J-S67016/15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF T.E.J.-H., JR., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A Minor : PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: J.H. and J.C.R. : No. 763 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order entered March 31, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Juvenile Court Division, at No. CP-06-DP-0000315-2014
BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., and PLATT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.: FILED JANUARY 19, 2016
J.H. and J.C.R. (Appellants)1 appeal from the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Berks County, entered March 31, 2015, which denied their
petition to intervene in the matter of the dependency of T.E.H.-J. (Child),
born in August of 2014. We affirm.
Berks County Children and Youth Services (CYS) assumed emergency
custody of Child and placed him in kinship care with Appellants upon his
discharge from the hospital on August 8, 2014. The trial court adjudicated
Child dependent and awarded temporary custody of Child to CYS on August
20, 2014. Child’s concurrent goals were reunification and adoption. CYS
removed Child from Appellant’s home on November 26, 2014, and placed
him in a traditional foster home due to numerous concerns about Appellants.
Richard F. Small, Ph.D., evaluated Appellants on October 21, 2014.
Dr. Small noted that J.H. demonstrated “great warmth and interest” in Child
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
J.H. is Child’s maternal aunt; J.C.R. is her partner.
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while J.C.R. demonstrated none. See Small Report, at 6. Dr. Small had
significant concerns regarding the Appellants’ ability to follow CYS’
directives. Dr. Small opined specifically:
[Appellants] had a poor experience with a foster child and
remain bitter. They have unrealistic expectations as to how
difficult raising [Child] is likely to be. [Appellants] seem to have
a stable relationship, and raising a child might put great strains
on that. Given the previous experience, if such strains appear,
preserving the relationship might prove more important than the
psychological well-being of [Child].
Id.
Matt Shollenberger, Ph.D., evaluated J.C.R. on November 14, 19 and
25, 2014. Dr. Shollenberger opined that J.C.R. had severe emotional issues
and needed to be thoroughly assessed for suicidal ideations, depression and
personality disorders. See Schollenberger Report, at 7. He further opined
that J.C.R. had “difficulty simply getting out of a chair,” and therefore she
needed to address the physical issues that inhibit her from normal daily
functioning. Id. Dr. Shollenberger specifically noted that J.C.R. is, “plagued
with mental and physical concerns,” and noted that those concerns were so
profound that he did not believe that J.C.R. was “a suitable foster parent for
any child.” Id.
On November 18, 2014, Appellants filed a Petition for Placement
Pending Adoption, Intervention and for Custody. The trial court denied that
petition. Appellants filed their notice of appeal on April 3, 2015, and, in
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response to an order of the trial court, their concise statement of errors
complained of on May 7, 2015.2
Appellants present the following questions for our review.
A. Whether the lower court’s refusal to recognize standing of
family members to intervene in dependency cases is contrary to
the laws and regulations of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
and the United States[?]
B. Whether the Pennsylvania courts’ interpretation of ‘party’
with respect to dependency matters violate[s] the constitutional
rights of citizens to familial relationships[?]
Appellants’ Brief, at 4.
Appellants ask us to consider a pure question of law. “As with all
questions of law, the appellate standard of review is de novo and the
appellate scope of review is plenary.” B.K.M. v. J.A.M., 50 A.3d 168, 172
(Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
Dependency proceedings are closed to the public in Pennsylvania and
only a party to a dependency may participate in them. This Court has stated
that
[u]nder the Juvenile Act [42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6336(d)], attendance at
and participation in dependency proceedings are restricted.
Dependency hearings are closed to the general public. Only a
“party” has the right to participate, to be heard on his or her
own behalf, to introduce evidence, and/or to cross-examine
witnesses. Although the Juvenile Act does not define “party,”
case law from this Court has conferred the status of party to a
dependency proceeding on three classes of persons: (1) the
2
There was no objection or claim of prejudice from Appellee as a result of
this late filing, so we have accepted it in reliance on our decision in In re
K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745 (Pa. Super. 2009).
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parents of the juvenile whose dependency status is at issue; (2)
the legal custodian of the juvenile whose dependency status is at
issue, or (3) the person whose care and control of the juvenile is
in question.
In the Intertest of L.C., II, 900 A.2d 378, 381 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(citations omitted).
In their first claim, Appellants argue that persons who are “family
members,” and bear no other relation to a dependent child, should be
allowed to intervene in dependency proceedings. In support of this claim,
Appellants cite a section of the Pennsylvania Code and a section of the Social
Security Act that each speak of reuniting a child with his or her family.
The Appellants first cite to Chapter 55, section 3130 of the
Pennsylvania Code that provides, in relevant part:
(c) Each county is responsible for administering a program of
children and youth social services that includes:
...
(3) Services designed to reunite children and their families
when children are in temporary, substitute placement.
55 Pa. Code § 3130.12(c)(3).
Appellants then cite to sections of the Social Security Act 3 that they
claim, “in relevant part, require that a judge must find that the state has
made ‘reasonable efforts’ to prevent placement of the child or to reunite the
3
We have attempted, without any success, to locate the parts of the Social
Security Act to which Appellants refer from the citations in their brief. We
assume, for the sake of argument, that the referenced statutes say what
Appellants claim they say.
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child with his or her family.” Appellants’ Brief, at 8 (emphasis added by
Appellants).
Appellants conclude their first argument by stating,
Petitioners argue that as demonstrated by the above
citations, the term ‘family’ is used frequently in both the Federal
and Pennsylvania statutes relating to dependent children.
Therefore, Petitioners seek standing to proceed in the
dependency hearings for the purposes of having T.J.-H. continue
to be placed in their care.
Appellants’ Brief, at 8.
Appellants argue that they should be given party status because our
law encourages the reuniting of children with their families. Their argument,
however, fails to address the question of why we should expand the
definition of party in L.C., II, above, to permit individuals who are no more
than members of a dependent child’s family to participate in that child’s
dependency proceeding. Appellants’ first argument is without merit.
In their second issue, Appellants claim that this Court’s definition of,
“whom [sic] is a proper party with standing to intervene in dependency
matters violates the constitutional rights of citizens to familial relationships.”
Appellants’ Brief, at 8.4 To support this claim, Appellants cite cases ranging
from Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which struck down race-based
barriers to marriage, to Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431
U.S. 816 (1977), in which the United States Supreme Court stated that the
4
We note that Appellants fail to state whether their exclusion from Child’s
dependency proceeding violates the constitution of this Commonwealth or of
the United States.
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“liberty interest in family privacy has its source . . . in intrinsic human
rights,” 431 U.S. 816, 845, while again including the Pennsylvania Code
section cited above for good measure. Citing cases, however, is all that
Appellants do to support their argument; they fail to relate those cases to
the facts of this case to develop a coherent legal argument in support of
their claim that we should grant them party status simply because they are
members of Child’s family.
They conclude by claiming they
were never afforded an opportunity to become a member of the
classes of individuals currently recognized and granted party
status in dependency proceedings because CYS gained custody
of the child through a Dependency Petition and Order prior to
[Child] being released from the hospital. Thus, it was impossible
for any family member desirous of caring for the child and
becoming the legal custodian of the child to exercise the right to
do so. Since an order was already in place declaring [Child]
dependent and giving CYS legal custody of [Child], no family
member (other than the parents) was able to gain standing to
intervene in the dependency proceedings. Here, the Appellants
are Maternal Aunt and her partner, clearly within the familial
bloodline and the definition of ‘family’ as defined by the Courts.
In refusing to grant standing to Appellants to Intervene and
participate in the Dependency Matter, the lower court has
applied the laws and regulations in such a way that it violates
the Constitutional Rights of Appellants.
Appellants’ Brief, at 16.
Our case law confers party status on three classes of individuals in a
dependency proceeding: “(1) the parents of the juvenile whose dependency
status is at issue; (2) the legal custodian of the juvenile whose dependency
status is at issue, or (3) the person whose care and control of the juvenile is
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in question.” L.C., II, supra. Appellants admit that they are not members
of any of those classes. And they fail to demonstrate how the law they cite
supports their contention that persons who are no more than family
members of dependent children have a constitutional right to party status in
a dependency proceeding. Appellants’ second argument is without merit.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s order.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/19/2016
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