated persons—but who have also had their civil rights restored—to favor the
State over the defense. See Oregon v. Benson, 384 P.2d 208, 210 (Or. 1963)
(“Many [jurors who were convicted of felonies or misdemeanors] have become
morally rehabilitated. And we have no reason to believe that those who have not
become rehabilitated and are called to jury duty are more likely to show partiality
for the state than for the defendant.”). We, therefore, reiterate that our decision in
Lowrey is limited to its unique set of circumstances and, thus, refuse to extend our
ruling therein to Boyd’s case and similarly situated cases.
Next, case law—both from this Court and from other appellate courts
throughout the nation—supports our rejection of Boyd’s claim that he is entitled to
- 11 -
a new trial by virtue of the fact that his jury included a statutorily disqualified
convicted felon who had not had her civil rights restored. The United States
Supreme Court has emphasized that “[t]he motives for concealing information may
vary, but only those reasons that affect a juror’s impartiality can truly be said to
affect the fairness of a trial.” McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464
U.S. 548, 556 (1984); see also United States v. Carpa, 271 F.3d 962, 967 (11th Cir.
2001) (citing McDonough, 464 U.S. at 553). Specifically concerning a juror’s
status as a convicted felon, many appellate courts throughout our nation have
echoed this precise viewpoint. For example, the Supreme Court of Michigan
explained:
Although a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be
tried by an impartial jury, a criminal defendant does not have a
constitutional right to be tried by a jury free of convicted felons.
Instead, the right to be tried by a jury free of convicted felons is
granted by statute. And by statute, a violation of this “right” only
requires a new trial if the defendant demonstrates that such a violation
“actual[ly] prejudice[d]” him.
Michigan v. Miller, 759 N.W.2d 850, 855-56 (Mich. 2008) (footnotes omitted); see
also Hunt v. Maryland, 691 A.2d 1255, 1266-67 (Md. 1997) (“What is required of
jurors is that they be without bias or prejudice for or against the defendant and that
their minds be free to hear and impartially consider the evidence and render a fair
verdict thereon.”); Washington v. Cleary, 269 P.3d 367, 370 (Wash. Ct. App.
2012) (“The disqualification criterion [for convicted felons addressed] here is by
- 12 -
statute, not the state or federal constitution. The assignment of error does not then
implicate constitutional rights.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Humphreys,
982 F.2d 254, 261 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding trial court did not abuse discretion in
denying defendant’s motion for a new trial on the ground that one juror was
previously convicted on embezzlement charge; defendant did not pursue
questioning of subject juror on voir dire or further investigate or raise any
challenge during trial, and there was no evidence of either bias or unfairness as a
result of the seating of juror); United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 633 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (“W[hile] [w]e think, therefore, that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an
impartial trial does not mandate a per se invalidation of every conviction reached
by a jury that included a felon[,] . . . there is still the question whether appellants
were entitled to a hearing to determine whether the juror was in fact biased.”
(internal citations and footnotes omitted)); United States v. Uribe, 890 F.2d 554,
562 (1st Cir. 1989) (denying defendants’ claim of entitlement to a new trial in
narcotics prosecution because one juror was a convicted felon; explaining “the
statutory violation—allowing a convicted felon to serve—did not implicate the
fundamental fairness of the trial or the defendants’ constitutional rights,” and
defendants did not otherwise demonstrate a “plausible link between the predicate
facts and the prejudice claimed”).
- 13 -
We acknowledge the contemplated reasons why felon-jurors sitting in
criminal trials may harbor bias in favor of the defense as well as the State.
Compare Johnston v. State, 63 So. 3d 730, 739 (Fla. 2011) (“In fact, juror
Robinson’s positioning as a prior defendant makes bias against Johnston especially
unlikely.”) (emphasis in original), and Uribe, 890 F.2d at 562 (“The district court
found not the slightest basis to conclude that the juror’s prior conviction, sentence,
or subsequent dealings with the court rendered him more prone to convict a
defendant in an unrelated case. We agree.”), with Companioni v. City of Tampa,
958 So. 2d 404, 413 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (outlining reasons why convicted felons
serving as jurors in criminal trials could be bias both in favor of and against
defendants) (citing Humphreys, 982 F.2d at 260-61; Rubio v. Super. Ct. of San
Joaquin Cnty., 593 P.2d 595, 600 (Cal. 1979) (en banc)).
However, if a criminal defendant has failed to establish that a particular juror
could not be fair and impartial and follow the law as instructed by the trial court,
then it is unreasonable to further ascertain whether the juror’s status as a convicted
felon rendered him or her more favorable to the State or the defense. In other
words, we do not see the efficacy in belaboring the direction in which a felon-
juror’s bias cuts in the absence of legally sufficient evidence showing that the juror
was actually biased against the defendant. See United States v. Boney, 97 F. Supp.
2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2000) (“Even if this Court did not credit the Juror’s explanation as
- 14 -
to why he omitted a California conviction from his District of Columbia jury
questionnaire[,] . . . additional evidence would still be necessary to establish actual
bias and to demonstrate prejudice to defendant’s case.”).
Besides, we do not think that it is pragmatic to promulgate a per se rule that
one’s status as a convicted felon denotes inherent bias against a criminal
defendant’s legal interests. Otherwise, courts would be placed in the precarious
position of ordering new trials based not on legally sufficient evidence of actual
bias or prejudice, but wholly on gut reactions to sociological generalizations of
human tendencies. See Uribe, 890 F.2d at 562 (“To be accorded weight, a bias
claim requires more than subjective characterizations unanchored in the realities of
human experience.”); Boney, 977 F.2d at 633 (“A per se rule [requiring a new trial
whenever a felon serves on a jury] would be appropriate, therefore, only if one
could reasonably conclude that felons are always biased against one party or
another. But felon status, alone, does not necessarily imply bias.”).
Indeed, such a categorical rule is repugnant to the actual bias standard
established in our jurisprudence. As further analyzed below, for claims of juror
bias this Court has repeatedly required that the defendant bear the burden of
pointing to evidence on the face of the record which exhibits the subject juror’s
lack of impartiality. See Lebron v. State, 135 So. 3d 1040, 1058 (Fla. 2014) (citing
Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312, 323 (Fla. 2007)); see also Smithers v. State, 18
- 15 -
So. 3d 460, 465 (Fla. 2009) (“Juror Collins’ statements did not show a biased
unwillingness to consider potential sentences other than death. . . . Thus, the
record does not demonstrate actual bias that would prevent juror Collins from
serving as an impartial juror.”). Maryland’s highest state court has expressed a
view of this issue that comports with our Carratelli line of cases. Specifically, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland has instructed: “ ‘[B]ias on the part of prospective
jurors will never be presumed, and the challenging party bears the burden of
presenting facts . . . which would give rise to a showing of actual prejudice.’ ”
Hunt, 691 A.2d at 1267 (emphasis in original) (quoting Davis v. Maryland, 633
A.2d 867, 873 (Md. 1993)); accord Miller, 759 N.W.2d at 857-58.
Hence, in light of the court decisions discussed above, again, we refuse to
accept Boyd’s position that a criminal defendant is per se entitled to a new trial
where he or she was convicted by a jury that included a convicted felon whose
civil rights had not been restored. Rather, we hold—as have many other appellate
courts throughout this nation—that a criminal defendant is not entitled to relief
under such atypical circumstances absent a showing, based on legally sufficient
evidence, of actual juror bias against the defendant. In other words, a person’s
disqualification from jury service by statute does not necessarily implicate a
violation of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights if that person somehow
served as one of said defendant’s jurors. Thus, the only relevant issue presently
- 16 -
before this Court is whether there is legally sufficient evidence that either Juror
Striggles or Juror Rebstock was actually biased against Boyd.
Under the “actual bias” standard announced by this Court in Carratelli:
A juror is competent if he or she “can lay aside any bias or
prejudice and render his [or her] verdict solely upon the evidence
presented and the instructions on the law given to him [or her] by the
court.” Lusk[ v. State], 446 So. 2d [1038,] 1041 [(Fla. 1984)].
Therefore, actual bias means bias-in-fact that would prevent service as
an impartial juror. See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133-34
(1936) . . . . Under the actual bias standard, the defendant must
demonstrate that the juror in question was not impartial—i.e., that the
juror was biased against the defendant, and the evidence of bias must
be plain on the face of the record. See Carratelli [v. State], 915 So. 2d
[1256,] 1260 [(Fla. 4th DCA 2005)] (citing Jenkins[v. State], 824 So.
2d [977,] 982 [(Fla. 4th DCA 2002))]; see also Patton v. Yount, 467
U.S. 1025, 1038-40 (1984).
Carratelli, 961 So. 2d at 324.
Here, Boyd has not alleged actual bias, nor has he pointed to any evidence in
this record indicating that Juror Striggles or Juror Rebstock likely did not
deliberate the question of his guilt fairly and impartially. In fact, the record is
replete with evidence demonstrating facts that support the opposite conclusion.
For instance, when asked during voir dire, Striggles informed the trial court that
she was treated fairly by the juvenile system as a juvenile delinquent and that she,
as previously noted, had gotten over whatever negative feelings she may have
developed about that experience. Striggles also told the prosecutor during voir dire
that she did not have a problem recommending a sentence of death where
- 17 -
appropriate because she expected the State to be fair in the presentation of its case
against Boyd. Further, Striggles was not part of the group of venire members that
expressed moral, religious, or personal beliefs that would have prevented them
from returning a verdict of guilty if the State satisfied its burden of proof. She,
however, was part of the group that affirmatively agreed with the prosecutor’s
statement that the verdict reached should be one based solely upon the evidence
presented, and not any juror’s personal biases or prejudices. Because this record
evidence gives no indication that either Juror Striggles or Juror Rebstock harbored
any bias against him, we conclude that Boyd has not shown that he is entitled to a
new trial. Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Below, Boyd raised numerous ineffectiveness claims regarding defense
counsel’s performance during voir dire as well as the guilt and penalty phases. The
circuit court summarily denied some claims, and denied the remainder following
an evidentiary hearing. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the defendant must
demonstrate both deficiency and prejudice:
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or
omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the
broad range of reasonably competent performance under
prevailing professional standards. Second, the clear,
substantial deficiency shown must further be
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and
- 18 -
reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the
outcome is undermined.
There is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance
was not deficient. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires
that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the
time. The defendant carries the burden to overcome the presumption
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s
performance must be highly deferential. Strategic decisions do not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have
been considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable
under the norms of professional conduct. Furthermore, where this
Court previously has rejected a substantive claim on the merits,
counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make a meritless
argument.
In demonstrating prejudice, the defendant must show a
reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.
Long v. State, 118 So. 3d 798, 805-06 (Fla. 2013) (internal citations and alterations
omitted).
“[W]hen a defendant fails to make a showing as to one element [of the
Strickland standard], it is not necessary to delve into whether he has made a
showing as to the other element.” Thompson v. State, 796 So. 2d 511, 516 (Fla.
2001); McCoy v. State, 113 So. 3d 701, 708 (Fla. 2013). “Because both prongs of
the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact, this Court employs a
mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit court’s factual findings that are
- 19 -
supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the circuit court’s
legal conclusions de novo.” Id. Where a claim is summarily denied without an
evidentiary hearing, “this Court will affirm only when the claim is legally
insufficient, should have been brought on direct appeal, or is positively refuted by
the record.” Jackson, 127 So. 3d at 460 (internal citations and alterations omitted).
1. Failure to Conduct Adequate Voir Dire
Boyd first claims that defense counsel’s failure during voir dire to question
Juror Striggles more in depth about information she revealed concerning her
juvenile delinquency record prejudicially denied him the opportunity to discover
information material to excusing Striggles from jury service. However, Boyd has
not proffered any additional questions that defense counsel should have asked
Striggles during voir dire that would have elicited the now-complained-of
information from her. See Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1105 (Fla. 2008)
(“Second, Parker did not render ineffective assistance in failing to ask Guiles more
questions, because an allegation that there would have been a basis for a for cause
challenge if counsel had followed up during voir dire with more specific questions
is speculative.” (citing Johnson v. State, 903 So. 2d 888, 896 (Fla. 2005); Reaves v.
State, 826 So. 2d 932, 939 (Fla. 2002))). Nevertheless, as discussed above, the
record in this case does not show that Striggles harbored any bias against Boyd,
and thus, it is not reasonable to conclude that she rendered her duties in any
- 20 -
manner other than fairly and impartially. See Carratelli, 961 So. 2d at 324. The
record also reflects that Boyd participated in the jury selection process, agreed to
an abbreviated voir dire, and did not object to seating Striggles as a juror because
he gave informed consent to his defense team’s overall trial strategy. This belies
Boyd’s contention that he was prejudiced by Striggles’ presence on his jury. See
Gamble v. State, 877 So. 2d 706, 714 (Fla. 2004) (“[I]f the defendant consents to
counsel’s strategy, there is no merit to a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.”). Therefore, Boyd has failed to show that counsel’s declination to ask
Striggles more specific voir dire questions about her criminal record affected the
fairness and reliability of the trial proceedings such that our confidence in the
outcome is undermined. See Long, 118 So. 3d at 805. Accordingly, we deny
Boyd any relief as to this subclaim.
2. Failure to Properly Challenge Penalty Phase Outburst
The following cross-examination colloquy between the State and Boyd
transpired during the penalty phase:
Q. Remember when I stood here and said, Mr. Boyd, I’m sorry
I have to ask this of you, but did you have your own sperm in your
mouth when they swabbed your mouth with the Q-tip and you said no.
A. But they -- you’re right.
Q. Right. I know I’m right.
A. But they --
Q. Now, you said you’d never do nothing like that.
MR. LASWELL: Objection, your Honor. Mr. Boyd has a
right to finish his answer.
THE COURT: Mr. Loe, I’m going to give Mr. Boyd --
- 21 -
BY MR. LOE:
Q. I said --
THE COURT: Excuse me, gentlemen. Excuse me. Mr. Boyd,
finish your answer and then Mr. Loe may proceed with his next
question.
THE WITNESS: I didn’t have my sperm in my mouth, but my
sperm was in this young lady right here that they took from me in
1998. That’s where they got my sperm from, out of me. That young
lady right there. That’s where my sperm came from.
[J.M.]: You raped me.
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Not out of my mouth.
BY MR. LOE:
Q. My question was --
A. Yes, sir.
Q. -- did you have your sperm in your mouth when they
swabbed you in 1998, your answer was no?
A. No, sir.
Q. That was my question, wasn’t it? Your answer was no?
A. The answer is no.
(emphasis added).
The record reflects that the trial judge did nothing to restore order in the
court from the gallery outburst or otherwise address the statement in the presence
of the jury. The record also reflects that counsel for the defense did not object or
move for a mistrial during the above exchange. Boyd asserts that such inaction in
the midst of the allegedly prejudicial, unsworn statement by the female spectator,
J.M., in open court constituted ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel. We
disagree, since there is competent, substantial evidence in this record supporting
the circuit court’s finding that defense counsel made a strategic decision not to
- 22 -
raise a challenge to the outburst so as to prevent it from becoming a contentious
issue in front of the jury.
This Court has repeatedly held that counsel does not render ineffective
assistance by employing strategic decisions made during trial that, in hindsight, did
not work to the defendant’s advantage. Reynolds v. State, 99 So. 3d 459, 483 (Fla.
2012); Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944, 959 (Fla. 2000) (citing Medina v. State,
573 So. 2d 293, 297 (Fla. 1990)). Stated differently, “[c]ounsel cannot be deemed
ineffective merely because current counsel disagrees with trial counsel’s strategic
decisions. Moreover, strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel’s
decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.” Occhicone v.
State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000) (internal citation omitted).
Here, the transcript for opening statements reflects that defense counsel
informed the jury that they would hear testimony during trial that Broward County-
area law enforcement had attempted to prosecute Boyd for two unrelated sexual
battery incidents spanning over the decade prior to the present case. Counsel then
suggested that because they had been embarrassed by unsuccessfully obtaining a
conviction when they charged Boyd with a sex offense in an earlier case, the
Sheriff’s Office and Police Department opportunistically colluded to blame
McCloud for the death of Dacosta, the victim in this case. Defense counsel further
- 23 -
indicated during opening statements that the evidence to be presented at trial would
show that law enforcement maintained control of the forensic evidence that
allegedly linked McCloud to Dacosta’s murder, and linked Dacosta to the crime
scene—the apartment McCloud at one point had shared with his girlfriend, Geneva
Lewis. Indeed, the defense team attempted to elicit such testimony while, for
example, cross-examining the lead detective, Glenn Bukata, about the fact that he
ordered Lewis and her children to vacate the apartment for several days while
crime scene technicians processed the premises for forensic evidence. The defense
also elicited testimony from Lewis that, sometime after Boyd’s arrest but before
she was ordered to leave, Detective Bukata attempted to enter Lewis’ apartment
while her children were home but she was not. While testifying on his own behalf,
Boyd indicated that during his interrogation, Bukata mocked him by addressing
Boyd with a racial epithet and boasting: “[W]e told you we was going to get you.”
Finally, in the course of closing arguments, defense counsel stressed that none of
the State’s expert witnesses could explain how or when Dacosta’s DNA ended up
on the furniture in Lewis’ apartment. All the above evidence shows that the
defense relied heavily on a general trial theory that law enforcement had motive to,
and actually did, plant incriminating evidence to incriminate Boyd unlawfully in
this case.
- 24 -
Further, defense counsel testified during the evidentiary hearing that he
immediately perceived the outburst incident as an opportunity to exploit this
theory. According to counsel, based on his prior success in obtaining an acquittal
under relatively similar circumstances, he believed the incident at issue in this case
presented a rare opportunity to allow the jury to connect law enforcement’s prior
failures to prosecute Boyd for unrelated sexual battery incidents with the
possibility that such failures motivated police to target him in the present sexual
battery case—as opposed to challenging the spectator’s outburst in open court and
risking it becoming a feature of the penalty phase. Thus, defense counsel clearly
considered and rejected alternative courses of action. In addition, this decision was
reasonable given that it was made under spur-of-the-moment circumstances and
based on a past experience that resulted in an outcome favorable to the defense.
We conclude, therefore, that defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance
by failing to object or move for a mistrial in response to the asserted penalty phase
outburst. See Reynolds, 99 So. 3d at 483; Occhicone, 768 So. 2d at 1048.
Additionally, we agree with the circuit court’s determination that Boyd’s
own actions during the penalty phase invited the asserted error. It is well-settled
under Florida law that “ ‘a party may not make or invite error at trial and then take
advantage of the error on appeal.’ ” Universal Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Warfel, 82 So.
3d 47, 65 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Sheffield v. Superior Ins. Co., 800 So. 2d 197, 202
- 25 -
(Fla. 2001)). In support of its finding that Boyd invited the asserted error in this
case by provoking J.M. in front of the jury, the circuit court cited Norton v. State,
709 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1997). In Norton, we rejected the defendant’s argument that
the State’s witness improperly commented on cross-examination about the
defendant’s failure to testify at trial. In so ruling, we noted that error was invited
where, in an unsuccessful attempt to make a point on cross-examination, defense
counsel probed the witness as to why the defendant bought carpet cleaners when
there were no carpets in his car. Id. at 94.
The record here shows that Boyd goaded the woman present in the
courtroom gallery when he identified her in front of the jury by partially standing
while on the witness stand and twice pointing at the woman while insisting she was
the source of his semen that law enforcement officers collected in the State’s
attempt to convict him of a prior sexual battery charge. The record does not reflect
that the woman was causing any disruption during the penalty phase proceeding, or
that observers other than the State or Boyd knew of her presence.
Contrary to Boyd’s assertion, these circumstances are reminiscent of those
found in Norton, given that in both cases some member of the defense’s party
probed the allegedly prejudicial statements. In Boyd’s particular case, J.M. had
not responded to or interjected herself into Boyd’s testimony until, in an attempt to
bolster the defense’s theory that a DNA sample from his semen was intentionally
- 26 -
planted on the victim’s body by law enforcement, Boyd deliberately and overtly
made J.M.’s presence in the courtroom known when the jury was present.
Finally, in further contrast to Boyd’s observation, the record does not
indicate that the State engaged in “argumentative and antagonistic” cross-
examination. Rather, the record shows nothing more than adversarial questioning
aimed at calling into question the credibility of a hostile witness as well as the
defense’s overall theory that, against Boyd’s interest, law enforcement planted the
incriminating forensic evidence at, and collected it from, the crime scene. See
Blanton v. State, 880 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (describing cross-
examination as an “adversarial tool” (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004))), approved in part, disapproved in part, 978 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 2008); see
also Fla. Power Corp. v. Smith, 202 So. 2d 872, 881-82 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967) (“The
very rule that sanctions the calling of a hostile witness permits cross-examination
by the adverse party on the subject matter of his original examination as a hostile
witness and also permits new evidence to contradict or impeach him.”).
Accordingly, we deny relief as to this subclaim.
3. Failure to Question Jurors about Pretrial Publicity
Next, Boyd argues that the circuit court erred in summarily denying his
claim that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to question
two prospective jurors—Barbara Berberich and then-prospective Juror Striggles—
- 27 -
adequately about their exposures to pretrial publicity concerning Boyd’s case.
Under Florida case law, it is well-established that “ ‘[t]he mere fact that jurors
were exposed to pretrial publicity is not enough to raise the presumption of
unfairness.’ The relevant inquiry is whether the jurors can lay aside any opinion or
impressions and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.”
Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So. 2d 1009, 1020 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Castro v. State,
644 So. 2d 987, 990 (Fla. 1994)).
The transcript in this case indicates that the State conducted its voir dire
prior to the defense and questioned the prospective jurors about pretrial publicity
and their knowledge of the case. Juror Striggles indicated that she had previously
overheard her family conversing about an aspect of the case related to the Boyd
Funeral Home, which was a business owned and operated by Boyd’s family.
However, she immediately stated that she knew nothing about the business or this
case. Juror Berberich likewise stated that, although she may have learned about
Boyd’s case after seeing it on television or reading about it in a newspaper, she did
not recall many details other than remembering Boyd’s name. Thus, because any
follow-up questioning by defense counsel likely would have elicited minimum
information not already brought out by the State’s voir dire, or otherwise would
have elicited cumulative information, Boyd has failed to prove the deficiency
prong under the Strickland standard. See id. (“The prosecutor also questioned the
- 28 -
prospective jurors about their exposure to news reporting. In light of this
questioning of the prospective jurors, we cannot fault trial counsel for failing to
repeat the questioning.”); Cole v. State, 841 So. 2d 409, 415 (Fla. 2003).
Assuming, however, that counsel was remiss in not asking Jurors Striggles
and Berberich additional questions about pretrial publicity and their knowledge of
this case, no prejudice resulted from such inaction. When asked by the State, both
prospective jurors explicitly assured that they would not permit whatever
information concerning Boyd’s case to which they may have been exposed to
affect them one way or the other during deliberations if chosen to serve on the jury.
Therefore, we find that the record positively refutes a showing that either juror had
actual bias against Boyd. See Carratelli, 961 So. 2d at 327 (“[T]he en banc
[district] court . . . held that [j]uror Inman’s slight familiarity with the case did not
rise to th[e] level of actual bias necessary for postconviction relief. We agree. The
record plainly shows that juror Inman held no firm opinion except that he could be
fair, listen to the evidence, and follow the law. Thus, Carratelli fails to
demonstrate prejudice under Strickland.”) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly,
we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of this claim and deny Boyd any relief
thereto.
4. Forensic Evidence
a. Failure to Request a Frye Hearing
- 29 -
Boyd argues that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing
to request a Frye hearing to challenge the admissibility of the State’s bite-mark
comparison and fiber analysis evidence, as well as evidence regarding the DNA
testing performed by the Bode Laboratory. The Frye test is used to evaluate the
“admissibility of expert scientific opinion by ascertaining whether new or novel
scientific principles on which an expert’s opinion is based ‘have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.’ ” Rodgers v. State, 948 So.
2d 655, 666 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Frye, 293 F. at 1014). It follows that trial counsel
does not render ineffective assistance by failing to request a Frye hearing when, at
the time of trial, there was general acceptance in the scientific community of the
scientific evidence at issue. In other words, where the methodology was neither
new nor novel, existing case law recognizes that a Frye hearing is not necessary.
Foster v. State, 132 So. 3d 40, 69 (Fla. 2013); McDonald v. State, 952 So. 2d 484,
495-96 (Fla. 2006).
As Boyd concedes in his initial brief, the forensic methodologies and
evidence presented at trial: trace and microscopic fiber analysis; forensic
odontology and bite-mark analysis; and Short Tandem Repeat (STR) DNA
technology, were neither new nor novel at the time of his 2002 trial. See, e.g.,
Long v. State, 610 So. 2d 1276, 1281 (Fla. 1992) (holding State’s hair, fiber, and
tire-track evidence was admissible in trial for first-degree murder to establish
- 30 -
defendant’s identity and to connect him to victim); Mitchell v. State, 527 So. 2d
179, 181 (Fla. 1988) (recognizing admissibility of expert testimony concerning
bite-mark analysis as an analytical methodology that is widely accepted in the
scientific community); Lemour v. State, 802 So. 2d 402, 407 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
(holding use of STR DNA testing kit to obtain DNA test results did not present
new scientific technique where kit used testing methods that were generally
accepted by scientific community), review denied, 821 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2002);
Bradford v. State, 460 So. 2d 926, 929-30 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (approving
admissibility of odontologist’s expert testimony similar to bite-mark analysis
(citing Bundy v. State, 455 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1984))). Boyd, therefore, has failed to
demonstrate that a Frye hearing was necessary in this case and, in turn, that the
trial court would have granted such a hearing had defense counsel requested one.
See Foster, 132 So. 3d at 69; McDonald, 952 So. 2d at 495-96. As such, we
conclude that defense counsel was not ineffective in this regard. See Long, 118
So. 3d at 805 (holding defense counsel is not ineffective for failing to present
meritless argument).
Boyd maintains that the 2009 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report
on forensic science, while it had not yet been published at the time of his 2002
trial, consisted of sources that were readily available at all relevant times and could
have been utilized by defense counsel to challenge the methodology, procedures,
- 31 -
and analyses of the forensic evidence for admissibility purposes at a Frye hearing.
Because we have previously addressed this issue in principle, we are not persuaded
by Boyd’s argument.
In Taylor v. State, 62 So. 3d 1101 (Fla. 2011), we determined that trial
counsel’s decision not to request a Frye hearing to challenge the admissibility of
DNA evidence was reasonable, given that the only authority proffered by the
defendant that both challenged the use of DNA evidence and existed at the time of
trial were academic articles and isolated, nonbinding decisions. Thus, we
concluded that “[w]hile this evidence certainly could have been presented at trial, it
was not essential for counsel to be determined to be effective.” Id. at 1111
(emphasis in original).
As to the fiber and bite-mark evidence at issue here, Boyd points our
attention mostly to a number of isolated articles, news reports, journals, book
chapters, and other nonbinding decisions from federal circuits. While these
documents were readily available at the time of his trial and could have been relied
upon throughout the trial proceedings, Boyd has not cited to any authority that
obligated counsel to rely upon the substance of the above documents in order to
persuade the trial court to grant a Frye hearing. See id. Regarding the DNA
analysis, Boyd has not articulated how or what part of the 2009 NAS report would
have called into question the admissibility of the DNA expert testimony in this
- 32 -
case. Rather, he alleges deficiency in a conclusory fashion, asserting “counsel
inexplicably failed to challenge the admissibility of DNA evidence analyzed by
Bode” and “failed to seek laboratory protocols, validation studies, accreditation
studies, equipment maintenance logs and operation manuals, contamination logs
and laboratory error rates from any of the three DNA labs involved.” Again, Boyd
has not pointed to any authority which requires counsel to pursue these measures,
and that indicates that counsel otherwise renders ineffective assistance if he fails to
do so. See id.
To the extent Boyd characterizes the 2009 NAS report as newly discovered
evidence, Boyd cannot show that the portions of the report upon which he relies
could “not have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of
trial,” and that he “or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of
diligence.” Schwab v. State, 969 So. 2d 318, 325 (Fla. 2007). As Boyd
acknowledges, many of the statements in the Summary and Introduction sections
of the NAS report to which Boyd cites appear in sources that were readily
available at the time of his 2002 trial. Therefore, Boyd has failed to demonstrate
that the NAS report constitutes newly discovered evidence. See Johnston v. State,
27 So. 3d 11, 21-23 (Fla. 2010) (finding 2009 NAS report was not newly
discovered evidence, in part, because report cited existing publications, some of
which were published before victim’s murder).
- 33 -
For all of the above reasons, we find this subclaim to be without merit and
deny relief thereto. See Long, 118 So. 3d at 805.
b. Failure to Utilize Forensic Experts
Boyd argues that defense counsel’s decision not to hire a forensic expert to
assist him in challenging the DNA and bite-mark evidence was unreasonable and
allowed the State to present its expert testimony virtually unchallenged. At the
time of Boyd’s trial, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.250 provided that “[a]
defendant offering no testimony in his own behalf, except his own, shall be entitled
to the concluding argument before the jury.” McAvoy v. State, 501 So. 2d 642,
643 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). Florida courts have deemed “a defense attorney’s case-
specific tactical decision not to present evidence because of a desire to retain the
first and last closing argument” to be a reasonable trial strategy. Cole v. State, 700
So. 2d 33, 36 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). However, counsel’s general practice or
blanket policy to preserve the closing argument “sandwich” without examining the
surrounding circumstances and potential defenses of the particular case is per se
deficient. Id.
In this case, the record reflects that defense counsel filed a pretrial motion to
grant defendant the concluding argument to the jury pursuant to then-applicable
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.250. Throughout the course of trial, defense
counsel was vigilant in ensuring that the defense did not admit any exhibits in
- 34 -
order to preserve the trial court’s grant of the closing argument “sandwich.” And,
other than Boyd’s testimony, the defense did not admit any evidence. The record
further shows that, using his experience as a former medical examiner, defense
counsel Ongley thoroughly cross-examined each of the State’s forensic expert
witnesses to expose the shortcomings of their conclusions, and echoed those points
during the defense’s first closing argument. Also, as previously discussed, Boyd
stressed during direct examination of his own testimony, and defense counsel
Laswell reiterated in the second closing argument the defense’s theory, that law
enforcement planted incriminating evidence against Boyd in an attempt to frame
him for the kidnapping, rape, and murder of Dacosta in this case. Likewise, the
defense elicited cross-examination testimony from the State’s witness that law
enforcement personnel ordered Boyd’s girlfriend to vacate the apartment unit
where the murder occurred and the forensic evidence was collected, and also that
law enforcement maintained unfettered control of the premises for several days.
In light of the above, Boyd failed to show from the record evidence that, in
exercising a reasonable trial strategy, counsel did not perform the minimum
requirements of professional conduct. See Branch v. State, 952 So. 2d 470, 478-79
(Fla. 2006) (agreeing with trial counsel that his ability to cross-examine the State’s
witnesses coupled with the importance of the right to present first and last closing
arguments were sufficient reasons to avoid the presentation of pathologist and
- 35 -
blood splatter expert, especially given that defense emphasized at trial that
defendant did not commit the crime, and that neither postconviction expert
identified any substantial factual mistakes made by State’s experts). Because,
therefore, he cannot establish the deficiency prong under the Strickland standard,
we deny Boyd relief as to this subclaim.
III. HABEAS PETITION CLAIMS
Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are appropriately
presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Dufour v. State, 905 So. 2d 42,
70 (Fla. 2005). Consistent with the Strickland standard, in determining whether to
grant habeas relief for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this Court makes
the following inquiries:
[F]irst, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and,
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the
correctness of the result.
Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 563 (Fla. 2010).
The defendant bears the burden of “alleging a specific, serious omission or
overt act upon which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.”
Id. (quoting Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000)). Ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claims “may not be used to camouflage issues that
should have been presented on direct appeal or in a postconviction motion.” Id.
- 36 -
Further, appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for not pursuing a
meritless claim. See id. (“If a legal issue would in all probability have been found
to be without merit had counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the failure of
appellate counsel to raise the meritless issue will not render appellate counsel’s
performance ineffective.” (internal citation omitted)).
A. Failure to Raise Issue of Admissibility of Incriminating Statement
Boyd argues that the trial court erred, in violation of his constitutional right
against self-incrimination, when it denied his motion to suppress the statement he
made to police during custodial interrogation, to wit: “What took you so long to
catch me?” It is further asserted that because, according to Boyd, trial counsel
preserved the error for appellate review, appellate counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to raise the issue on direct appeal.
Assuming trial counsel properly preserved the alleged error and that
appellate counsel’s failure to raise it satisfied the deficiency prong, such lack in
performance does not undermine our confidence in the correctness of the result of
the direct appeal proceedings. As indicated in our direct appeal decision, we found
competent, substantial evidence to support Boyd’s conviction of sexual battery:
The State presented substantial evidence that Boyd sexually
battered Dacosta, including evidence that Boyd and Dacosta did not
know each other before she encountered Boyd while looking for a ride
back to her vehicle after obtaining gas at the Texaco station; that
Boyd’s semen was on Dacosta’s inner thighs; that Dacosta’s blood
was in Boyd’s apartment; and that Boyd’s DNA was in material found
- 37 -
under Dacosta’s fingernails. The State also presented testimony
establishing the chain of custody of the evidence collected, providing
evidence against Boyd’s theory that Detective Bukata planted
evidence so that it would match Boyd’s and Dacosta’s DNA.
Bruising on Dacosta’s inner thighs and vaginal area was consistent
with either consensual or nonconsensual intercourse. Dacosta was last
seen alive with Boyd.
Boyd, 910 So. 2d at 181.
This same evidence, in addition to evidence “that Dacosta was stabbed
with a Torx screwdriver thirty-six times in the chest and four times in the head”
and “had twelve wounds on her right hand that were consistent with defensive
wounds,” supported our determination that there was also competent, substantial
evidence to uphold the jury’s guilty verdicts for armed kidnapping and
premeditated murder. Id. at 182-84. Finally, we determined that, based on Boyd’s
convictions of sexual battery and armed kidnapping, the record on appeal further
supported the first-degree murder conviction on the basis of felony murder. Id. at
182. Therefore, even had Boyd’s statement: “What took you so long to catch me?”
not be adduced at trial, his convictions and sentence of death would have been
upheld, given the overwhelming amount of remaining evidence establishing
Boyd’s guilt. See Williamson v. State, 123 So. 3d 1060, 1056-66 (Fla. 2013)
(“[T]o establish prejudice under Strickland, . . . a court hearing an ineffectiveness
claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury, and a
verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have
- 38 -
been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.” (citation
omitted)); Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 492 (Fla. 2012) (holding that, even if
trial counsel’s stipulation that defendant was source of semen found inside victim’s
body constituted deficient performance, no prejudice could be shown in light of
overwhelming evidence of guilt, including evidence of victim’s blood found inside
defendant’s car; testimony of eyewitnesses who had seen victim screaming for help
from defendant’s car on the night of the murder; and the fact that tire tracks of
defendant’s car were found near the location where victim’s body was found).
Accordingly, Boyd is not entitled to relief on this claim.
B. Failure to Raise Fundamental Error as to Improper Comment
Boyd raises his previous ineffectiveness claim for failure to properly
challenge a penalty phase spectator’s outburst: “You raped me,” see Section
II.B.2., supra, but under the guise of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for
failure to raise the claim on direct appeal. Because, as noted, defense counsel did
not preserve the issue for appeal during the penalty phase of trial, appellate counsel
cannot be ineffective for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal unless the claim
involves fundamental error. See Archer v. State, 934 So. 2d 1187, 1205 (Fla.
2006). An error is fundamental if it “reaches down into the validity of the trial
itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the
assistance of the alleged error.” Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1282 (Fla.
- 39 -
2005). Concerning improper comments made in the penalty phase, to be
fundamental error the comments “must be so prejudicial as to taint the jury’s
recommended sentence.” Fennie v. State, 855 So. 2d 597, 609 (Fla. 2003) (citing
Thomas v. State, 748 So. 2d 970, 985 n.10 (Fla. 1999)).
The cases to which Boyd cites for support are factually distinguishable to the
present circumstances and, thus, are uninstructive. In Arbelaez v. State, 626 So. 2d
169 (Fla. 1993), for instance, the murder victim’s mother, upon being called by the
State to testify, was crying during the administration of the oath. Id. at 176. The
prosecutor requested a break for the mother to compose her emotions, after which
time she then called the defendant a “murderer” and a “son of a bitch” in Spanish
while the jury was still present. Id. Boyd also likened the facts of this case to
those in Evans v. State, 995 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 2008), where the defendant raised a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to a juror’s
participation in the trial. Id. at 945. Particularly, the defendant asserted that he
was prejudiced when the juror interjected herself into the trial as an unsworn
witness to answer a question concerning a traffic light that was germane to the
defense’s theory of the case. Id. Neither of these decisions contemplates a
situation in which the defendant incited the complained-of outburst. Id.
To the contrary, Boyd goaded the spectator by partially standing while on
the witness stand and twice pointing at her while insisting she was the source of
- 40 -
Boyd’s semen that law enforcement officers collected in the State’s attempt to
convict him of a prior sexual battery charge. The record does not reflect that the
spectator was causing any disruption during the penalty phase proceeding, or that
observers other than the State or Boyd knew of her presence. In addition, before
the asserted outburst, the jury was twice informed that Boyd was the subject of
prior sexual battery charges. And, although the jury could have easily inferred that
the subject spectator was the alleged victim from at least one of the charges, there
was no reasonable basis upon which to believe that Boyd actually committed the
offense given that the jury was also informed of his acquittals from all prior
charges. In light of these circumstances, whatever prejudice that Boyd may have
suffered as a result of the outburst is self-inflicted. Further, we are not convinced
that the jury unanimously recommended the sentence of death only with the
assistance of this particular incident. Accordingly, we deny this claim as meritless.
See Schoenwetter, 46 So. 3d at 563; Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 644
(Fla. 2000) (“The failure to raise meritless claims does not render appellate
counsel’s performance ineffective.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of
postconviction relief. We also deny Boyd’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.
It is so ordered.
- 41 -
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE and PERRY, JJ., concur.
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result.
LEWIS, J., concurs in result only with an opinion.
QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
LEWIS, J., concurring in result only.
Under the Florida Statutes, a person who has been convicted of a felony is
disqualified from service on a jury unless and until his or her civil rights have been
restored. See § 40.013(1), Fla. Stat. (2015). However, the statute fails to provide
any specific remedy when a disqualified individual actually serves on a jury. In
my view, the dispositive issue should be whether the jury was properly comprised
under the law, not whether the defective jury performed properly. Therefore, when
a convicted felon serves on a jury, as occurred in this case, a structural defect is
present that invalidates the jury from the outset, and whether the jury reached the
correct determination is simply not the relevant standard. Instead, I would
conclude that the verdict is per se invalid.
I am surprised that neither Florida courts, nor many courts in other
jurisdictions that have addressed this issue, have reached this conclusion. Rather, a
significant number have determined, as the majority holds today, that actual bias is
the proper inquiry where a convicted felon serves on a jury. See, e.g., Companioni
v. City of Tampa, 958 So. 2d 404, 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (holding that in civil
- 42 -
cases in which individuals with prior felony convictions serve on a jury, “it is
entirely appropriate to require a showing of actual bias or prejudice before setting
aside a verdict”); United States v. Bishop, 264 F.3d 535, 554 (5th Cir. 2001)
(“[O]nce the trial is complete, a felon’s serving as a juror is not an automatic basis
for a new trial. The defendant must demonstrate that the juror was actually biased
or fundamentally incompetent.”); Coughlin v. Tailhook Ass’n, 112 F.3d 1052,
1059 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he participation of a felon-juror can be the basis for a
new trial if the juror’s participation in the case results in ‘actual bias’ to one or
more of the parties.”); United States v. Humphreys, 982 F.2d 254, 261 (8th Cir.
1992) (“In an effort to obtain a new trial, it is incumbent upon the defendant to
clearly demonstrate that the juror’s lack of qualifications presented actual bias or
prejudice, affecting the juror’s impartiality and impacting the fairness of the trial.
A challenge after the verdict without such a showing comes too late.” (footnote
omitted)); United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 633-35 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding
that “the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial trial does not mandate a per
se invalidation of every conviction reached by a jury that included a felon” and
remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the juror’s failure to
disclose his status resulted in actual bias); Young v. United States, 694 A.2d 891,
895 (D.C. 1997) (“[T]he fact that the juror was statutorily ineligible to serve due to
a felony conviction does not constitute prejudice per se meriting automatic
- 43 -
reversal.”); People v. Duffy, 923 N.Y.S.2d 822, 825 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2011) (noting
that “there is no per se rule requiring the setting aside of a jury verdict upon the
postverdict discovery that a juror had previously been convicted of a felony,” and
concluding that the defendant had failed to demonstrate actual bias).
In my opinion, whether actual bias existed should not be the appropriate
consideration where a disqualified juror served in violation of statutory law.
Rather, I would conclude that if a jury is not properly comprised pursuant to
section 40.013(1), it is incapable of rendering a valid verdict or advisory sentence.
Therefore, if writing on a clean slate, I would hold that the presence of a convicted
felon on Boyd’s jury invalidated his trial from the outset, and he would be entitled
to a new trial. Nevertheless, I recognize that the weight of the authority, including
Florida precedent, is contrary to my position.
Other states, such as Texas and Virginia, have provided statutory remedies
where a disqualified individual served on a jury. See Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann.
art. 44.46(2) (Vernon 2014) (criminal defendant must demonstrate “significant
harm” by service of disqualified juror); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-352(B) (2014) (new
trial will not be granted unless it appears that the legal disability of juror “probably
cause[d] injustice”). As these states have done, I urge the Legislature to review the
current law in Florida and enact a specific remedy to address the situation where a
verdict is entered by a jury that was not properly comprised pursuant to the
- 44 -
directives of the Florida Statutes. Without such a remedy in place, actual bias will
remain the standard, despite the fact that this burden is virtually impossible to
meet. Thus, the clear prohibition is meaningless. This extremely high standard
operates to undermine the statutory prohibition in section 40.013(1). If service by
a convicted felon almost never invalidates a verdict, subsection (1) basically has no
operational effect post-trial.
Despite my deep disagreement with the use of the actual bias standard in this
context, statutory change is required to address the current injustice in Florida.
Until the Legislature takes action, a party must meet a nearly insurmountable
burden to obtain relief where a convicted felon served on his or her jury in clear
violation of the law. Therefore, I am compelled to concur in result only.
QUINCE, J., dissenting.
I believe, under the circumstances of the case, the defendant is entitled to a
new trial because an unqualified person served on this capital jury. It is undisputed
that Juror Striggles was a convicted felon whose civil rights had not been restored
at the time she served on the jury that convicted Boyd. Section 40.013(1), Florida
Statutes (2001), provides that any person who has been convicted of a felony and
whose civil rights have not been restored shall not be qualified to serve as a juror.
This statutory directive is clear and unequivocal. Juror Striggles should not have
been on this jury.
- 45 -
It is impossible to tell whether bias from such a situation cuts for or against
the defendant, and a defendant should not be placed in the position of having to
demonstrate bias. Because in most instances demonstrating prejudice is difficult, if
not impossible, there should be a per se rule that would require a new trial when a
disqualified person serves on a jury. Thus, Boyd should be given a new trial.
Two Cases:
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County,
Andrew L. Siegel, Judge - Case No. 061999CF005809A88810
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus
Neal Andre Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region,
Suzanne Myers Keffer, Chief Assistant, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel,
Southern Region, and Scott Gavin, Staff Attorney, Capital Collateral Regional
Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Leslie T. Campbell,
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent
- 46 -