MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Feb 12 2016, 8:22 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kimberly A. Jackson Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General
Robert J. Henke
Deputy Attorney General
David E. Corey
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the matter of: February 12, 2016
E.G. and H.G., Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1506-JC-488
A.B. (Mother), Appeal from the Marion Superior
Appellant-Respondent, Court
The Honorable Danielle Gaughan,
v. Magistrate
The Honorable Marilyn Moores,
The Indiana Department of Judge
Child Services, Trial Court Cause No.
Appellee-Petitioner. 49D09-1410-JC-2570
49D09-1410-JC-2571
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] A.B. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s adjudication of her minor children,
E.G. and H.G., as children in need of services (CHINS). The sole issue for our
review is whether the evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that
the children were CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1.
Concluding that the evidence does not support the juvenile court’s
determination, we reverse the CHINS adjudication.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Mother has two daughters, E.G. born on March 19, 2010, and H.G., born on
May 30, 2014. A few months after H.G.’s birth, Mother was hospitalized and
told one of the nurses, “[y]ou need to sacrifice your children as well as I did.”
Tr. p. 75. After Mother’s mother contacted DCS with concerns about her
daughter’s mental health, DCS case manager Kevin Kapp interviewed Mother
at the hospital. Mother was sluggish and sedated. She denied that her
“sacrifice” statement referred to killing her children.
[3] When Kapp interviewed Mother a week later, after her release from the
hospital, Mother appeared more coherent. She explained that her prior health
condition might have been related to her thyroid or to post-partum depression,
which she suffered from after the birth of her first child. Mother told Kapp that
she had been prescribed Risperdal.
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[4] At the end of October, Kapp received a report that Mother had been
hospitalized again. When Kapp went to the hospital to interview Mother, she
was sedated and told Kapp that she had stopped taking her medicine. Kapp
described Mother as “zombie-like.” Tr. p. 49.
[5] A few days later, DCS filed a petition alleging that both children were CHINS.
At the initial hearing, Mother acknowledged that she was not able to care for
her children at that time because her medication left her “groggy [and] very
unable to focus.” Tr. p. 20. Additional testimony revealed that doctors were
working on adjusting the dosage of the medication. The juvenile court placed
the children with their father, who had previously had the children in his care
and had a good relationship with them. Mother was granted supervised
parenting time.
[6] In early December, Mother’s tongue became swollen, and she was sluggish.
The doctor realized that Mother was having an allergic reaction to the
medication prescribed for her post-partum condition. The doctor discontinued
the medication, and Mother suffered no more symptoms of post-partum
depression.
[7] At the April 6, 2015, fact-finding hearing on the CHINS petition, Adam Tinker,
the DCS case manager that was assigned to Mother’s case in December 2014,
testified that Mother had been participating in a home-based case management
program as well as home-based therapy and had cooperated with all services.
She had stable employment in the security department at Menard’s and stable
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housing that included utility assistance. Tinker testified that DCS planned to
transition the children back into Mother’s home and that he had no concern
that placing the children back in Mother’s home would create anxiety or stress
for her. According to Tinker, both Mother and Father were “deeply involved in
their children’s li[ves].” Tr. p. 61.
[8] Home-based therapist Kristina Shannon, who had been meeting with Mother
weekly since December 2014, testified that she and Mother had developed a
mental health and personal safety plan for Mother should her mental health
symptoms return. According to Shannon, Mother has support from family and
could obtain immediate assistance should she need it. Shannon had no concern
that children’s return to Mother’s home would trigger her mental health issues
or cause her stress.
[9] Last, Mother testified that she had not taken any medication since December
2014. She had stable housing and employment, and the children had begun
overnight visits. She had family available to watch her children if their father
was out of town, and she had resources available should she need help. When
asked what she meant seven months before when she mentioned sacrificing her
children, Mother explained that she meant to, “put everything to a side and put
God above everything . . . and having God in your household and teaching
your kids how to love for God.” Tr. p. 76.
[10] At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated the children to
be CHINS. Specifically, the court explained as follows:
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Here’s what’s worrying me about this and that is . . . we have
some mental health issues . . . seems to be centered around post-
partum. But, and I know you have a safety plan in place, but
these children are so young. You’re doing everything right. You
really are. You got a job, you got a home. You’re sweet as you
can be and I think you love your children very much. But I feel
like, since this was initiated, and you were at that state where you
were when it started that I need to see you through this transition
to ensure the safety of the children.
Tr. p. 77-78. Mother appeals the adjudication.
Discussion and Decision
[11] Mother’s sole argument is that there is insufficient evidence to support the
juvenile court’s adjudication that her children are CHINS. Not every
endangered child is a CHINS permitting the State’s parens patriae intrusion into
the ordinarily private sphere of the family. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind.
2014). Rather a CHINS adjudication under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1
requires three basic elements: 1) that the parent’s actions or inactions have
seriously endangered the child; 2) that the child’s needs are unmet; and 3)
perhaps most critically, that those needs are unlikely to be met without State
coercion. Id. In full, the statute provides as follows:
A child is a [CHINS] if before the child becomes eighteen (18)
years of age:
(1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously
endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of
the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child
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with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
education, or supervision; and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that
(A)the child is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive
intervention of the court.
The final element guards against unwarranted State interference in family life,
reserving that intrusion for families who lack the ability to provide for their
children, not merely where they encounter difficulty in meeting their children’s
needs. Id.
[12] DCS has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a child
is a CHINS. V.H. v. Indiana DCS, 967 N.E.2d 1066, 1072 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)
(citing Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3). When reviewing a CHINS determination, we
neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. In re K.D., 962
N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012). We consider only the evidence favorable to the
judgment and the reasonable inferences raised by that evidence. In re M.W.,
869 N.E.2d 1267, 1270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
[13] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that at the time of the April 2015
hearing, Mother had cooperated with all recommended services. She had not
suffered from any post-partum or mental health issues - or taken any
medication for these conditions - since December 2014. She also had a plan
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should her symptoms return. Mother had stable employment and housing, and
both the DCS case manager and Mother’s therapist testified that they had no
concerns that placing the children with Mother would create anxiety and stress
for her.
[14] This evidence, even viewed most favorably to the judgment, cannot reasonably
support an inference that Mother was likely to need the court’s coercive
intervention for any reason. A CHINS finding should consider the family’s
condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it was heard. S.D., 2
N.E.3d at 1290.
[15] A CHINS adjudication may have long-lasting collateral consequences for a
family. Id. at 1284. Accordingly, the intrusion of a CHINS adjudication must
be reserved for families who cannot meet their needs without coercion. Id. The
facts of this case do not justify subjecting Mother to State compulsion. See id.
We therefore reverse the juvenile court’s adjudication.
[16] Reversed.
Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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