UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4309
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DAMON KEYON JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:97-cr-00178-NCT-1)
Submitted: December 18, 2015 Decided: December 23, 2015
Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William S. Trivette, WILLIAM S. TRIVETTE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United
States Attorney, Harry L. Hobgood, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Damon Keyon Jones appeals from the district court’s amended
judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to
48 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Jones argues that this
sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
This court will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation
of supervised release “if it is within the statutory maximum and
is not ‘plainly unreasonable.’” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d
638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006)). When reviewing whether a
revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first assess the
sentence for unreasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the
procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our
review of original sentences.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438.
A supervised release revocation sentence is procedurally
reasonable if the district court considers the Sentencing
Guidelines’ Chapter Seven advisory policy statement range and
explains the sentence adequately after considering the policy
statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors it is
permitted to consider in a supervised release revocation case.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.
A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the
district court states a proper basis for concluding the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the
2
statutory maximum. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a
sentence is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable
will we “then decide whether the sentence is plainly
unreasonable.” Id. at 439 (emphasis omitted). A sentence is
plainly unreasonable if it is clearly or obviously unreasonable.
Id.
Jones contends that his 48-month revocation sentence is
substantively unreasonable because the district court did not
consider certain mitigating factors proffered in support of a
sentence within the advisory policy statement ranges of 12 to
18 months’ imprisonment and imposed the revocation sentence to
punish him for his conduct violating supervised release rather
than for his breach of trust. Contrary to Jones’ assertion,
however, the record makes clear that the district court heard
his arguments in mitigation at the revocation hearing but
rejected them in light of the nature and circumstances of his
violative behavior, his history and characteristics, and the
need for the revocation sentence to sanction his breach of trust
on release, all factors the court was permitted to consider in
imposing a revocation sentence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1),
3583(e); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A,
introductory cmt. 3(b) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2015) (“[A]t
revocation the [district] court should sanction primarily the
defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to a
3
limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and
the criminal history of the violator.”). We therefore conclude
that the revocation sentence is not substantively unreasonable
and affirm the district court’s amended judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4