FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JAN 07 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 14-10518
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 4:13-cr-00787-YGR-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KRAIG HILL,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 8, 2015
San Francisco, California
Before: WARDLAW, W. FLETCHER, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
The government appeals the district court’s grant of Kraig Hill’s suppression
motion. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731, and we affirm.
Although it was error (1) to suppress evidence based on the falsity of the
testimony of Officers Scheuller and Miguel, see United States v. Thomas, 726 F.3d
1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013), and (2) to conclude that Hill was unlawfully seized
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
when ordered to get out of his car, see Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,
110–11 (1977), we “may affirm on any basis supported by the record,” United
States v. McClendon, 713 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2013). We affirm the grant of
Hill’s suppression motion because, even assuming the officers had reasonable
suspicion to stop Hill, they were, at most, investigating a completed misdemeanor,
and so the manner and duration of the stop were unreasonable. See United States
v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 1074–75, 1081–83 (9th Cir. 2007).
As the district court recognized, “the governmental interest in investigating
possible criminal conduct based on an officer’s reasonable suspicion may be
outweighed by the Fourth Amendment interest of the driver in remaining secure
from the intrusion.” Id. at 1075. The alleged misdemeanor traffic violation
occurred roughly fifteen minutes before the officers stopped Hill. By that time,
Hill had parked the Mercedes in a hotel parking garage and had not been operating
the vehicle for almost ten minutes. Hill was, at most, “a suspect in a past crime
who now appear[ed] to be going about his lawful business,” United States v.
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985), and he presented no “potential for ongoing or
repeated danger,” Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1081. Accordingly, the stop was not
reasonable. See id. at 1081–82.
AFFIRMED.
2
FILED
United States v. Hill, No. 14-10518
JAN 07 2016
MURGUIA, Circuit Judge, dissenting: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I respectfully dissent. While I agree that the district court erred in granting
Hill’s motion to suppress based on the officers’ false testimony and act of ordering
Hill out of the car, I do not agree that the record in this case clearly demonstrates
that Hill’s stop was unreasonable. See United States v. Willis, 431 F.3d 709,
714–15 (9th Cir. 2005). Because the district court’s focus was on the events
subsequent to the stop, rather than the stop itself, I would vacate the district court’s
order and remand for any further factual development, and for the district court to
determine in the first instance the legality of the stop, including whether the stop
was unreasonable under United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2007).