February 16 2016
DA 15-0397
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA Case Number: DA 15-0397
2016 MT 39N
ZACHARY SHAFFER,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondent and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-Second Judicial District,
In and For the County of Carbon, Cause No. DV 15-40
Honorable Blair Jones, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Zachary Shaffer, Self-Represented, Shelby, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, C. Mark Fowler, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Alex Nixon, Carbon County Attorney, Red Lodge, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 3, 2016
Decided: February 16, 2016
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Patricia Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by unpublished opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 In 2013, a jury convicted Zachary Shaffer of felony assault on a police officer.
Shortly thereafter, and in a separate criminal action, Shaffer entered a nolo contendere
plea to a charge of intimidation. Following sentencing in both cases, Shaffer appealed his
judgments claiming, among other things, he received ineffective assistance of counsel
(IAC). This Court affirmed the judgments in a non-cite opinion, State v. Shaffer, 2014
MT 340N, 377 Mont. 436, 348 P.3d 172, and determined that Shaffer’s IAC claims could
not be reviewed on direct appeal.
¶3 In April 2015, Shaffer filed a pro se Petition for Postconviction Relief (PCR) with
the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Carbon County, claiming his trial and
appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance and that he was maliciously prosecuted.
In conclusory statements, he set forth several examples of counsels’ failure to adequately
represent him. He further indicated that he would develop facts supporting his
allegations in an “amended petition.” The District Court denied and dismissed Shaffer’s
petition finding that Shaffer failed to provide any substantive evidence in support of his
conclusory allegations. The court further observed that while a petitioner is permitted
one amendment of an original PCR petition, it is inappropriate to submit a deficient
original petition in anticipation of submitting an amended one.
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¶4 In October 2015, Shaffer filed a pro se brief on appeal to this Court. He argues
that the District Court erred when it denied his petition without appointing counsel for
him or providing him an evidentiary hearing. The State responds that Shaffer’s PCR
petition was properly denied as deficient and that Shaffer was not statutorily or
constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel for his PCR proceeding. Moreover, the
State asserts that Shaffer’s petition before this Court seeking reversal of the District
Court’s ruling was deficient in its failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
¶5 Section 46-21-104, MCA, provides, in relevant part:
(1) The petition for postconviction relief must:
. . .
(c) identify all facts supporting the grounds for relief set forth in the
petition and have attached affidavits, records, or other evidence establishing
the existence of those facts.
Shaffer’s PCR petition before the District Court failed to satisfy this statutory
requirement, justifying the District Court’s dismissal and denial of the petition.
¶6 Furthermore, Shaffer failed to properly brief and argue his claims on appeal before
this Court. M. R. App. P. 12(1)(g) requires parties to cite to relevant authorities and
statutes in support of their arguments on appeal. Shaffer fails to cite to any statute, rule,
or applicable case to support his claim that the District Court was required to appoint
counsel or conduct an evidentiary hearing on his IAC claims. “We have repeatedly held
that it is not this Court’s obligation to conduct legal research on behalf of a party or to
develop legal analysis that might support a party’s position.” State v. Cybulski, 2009 MT
70, ¶ 13, 349 Mont. 429, 204 P.3d 7.
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¶7 While self-represented litigants are given a certain amount of latitude in legal
proceedings, we cannot allow such latitude to prejudice the opposing party. It is
reasonable to expect all litigants to comply in most respects with the applicable
procedural rules. Greenup v. Russell, 2000 MT 154, ¶ 15, 300 Mont. 136, 3 P.3d 124.
Here, Shaffer has failed to comply with these rules and has failed to demonstrate error on
the part of the District Court.
¶8 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the District Court’s findings were not
clearly erroneous nor were its conclusions of law incorrect. Davis v. State, 2004 MT 112,
¶ 13, 321 Mont. 118, 88 P.3d 1285.
¶9 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of
our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for unpublished opinions. In the opinion of
this Court, this case presents questions clearly controlled by settled law.
¶10 Affirmed.
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
We Concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ JIM RICE
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