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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS.
No. CR-15-635
Opinion Delivered January 21, 2016
JACKIE L. WILLIAMS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO: 60CR-95-2566]
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE HONORABLE HERBERT T.
WRIGHT, JR., JUDGE
AFFIRMED.
PER CURIAM
In 1995, appellant Jackie L. Williams was charged with three counts of rape in case
no. 60CR-95-2566 in the Pulaski County Circuit Court. The counts were severed for
trial. Williams was found guilty by a jury in count three and sentenced as a habitual offender
to life imprisonment. We affirmed. Williams v. State, 331 Ark. 263, 962 S.W.2d 329 (1998).
Williams was found guilty by a jury in count two and sentenced as a habitual offender to
twenty-five years’ imprisonment. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. Williams v.
State, CR-96-725 (Ark. App. Apr. 2, 1997) (unpublished) (original docket no. CACR 96-
725). On count one, Williams was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to life
imprisonment as a habitual offender. We affirmed. Williams v. State, CR-98-1027 (Ark.
Jan. 20, 2000) (unpublished per curiam). The sentences for the three offenses were ordered
to be served consecutively.
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On April 6, 2015, Williams filed in the trial court a pro se petition to correct an
illegal sentence pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-111 (Repl. 2006). The
petition was denied, and Williams brings this appeal.
There is a provision in section 16-90-111 that allows the trial court to correct an
illegal sentence at any time because a claim that a sentence is illegal presents an issue of
subject-matter jurisdiction. See Walden v. State, 2014 Ark. 193, 433 S.W.3d 864. While
the time limitations on filing a petition under section 16-90-111(a)(b)(1) on the grounds
that the sentence was imposed in an illegal manner were superseded by Arkansas Rule of
Criminal Procedure 37.2(c) (2015), the portion of section 16-90-111 that provides a means
to challenge a sentence at any time on the ground that the sentence is illegal on its face
remains in effect. Halfacre v. State, 2015 Ark. 105, 460 S.W.3d 282 (per curiam). For that
reason, the trial court had authority to grant relief under the statute if the sentences imposed
on Williams were indeed illegal. Id.; see also Hill v. State, 2013 Ark. 291 (per curiam).
As grounds for his contention that the sentences imposed on him were illegal,
Williams argued that the amended felony information in his case was unconstitutional. He
contended that (1) the information was irregular and that it violated the constitutional
provisions against double jeopardy because the information encompassed three separate
offenses, and he was tried three times for the same offenses; (2) the State violated Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by not disclosing all exculpatory evidence to the defense; (3)
he was entitled to indictment by grand jury under Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and Arkansas and federal law. Williams did not allege that the sentences imposed
were outside the statutory range for the offenses as set by statute.
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A sentence is illegal on its face when it exceeds the statutory maximum for the offense
for which the defendant was convicted. Bell v. State, 2015 Ark. 370, at 3 (per curiam); see
also Halfacre, 2015 Ark. 105, 460 S.W.3d 282. Here, Williams did not contend that the
sentences imposed on him exceeded the statutory maximum. Williams was convicted of
three Class Y felonies. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103(b) (Supp. 1993). Under the provisions
of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-401(a)(1) (1987), in effect when Williams was
convicted, a term of ten to forty years or life could be imposed for a Class Y felony.
Accordingly, the life sentences and the twenty-five-year sentence imposed on Williams
were within the range allowed by statute and were not facially illegal. Ehler v. State, 2015
Ark. 107, at 2 (per curiam) (When the sentences imposed on the petitioner were within the
statutory range for the offense, the sentence was legal on its face and not subject to challenge
under section 16-90-111.).
Constitutional violations such as those raised by Williams challenging the judgments
on grounds of double jeopardy and a Brady violation, which did not implicate the facial
validity of the judgment, did not render the sentences imposed illegal.1 See Redus v. State,
2013 Ark. 9 (per curiam). The claims advanced by Williams in his petition did not allege
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Williams’s claim of a defective charging instrument has been specifically rejected
by this court. Section 1 of amendment 21 to the Arkansas Constitution provides that “all
offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment may be prosecuted either by
indictment by a grand jury or information filed by the Prosecuting Attorney.” Smith v.
State, 2012 Ark. 311, at 2 (per curiam). States are not required to charge by indictment
but may charge by information. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). This court has
addressed this issue on a number of occasions and has refused to extend the right to grand
jury indictment to proceedings in this state. Taylor v. State, 303 Ark. 586, 593, 799 S.W.2d
519, 523 (1990); Hamm v. State, 296 Ark. 385, 757 S.W.2d 932 (1988).
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an illegal sentence of the type that is jurisdictional in nature; rather, the grounds for relief
were of the type that should have been raised at trial, on appeal, or, to the extent that the
claims were intended as allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, in a timely-filed
petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1
(2015). Stanley v. State, 2013 Ark. 483 (per curiam). Assertions of constitutional error are
not cognizable under section 16-90-111. Id.
A trial court’s decision to deny relief under section 16-90-111 will not be overturned
unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Gilliland v. State, 2014 Ark. 149. The trial court’s
decision in this case was not clearly erroneous inasmuch as Williams did not meet his burden
of demonstrating in his petition that the sentence was illegal.
Affirmed.
Jackie L. Williams, pro se appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Jake H. Jones, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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