This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0581
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Brandon Christopher Seals,
Appellant.
Filed February 1, 2016
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge *
Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-14-2519
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
James E. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Stacy Ann St. George, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi Elstan Forte Axelson,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.
*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant Brandon Seals challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the
district court’s verdict convicting him of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person
and possession of a firearm with a removed or altered serial number. Because the
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support the district court’s finding that Seals
constructively possessed the firearm, we affirm.
DECISION
When reviewing a verdict, an appellate court considers whether the legitimate
inferences drawn from the evidence would permit the fact-finder to conclude that the
defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Pratt, 813 N.W.2d 868, 874
(Minn. 2012). Review is limited to a close analysis of the record to determine whether the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow
the fact-finder to reach the verdict that it did. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn.
1989). The reviewing court must assume “the [fact-finder] believed the state’s witnesses
and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108
(Minn. 1989). The reviewing court will not disturb the verdict if the fact-finder, acting
with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude the defendant was guilty of the charged
offenses. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004). “[R]eview [of]
criminal bench trials [is] the same as [that of] jury trials when determining whether the
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evidence is sufficient to sustain convictions.” State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn.
1998).
The parties agree that the evidence establishing constructive possession in this case
is circumstantial. An appellate court applies heightened scrutiny when reviewing a verdict
based on circumstantial evidence. Pratt, 813 N.W.2d at 874. The circumstances proved
must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis. Id.
Minnesota courts employ a two-step process when reviewing convictions based on
circumstantial evidence. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2010). First, the
reviewing court identifies the circumstances proved. Id. In doing so, the court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Pratt, 813 N.W.2d at 874 (stating
that the supreme court had considered the evidence “in the light most favorable to the
verdict” when determining the circumstances proved). The court defers to the fact-finder’s
acceptance and rejection of proof and to its credibility determinations. Andersen, 784
N.W.2d at 329; see also State v. Hughes, 749 N.W.2d 307, 312 (Minn. 2008) (stating that
the fact-finder is “in the best position to weigh the credibility of the evidence and thus
determine which witnesses to believe and how much weight to give their testimony”).
Next, the reviewing court examines the reasonableness of the inferences that can be
drawn from the circumstances proved, including inferences of innocence as well as guilt.
Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 329. All of the circumstances proved must be consistent with
guilt and inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis negating guilt. Id. The reviewing
court does not defer to the fact-finder’s choice between rational hypotheses. Id. at 329-30.
But appellate courts “view the circumstantial evidence as a whole, not as isolated facts.”
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State v. Hurd, 819 N.W.2d 591, 599 (Minn. 2012). And the “[s]tate does not have the
burden of removing all doubt, but of removing all reasonable doubt.” State v. Al-Naseer,
788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). A rational hypothesis negating guilt must be based
on more than mere conjecture or speculation. Id. at 480; Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 330.
“Possession of a firearm may be proved through actual or constructive possession.”
State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn. 2015).
The purpose of the constructive-possession doctrine is
to include within the possession statute those cases where the
state cannot prove actual or physical possession at the time of
arrest but where the inference is strong that the defendant at
one time physically possessed [an item] and did not abandon
his possessory interest in the [item] but rather continued to
exercise dominion and control over it up to the time of the
arrest.
State v. Florine, 303 Minn. 103, 104-05, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (1975). To prove
constructive possession under the Florine test, “the [s]tate must show either (1) that the
prohibited item was found ‘in a place under defendant’s exclusive control to which other
people did not normally have access,’ or (2) if the prohibited item was found ‘in a place to
which others had access, there is a strong probability (inferable from other evidence) that
defendant was at the time consciously exercising dominion and control over it.’” Salyers,
858 N.W.2d at 159 (quoting Florine, 303 Minn. at 105, 226 N.W.2d at 611). “Proximity
is an important factor in establishing constructive possession” and “an item that is
constructively possessed may be possessed by more than one person.” State v. Porte, 832
N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted). “An offender who place[s] a
firearm where it is discovered has constructive possession of the firearm.” Salcido-Perez
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v. State, 615 N.W.2d 846, 846 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Sept. 13, 2000);
see also State v. Smith, 619 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn. App. 2000) (“[A] defendant may
constructively possess a firearm if he placed the firearm where it was discovered.”), review
denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2001).
In this case, the evidence is clear that the gun was found in a place that was not
under Seals’s exclusive control and to which other people had access. Thus, the state had
to prove, under the second prong of the Florine test, a “strong probability” that Seals was
“consciously exercising dominion and control” over the gun. See Florine, 303 Minn. at
105, 226 N.W.2d at 611.
The circumstances proved include: (1) the van where the gun was found had three
rows of seats; (2) Seals was sitting in the front passenger seat, A.E.—the vehicle’s owner—
was sitting in the driver’s seat, and L.H. was sitting in the third row of seats; (3) police
observed Seals in the vehicle bending forward and down, twisting his body, and looking
around; (4) the gun was found under the second row of seats behind the front passenger
seat; (5) the gun could not have been placed under the seat until shortly before the police
discovered it because it would have slid around on the van floor had it been there while the
vehicle was moving; (6) A.E. and L.H. were excluded as possible contributors to the DNA
found on the gun; (7) Seals could not be excluded as a contributor to the DNA on the gun;
(8) 85.8 percent of the general population could be excluded as contributors to the DNA
on the handle of the gun, and 99 percent of the general population could be excluded as
contributors to the DNA on the gun’s trigger. These circumstances are consistent with the
district court’s conclusion that Seals placed the gun under the seat shortly before it was
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discovered by police and thus consciously exercised dominion and control over it. See
Salcido-Perez, 615 N.W.2d at 846.
Seals first argues that police observed him “bending forward and down,” which he
claims “is inconsistent with turning around and placing a gun under the seat.” He also
contends that there was a drawer under the front passenger seat, “making it impossible for
[him] to slide the gun under his seat all the way to the second bench row seat.” But the
district court found, consistent with Sergeant Stoler’s testimony, that in addition to bending
forward and down, Seals was “twisting.” And, although there was a drawer under Seals’s
seat, Sergeant Stoler testified that there was an open area with no center console between
the two front seats. The circumstances proved are therefore consistent with the hypothesis
that Seals leaned forward, twisted his body towards the driver’s seat, and placed the gun
under the second row of seats by reaching or sliding the gun through the empty area
between the two front seats.
Seals next argues that the circumstances proved are consistent with the hypothesis
that one of A.E.’s coworkers left the gun in the van earlier that day and that it was not
discovered until the police searched the van. Seals acknowledges A.E.’s testimony that no
one other than A.E., Seals, and L.H. were in the van that day and that he would have seen
the gun had it been in the vehicle earlier in the day. But Seals states that the district court
found A.E. generally not credible. Seals’s argument ignores Sergeant Stoler’s testimony
and the district court’s finding that Sergeant Stoler “believed the gun had recently been put
under the van seat because, if it had been in that position for any length of time, it would
have shifted around while the vehicle was moving.” The district court clearly credited this
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testimony and/or A.E.’s testimony because it found that “[t]he testimony was clear that the
gun was placed under the middle seat of the van that evening. Only one, or more, of the
three passengers in the van placed it under the middle seat.” This court defers to the fact-
finder’s acceptance and rejection of proof and to its credibility determinations. Andersen,
784 N.W.2d at 329.
Seals also argues that “[A.E.] or [L.H.] placed the gun under the seat but their DNA
profiles were not transferred because [A.E.] or [L.H.] wiped the gun to remove their DNA
or their DNA was never on the gun because [A.E.] or [L.H.] handled the gun with a glove,
shirt or other item that would not transfer their DNA.” The forensic scientist could not say
definitively that Seals’s DNA was on the gun. It therefore is not beyond the realm of
possibility that Seals never touched the gun and A.E. or L.H. placed the gun under the seat
without transferring DNA. But, given Seals’s furtive movements and the fact that Seals
could not be excluded as a contributor to the DNA on the gun, while the two other
individuals in the van and a very high percentage of the general population could be
excluded, this theory is not rational. This scenario also seems improbable because Sergeant
Stoler testified that L.H. was not making any abnormal movements in the vehicle and,
although A.E. was moving, he was not reaching down and he was not moving as
dramatically as Seals. “[P]ossibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a . . . verdict
so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.” State v.
Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn. 2002) (quotation omitted).
Finally, Seals argues that L.H. was left unsupervised in the vehicle after Seals and
A.E. were removed and was still in the vehicle when the officers discovered the gun. Seals
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claims that L.H. could have hidden the gun during this period. But Sergeant Stoler and
Officer Carlson testified, and the district court found, that all three men were removed from
the vehicle before Officer Carlson conducted the search. Moreover, L.H. testified that the
officers had all three men exit the van at the same time. Sergeant Stoler’s testimony does
suggest that there may have been a brief period of time that L.H. was alone and
unsupervised in the van while Sergeant Stoler was pat searching Seals and Officer Carlson
was asking A.E. for consent to search the vehicle. But it seems unlikely that this period
was much longer than a few seconds. And, even if L.H. was left alone and unsupervised
in the vehicle for a long enough period to hide the gun, the DNA evidence again makes
this scenario extremely unlikely. This hypothesis also does not explain why Seals was
making suspicious movements while L.H. was behaving normally.
Because the circumstances proved are consistent with the hypothesis that Seals
constructively possessed the gun and inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis, we
conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Seals’s convictions.
Affirmed.
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