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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
RICHARD RAYMOND ALLEN
Appellant No. 1288 MDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order July 1, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0001234-1975
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 02, 2016
Richard Raymond Allen (“Appellant”) appeals from the order entered in
the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his petition
for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We
affirm.
On July 23, 1975, following an oral guilty plea colloquy, Appellant pled
guilty to murder, generally. N.T., 7/23/1975, at 16. In exchange for the
plea, the Commonwealth agreed not to seek the death penalty. Id. at 15.
On July 25, 1975, the trial court found Appellant guilty of murder in the first
degree2 and sentenced him to life in prison. After hearing several post-
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1
42 Pa.C.S. § 9541-9546.
2
18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).
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sentence motions, the trial court re-sentenced Appellant to life in prison on
February 4, 1977. Appellant appealed, and this Court affirmed Appellant’s
judgment of sentence on December 7, 1979. Our Supreme Court denied
Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on March 28, 1980. Appellant
did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with the Supreme Court of the
United States.
Appellant filed petitions for collateral relief on December 26, 1980,
August 8, 1981, and October 8, 1997.3 The courts did not grant Appellant
relief. On December 22, 2014, Appellant filed a “Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus Seeking Post Conviction Relief,” which is the subject of this appeal.
The PCRA court treated Appellant’s petition as a PCRA petition 4 and issued a
notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 of its intent to dismiss the petition
without a hearing. On July 1, 2015, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s
petition. On July 23, 2015, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
DID THE [TRIAL] COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
DENYING []APPELLANT’S [PCRA] PETITION BECAUSE THE
COURT DETERMINED THAT THE REQUEST FOR RELIEF
WAS UNTIMELY IN NATURE ?
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3
Appellant’s first two petitions were filed pursuant to the Post Conviction
Hearing Act.
4
“[A]ny motion filed after the finality of a sentence that raises an issue that
can be addressed under the PCRA is to be treated as a PCRA petition.”
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa.Super.2013).
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DOES THE RECORD SUPPORT [] APPELLANT’S CLAIM THAT
HE DID AGREE TO ENTER A GUILTY PLEA TO MURDER,
NOT TO EXCEED MURDER IN THE 3RD DEGREE AND THAT
THE RECORD SHOWS THIS TO BE CORRECT ?
DOES THE RECORD SHOW THAT [] APPELLANT WAS
INCORRECTLY SENTENCED TO MURDER IN THE 1ST
DEGREE INSTEAD OF MURDER IN THE 3RD DEGREE ?
Appellant’s Brief at 1.
Before we address the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must determine
whether his PRCA petition was timely. The timeliness of a PCRA petition
implicates the jurisdiction of both this Court and the PCRA court.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 35 A.3d 44, 52 (Pa.Super.2011), appeal
denied, 50 A.3d 121 (Pa.2012). “Pennsylvania law makes clear that no
court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition.” Id. To “accord
finality to the collateral review process[,]” the PCRA “confers no authority
upon [appellate courts] to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA
timebar[.]” Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa.2011). With
respect to jurisdiction under the PCRA, this Court has further explained:
The most recent amendments to the PCRA...provide a
PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition,
shall be filed within one year of the date the underlying
judgment becomes final. A judgment is deemed final at
the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of
time for seeking the review.
Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Pa.Super.2010)
(citations and quotations omitted), appeal denied, 20 A.3d 1210 (Pa.2011);
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see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545. This Court may review a PCRA petition filed
more than one year after the judgment of sentence becomes final only if the
claim falls within one of the following three statutory exceptions, which the
petitioner must plead and prove:
(i) the failure to raise the claim was the result of
interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution
or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or
laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court
to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Further, if a petition pleads one of these
exceptions, the petition will not be considered unless it is “filed within 60
days of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(2).
Additionally, a heightened standard applies to a second or subsequent
PCRA petition to avoid “serial requests for post-conviction relief.”
Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1043 (Pa.2011). A second or
subsequent PCRA petition “will not be entertained unless a strong prima
facie showing is offered to demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice may
have occurred.” Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 953 A.2d 1248, 1251
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(Pa.2006). Further, in a second or subsequent post-conviction proceeding,
“all issues are waived except those which implicate a defendant’s innocence
or which raise the possibility that the proceedings resulting in conviction
were so unfair that a miscarriage of justice which no civilized society can
tolerate occurred.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 660 A.2d 614, 618
(Pa.Super.1995).
Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final in 1980, when
Appellant’s time for seeking review with the Supreme Court of the United
States expired. See Monaco, supra. Appellant filed the instant pro se
PCRA petition over thirty-four years later, on December 22, 2014. Thus, his
PCRA petition is facially untimely, and we must determine whether Appellant
has pled and proved any of the exceptions to the PCRA time limitation. See
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
Appellant’s petition does not claim, plead, or prove any of the
exceptions to the PCRA time limitation. Thus, Appellant’s petition is time-
barred, and the PCRA court properly denied it. Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/2/2016
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