In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15‐1928
MICHAEL L. THOMPSON,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
WILLIAM HOLM, et al.,
Defendants‐Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 13‐CV‐930 — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.
____________________
SUBMITTED DECEMBER 4, 2015*— DECIDED JANUARY 4, 2016
____________________
Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Michael Thompson, a Muslim in‐
mate incarcerated at Waupun Correctional Institution in
Wisconsin, sued members of the prison staff for violating his
right under the First Amendment to exercise his religion
* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that
oral argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs
and the record. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
2 No. 15‐1928
freely. The violation occurred, Thompson says, when for two
days prison staff prevented him from fasting properly dur‐
ing Ramadan. The district court granted the defendants’ mo‐
tion for summary judgment. Because Thompson presented
evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that the
defendants violated his free exercise rights, we vacate the
judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
we recount the facts in the light most favorable to Thomp‐
son, the nonmoving party. See Tradesman Int’l, Inc. v. Black,
724 F.3d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir. 2013). A central religious prac‐
tice of the Islamic faith is a sunrise‐to‐sunset fast during the
month of Ramadan. The prison normally accommodates this
practice by providing Ramadan “meal bags” at sunset to
each Muslim prisoner listed as eligible. The prison’s chaplain
determines eligibility. Each Ramadan meal bag contains two
meals: the post‐sunset dinner and the next morning’s pre‐
sunrise breakfast. A prisoner who eats at the prison cafeteria
during Ramadan forfeits his right to the meal bags for the
rest of the month‐long fast. Thompson, a practicing Muslim,
began fasting for Ramadan after sunrise on August 11,
2010—the first day of Ramadan. He received his daily meal
bags until August 21, about one‐third into the month.
The events leading up to the interruption of his meal
bags on August 21 are disputed. Thompson says that shortly
before August 21, as he was on his way back to his cell,
Randall Lashock, a prison guard, handed him a meal bag.
When Thompson arrived at his cell, he found that a guard
had already left a meal bag for him there. Thompson could
not leave his cell to return the extra bag without risking a
conduct violation, so he left one of the two bags unopened
No. 15‐1928 3
for Lashock to retrieve. Lashock asserts that when he later
retrieved that extra meal bag from Thompson’s cell, he found
Thompson eating from both bags.
Thompson received no meal bags on August 21 and 22.
Lashock was supposed to deliver the Ramadan meal bags to
every prisoner on the eligibility list. But on those two days,
Lashock brought Thompson nothing, even though, some ev‐
idence suggests, he remained on the list. Receiving no meals,
and learning from Sergeants Bruce Bleich and Matthew Lar‐
son when he complained to them that he would have to go
to the cafeteria if he wanted to eat, Thompson felt pressure
to break his fast by going to the cafeteria. But he knew that
under the prison’s policy he could not do that without for‐
feiting meal bags for the rest of the month‐long fast. He also
had hunger pangs and felt tired and unwell. Because of his
hunger, exhaustion, and anxiety, he missed one of his morn‐
ing prayers and did not properly experience Ramadan,
which is meant to be a time of peace and focus.
The reason that Lashock kept the meal bags from
Thompson is also contested. Lashock told Thompson that his
name was removed from the eligibility list because he had
stolen the extra bag; Lashock swears that he wrote a conduct
report accusing Thompson of the theft. But the defendants
admit that no one has found any report of this accusation.
And in an affidavit the prison’s current chaplain, who
checked the records of the eligibility lists, said that he found
no evidence of a theft complaint about Thompson or his re‐
moval from the Ramadan list.
While he was receiving no meal bags, Thompson asked
other prison officials to explain why Lashock was not bring‐
ing him food, and those explanations, too, are now disputed.
4 No. 15‐1928
Thompson says that Sergeants Bleich and Larson told him
that Captain William Holm had ordered his name removed
from the list because he had stolen a meal bag; they too re‐
fused to bring him any meals. But Holm now asserts, as do
Lashock and the sergeants, that they did not remove
Thompson from the list and had no authority to do so; only
the chaplain could do that.
Also, as he was receiving no meals, Thompson filed two
formal, written complaints that themselves produced con‐
flicting results. The investigator of the first complaint report‐
ed that, according to Holm, Thompson had not been re‐
moved from the Ramadan list but that he might receive a
conduct report for theft of a meal bag. The investigator of the
second complaint reported, however, that Thompson was
taken off the Ramadan list for two days. Everyone agrees,
though, that on August 23, Thompson received a Ramadan
meal bag at sunset and continued to receive a bag each day
until the end of Ramadan.
Thompson sued Lashock, Holm, Bleich, and Larson un‐
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his First Amendment
rights, and the defendants moved for summary judgment.
(Other claims are not at issue on appeal.) They argued:
(1) the lack of meal bags for two days did not substantially
burden Thompson’s free‐exercise rights; (2) any burden was
reasonably related to punishing his theft, a legitimate peno‐
logical interest; (3) none of the defendants was personally
involved in the alleged constitutional violation; (4) damages,
the only requested relief, were unavailable because Thomp‐
son could not prove physical injury or that the defendants
had acted recklessly or with “callous indifference”; and
(5) qualified immunity shielded them.
No. 15‐1928 5
Thompson responded that the defendants unlawfully
withheld his meal bags. He countered the defendants’ five
arguments as follows: (1) by forcing him to choose between
adequate nutrition and a central tenant of his religion, the
defendants substantially burdened his free‐exercise rights;
(2) no valid penological interest justified the burden; (3) the
evidence reasonably reflects that the defendants were per‐
sonally involved in withholding the bags to pressure him to
break his fast; (4) he is entitled to punitive damages because
the defendants intentionally violated his rights; and (5) qual‐
ified immunity is unavailable because accommodation of a
prisoner’s religious diet is a clearly established right.
A magistrate judge, presiding by consent, granted the de‐
fendants’ motion for summary judgment. The judge ruled
that receiving no meal bags for just two days was not a sub‐
stantial burden on Thompson’s free exercise rights because
he kept fasting, praying, and reading the Koran. The judge
reached no other arguments.
On appeal Thompson challenges the entry of summary
judgment. To survive summary judgment, Thompson had to
submit evidence from which a jury could reasonably find
that the defendants personally and unjustifiably placed a
substantial burden on his religious practices. See, e.g.,
Hernandez v. Comm’n of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699
(1989); Vinning‐El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 592 (7th Cir. 2011);
Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 879–80 (7th Cir. 2009); Lovelace
v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006). A substantial burden
“put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his
behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981); see also Nelson, 570 F.3d at 878
(7th Cir. 2009); Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 799 (7th Cir.
6 No. 15‐1928
2008). A burden is unjustified if it is not reasonably related to
a legitimate penological interest. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
89–91 (1987).
We begin our analysis by asking whether the denial of
meal bags substantially burdened Thompson’s free exercise
rights. The answer is yes. Without the meal bags, Thompson
was forced to choose between foregoing adequate nutrition
or violating a central tenant of his religion. Facing that
choice for “only” two days was not, as defendants argue, a
“de minimis” burden. Not only did Thompson receive no
proper meal for 55 hours, leaving him weak and tired, he did
not know if he would ever be put back on the Ramadan list
and get regular food. This uncertainty put pressure on him
to resign himself to the cafeteria; the anxiety left him unable
to practice Ramadan properly.
We have repeatedly held that forcing an inmate to choose
between daily nutrition and religious practice is a substantial
burden. See Nelson, 570 F.3d at 879 (ruling that inmate’s free
exercise rights were substantially burdened when prison
forced him to choose between his religious practice and ade‐
quate nutrition by denying his request for meatless meals on
Fridays); Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 47 (7th Cir. 1990)
(reasoning that failure to ensure that preparation of meals
kept pork separate from other food substantially burdened a
Muslim prisoner’s religious practice because it forced him to
“an improper choice between adequate nutrition and ob‐
servance of the tenets of his faith”); see also Love v. Reed, 216
F.3d 682, 689–690 (8th Cir. 2000) (ruling prison’s failure to
accommodate prisoner’s religious diet substantially burden‐
some and rejecting prison’s suggestion that the prisoner
could fast as an alternative to the prison’s accommodation of
No. 15‐1928 7
the desired diet); McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th
Cir. 1987) (“Inmates … have the right to be provided with
food sufficient to sustain them in good health that satisfies
the dietary laws of their religion.”).
We next consider whether Thompson produced sufficient
evidence that all the defendants were personally involved in
imposing this burden. See Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458,
462–63 (7th Cir. 2009). Once again, the answer is yes. We con‐
sider the defendants individually, beginning with Lashock.
He was responsible for delivering the meal bags to all in‐
mates on the eligibility list. Yet he personally denied them to
Thompson for two days even though, as one could infer
from the evidence, Thompson remained on the list. As to
Holm, Thompson swears that Bleich and Larson told him
that Holm personally removed him from the list, thus over‐
riding the role of the chaplain. Moreover, a jury reasonably
could infer from the conflicting grievance report investiga‐
tions that Holm lied about whether he had removed Thomp‐
son from the meal list. Finally, as to Bleich and Larson, they
also bear responsibility for depriving Thompson of his food.
By (falsely) telling Thompson that Holm had removed him
from the religious meal list, refusing to bring him any meals,
and warning him to go to the cafeteria if he wanted to eat, a
jury reasonably could infer that they were involved in a joint
effort to pressure Thompson to break his fast. From this evi‐
dence, construed in Thompson’s favor, a jury could find that
all the defendants were personally involved in intentionally
denying Thompson the meal bags.
The record also undermines the defendants’ argument
that, because Thompson supposedly stole a meal bag, with‐
holding his meal bags for two days was justified. The record,
8 No. 15‐1928
construed favorably to Thompson, supports an inference
that Lashock fabricated the charge of theft: Although he as‐
serts that he wrote a conduct report for the theft, none exists,
and the chaplains’ records contain no record of theft. If
Lashock lied about the theft, his dishonesty can imply that
he is guilty of intentionally withholding the bag. See Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000)
(observing “the general principle of evidence law that the
factfinder is entitled to consider a partyʹs dishonesty…as af‐
firmative evidence of guilt” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)). In any case, without a finding of theft,
denying him food and removing Thompson from the meal
list is not justified. A prison official’s mere belief in an in‐
mate’s guilt is insufficient to justify denying a liberty interest
that the inmate retains. See Gilbert v. Cook, 512 F.3d 899, 901
(7th Cir. 2008) (“One major function of the due process
clause is to ensure that a wrongdoer’s punishment comes
after a hearing, rather than being meted out on the spot by a
public official[] … .”).
Their next argument is that damages are unavailable. But
Thompson’s evidence, construed favorably to him, supports
the inference the defendants acted intentionally and thus re‐
futes the contention that damages are unavailable. If a trier
of fact credits Thompson’s evidence that the defendants in‐
tentionally violated his rights, he may receive both nominal
and punitive damages. See Thomas v. Ill., 697 F.3d 612, 614
(7th Cir. 2012); Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 941–42 (7th
Cir. 2003); Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1999).
The defendants’ final argument is that qualified immuni‐
ty shields them. But we have held that “a prisoner’s religious
dietary practice is substantially burdened when the prison
No. 15‐1928 9
forces him to choose between his religious practice and ade‐
quate nutrition.” Nelson, 570 F.3d at 879; see also Hunafa, 907
F.2d at 47 (7th Cir. 1990). Other circuits also observe that a
prisoner has a “clearly established … right to a diet con‐
sistent with his … religious scruples,” including proper food
during Ramadan. Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 597 (2nd
Cir. 2003); see also Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 198–99; Love, 216 F.3d
at 689–690; Makin v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205, 1212–
13 (10th Cir. 1999); McElyea, 833 F.2d at 198. Because the evi‐
dence supports an inference that the defendants intentional‐
ly and unjustifiably forced this burdensome choice on
Thompson, qualified immunity is unavailable.
We end with two observations. First, we repeat that we
have construed the facts in the light most favorable to
Thompson. A jury may find the facts to be otherwise. Sec‐
ond, we encourage the district court on remand to consider
recruiting counsel for Thompson.
Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment. This case is
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this
order.