NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 9 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CLIFTON J. TERRELL, Jr., No. 19-16320
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:17-cv-03924-WHO
v.
MEMORANDUM*
C. E. DUCART, Warden, Pelican Bay State
Prison; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
William Horsley Orrick, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 2, 2020**
Before: LEAVY, PAEZ, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Clifton J. Terrell, Jr., appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a First
Amendment claim arising out of the delay in receiving kosher meals. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Sandoval v. County of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Sonoma, 912 F.3d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 2018), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants
Gomez, Holt, Peterson, and Ducart because Terrell failed to raise a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether these defendants personally participated in the
prison’s process to approve religious meals for prisoners. See Keates v. Koile, 883
F.3d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[D]efendants cannot be held liable for a
constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless they were integral
participants in the unlawful conduct.”); see id. at 1243 (“[A] supervisor can be
liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the
training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the
constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous
indifference to the rights of others.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant
Losacco because Terrell failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether Loscacco violated his First Amendment right to religious exercise. See
Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that a prisoner
“asserting a free exercise claim must show that the government action in question
substantially burdens the . . . practice of [the prisoner’s] religion.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant
Abdullah on the basis of qualified immunity because it would not have been clear
2 19-16320
to every reasonable prison official that a two-month delay in receiving kosher
meals, during which the prison verified a prisoner’s eligibility to receive kosher
meals, was unlawful under the circumstances. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 232 (2009) (“Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct
violated a clearly established constitutional right.”); Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d
807, 815 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A right is ‘clearly established’ when its contours are
sufficiently defined, such that ‘a reasonable official would understand that what he
is doing violates that right.’” (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999))).
Contrary to his contention, the district court did not fail to consider Terrell’s
equal protection claim because no such claim was clearly alleged in the operative
complaint.
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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