J-A28045-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: H.L-R, A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
APPEAL OF: T.L., FOSTER PARENT,
Appellant No. 100 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Orders Entered November 20, 2014 and December 17,
2014, In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000572-2012, FID: 51FN-001046-
2012
IN THE INTEREST OF: H.L-R, A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: T.L., FOSTER PARENT,
Appellant No. 102 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Orders Entered November 20, 2014 and December 17,
2014, In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000573-2012, FID: 51FN-001046-
2012
IN THE INTEREST OF: H.L-R, A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: T.L., FOSTER PARENT,
Appellant No. 104 EDA 2015
J-A28045-15
Appeal from the Orders Entered November 20, 2014 and December 17,
2014, In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000599-2012, FID: 51FN-001046-
2012
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, and SHOGAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 23, 2015
In these consolidated appeals, Appellant, foster parent T.L. (“T.L.”),
appeals from three orders entered on November 20, 2014, that removed
three children (“the Children”), each of whom have the initials “H.L-R,” from
her home. In addition, T.L. appeals from three orders entered on
December 17, 2014, that denied her petitions to intervene in these
dependency cases. After careful review, we affirm the December 17, 2014
orders that denied T.L.’s petitions to intervene, and we quash the appeals
from the November 20, 2014 orders due to lack of standing.
In April of 2012, the trial court ordered the Department of Human
Services (“D.H.S.”) to take custody of H.L-R 1, who was born in March of
2011,1 and twins H.L-R 2 and H.L-R 3, who were born in February of 2012.
All of the Children were adjudicated dependent, and they were placed in
foster care with T.L.
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1
Sadly, we are constrained to note that on September 8, 2015, this Court
was notified that H.L-R 1 had died.
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On December 23, 2013, D.H.S. filed petitions to change the Children’s
permanency goal to adoption and to have the Children’s biological parents’
parental rights involuntarily terminated. On May 13, 2014, the trial court
granted the petitions. The Children remained in foster care with T.L.
However, following reports that T.L.’s mother was abusing the Children, the
child advocate requested that the trial court remove the Children from T.L.’s
home. The trial court scheduled a hearing on the child advocate’s motion.
T.L. was provided notice of the hearing and her right to be heard on
October 31, 2014.
The hearing was held on November 20, 2014. The testimony revealed
that there was suspected abuse of the Children by T.L.’s mother, the
Children had medical and emotional difficulties for which they were not
receiving proper care, and the Children’s needs were not met while living in
T.L.’s home. T.L. attended the November 20, 2014 hearing, but she did not
testify. The trial court concluded that the witnesses’ testimony supported
the immediate removal of the Children from T.L.’s home. 2 N.T., 11/20/14,
at 110-114.
On November 25, 2014, T.L. filed petitions to intervene in the
dependency proceedings. In her petitions, T.L. averred that she had a right
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2
In addition to the Children, there were two other minors in foster care at
T.L.’s home. The record reflects that all five children were removed from the
home. N.T., 11/20/14, at 114.
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to be heard as a foster parent pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6336.1(a);
alternatively, she claims that she had standing to intervene because she was
a preadoptive parent. On December 17, 2014, the trial court held a hearing
on T.L.’s petitions, determined that T.L. lacked standing, and denied T.L.’s
petitions. N.T., 12/17/14, at 39.
On December 19, 2014, T.L. filed her notices of appeal and concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On appeal, T.L. raises the following issues for this
Court’s consideration:
1. Did the Trial Court err in denying standing to [T.L.], a
prospective adoptive parent, in the proceeding in which her
prospective adoptive children were removed from her care?
2. Did the Trial Court err in denying [T.L.] her 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6336.1 statutory right to be heard in violation of procedural
due process at a dependency hearing?
3. Did the Trial Court err in finding, against the
recommendation of DHS, that it was in the [C]hildren’s best
interest to be removed from Appellant’s home, where they had
resided and thrived for the majority of their lives?
T.L.’s Brief at 4.
We begin by setting forth our standard of review. Questions regarding
standing to participate in dependency proceedings are questions of law; this
Court’s scope of review is plenary, and our standard of review is de novo.
In re S.H.J., 78 A.3d 1158, 1159 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
In S.H.J., this Court explained that party status in dependency
proceedings is limited to three classes of persons: (1) the parents of the
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juvenile whose dependency is at issue; (2) the legal custodian of the
juvenile whose dependency is at issue; or (3) the person whose care and
control of the juvenile is in question.3 Id. at 1160-1161 (citing In the
Interest of L.C., II, 900 A.2d 378, 381 (Pa. Super. 2006)). These three
categories logically stem from the fact that after an adjudication of
dependency, the trial court has the authority to remove a child from the
custody of his or her parents or legal custodian. Id. (citing L.C., II, 900
A.2d at 381). Because the appellant in S.H.J. did not fall into one of the
specified categories, this Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of standing
and reiterated that foster parents and persons acting in loco parentis lack
standing to intervene in dependency proceedings. S.H.J., at 1161-1163.
Nonetheless, T.L. also argues that she has standing as a prospective
adoptive parent pursuant to In re Griffin, 690 A.2d 1192 (Pa. Super.
1997). T.L.’s Brief at 10. We disagree. In Griffin, the children were
removed from a preadoptive foster family. Id. at 1199. The Griffin Court,
under the unique facts of that case, concluded that the preadoptive foster
parents, who were originally foster parents, had standing to challenge the
children’s removal from their home. Id. at 1101-1202. However, in the
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3
Foster parents do not fall into these three classes. In re J.S., 980 A.2d
117, 122 (Pa. Super. 2009); see also In re C.R., 111 A.3d 179, 185 n.3
(Pa. Super. 2015) (noting that foster parents could not stand in loco parentis
because their status as foster parents was subordinate to the County
Children & Youth Services Agency, which maintained legal custody and was
primarily responsible for the child’s care and custody).
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case at bar, which is a dependency proceeding and not an adoption
proceeding,4 T.L. was and remained a foster parent. There was no adoption
petition, adoptive placement agreement, or other indication, aside from her
unsupported assertion, that T.L. was a preadoptive parent as contemplated
by the holding in Griffin.5 Therein, the trial court specifically recognized the
appellants as prospective adoptive parents. Griffin, 690 A.2d at 1201-
1202. Here, there is nothing in the record that altered T.L.’s status from
foster parent to preadoptive parent. T.L.’s alleged intent notwithstanding,
T.L. may not simply label herself a preadoptive parent in an effort to achieve
standing.6
After review, we agree with the trial court that T.L. does not fall into
any of the three enumerated categories that would confer standing to
intervene. Rather, T.L. was a foster parent who was never granted legal
custody of the Children. Therefore, T.L. lacked standing to intervene in the
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4
Similar to the facts underlying S.H.J., herein, the proceedings in the trial
court were pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301 et seq., not the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101 et seq.
5
Counsel for T.L. argued at the December 17, 2014 hearing, that, but for
the removal of the Children on November 20, 2014, the paperwork
necessary to pursue adoption would have been filed. N.T., 12/17/14, at 11.
6
We also note that despite Griffin, and the unique circumstances
presented therein, even if T.L. had established that she was a preadoptive
parent, standing is not automatic. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6336.1(a) (“nothing in
this section shall give the foster parent, preadoptive parent or relative
providing care for the child legal standing in the matter being heard by the
court.”).
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proceedings involving the Children, and we discern no error in the trial
court’s order. See S.H.J., 78 A.3d 1160-1161. Therefore, pursuant to 42
Pa.C.S. § 6336.1, T.L., as a foster parent, had a right only to notice and
opportunity to be heard.
In her second issue, T.L. argues that the trial court erred in denying
her statutory right to be heard in violation of 42 Pa.C.S. § 6336.1. This
claim is belied by the record.
Notice and hearing
(a) General rule.--The court shall direct the county agency or
juvenile probation department to provide the child’s foster
parent, preadoptive parent or relative providing care for the child
with timely notice of the hearing. The court shall provide the
child’s foster parent, preadoptive parent or relative providing
care for the child the right to be heard at any hearing under this
chapter. Unless a foster parent, preadoptive parent or relative
providing care for a child has been awarded legal custody
pursuant to section 6357 (relating to rights and duties of legal
custodian), nothing in this section shall give the foster parent,
preadoptive parent or relative providing care for the child legal
standing in the matter being heard by the court.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6336.1(a).
As we stated above, the record reflects that T.L. was present at the
November 20, 2014 hearing, but she elected not to testify. Thus, she
obviously was provided notice and the opportunity to be heard pursuant to
42 Pa.C.S. § 6336.1(a). Moreover, when the trial judge convened the
December 17, 2014 hearing, he went so far as to open the record in order
for T.L. to be heard, and indeed, T.L. then provided testimony. N.T.,
12/17/14, at 24-39. Hence, not only was T.L. afforded an opportunity to be
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heard, she was heard. Accordingly, T.L.’s allegation that she was denied
her rights under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6336.1(a) is meritless. Additionally,
regardless of T.L.’s testimony, the fact remained that as a foster parent, T.L.
lacked standing to intervene in the proceedings. S.H.J., 78 A.3d 1160-
1161; 42 Pa.C.S. § 6336.1(a).
Finally, T.L. argues that the trial court erred in removing the Children
from her home. However, because we have concluded that T.L. lacks
standing in this matter, we are faced with a question of whether T.L. was a
proper party to appeal the order removing the Children from her home.
The Pennsylvania Code provides as follows:
Foster parent appeal of child relocation.
(a) Foster parents may appeal the relocation of a child from the
foster family except under one of the following conditions:
(1) The child has been with the foster family less
than 6 months.
(2) The removal is initiated by the court.
(3) The removal is to return the child to his parents.
(4) The removal is to place the child for adoption.
(5) An investigation of a report of alleged child
abuse indicates the need for protective custody
removal to protect the child from further serious
physical or mental injury, sexual abuse or serious
physical neglect as defined in Chapter 3490 (relating
to protective services).
55 Pa.Code § 3700.73(a).
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While this Court is cognizant that Section 3700.73(a) concerns
administrative appeals, it is clear that in cases such as this, where the
removal is initiated by the court, the foster parent cannot pursue an
administrative appeal. 55 Pa.Code § 3700.73(a)(2). Additionally, T.L. has
not identified a basis upon which she was permitted to pursue her appeal of
the removal of the Children through the courts. The Pennsylvania Rules of
Appellate Procedure set forth who may appeal as follows:
Any Aggrieved Party May Appeal
Except where the right of appeal is enlarged by statute, any
party who is aggrieved by an appealable order, or a fiduciary
whose estate or trust is so aggrieved, may appeal therefrom.
Pa.R.A.P. 501.
Here, T.L. cannot be considered an aggrieved party because, as we
explained in our discussion of S.H.J., she is not a party. Rather, in
dependency proceedings, a Child Advocate is designated as the party to
protect the child’s best interests before the court. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6337 and
see generally In re L.J., 691 A.2d 520, 527 (Pa. Super. 1997) (discussing
standing to appeal). Accordingly, we conclude that T.L.’s appeals from the
November 20, 2014 order removing the Children from her home were
improper as she lacked standing.
For the reasons set forth above, we discern no abuse of discretion or
error of law in the trial court’s orders entered on December 17, 2014.
Moreover, because we conclude that T.L. was not a party to the proceedings
in the trial court, the appeals from the orders entered on November 20,
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2014, are quashed. See C.R., at 180 (quashing foster mother’s appeal for
lack of standing).
December 17, 2014 orders affirmed. Appeals from the November 20,
2014 orders quashed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/23/2015
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