UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4390
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAVOTA JETER, a/k/a Javonte Jeter,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:12-cr-00254-MOC-1)
Submitted: January 29, 2016 Decided: February 5, 2016
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Chiege O. Kalu Okwara, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Javota Jeter pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to possessing and brandishing a firearm in
furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2, 924(c) (2012), and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). The
district court imposed an aggregate sentence of 125 months’
imprisonment. In accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), Jeter’s counsel has filed a brief certifying that
there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning
whether Jeter possessed the firearm used in the § 924(c)
offense. We affirm the district court’s judgment.
We consider Jeter’s claim on appeal as an attack on his
guilty plea. Jeter did not move to withdraw his guilty plea;
thus, we review the adequacy of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing
for plain error. United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th
Cir. 2014). Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court
must conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant
of, and determines he understands, the rights he is
relinquishing by pleading guilty, the charges to which he is
pleading, and the maximum and mandatory minimum penalties he
faces. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United States v. DeFusco, 949
F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). The court also must ensure that
the plea was voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or
2
promises not contained in the plea agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(2), and “that there is a factual basis for the plea,” Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).
Although we note that there were minor omissions in the
Rule 11 colloquy conducted by the magistrate judge, we conclude
that these minor omissions did not affect Jeter’s substantial
rights. See United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2147
(2013) (stating that, to demonstrate effect on substantial
rights in Rule 11 context, defendant “must show a reasonable
probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered
the plea” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, the
district court confirmed at sentencing that Jeter entered his
plea knowingly and voluntarily and that a factual basis
supported his plea. See DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 116, 119-20.
While Jeter now contests the fact that he possessed the firearm
used in the § 924(c) offense, the relevant conduct in the
presentence report, * to which Jeter stipulated, establishes that
he personally brandished a firearm in furtherance of a
carjacking. See United States v. Strayhorn, 743 F.3d 917, 922
*
In the plea agreement, the parties deferred the court’s
finding of the factual basis for the guilty plea until the
sentencing hearing, and further stipulated that the Court may
use the facts in the presentence report not objected to by Jeter
in finding a factual basis for the plea.
3
(4th Cir.) (stating elements of § 924(c) offense), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 2689 (2014).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Jeter, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Jeter requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Jeter.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4