2016 IL App (2d) 131345
No. 2-13-1345
Opinion filed February 10, 2016
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Winnebago County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 11-CF-2763
)
BRANDON LEWIS SAGO, ) Honorable
) Gary V. Pumilia,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Hutchinson and Hudson concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In this direct appeal of his first-degree murder (felony murder) conviction (720 ILCS 5/9-
1(a)(3) (West 2010)), defendant, Brandon Lewis Sago, argues only that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury about an off-duty police officer’s status as a peace officer and his right to use
force. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On October 1, 2011, at approximately 10:30 p.m., three individuals, including defendant,
all with their faces covered, entered Marie’s Pizza in Rockford. One of the individuals, later
2016 IL App (2d) 131345
identified as Lamar Coates, 1 pointed a gun at the restaurant owner, Vincent Tarara, and
demanded money. Defendant and Desmond Bellmon stood behind Coates. Tarara argued with
Coates, who continued to demand money and pushed the gun to Tarara’s forehead. Coates was
very angry and aggravated. Coates pushed the gun into Tarara’s chest, and Tarara stepped
backward. Coates then turned around and pointed the gun at the head of a customer, Frank
Pobjecky, who was an off-duty Winnebago County sheriff’s deputy. Pobjecky had been
watching television while waiting for a pizza. Tarara asked Coates to calm down and said that
he would get the money. Coates lowered the gun, and Tarara grabbed it. The two men fell to the
floor. Defendant and Bellmon joined the struggle to retrieve Coates’s gun.
¶4 Pobjecky testified that, when the gun was pointed at him, he knew instantly that his life
was in danger. “I mean, at any moment I was just expecting to be shot in my face.” Pursuant to
his police training, Pobjecky assessed the situation as one of “deadly threat.” Pobjecky did not
have his service weapon on his person. However, he had known Tarara for around five years,
and he knew that Tarara often wore a holstered firearm concealed under his shirt. When Tarara
grabbed Coates’s gun and a struggle ensued, Pobjecky lifted Tarara’s shirt and retrieved Tarara’s
gun from its holster. One of the intruders charged toward Pobjecky, while the other two
continued to fight Tarara for Coates’s weapon. Pobjecky fired two shots at the individual
charging him. Pobjecky did not, at that point, know who possessed Coates’s gun, so, he testified,
he viewed everyone in the restaurant as a deadly threat and had to suspect that everyone was
armed. The other suspects were moving around, and he fired the gun in their direction. While
1
Coates was tried and convicted separately. In People v. Coates, 2015 IL App (2d)
130762-U, this court affirmed his conviction, rejecting virtually the identical argument raised
herein.
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engaged with the assailants, a fourth assailant, later identified as Michael Sago, Jr. (hereinafter
Sago; apparently, defendant’s cousin), entered the restaurant. Pobjecky was concerned about the
possible existence of assailants outside of the restaurant. He did not know how many times he
fired the gun or whether he had hit anyone, but he discharged all of the bullets. Ultimately, Sago
was shot three times and died at the scene. Pobjecky testified that, between 2002 and 2006, he
served two combat tours in Iraq and had been confronted with deadly force there; however, he
said, the October 1, 2011, incident was “the closest I’ve been to death, ever.”
¶5 At trial, defendant repeatedly suggested that he was not guilty of felony murder because
Pobjecky’s conduct was excessive and not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
attempted robbery. For example, in opening, defendant asserted that the evidence would show
that Pobjecky “gunned down” Sago. On cross-examination, defense counsel examined with
Pobjecky the surveillance video of the shooting, asking whether Pobjecky agreed that, when he
shot at them, the assailants appeared to be “fleeing” or moving toward the door. Counsel
presented Pobjecky with a copy of the “Winnebago County Sheriff’s Department Standard
Operating Procedures” and questioned him about the use-of-force guidelines therein, suggesting
that, because the suspects appeared to be heading toward the door, Pobjecky used more force
than necessary for the scale of the threat. In closing, he again argued that Pobjecky’s actions
were not warranted or justified, because the evidence showed that Sago was shot in the back and
was leaving when he died. He argued that Pobjecky, as an off-duty police officer, should have
practiced some restraint and that his actions were not the “calculating actions of a trained police
officer.” Counsel told the jury that, based on Pobjecky’s testimony on cross-examination, it was
clear that he did not follow the sheriff department’s use-of-force protocol and that he exceeded
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the force appropriate for the situation. As such, his actions could not have been reasonably
foreseeable.
¶6 In contrast, the State tried to refocus the jury’s attention on defendant’s actions. For
example, in closing, the State argued:
“So don’t get sidetracked. Stay focused, because this is People vs. Brandon Sago.
This is not about Frank Pobjecky’s actions other than doing the duty of a law
enforcement officer when he found himself in the middle of an armed robbery. He
wasn’t even carrying his service revolver. He’s off duty, technically, but he’s never off
duty officially, because he’s a police officer.”
Further, the State noted that Pobjecky did not intend to wear “two hats” that night. “He finds
himself in the middle of something [and] he has to[,] as a sworn peace officer[,] take action to
preserve the peace, and that’s what he tried to do.” Finally, the State argued that the jury should
disregard defendant’s argument that Pobjecky’s actions broke the chain of events and thus were
not reasonably foreseeable:
“Their co-confederate in crime was killed during the course of a forceful felony.
And he knows that it was foreseeable because they went there with a loaded gun. ***
You have the loaded gun for a reason. You have it because you’re going to use it if you
encounter resistance. And when you take that risk ***. *** It’s a possibility that
somebody might be killed. Somebody might get shot. Somebody might die as a result of
the chain of events you set in motion. And that’s what happened here.”
¶7 The court provided the jury with two instructions relevant to this appeal. First, Illinois
Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 4.08 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter, IPI Criminal 4th),
defines a “peace officer” as:
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2016 IL App (2d) 131345
“Any person who, by virtue of his office or public employment, is vested by law with a
duty to maintain public order or to make arrests for offenses, whether that duty extends to
all offenses or is limited to specific offenses.”
Defendant objected only that the instruction was not relevant. The court disagreed.
¶8 Second, IPI Criminal 4th, No. 24-25.12 provides:
“A peace officer need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest
because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest. He is justified in the use of
any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the arrest or to defend
[himself or another] from bodily harm while making the arrest.
However, he is justified in using force likely to cause death or great bodily harm
only when he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent
[1] death or great bodily harm to [himself or another]
[or]
[2] the arrest from being defeated by resistance or escape and the person to be
arrested has committed or attempted [armed robbery] which involves the infliction or
threatened infliction of great bodily harm.
[or]
[3] the arrest from being defeated by resistance or escape and the person to be
arrested is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon or otherwise indicates that he
will endanger human life or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested without delay.”
(Emphasis added.)
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2016 IL App (2d) 131345
¶9 Defendant objected only that the instruction was already covered by other self-defense
instructions (which were given over his objection that they were not applicable). The court
disagreed.
¶ 10 The jury convicted defendant of felony murder. The court sentenced defendant to 37
years’ imprisonment and denied his motion for a new trial. Defendant appeals.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in providing the jury with IPI Criminal 4th,
Nos. 4.08 and 24-25.12. Defendant notes that Pobjecky was not wearing a police uniform, did
not identify himself as a police officer, did not attempt to arrest any of the armed-robbery
suspects, and did not order the suspects to submit to police authority. Further, defendant notes
that Pobjecky’s status as a police officer was not an element of the offenses with which
defendant was charged. Accordingly, defendant argues, the instructions tended to confuse and
mislead the jury by permitting it to consider a peace officer’s right to use deadly force and
“impermissibly shifting their focus from a determination of proximate causation of the
defendant’s actions surrounding [Sago’s] death to a consideration of the reasonableness of
Pobjecky’s actions.” Defendant argues that the instructions suggested to the jury that, if
Pobjecky acted reasonably as a peace officer, his actions could not have broken the chain of
foreseeability and proximate causation required to sustain a conviction of first-degree felony
murder. We reject defendant’s arguments.
¶ 13 Jury instructions convey the legal rules applicable to the evidence and guide the jury
toward a proper verdict. People v. Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d 53, 65 (2008). Instructions should not be
given if they are not supported by either the evidence or the law. Id. We review for an abuse of
discretion a trial court’s determination that there is “some evidence” justifying an instruction. Id.
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¶ 14 Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that “some evidence”
justified giving the jury instructions at issue. The trial court could have reasonably determined
that it was appropriate to inform the jury of the standards for deciding whether Pobjecky, as a
police officer, reacted properly in trying to prevent the robbery and to protect the safety of
himself and others. Indeed, defendant repeatedly argued that Pobjecky’s actions were
inappropriate and excessive and that therefore Sago’s death at the hands of Pobjecky was not
foreseeable. Thus it was clearly no abuse of discretion for the trial court to instruct the jury that
an officer could, as a matter of law, react with deadly force to prevent death or great bodily harm
to himself or others. The facts that Pobjecky was not in uniform and did not announce himself as
an officer or try to effectuate an arrest, or that defendant was not charged with a crime of which
the status of a police officer is an element, are, in our view, irrelevant. Defendant put at issue the
reasonableness of Pobjecky’s actions, for he was trying to establish that the actions were so
outrageous that they were not reasonably foreseeable. Therefore, it was not an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to provide instructions clarifying those actions.
¶ 15 Further, defendant argues that, as a result of the instructions, the jury might have been
misled, confused, or distracted away from focusing on defendant’s actions to considering instead
the reasonableness of Pobjecky’s actions. First, we note that he points to nothing in the record to
support such an inference. Second, as noted above, we suspect that this is exactly what
defendant hoped would happen. Indeed, it was defendant who repeatedly challenged Pobjecky’s
actions to draw attention away from his own causal link to the murder. See People v. Lowery,
178 Ill. 2d 462, 465 (1997) (liability for felony murder attaches for deaths proximately caused by
the defendant’s forcible felony). The State, in contrast, reminded the jury to stay focused and to
remember that it was charged with assessing only whether Sago’s death was foreseeable in light
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of the chain of events defendant and his accomplices set in motion. In sum, there was no abuse
of discretion, and we reject defendant’s arguments.
¶ 16 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 17 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County.
As part of our judgment, we grant the State’s request that defendant be assessed $50 as costs for
this appeal. 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2014); see also People v. Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d 166, 179
(1978).
¶ 18 Affirmed.
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