IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 14–2062
Filed December 18, 2015
BRUCE BAKER,
Appellee,
vs.
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE and OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE,
Appellants.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D.
Rosenberg, Judge.
An employer appeals the district court’s ruling on judicial review of
the workers’ compensation commissioner, contending the employee’s
claim is time-barred because the discovery rule does not apply to work-
related injuries arising out of a singular event. AFFIRMED.
Joseph M. Barron and William Timothy Wegman of Peddicord,
Wharton, Spencer, Hook, Barron & Wegman, LLP, West Des Moines, for
appellants.
Martin Ozga of Neifert, Byrne & Ozga, P.C., West Des Moines, for
appellee.
2
HECHT, Justice.
An employee of a tire manufacturer strained his back on the job.
On the second anniversary of the incident, the manufacturer notified the
employee that the limitations period had expired and no further medical
services would be provided for treatment of the employee’s injury. The
employee filed a workers’ compensation proceeding within thirty days
after receiving the notice from his employer, but the workers’
compensation commissioner concluded the statute of limitations barred
the claim. We must decide in this case whether the commissioner
committed legal error in concluding the discovery rule does not apply
under the circumstances presented in this case. Because we conclude
the discovery rule can apply under the circumstances presented here, we
affirm the district court’s judgment reversing the agency’s decision.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Bruce Baker works for Bridgestone/Firestone 1 at its Des Moines
plant. He has worked for the company since 1994. At the time of the
arbitration hearing in this case, he was a maintenance mechanic in the
hoist department. As a maintenance mechanic, Baker inspected and
repaired machines located at the Bridgestone plant. This position often
required him to work on scissor lifts suspended up to twenty-six feet off
the ground. As a result, Baker frequently worked in awkward positions—
including reaching, leaning, and bending over backwards—to reach the
machines.
On May 23, 2010, Baker sustained a back injury while working at
the plant. The accident occurred when he bent over to pick up a dropped
tool and inadvertently stepped on a lanyard hooked to his chest. When
1For economy’s sake, we refer to the company simply as Bridgestone.
3
Baker attempted to stand up, the lanyard stuck under his right foot and
pulled him to the ground, causing him to roll over. He experienced pain
in his lower back and immediately reported the incident to a supervisor
as required by company policy. Baker resumed working after reporting
the incident.
Dr. Troll, the plant physician, examined Baker on May 25. The
doctor recommended stretching exercises and instructed Baker to use
acetaminophen and ice for his discomfort. Dr. Troll’s progress note for
the May 25 examination recommended Baker “work at his own pace
today.” Although he experienced some pain immediately after the fall,
Baker testified—and the commissioner found—that he did not foresee the
incident having a lasting impact on his ability to perform the functions of
his position.
Unfortunately, Baker’s back pain did not subside, so he consulted
another plant physician on July 30, as well as Dr. Troll again on
September 2. Both doctors recommended Baker treat his pain with over-
the-counter analgesics, ice, and light physical therapy. Baker’s pain
gradually increased, but he was able to continue performing his assigned
job duties despite the discomfort. However, because he continued to
experience pain, he consulted Dr. Troll four more times in December. At
his December 2 appointment—just over six months following the
accident—Dr. Troll ordered x-rays and an MRI of Baker’s lumbosacral
spine and prescribed Tramadol to address Baker’s persistent pain. The
MRI study revealed Baker had mild lumbar degenerative changes
consistent with normal wear and tear. Although Baker reported ongoing
low back pain, Dr. Troll’s progress note for a December 16 exam reveals
Baker was instructed to work at regular duty. Dr. Troll did not assign
any lifting or other specific restrictions on Baker’s exertion.
4
In January 2011, Dr. Troll referred Baker to Dr. Hansen, a pain
management specialist. Dr. Hansen administered injections for Baker’s
pain and prescribed other medications, including Hydrocodone,
Tizanidine, and Tramadol. Baker testified that by the time he began
seeing Dr. Hansen, he had realized his back injury would affect his job
performance and his life in general. On April 1, Baker underwent a
radiofrequency denervation procedure, causing him to miss work for the
first time since the incident on May 23, 2010. Bridgestone paid for this
medical treatment provided by Dr. Hansen but did not pay Baker wages
or compensation benefits for the five days of missed work. In July 2011,
Dr. Troll again advised Baker to “work at his own pace.” Dr. Hansen
provided treatment for Baker through May 2012.
On May 23, 2012, Bridgestone notified Baker that it would no
longer pay for his medical care, as it believed the two-year statute of
limitations for workers’ compensation benefits had expired. At that time,
Baker sought treatment from his family doctor, Dr. Davis, to continue his
pain management. Baker paid for this and subsequent medical
treatment through his own health insurance plan.
On June 20, 2012, Baker filed two petitions with the Iowa Workers’
Compensation Commission seeking benefits for his back injury. One
petition alleged an injury date of May 23, 2010; the other petition alleged
a cumulative injury arising on June 19, 2012. The commission
consolidated the petitions for hearing.
After a hearing, a deputy commissioner issued an arbitration
decision ruling that Baker did not sustain a cumulative injury on
June 19, 2012, and that the two-year statute of limitations in Iowa Code
section 85.26 (2009) barred Baker’s claim. The deputy commissioner
found Baker knew or should have known his condition was serious
5
before June 20, 2010 because (1) he reported the injury; (2) he sought
medical treatment by visiting Dr. Troll on May 25; (3) Dr. Troll imposed
“work restrictions” by instructing Baker to work at his own pace;
(4) Baker underwent some physical therapy; and (5) Baker testified his
symptoms never went away after May 23, 2010. However, the deputy
also found “no quarrel” with Baker’s testimony that he did not anticipate
permanent adverse impact on his employment until after June 20, 2010.
Ultimately, the deputy concluded these facts actually did not matter
because the discovery rule only applied to cumulative injuries and Baker
did not prove a cumulative injury.
Baker filed an intra-agency appeal. The commissioner’s appeal
decision also determined Baker’s claim was time-barred and concluded
the discovery rule is categorically inapplicable to workers’ compensation
claims arising out of a singular event. The commissioner’s appeal
decision “affirm[ed] and adopt[ed]” the deputy’s arbitration decision
except for new analysis “on the issue of the discovery rule in traumatic
injury claims.” The commissioner’s appeal decision acknowledged that
“traumatic injuries commonly fail to be instantly disabling or otherwise
have an immediate significant impact on employment,” but nonetheless
affirmed the deputy’s reliance on Clark v. City of Spencer, Iowa Workers’
Comp. Comm’n No. 5017329, 2007 WL 2707714, as agency precedent
precluding application of the discovery rule in this case.
Baker filed a petition for judicial review in the district court. 2 The
district court reversed the commissioner’s ruling, concluded the
discovery rule can apply to injury claims arising from singular events,
2Baker’s petition for judicial review did not challenge the agency’s determination
that the injury in this case was not a cumulative injury.
6
and remanded to the agency for a determination whether the discovery
rule extended Baker’s time to file to at least June 20, 2012. Bridgestone
appealed, and we retained the appeal.
II. Scope of Review.
The issue we must resolve is whether the discovery rule can be
applied in determining when the period of limitation commences for
workers’ compensation claims arising out of a singular event. “Iowa
Code chapter 17A governs judicial review of the decisions of the workers’
compensation commissioner.” Mycogen Seeds v. Sands, 686 N.W.2d
457, 463 (Iowa 2004). Under Iowa Code section 17A.19 “we are free to
substitute our own interpretation of statutes ‘whose interpretation[s]
ha[ve] not clearly been vested’ in the agency.” Roberts Dairy v. Billick,
861 N.W.2d 814, 817 (Iowa 2015) (quoting Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c)).
The legislature has not expressly granted the commissioner
authority to interpret section 85.26, which prescribes periods of
limitation for workers’ compensation cases. See Iowa Code § 85.26.
Normally, in the absence of an express grant of interpretive authority, we
must determine whether the legislature has nonetheless “clearly vested
the agency with authority to interpret the statutes at issue.” Xenia Rural
Water Dist. v. Vegors, 786 N.W.2d 250, 253 (Iowa 2010). But the
discovery rule question here does not really involve the agency’s
interpretation of the statute; instead, the question is whether the agency
correctly applied the “judicial interpretation that the date of injury
referred to in the statute is the time when the employee discovers the
injury and its probable compensable nature.” Bergen v. Iowa Veterans
Home, 577 N.W.2d 629, 630 (Iowa 1998). Therefore, our review is for
errors at law. See Vachon v. State, 514 N.W.2d 442, 443 (Iowa 1994)
7
(applying the errors-at-law standard in determining whether the district
court correctly applied the discovery rule in a tort action).
III. Analysis.
As we have already noted, the agency’s ruling in this case relied on
its own prior decision in Clark in concluding the discovery rule does not
apply in workers’ compensation cases arising from singular traumatic
events. Of course, the agency’s interpretation of law does not bind the
court. Finch v. Schneider Specialized Carriers, Inc., 700 N.W.2d 328, 332
(Iowa 2005) (per curiam). For reasons explained below, the agency’s
decision in Clark is factually and legally inapposite here.
Section 85.26(1) contains two limitation periods for workers’
compensation cases. A two-year period applies unless “weekly
compensation benefits are paid under section 86.13.” Iowa Code
§ 85.26(1). If—as in Clark—the employer has paid weekly compensation
benefits on a claim, the claimant must file “within three years from the
date of the last payment of weekly compensation benefits.” Id. In such
cases, the limitation period is not measured from the occurrence of the
injury. Bergen, 577 N.W.2d at 630. Because no compensation benefits
were paid to Baker, the commissioner erred in concluding the Clark
case—which involved a different limitations period measured from a
different starting point—controlled the agency’s decision in this case. We
now turn to the question whether the commissioner also erred in
concluding the discovery rule does not apply in workers’ compensation
cases arising from a singular incident.
A. Purpose and Character of Workers’ Compensation. Iowa
first enacted a workers’ compensation system in 1913. 1913 Iowa Acts
ch. 147; Hansen v. State, 249 Iowa 1147, 1150, 91 N.W.2d 555, 556
(1958) (recognizing the 1913 enactment was “[t]he original work[ers’]
8
compensation act” in Iowa). “By 1920 all but eight states had adopted
compensation acts,” and by the mid-1960s, all fifty had. 1 Arthur
Larson et al., Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 2.08, at 2-15 (rev.
ed. 2015) [hereinafter Larson]. “The purpose, intent, and scheme of
work[ers’] compensation legislation is well understood . . . .” Flint v. City
of Eldon, 191 Iowa 845, 847, 183 N.W. 344, 345 (1921). A fundamental
principle undergirding workers’ compensation law is the proposition
that the disability of a work[er] resulting from an injury
arising out of and in the course of his [or her] employment is
a loss that should be borne by the industry itself . . . and not
suffered alone by the work[er] or the employer, depending on
individual fault or negligence.
Tunnicliff v. Bettendorf, 204 Iowa 168, 171, 214 N.W. 516, 517–18 (1927).
To accomplish their purpose, workers’ compensation systems impose a
series of tradeoffs. See Ganske v. Spahn & Rose Lumber Co., 580 N.W.2d
812, 814 (Iowa 1998) (discussing “the quid pro quo rationale underlying”
workers’ compensation); see also Henry v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 982
P.2d 456, 458 (Mont. 1999) (noting workers’ compensation systems are
“premised on a compromise”).
In the grand bargain removing workers’ compensation matters
from the civil justice system, employers receive immunity from
potentially large tort lawsuits and jury verdicts on the condition that they
pay compensation benefits for injuries arising out of and in the course of
employment without regard to fault. See 1913 Iowa Acts ch. 147, § 1(a)
(relieving employers “from other liability for recovery of damages or other
compensation for . . . personal injury”); see also McGarrah v. State
Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 675 P.2d 159, 168 (Or. 1983) (“[E]mployers,
regardless of fault, [must] compensate employe[e]s for injuries arising out
of and in the course of employment.”).
9
The workers’ compensation bargain also requires claimants to
relinquish rights they would otherwise maintain against their employers.
Claimants cede the prospect of pressing tort lawsuits in exchange for a
system designed to provide compensation benefits and medical services
promptly, without protracted and expensive litigation. See Flint, 191
Iowa at 847, 183 N.W. at 345; see also Grinnell Coll. v. Osborn, 751
N.W.2d 396, 400 (Iowa 2008) (“The process sought to establish an
administrative tribunal that would provide for the prompt and efficient
determination and award of compensation to injured workers.”); Morrison
v. Century Eng’g, 434 N.W.2d 874, 877 (Iowa 1989) (“The system is
designed to be essentially nonadversarial. . . . [It] presupposes that all
workers will benefit more if claims are processed routinely and paid
quickly.”); Conrad v. Midwest Coal Co., 231 Iowa 53, 64, 300 N.W. 721,
727 (1941) (noting the workers’ compensation system “was adopted by
our legislature as a means of avoiding lengthy litigation that might grow
out of industrial accidents”).
Larson explains the essence and mutual benefit of these tradeoffs:
[N]egligence and fault are largely immaterial, both in the
sense that the employee’s contributory negligence does not
lessen his or her rights and in the sense that the employer’s
complete freedom from fault does not lessen its liability
. . . [.] [T]he employee and his or her dependents, in
exchange for [some] modest but assured benefits, give up
their common-law right to sue the employer for damages for
any injury covered by the act[.]
1 Larson § 1.01, at 1-2 to -3; accord Harned v. Farmland Foods, Inc., 331
N.W.2d 98, 100 (Iowa 1983) (“The legislature has plainly tried . . . to
protect employers from facing tort suits brought by injured employees. It
should certainly not be necessary to repeat here that this protection is in
exchange for advantages to employees . . . .”); Mitchell v. Phillips Mining
Co., 181 Iowa 600, 607, 165 N.W. 108, 110 (1917) (acknowledging the
10
purpose of workers’ compensation was to allow employers to “escape the
evils of personal injury litigation” yet provide employees with “reasonable
compensation for injuries received in their employment”); Henry, 982
P.2d at 458 (“[W]orkers g[i]ve up their right to sue employers in tort for
work-related injuries in exchange for a guaranteed compensation
system.”); Meadows v. Lewis, 307 S.E.2d 625, 638 (W. Va. 1983) (“The
benefits of this system accrue both to the employer, who is relieved from
common-law tort liability . . . , and to the employee, who is assured
prompt payment of benefits.”). “[U]nlike tort, the right to benefits and
[the] amount of benefits are based largely on a social theory of providing
support and preventing destitution, rather than settling accounts
between two individuals according to their personal deserts or blame.” 1
Larson § 1.02, at 1-3.
The workers’ compensation system establishes a relationship
between injured employees and their employers that is notably different
from the relationship between plaintiffs and defendants litigating at
arm’s length in personal injury cases. See Morrison, 434 N.W.2d at 877
(noting the workers’ compensation system is intended to be
nonadversarial); cf. Meadows, 307 S.E.2d at 638 (“[C]haracterization of
workers’ compensation proceedings as ‘adversarial’ is not consistent with
the purpose of the . . . Act.”). One stark illustration of the difference is
employers’ obligation to promptly furnish reasonable medical services for
the care of their employees’ work-related injuries. Iowa Code § 85.27(1),
(4). Employers promptly furnishing such medical services for their
injured workers are entitled to choose the physician who will perform the
services. Id. § 85.27(4). In promptly furnishing reasonable medical care
to injured employees under chapter 85, employers are empowered to
substitute their judgment for that of their injured employees on the
11
important question of which medical professionals are best suited to
diagnose and treat work-related injuries. 3 Tortfeasors have no corollary
control over the selection of their victims’ medical providers.
The unique relationship between employers and their injured
workers in our workers’ compensation system is further evidenced by the
employer’s obligation to pay compensation benefits in the correct amount
promptly when they are owed to injured employees. A statutory
provision promotes voluntary compliance with this obligation by
authorizing an award of additional benefits “up to fifty percent of the
amount of benefits that were denied, delayed, or terminated without
reasonable or probable cause or excuse.” Id. § 86.13(4)(a). In
furtherance of prompt payment of compensation benefits, the statute
requires employers to reasonably investigate claims. Id. § 86.13(4)(c)(1).
These statutory provisions justify injured employees’ corollary
expectation that compensation benefits for temporary or permanent
disability will be paid to them when they are owed without litigation and
delay.
The unique relationship between employers and their injured
employees under the grand bargain of workers’ compensation also
animates a rule of statutory interpretation deeply embedded throughout
our caselaw. We liberally construe workers’ compensation statutes in
3Of course, employers’ authority to choose the medical providers who will
diagnose and treat injured workers is not boundless. If an employee believes the
medical care provided by the employer is not offered promptly or is not reasonably
suited to treat an injury, the employee may file a petition for alternate care. Iowa Code
§ 85.27(4).
12
claimants’ favor to effectuate the statute’s humanitarian and beneficent
purpose. 4
The ultimate takeaway is this: “[T]ort litigation is an adversary
contest to right a wrong between the contestants; workers’ compensation
is a system, not a contest, to supply security to injured workers . . . .” 1
Larson § 1.03[7], at 1-13. This characterization is just as true today as it
was when Iowa first established its workers’ compensation system. See
P.D.S.I. v. Peterson, 685 N.W.2d 627, 635 (Iowa 2004) (concluding a fault-
based interpretation of statutes “has no place in workers’ compensation
law”); cf. Marovec v. PMX Indus., 693 N.W.2d 779, 787 (Iowa 2005)
(concluding language from Flint describing the purpose of workers’
compensation is just as true now as it was then). With this
understanding of the obligations and expectations of the parties in
workers’ compensation cases, we now turn to section 85.26, our caselaw,
and the particular circumstances of this case.
B. Iowa Law Through 1980. “Prior to the . . . Fortieth General
Assembly (extra session), there was no statute of limitations applicable to
claims arising under the Work[ers’] Compensation Law.” Hinrichs v.
Davenport Locomotive Works, 203 Iowa 1395, 1398, 214 N.W. 585, 586
(1927); see H.F. 42, § 23-a1, 40th Ex. G.A. (Iowa 1924). But beginning
with the 1924 Iowa Code, the statute required workers’ compensation
4The cases in which we have acknowledged this principle are numerous and we
will therefore not provide an exhaustive list. However, we have applied it repeatedly,
beginning shortly after the legislature enacted Iowa’s first workers’ compensation
system. See, e.g., Denison Mun. Utils. v. Iowa Workers’ Comp. Comm’r, 857 N.W.2d 230,
234–35 (Iowa 2014); Dillinger v. City of Sioux City, 368 N.W.2d 176, 180 (Iowa 1985);
Usgaard v. Silver Crest Golf Club, 256 Iowa 453, 459, 127 N.W.2d 636, 639 (1964);
Heiliger v. City of Sheldon, 236 Iowa 146, 152, 18 N.W.2d 182, 186 (1945); Walker v.
Speeder Mach. Corp., 213 Iowa 1134, 1143, 240 N.W. 725, 729 (1932); Bidwell Coal Co.
v. Davidson, 187 Iowa 809, 818, 174 N.W. 592, 595 (1919).
13
claimants to commence proceedings within “two years from the date of
the injury causing . . . death or disability.” Iowa Code § 1386 (1924).
Our first major case examining the interplay between the workers’
compensation statute of limitations and a singular traumatic event was
Otis v. Parrott, 233 Iowa 1039, 8 N.W.2d 708 (1943). In January 1939, a
truck driver sustained several injuries in a highway accident. Id. at
1040, 8 N.W.2d at 710. Two months later, he developed tuberculosis.
Id. at 1041, 8 N.W.2d at 710. After tuberculosis took the truck driver’s
life, his surviving spouse filed a workers’ compensation action in
February 1941, more than two years after the highway accident but less
than two years after the tuberculosis became apparent. See id.
We held the action was not timely. See id. Our decision in Otis
focused on the language in the statute at the time requiring proceedings
to begin within two years of “the injury causing . . . death or disability for
which compensation is claimed”:
[T]he legislature has designated the injury it means. It does
not mean the compensable injury or the state of facts or
conditions which first entitle the claimant to compensation.
It is the causal injury without reference to whether it is
compensable or not. With this description of the word
“injury,” we cannot arrive at a conclusion that the “resultant
injury” was meant by the legislature. In all compensation
cases there may be two injuries. The first injury, without
which there can be no compensation case, is synonymous
with accident. This may be serious or it may be trivial. It
may result in immediate disability or death, or it may not
result in disability or death for a long time. If this first injury
or accident is trivial, then there may be a second injury
which occurs when the disability arises. This is the
resultant injury. It is caused by the first injury. If the
legislature, by using the single word “injury”, allows the
courts to speculate on which injury was intended, the courts
can upon reason and authority arrive at a conclusion that
the second or resultant injury was meant. When, however,
the legislature specifies that the causal injury will control,
then the court is bound by the words of the statute.
14
Id. at 1042–43, 8 N.W.2d at 711; see Iowa Code § 1386 (1939). We
concluded the statute measured the limitations period from the date of
the singular event, “without reference to the exigencies which arise from
a trivial injury that later causes a compensable injury.” Otis, 233 Iowa at
1043, 8 N.W.2d at 711.
In 1969, we considered another case in which the claimant based
his claim for benefits on a singular traumatic event. Mousel v.
Bituminous Material & Supply Co., 169 N.W.2d 763, 764–65 (1969).
While blacktopping roads in 1958, Mousel “received thermal burns about
his face, neck, wrists and arms” when heated oil splattered him. Id. at
764. “He told his foreman about the burns but kept on working and saw
no physician, nor was he asked to . . . .” Id. Almost eight years after his
employment ended, Mousel saw a dermatologist who found the burns
had caused lesions, and the lesions had ulcerated and become
cancerous. Id. A deputy commissioner awarded benefits, but the
commissioner’s appeal decision “dismissed the claim as not timely filed,”
and the district court affirmed. Id. Applying the Otis rule, we also
concluded Mousel’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits was
untimely. Id. at 767.
A few years after Mousel was decided, however, the legislature
enacted new language in the statute of limitations for workers’
compensation claims. See 1977 Iowa Acts ch. 51, § 2 (codified at Iowa
Code § 85.26 (1979)) (providing claims for workers’ compensation
benefits must be “commenced within two years from the date of the
occurrence of the injury for which benefits are claimed,” or if weekly
15
compensation benefits were paid under section 86.13, “within three
years from the date of the last payment of weekly benefits”). 5
In 1980, we considered the amendment for the first time and
concluded the discovery rule is generally available under section 85.26.
Orr v. Lewis Cent. Sch. Dist., 298 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Iowa 1980). In Orr,
the claimant “was struck on the back of the neck by a falling plank” in
May 1975. Id. at 257. However, he did not file for workers’
compensation benefits until 1978. Id. Orr contended his action was
timely because he was seeking benefits for headaches and, “despite
reasonable diligence, he was unable to determine the headaches were
caused by the May 1975 incident until September 1977.” Id.
We acknowledged the Otis rule in Orr. See id. at 258 (noting that
under Otis, the section 85.26 “limitations period started on the date of
the accident”). We also noted that we had “not been required to
reexamine the holding in Otis since the decision in Mousel.” Id. at 259.
We reasoned that significant developments since Otis—“uncertainty in
the law after . . . Mousel, the general trend toward adoption of the
discovery rule under similar statutes, and the context in which the
[1977] amendment occurred”—led strongly toward making the discovery
rule available under section 85.26. Id. at 260. Ultimately, “[b]ecause the
[1977] amendment removed the language which had been determinative
in Otis,” we concluded “the legislature intended to remove the
uncertainty following Mousel concerning whether the discovery rule was
applicable under section 85.26.” Id. at 260–61. This conclusion was
5The fact that section 85.26 does not refer to the discovery rule is not unusual.
See 11 Larson § 126.05[2], at 126-19 (“The usual [workers’ compensation] statute
merely dates the period from the time of injury . . . , saying nothing about time of
discovery of the nature of the condition.”).
16
consistent with the proposition that “[c]ourts do not favor statutes of
limitations. When two interpretations of a limitations statute are
possible, the one giving the longer period to a litigant seeking relief is to
be preferred and applied.” Id. at 261. Accordingly, we overruled Otis.
Id.
C. Application of the Discovery Rule Since 1980. Orr
established that for discovery rule purposes, the statute of limitations on
a workers’ compensation claim does not begin to run until the claimant
knows or should recognize the nature, seriousness, and probable
compensable character of his or her injury. See id. at 257. We have
applied this rule in several cases involving cumulative injuries or
occupational diseases that developed over time. See, e.g., Herrera v. IBP,
Inc., 633 N.W.2d 284, 288 (Iowa 2001); Ranney v. Parawax Co., 582
N.W.2d 152, 154–55 (Iowa 1998); McKeever Custom Cabinets v. Smith,
379 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Iowa 1985). A cumulative injury is deemed to
have occurred when it manifests—and “manifestation” is that point in
time when “both the fact of the injury and the causal relationship of the
injury to the claimant’s employment would have become plainly apparent
to a reasonable person.” Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. v. Tasler, 483 N.W.2d
824, 829 (Iowa 1992) (quoting Peoria Cty. Belwood Nursing Home v.
Indus. Comm’n, 505 N.E.2d 1026, 1029 (Ill. 1987)). In such cases, “[t]he
preferred analysis is to first determine the date the injury is deemed to
have occurred . . . , and then to examine whether the statutory
[limitations] period commenced on that date or whether it commenced
upon a later date based upon application of the discovery rule.” Herrera,
633 N.W.2d at 288.
This case, however, does not involve a cumulative injury or
occupational disease. Rather, Baker suffered some pain immediately
17
from an identifiable singular event on May 23, 2010, but claims he was
not aware of the nature, seriousness, or probable compensable character
of his injury until at least June 20, 2010. Bridgestone contends, and the
commissioner concluded, that the limitations period for Baker’s claim
expired on May 23, 2012, because the discovery rule has no application
in such a case. We disagree with Bridgestone and the commissioner.
We have applied the discovery rule in several singular event cases
since Orr. For example, in Dillinger v. City of Sioux City, the claimant fell
into a pit and injured his back in October 1975 when a ladder gave way.
368 N.W.2d 176, 179 (Iowa 1985). He notified his employer of the
incident but continued to work and did not immediately seek medical
treatment. See id. at 178–79. Dillinger kept working for a year and a
half “until the pain forced him to terminate his employment.” Id. at 179.
He filed for workers’ compensation benefits in April 1978, about two
years and six months after the work-related traumatic incident. See id.
He contended he had timely filed the claim because he did not know his
back injury was serious until he had surgery to remove a herniated disc
in December 1977 and his physician opined the 1975 fall was a causal
factor. See id. at 178–79. We concluded substantial evidence supported
the agency’s conclusion—which was unquestionably based on the
discovery rule—that the action was timely. Id. at 182. Although
Dillinger knew he injured his back when he fell, he continued to work
despite his pain for several months after the traumatic incident.
Substantial evidence supported the commissioner’s finding that Dillinger
did not know until later about the seriousness of his injury or its
potentially permanent effect on his ability to work. See id.
In Herrera, we further explicated the meaning of the “seriousness”
component of the discovery rule in the workers’ compensation context.
18
We concluded the limitations period does not commence “until the
employee . . . knows that the physical condition is serious enough to
have a permanent adverse impact on the claimant’s employment or
employability.” Herrera, 633 N.W.2d at 288. We have since repeated this
formulation. Larson Mfg. Co. v. Thorson, 763 N.W.2d 842, 854–55 (Iowa
2009); Midwest Ambulance Serv. v. Ruud, 754 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Iowa
2008). In Larson, we reaffirmed that the phrase “permanent adverse
impact” provides an abbreviated or alternative characterization of the
three elements of the discovery rule test: nature, seriousness, and
probable compensable character of the injury. See Larson Mfg., 763
N.W.2d at 855. (connecting “permanent adverse impact” with the three-
element test using the abbreviation “i.e.,” meaning “in other words”).
Bridgestone contends our decision in Swartzendruber v. Schimmel,
613 N.W.2d 646 (Iowa 2000), stands for the proposition that the
discovery rule has no application in claims based upon a singular
traumatic incident. In Swartzendruber, the claimant worked a full day
stocking shelves at a grocery store but experienced pain in his hip and
back by the time the work shift ended. Id. at 648. He awoke the next
morning and could barely walk, with even more intense pain in his back
and hip. Id. He promptly went to a hospital emergency room. Id. X-
rays taken at that time revealed Swartzendruber’s prosthetic hip was
loose. Id. After seeing an orthopedic physician who recommended
surgery, he never worked at the grocery store again. Id. He filed a
workers’ compensation proceeding two years and four days after the
onset of hip pain—and two years and three days after x-rays revealed the
hip joint defect—but less than two years after consulting the orthopedist
who recommended surgery. See id. at 649.
19
Our decision in Swartzendruber discussed the analytical
framework for cases presenting pure latent injuries and distinguished it
from the framework controlling personal injury cases in which traumatic
events cause latent manifestation of injuries. Id. at 650; see LeBeau v.
Dimig, 446 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Iowa 1989). We then stated that under the
latter framework, “the statute of limitations begins to run from the initial
injury, not when the injury is later discovered. The discovery rule is
actually applied . . . only to the first injury in ‘traumatic event/latent
manifestation’ cases.” Swartzendruber, 613 N.W.2d at 650 (citation
omitted).
Bridgestone contends Swartzendruber stands for the proposition
that the discovery rule does not apply if the claimant’s injury arises from
a single traumatic event. This contention flows from a misunderstanding
of Swartzendruber, however, because we applied the discovery rule
analysis in that case and concluded the rule did not save
Swartzendruber’s claim. Id. at 650–51. Our analysis in Swartzendruber
focused specifically on the seriousness component of the rule:
The seriousness component of the discovery rule exists
so that “every minor ache, pain, or symptom” does not begin
the statute of limitations. Thus, the failure to file a claim
within two years of the occurrence of the injury may be
excused if the claimant had no reason to believe the
condition was serious. If the injury is trivial or minor, or the
symptoms indicate no serious trouble, the seriousness
component is not met.
Id. at 650 (citations omitted) (quoting 2B Arthur Larson, Workers’
Compensation § 78.41(e), at 15-279 (1994)). We refrained in
Swartzendruber “from pinpointing any specific event to establish the
seriousness of an injury, such as going to a physician or missing work.”
Id. at 651. We further noted a “reasonable worker would not necessarily
20
be charged with knowledge of a compensable injury after experiencing
back or hip pain following work which required bending.” Id.
Just as not every ache, pain, or symptom is immediately known to
be compensable, not every ache, pain, or symptom will satisfy the
seriousness component of the discovery rule. See id. at 650. Consistent
with our more recent decision in Herrera, not every ache, pain, or
symptom will be understood as possibly suggesting a permanent adverse
impact on a claimant’s health or physical capacity for employment.
Herrera, 633 N.W.2d at 288.
Our conclusion that the discovery rule could not save
Swartzendruber’s claim was based on the uncontroverted fact that an
emergency room physician diagnosed Swartzendruber’s loose prosthetic
hip the morning after the onset of severe hip and back pain and referred
him to an orthopedic specialist. Swartzendruber, 613 N.W.2d at 651.
Because Swartzendruber did not file his claim within two years of the
medical diagnosis of the serious hip joint defect and referral to the
specialist, we concluded his claim was time-barred as a matter of law.
Id.
However, the determination “of the question of what constitutes
recognition of the seriousness of an injury or disease is a fact specific
inquiry.” Id. The facts in the case now before the court are
distinguishable from those in Swartzendruber. Baker’s condition was
viewed as a minor muscle strain when Dr. Troll, the plant doctor,
examined him on May 25 and at the time of follow-up appointments in
July and September. Dr. Troll initially prescribed only over-the-counter
medications for pain and advised Baker to perform stretching exercises
during the several weeks after the incident. Additionally, Baker missed
no work and continued to perform his regular job duties at his own pace
21
without specific lifting limitations for several months after the May 23
incident. Unlike the claimant in Swartzendruber, Baker was not
immediately referred to a specialist. The record reveals instead that
Dr. Troll ordered no prescription medication, x-rays, or diagnostic scans
for Baker until December 2010. Although none of these facts are
dispositive on the issue of seriousness, when taken together with the
other evidence in this record they clearly distinguish this case from
Swartzendruber and preclude a summary resolution of the limitations
issue.
D. Synthesis. Whether a work-related injury arises cumulatively
because of repetitive trauma or from a singular traumatic event, the
agency must apply the discovery rule when it is properly raised and
substantial evidence supports it. In cumulative injury cases, the agency
applies the rule by deciding “whether the statutory period commenced on
[the manifestation] date or whether it commenced upon a later date.”
Herrera, 633 N.W.2d at 288. In cases alleging injuries arising from a
singular event, the agency must apply the rule in deciding whether the
limitation period commenced on the date of the singular event or at some
later time. If the claimant did not know—or did not have knowledge of
facts sufficient to trigger a duty to investigate—“the nature, seriousness[,]
and probable compensable character” of their injury, Orr, 298 N.W.2d at
261, the discovery rule tolls the limitation period until the claimant gains
that knowledge. The fact an initial accident is traumatic does not
necessarily provide immediate notice of seriousness or compensability.
See Ga. Pac. Corp. v. Taplin, 586 So. 2d 823, 827 (Miss. 1991).
As we have explained, claimants and employers have a unique
cooperative relationship in the workers’ compensation context that has
no counterpart in the tort arena. The discovery rule promotes that
22
relationship because it decreases the likelihood that workers’
compensation proceedings will be filed before the nature, seriousness,
and probable compensability of claims are known—especially during
periods when employers are interacting cooperatively with claimants and
providing them with appropriate medical services in the aftermath of a
work-related injury that is not perceived as serious. Cf. Vossoughi v.
Polaschek, 859 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Iowa 2015) (concluding a person with a
possible legal malpractice claim should not have to initiate suit and
sabotage an ongoing cooperative attorney–client relationship when the
person’s injury is only speculative).
Courts in several other jurisdictions have applied the discovery
rule under circumstances analogous to those presented here, often
noting an onset of back pain does not necessarily indicate a serious
injury. See, e.g., Freeman v. Tiffany Stand & Furniture, 726 S.W.2d 294,
295–96 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding a claimant did not know the
extent of his lumbar injury for statute-of-limitations purposes when the
pain was manageable with aspirin and he kept working); Sevin v.
Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 652 So. 2d 1323, 1324, 1327 (La.
1995) (concluding a claim was timely when the initial treatment involved
only rest, physical therapy, and medication, but the claimant continued
experiencing pain and later returned to the doctor); Loud v. Dixie Metal
Co., 475 So. 2d 122, 124–25 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting an employer’s
contention that “since [the claimant] suffered immediate pain, he was
aware of his compensation claim sufficiently” to commence the
limitations period); Williams v. Dobberstein, 157 N.W.2d 776, 778 (Neb.
1968) (rejecting “the defendants’ position that since the [claimant] knew
that he had an accident, and had pain which he associated with the
accident[,] . . . the statute of limitations began to run on the date of the
23
accident”); Montgomery v. Milldale Farm & Live Stock Improvement Co.,
246 N.W. 734, 735 (Neb. 1933) (concluding a claim was not time-barred
when the claimant initially “relied . . . upon the advice of his physicians
that his injuries were muscular and temporary” rather than serious and
permanent); White v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 441 N.W.2d 908, 911
(N.D. 1989) (“[W]e disagree with the Bureau’s argument that White’s
claim is barred because he knew the origin of his back pain was the fall
and because he sought medical attention for his back.”); Burcham v.
Carbide & Carbon Chems. Corp., 221 S.W.2d 888, 892 (Tenn. 1949)
(ascribing significance to the company doctor’s initial and minimal
diagnosis); Teague v. Tex. Emp’rs’ Ins. Ass’n, 368 S.W.2d 643, 644–45
(Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (“We . . . cannot find that [claim]ant had any
symptoms other than constant pain to warn him that he might have
been injured in a manner other than the trivial injury first reported to
him by the doctor . . . .”).
The commissioner erred in concluding the discovery rule has no
application in this case. Under the circumstances presented here, we
conclude the district court correctly ordered a remand for the agency’s
application of the discovery rule. 6 We therefore affirm the district court’s
decision. On remand before the commissioner, Baker must “meet his
burden . . . to prove a factual basis for application of the rule.” Orr, 298
N.W.2d at 262.
6Although the deputy’s arbitration decision included a finding that Baker
understood the seriousness of his injury before June 20, 2010, the deputy also found
no quarrel with Baker’s testimony that he was unaware of the possibility that his injury
would have a permanent impact on his employment until the summer or fall of that
year. Given these findings and the record evidence detailed above, we are unable to
conclude the final agency action provides a basis for reversing the district court’s
decision and affirming the agency’s decision on the alternative ground that application
of the discovery rule would have produced the same result as a matter of law.
24
IV. Conclusion.
Whether a work-related injury arises because of a single event or
develops cumulatively over time, the discovery rule applies in
determining whether a workers’ compensation claim has been filed
within two years after the occurrence of the injury under section 85.26(1)
(2009). That limitation period does not begin to run until the claimant
knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should know “the
nature, seriousness[,] and probable compensable character” of his or her
injury. Id. at 261. Because the district court reached the same
conclusion, we affirm its judgment and remand to the district court with
instructions to remand this matter to the commissioner for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED.