UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JEROME BAY BROTHER JULIUS
BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 15-1408, 15-1409 (RDM)
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN
AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jerome Brown, proceeding pro se, sued Defendant Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority (WMATA) and others on February 2, 2015, in the Superior Court for the
District of Columbia. See No. 15-1408, Dkt. 1-1. The Defendants removed to this Court on
August 28, 2015. See No. 15-1408, Dkt. 1. Brown then filed a nearly identical complaint
against the same defendants on February 3, 2015, in the Superior Court, see No. 15-1409, Dkt. 1-
1, and Defendants again removed the action to this Court. See No. 15-1409, Dkt. 1. The Court
consolidated the cases in a Minute Order on November 19, 2015. The complaints in both cases
consist of a string of often unrelated words and names. It appears that Brown is asking for
$30,000. He uses the phrase “false arrest” at one point, and he uses other phrases (such as “order
denying as moot motion to amend complaint” and “fail to file notice of appearance as counsel”)
that might refer to court orders from other cases he has previously filed, but they—as far as the
court can discern—are not relevant to this case.
Defendants moved to dismiss one of the cases on October 2, 2015, see No. 15-1409, Dkt.
9, and the other on October 13, 2015, see No. 15-1408, Dkt. 8. In the second of the two cases,
No. 15-1409, Brown filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, but that brief, like the
complaints, is incomprehensible. See No. 15-1409, Dkt. 10. On November 20, 2015, after
consolidating the cases, the Court issued an Order that: (1) explained to Brown that he risked
having the first of the cases dismissed if he did not oppose the motion to dismiss; (2) warned
Brown that if he failed to address any particular argument raised by Defendants in either case,
that argument may be treated as conceded; and (3) granted Brown nearly one month to file an
opposition to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss in the first case and to supplement his
opposition in the second case. See No. 15-1408, Dkt. 12. In that same Order, the Court
explained to Brown that his complaints were not in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 8(a) and that he should show cause why the Court should not dismiss the
complaints for that reason. Id. at 2–3.
On the same day that the Court ordered Brown to show cause why the cases should not
be dismissed, it also issued a separate Minute Order directing the deputy clerk to send a copy of
the Court’s Order and the separate Minute Order to both the address listed on the docket sheet
and another address found in the record. See Minute Order, November 20, 2015. The Court
further ordered Defendants to email copies of these same documents to Brown. Id. The mail the
Court sent was returned as undeliverable, and Brown has not provided any forwarding address.
Nor has he responded to the Court’s November 20, 2015, Order.
Rule 8(a) requires that a “pleading that states a claim for relief” must include both “a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the court already has
jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support” and “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The Rule is designed to “give the
defendant notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Court recognizes that complaints filed by pro se litigants are subject to more forgiving
standards than those filed by members of the bar. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). Even with that caveat, however, Brown’s complaints fail to meet the standards of Rule
8(a) because they are not “plain.” They do not explain or even state the basis for the Court’s
jurisdiction, the cause of action under which Brown sues, or any facts that could plausibly
support a claim for relief. They are instead unintelligible filings by a litigant who is subject to
pre-filing restrictions in two other federal district courts. See Brown v. Chevy Chase Bank, No.
3:10-cv-381, 2012 WL 8304344, at *1 (E.D. Va. July 3, 2012) (noting that Brown is subject to
pre-filing restrictions in the District Court for Maryland and the District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia). 1 The Court will therefore sua sponte DISMISS the complaints without
prejudice. See Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995) (acknowledging that a district
court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint under Rule 8(a) (citation omitted)); Tanner v.
Neal, 232 Fed. App’x 924, 924–25 (11th Cir. 2007) (same); see also Nicole v. Nat’l Savings &
Trust Co., 250 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (affirming a district court’s dismissal of a complaint
under Rule 8(a) because “[w]e cannot discover what claim the complaint is intended to make”);
Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668–69 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding no abuse of discretion where a
district court dismissed a claim without prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)).
1
Brown is also enjoined from filing cases in this Court in forma pauperis. See Brown v. Lyons
Lane Ltd. P’ship, No. 10-mc-7, Dkt. 3 (D.D.C., Mar. 1, 2010).
The Court grants Brown leave to refile within 30 days an amended complaint that cures
the existing deficiencies. Because the cases are redundant and have been consolidated, he need
file only one amended complaint. But “[i]f Mr. [Brown] files an amended complaint that merely
recycles the complaint presently before the Court it may be dismissed with prejudice.” Hamrick
v. United Nations, No. 10-857, 2010 WL 3324721, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2010) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Because the Court has dismissed the complaint sua sponte, the Defendants’ motions to
dismiss, see No. 15-1408, Dkt. 8; No. 15-1409, Dkt. 9 are DENIED as moot.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Randolph D. Moss
RANDOLPH D. MOSS
United States District Judge
Date: February 5, 2016