In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 17‐1314
LARRY KEMP, et al.,
Plaintiffs‐Appellants,
v.
DAVID LIEBEL,
Defendant‐Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division
No. 1:14‐cv‐1728 — Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED OCTOBER 26, 2017 — DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2017
____________________
Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and MANION, Circuit Judges.
FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Larry Kemp and Brian
Woodring were Jewish inmates at prisons operated by the In‐
diana Department of Corrections (“DOC”).1 In 2014, Kemp
and Woodring were transferred from one DOC facility to an‐
other in order to maintain a kosher diet. Plaintiffs allege that
1 Kemp was released from the DOC on June 15, 2016.
2 No. 17‐1314
defendant David Liebel, the DOC Director of Religious and
Volunteer Services, violated the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment by failing to delay that transfer until the
new facility offered opportunities for Jewish group worship
and study. On cross motions for summary judgment, the dis‐
trict court found for Liebel on the ground that plaintiffs failed
to overcome Liebel’s qualified immunity defense. We affirm.
I. Background
The factual background is mostly undisputed. Plaintiffs
Kemp and Woodring were prisoners at Pendleton Correc‐
tional Facility (“Pendleton”) until April 2014, when they were
transferred to Wabash Valley Correctional Facility (“Wabash
Valley”) in order to maintain a kosher diet. Defendant Liebel
is the DOC Director of Religious and Volunteer Services. In
that role, he is responsible for establishing religious program‐
ming, managing religious services, setting guidelines for reli‐
gious group meetings, and maintaining the DOC Handbook
of Religious Belief and Practices.2 Liebel is not, however, in‐
volved in the operation of day‐to‐day activities at DOC facili‐
ties. For instance, he does not directly supervise chaplains or
decide whether a group can meet for services or study.
The DOC maintains a general policy regarding religious
services and study: recognized religious groups are permitted
to participate in one hour of group worship and one hour of
group study each week. The DOC mandates that group wor‐
ship and study be supervised by chaplains, religious special‐
ists, or qualified volunteers in order to maintain the “integrity
2 The DOC Handbook of Religious Beliefs and Practices recognizes that
group worship is an important facet of Judaism, especially on Shabbat, a
weekly holy day observed from sunset Friday until sunset Saturday.
No. 17‐1314 3
and authenticity of beliefs and practice.” If an outside leader
is unavailable, inmates are permitted to lead group services
only if certain conditions are met. First, an outside religious
authority must explain to a DOC chaplain how the service is
run and certify that the inmate‐leader has requisite
knowledge to lead the service. Second, the inmate‐leader
must be qualified by the DOC facility. Finally, a DOC chaplain
must supervise the meeting.
While the DOC employs chaplains at its facilities to lead
Christian services, it does not employ leaders of other reli‐
gions, including Judaism. Instead, the DOC contracts with
Lubavitch of Indiana, an Orthodox Jewish group. Lubavitch
rabbis visit some DOC facilities—including Pendleton but not
Wabash Valley—once a month to lead services and study and
to certify inmate leaders. Thus, while at Pendleton, Kemp and
Woodring attended group services and study each week.
However, Wabash Valley could not offer any group services,
including inmate‐led services, because no volunteers were
available.
Inmates at DOC facilities can also keep a kosher diet, both
for religious and non‐religious reasons. Until 2013, kosher
meals were provided exclusively in pre‐packaged form, and
were about four times more expensive than regular meals. In
2013, in order to centralize kosher food production and
reduce costs, the DOC initiated a plan to create kosher
kitchens at four of its facilities. The plan included Wabash
Valley but not Pendleton. The locations were chosen based on
physical amenities, availability of Aramark staff (the
contracted food provider), and security level. Liebel did not
choose the kosher kitchen facilities, but was involved in the
project; for example, he objected to opening the kitchens in
4 No. 17‐1314
December 2013 because they had not been certified as kosher
and he did not want to open them during Hanukkah.
Although the record is not clear about the exact cost of kosher
meals, both parties agree that the kosher kitchen project was
developed in order to provide kosher meals at a lower cost
compared to providing pre‐packaged kosher meals.3
In late 2013, the DOC determined that all inmates who
kept kosher would be housed at facilities with the new kitch‐
ens. Kosher inmates at Pendleton received a notice from
Liebel informing them they would be transferred to accom‐
modate their diet. They were given the option, however, of
forgoing kosher food in order to remain at Pendleton. Some
inmates took that option, while others, including Kemp and
Woodring, accepted the transfer. Liebel provided Jack Hen‐
drix, the DOC’s executive director of classification, with a list
of inmates to be moved. Hendrix, and not Liebel, chose which
kosher kitchen facility inmates would be transferred to; the
decision was based on a variety of factors, including security,
medical and mental health, programming, and other prisoner
needs. Liebel did, however, have the ability to request that an
inmate’s transfer be delayed, and he was aware Wabash Valley
3 In their briefing, plaintiffs introduced a publicly available contract ad‐
dendum between the DOC and Aramark. See Amendment #16, EDS #D12‐
6‐02 (2013), at 149, https://fs.gmis.in.gov/IDOAcontracts/public/451‐
020.pdf. According to that document, Aramark agreed to prepare kosher
meals for the DOC at the same cost as regular meals. Id. This document
suggests that all kosher meals—whether pre‐packaged or made in a ko‐
sher kitchen—cost the same. However, the addendum, with an effective
date of December 1, 2013, was specifically agreed to in contemplation of
opening the new kosher kitchens. It was based on the assumption that
nearly all kosher meals would be made in the kosher kitchens at a lower
cost.
No. 17‐1314 5
did not offer congregate Jewish services or study at the time
of the proposed transfer.
Eventually, a rabbi certified the new kitchens as kosher,
and in April 2014, the DOC transferred about twenty kosher
inmates from Pendleton to facilities with kosher kitchens.
Kemp and Woodring were moved to Wabash Valley. At least
three inmates remained at Pendleton and continued to receive
pre‐packaged kosher meals. The transfer of these individuals
was postponed because at that time, they lived in special
housing for non‐religious reasons. For example, they had re‐
strictive housing status, required mental health treatment, or
lived in special housing for disciplinary reasons. Eventually,
these inmates were also moved, though at least one inmate
resided at Pendleton and receive pre‐packaged kosher meals
until December 2014.
At the time of the transfer, the DOC was unable to recruit
Jewish volunteers to Wabash Valley to lead worship or train
inmate leaders; therefore, no Jewish services or group study
were available. Liebel was aware that inmates, including
Kemp and Woodring, made requests for worship and study.
He made a concerted effort to locate Jewish volunteers to set
up services and certify inmates. The DOC called Jewish syna‐
gogues in the area, and Liebel met personally with a rabbi.
However, these efforts were unsuccessful until January 2015,
when a Jewish leader came to Wabash Valley and certified in‐
mates, including Kemp, to become leaders.4 Ever since, Wa‐
bash Valley has offered congregate Jewish services and study.
4 Wabash Valley did permit an inmate to lead a Passover gathering in
April 2014. And in December 2014, a Messianic Jewish rabbi visited Wa‐
bash Valley, led a service, and qualified two inmates to lead Messianic
6 No. 17‐1314
On October 22, 2014, after exhausting all administrative
remedies, Kemp and Woodring filed a complaint seeking de‐
claratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages against the
Commissioner of the DOC in his official capacity, the Chap‐
lain of Wabash Valley in his official capacity, and Liebel, in
both his official and individual capacity. They asserted claims
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged violation of the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc, et seq., the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act. On October 20, 2015, plaintiffs moved for partial
summary judgment on the issue of liability and conceded that
their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot
because Wabash Valley started offering congregate Jewish
services and study. On December 18, 2015, Liebel filed a cross‐
motion for summary judgment. One week later, plaintiffs dis‐
missed their official capacity claims against the DOC Com‐
missioner, the Wabash Valley Chaplain, and Liebel. On Janu‐
ary 20, 2017, the district court granted Liebel’s motion for
summary judgment, holding that Liebel was entitled to qual‐
ified immunity. This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
“We review de novo a district court’s decision on cross‐
motions for summary judgment, construing all facts and
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against
whom the motion under consideration was filed.” Hess v. Bd.
Of Trs. Of S. Ill. Univ., 839 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2016). “Sum‐
Jewish services. Messianic Jewish services, however, are not traditional
services, and Messianic Judaism is generally considered to be a variant of
Christianity, separate from Judaism.
No. 17‐1314 7
mary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine is‐
sues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a)). Likewise,
we review de novo a district court’s grant of qualified immun‐
ity. Green v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2017).
A. The Doctrine of Qualified Immunity
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government
officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their con‐
duct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu‐
tional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified im‐
munity balances two important interests—the need to hold
public officials accountable when they exercise power irre‐
sponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment,
distraction, and liability when they perform their duties rea‐
sonably.” Id. “The defense provides ample room for mistaken
judgments and protects all but the plainly incompetent and
those who knowingly violate the law.” Green, 868 F.3d at 633
(quoting Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 639 (7th Cir. 2008)).
A state official is protected by qualified immunity unless
the plaintiff shows: “(1) that the official violated a statutory or
constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly estab‐
lished’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al‐
Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).
In order to avoid “[u]nnecessary litigation of constitutional is‐
sues” and expending scarce judicial resources that ultimately
do not impact the outcome of the case, we may analyze the
“clearly established” prong without first considering whether
the alleged constitutional right was violated. Pearson, 555 U.S.
at 236–37. We take that approach here.
8 No. 17‐1314
B. The Relevant “Clearly Established Law” Inquiry
To defeat Liebel’s qualified immunity defense, the burden
is on plaintiffs to demonstrate that the alleged violation of
their Free Exercise Clause right was “clearly established.” See
Green, 868 F.3d at 633. “To be clearly established at the time of
the challenged conduct, the right’s contours must be suffi‐
ciently clear that every reasonable official would have under‐
stood that what he is doing violates that right … .” Gustafson
v. Adkins, 803 F.3d 883, 891 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Rabin v.
Flynn, 725 F.3d 628, 632 (7th Cir. 2013)). “[T]he crucial ques‐
tion [is] whether the official acted reasonably in the particular
circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S.
Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014).
Plaintiffs need not point to an identical case finding the
alleged violation unlawful, “but existing precedent must have
placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond de‐
bate.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam)
(quoting al‐Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741). “[W]e look first to control‐
ling Supreme Court precedent and our own circuit decisions
on the issue.” Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 767 (7th
Cir. 2000). If no controlling precedent exists, “we broaden our
survey to include all relevant caselaw in order to determine
‘whether there was such a clear trend in the caselaw that we
can say with fair assurance that the recognition of the right by
a controlling precedent was merely a question of time.’” Id.
(quoting Cleveland‐Perdue v. Brutsche, 881 F.2d 427, 431 (7th
Cir. 1989)). In the absence of controlling or persuasive author‐
ity, plaintiffs can demonstrate clearly established law by prov‐
ing that the defendant’s conduct was “so egregious and un‐
reasonable that … no reasonable [official] could have thought
he was acting lawfully.” Abbott v. Sangamon County, Illinois,
No. 17‐1314 9
705 F.3d 706, 724 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Jacobs, 215 F.3d at 767
(“In some rare cases, where the constitutional violation is pa‐
tently obvious, the plaintiffs may not be required to present
the court with any analogous cases … .”).
Before we can determine if the law was clearly established,
“the right allegedly violated must be defined at the appropri‐
ate level of specificity.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615
(1999). “The Supreme Court has ‘repeatedly told courts … not
to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.’”
Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 2013) (alteration
in original) (quoting al‐Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742); see, e.g., White v.
Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per curiam); Mullenix, 136 S.
Ct. at 308; City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct.
1765, 1775–76 (2015). Instead, “[t]he dispositive question is
‘whether the volatile nature of particular conduct is clearly es‐
tablished.’” Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (quoting al‐Kidd, 563
U.S. at 742). In other words, “the clearly established law must
be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.” White, 137 S. Ct. at
552 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987));
see also Volkman, 736 F.3d at 1090 (“[T]he Seventh Circuit has
long held that ‘the test for immunity should be whether the
law was clear in relation to the specific facts confronting the
public official when he acted.’” (quoting Colaizzi v. Walker,
812 F.2d 304, 308 (7th Cir. 1987))).
The Supreme Court has expressly rejected over‐general
formulations of clearly established law in the Fourth Amend‐
ment context. In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), and
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), the Court created a rea‐
sonableness test for determining whether excessive force is
contrary to the Fourth Amendment. See Brosseau v. Haugen,
543 U.S. 194, 197 (2004) (per curiam). This test made clear that
10 No. 17‐1314
officers’ use of excessive force violates the Fourth Amend‐
ment if it is objectively unreasonable. Id. In recent years, the
Court has repeatedly stressed that Graham and Garner “lay out
excessive‐force principles at only a general level.” White,
137 S. Ct. at 552. The Court reasoned that general statements
of law can only give “‘fair and clear warning’ to officers” if the
unlawfulness is apparent based on pre‐existing law. Id. (quot‐
ing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)). Thus, the
Court held that “Garner and Graham do not by themselves cre‐
ate clearly established law outside ‘an obvious case.’” Id.
(quoting Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199).
Here, plaintiffs ask us to define the relevant clearly estab‐
lished law as “the right of prisoners not to have their religious
practices interfered with and prevented absent a legitimate
penological basis.” This formulation is too broad. In fact, it
simply restates the standard for analyzing prisoners’ consti‐
tutional claims created by the Court in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.
78 (1987). There, the Court held that “when a prison regula‐
tion impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation
is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological in‐
terests.” Id. at 89.5 Just as Garner and Graham create a general‐
ized excessive force standard, Turner creates a generalized
5 This determination depends on four factors:
(1) whether a valid, rational connection exists between the regu‐
lation and a legitimate government interest behind the rule; (2)
whether there are alternative means of exercising the right in
question; (3) what impact accommodation of the asserted consti‐
tutional right would have on guards, other inmates, and on the
allocation of prison resources; and (4) what easy alternatives exist
to the regulation because, although the regulation need not satisfy
No. 17‐1314 11
framework to analyze prisoners’ constitutional claims. Both
describe a multi‐factor reasonableness test used to determine
whether a defendant’s actions violated the Constitution. Thus,
like the Garner and Graham standard, the Turner test cannot
create clearly established law outside an obvious case.6 In‐
stead, as the district court stated, the proper inquiry is
a least restrictive alternative test, the existence of obvious alterna‐
tives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable.
Shimer v. Washington, 100 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Turner, 482
U.S. at 89–90).
6 Plaintiffs point to several cases where they contend we used a more gen‐
eral clearly established law inquiry. These cases are distinguishable. First,
in Conyers v. Abitz, an inmate was denied late dinners during Ramadan,
when Muslims cannot eat from dawn to dusk. 416 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir.
2005). We described the relevant inquiry as whether “the law was clearly
established that prison officials must have a legitimate penological inter‐
est before imposing a substantial burden on the free exercise of an in‐
mate’s religion.” Id. at 586. Critically, however, in holding the defendant
was not entitled to qualified immunity, we cited specific examples of
courts finding Free Exercise Clause violations when prison polices did not
accommodate religious dietary needs. Id. In contrast, no such precedent
exists here. Second, in Williams v. Lane, a prison official denied protective‐
custody inmates the ability to participate in group worship even though
general‐population inmates were permitted to attend religious group ser‐
vices. 851 F.2d 867, 873–74 (7th Cir. 1988). We held defendants were not
entitled to qualified immunity because they “fail[ed] to demonstrate a le‐
gitimate rationale justifying their deprivation of rights of these protective
custody inmates.” Id. at 883. But Williams was not a typical case. Indeed as
my concurrence recognized, “[t]he defendants’ litigation strategy … dic‐
tated the outcome” and resulted in affording “rights which [were] not nec‐
essarily indicated by … Supreme Court precedent.” Id. at 885–86 (Flaum,
J., concurring in the result) (suggesting that “plaintiffs’ success on their
[First Amendment] claim[] was far from inevitable”). Finally, in Grayson
v. Schuler, a prison official forced an inmate to cut his dreadlocks. 666 F.3d
450, 451 (7th Cir. 2012). We recognized that a ban on long hair ordinarily
12 No. 17‐1314
whether there existed a “clearly established constitutional
right on the part of prisoners to congregate services and study
absent appropriate leadership and supervision at the time of
an interfacility transfer.” Kemp v. Liebel, 229 F. Supp. 3d 828,
836 (S.D. Ind. 2017).
C. Liebel Did Not Violate Clearly Established Law
Under this framework, it is clear that Liebel is protected
by qualified immunity. Plaintiffs cite no case where we held
that the Free Exercise Clause provides prisoners the right to
group worship when outside volunteers were unavailable to
lead or train inmates. Likewise, they cite no case where we
held that a prison official violates the Free Exercise Clause by
transferring inmates to a facility that does not provide congre‐
gate worship and study, or by failing to delay a transfer until
the new facility provides congregate worship and study.7
“would pass constitutional muster.” Id. at 452. However, we concluded
this particular order was unreasonable because it was based on the “Ras‐
tafarian exception,” which allowed Rastafarian prisoners, but not prison‐
ers of other religions, to wear dreadlocks. Id. at 453. We thus held the de‐
fendant was not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable offi‐
cial could not believe the plaintiff was insincere in his religious beliefs or
that only Rastafarians could wear dreadlocks without posing a security
threat. Id. at 454–55. We did not use a broad clearly established law in‐
quiry, but instead determined that the policy was so egregious and unrea‐
sonable that it “could not reasonably be thought constitutional.” Id. at 455.
7 Plaintiffs cite only to Thompson v. Holm, 809 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 2016). In
Thompson, a Muslim prisoner was denied meal bags during Ramadan. Id.
at 378. We denied defendants’ qualified immunity claim, noting that “we
have held that ‘a prisoner’s religious dietary practice is substantially bur‐
dened when the prison forces him to choose between his religious practice
and adequate nutrition.’” Id. at 381 (quoting Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868,
No. 17‐1314 13
Indeed, our precedent suggests that prison officials “need
not … allow inmates to conduct their own religious services”
so long as the delay in offering services by qualified leaders is
reasonable. Johnson‐Bey v. Lane, 863 F.2d 1308, 1310–11 (7th
Cir. 1988); see also Hadi v. Horn, 830 F.2d 779, 784–87 (7th Cir.
1987).8 Other circuits have reached similar conclusions. See,
e.g., Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 120–22 (5th Cir. 2007);
Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398, 405–06 (6th Cir. 1999); Anderson
v. Angelone, 123 F.3d 1197, 1198–99 (9th Cir. 1997); Tisdale v.
879 (7th Cir. 2009)). Plaintiffs contend that Liebel imposed a similarly bur‐
densome choice: staying at Pendleton to attend group services but losing
a kosher diet, or accepting a transfer to Wabash Valley to keep a kosher
diet but losing the ability to attend services. We disagree. Although we
held in Thompson that a prisoner’s right to maintain a religious diet (as
opposed to starving) is clearly established law, we said nothing about the
right to attend group worship. Simply put, Thompson did not in any way
clearly establish that Liebel violated the Free Exercise Clause here.
8 In Hadi, we applied the Turner factors and determined that each favored
the defendant: (1) barring unsupervised services furthered legitimate in‐
terests in ensuring adequate prison security, avoiding inmate conflict, and
preventing the formation or recognition of a leadership hierarchy; (2)
plaintiffs had alternative means of exercising the right, as the prison em‐
ployed a full‐time Muslim chaplain and prisoners could attend weekly
study classes; (3) allowing unsupervised religious services would man‐
date unsupervised services for other religious groups, compounding the
security concerns; and (4) no alternative outside a ban on unsupervised
services would dispel the security concerns underlying the policy.
830 F.2d at 784–87. In Johnson‐Bey, we cited Hadi’s concern that allowing
inmates to conduct their own religious services could “foment conspira‐
cies” and “create (though more likely merely recognize) a leadership hier‐
archy among the prisoners.” 863 F.2d at 1310. We clarified, however, that
prisons may not “place arbitrary obstacles in the way of inmates seeking
to participate in the sect’s mode of observance.” Id. at 1311. Moreover, we
stressed that “the reasonableness of the ban on inmates’ conducting their
own religious services is related to the availability of substitutes.” Id.
14 No. 17‐1314
Dobbs, 807 F.2d 734, 737–39 (8th Cir. 1986). Moreover, the
Court has held that an inmate has no right to remain at a par‐
ticular facility under the Due Process Clause. Meachum v.
Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). Based on those precedents, “a
reasonable government official would not have known the of‐
ficial was violating clearly established law” by failing to halt
inmates’ transfers to a facility that reasonably did not offer
group worship. See Kramer v. Pollard, 497 F. App’x 639, 644 (7th
Cir. 2012); see also West v. Grams, 607 F. App’x 561, 565 (7th Cir.
2015) (“It has never been clearly established that inmates have
a right to inmate‐led group worship under the First Amend‐
ment … where non‐inmate volunteers are unavailable and
prison administrators justify the restriction for security rea‐
sons.”); Turner v. Hamblin, 590 F. App’x 616, 619–20 (7th Cir.
2014).
Finally, this is not the “rare case” where Liebel’s conduct
was “so egregious and unreasonable” that the constitutional
violation was “patently obvious” to any reasonable official.
See Jacobs, 215 F.3d at 767; Abbott, 705 F.3d 724. Plaintiffs con‐
tend that Liebel’s First Amendment violation was obvious be‐
cause he was responsible for managing religious services, ex‐
ercised at least some control over the transfer of prisoners to
facilities with kosher kitchens, and knew that Wabash Valley
did not offer congregate Jewish services. We do not agree. On
the contrary, Liebel acted reasonably given the circumstances.
Not only were his actions not counter to any of our precedent,
but he also made a significant effort to recruit Jewish volun‐
teers so that Wabash Valley could offer group prayer and
study. Moreover, Liebel was not even the ultimate deci‐
sionmaker with respect to plaintiffs’ transfer; he simply had
the ability to delay it. Thus, Liebel did not violate clearly es‐
tablished law, and he is entitled to qualified immunity.
No. 17‐1314 15
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.