This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1293
In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
L. S., E. B. and H. J., Parents
Filed February 1, 2016
Affirmed
Worke, Judge
Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-JV-15-117
John E. Mack, New London, Minnesota (for appellant)
Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent
county)
John W. Mueller, Litchfield, Minnesota (for respondent E.B.)
Dawn Weber, New London, Minnesota (for respondent H.J.)
Penny Johnson, Willmar, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the termination of her parental rights, arguing that
termination is not in her children’s best interests. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2007, appellant-mother L.S. gave birth to I.B. In July 2008, I.B. resided with a
foster family for four days while L.S. was in jail. From August 18 through December 5,
2008, L.S. and I.B. resided at a chemical-dependency treatment facility and a halfway
house. L.S. and I.B. next resided with B.S., L.S.’s ex-husband, until April 2011. L.S.
stated that she and I.B. left for a women’s shelter because B.S. assaulted her.
After leaving the women’s shelter, L.S. and I.B. lived on their own for a few
months before moving in with E.B., I.B.’s father. On January 4, 2012, law enforcement
searched the residence and arrested L.S. and E.B. for possessing methamphetamine. L.S.
and I.B. tested positive for methamphetamine. From January 2012 through January 2013,
L.S. spent time in jail, chemical-dependency treatment, a shared apartment, and a motel
before moving into an apartment in Willmar. I.B. was in foster care from January
through February 2012 and from May 2012 until June 2013.
In July 2013, L.S. gave birth to H.B. One week later, L.S. consumed bath salts
and tested positive for amphetamine. In April 2014, L.S., I.B., and H.B. moved into a
house. Shortly after, A.C., L.S’s boyfriend at the time, moved in. In August 2014, A.C.
became intoxicated, threatened L.S. with a knife, and attempted to burn down the house
while I.B. and H.B. slept upstairs. A.C. was charged with assault but convicted of
disorderly conduct after L.S. asked the district court to send him to treatment.
A.C. returned from jail and continued to reside with L.S. In February 2015, A.C.
held L.S. hostage in her basement for three days. A.C. threw L.S. through a glass table
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and a mirror, choked her, and pulled out her hair. A.C. brought I.B. and H.B. into the
basement to visit L.S., and L.S. escaped by playing dead and crawling through a window.
On April 30, 2015, L.S., I.B., and H.B. were staying at W.N.’s home in Benson.
Law enforcement located I.B. and another child walking to a store. The children were
returned to W.N.’s home when law enforcement made contact with L.S., who appeared to
be under the influence of “narcotics.” Law enforcement located drug paraphernalia in
W.N.’s home that tested positive for methamphetamine. The paraphernalia was located
in areas easily accessible to the children. L.S. was arrested and later admitted to using
methamphetamine for multiple weeks. L.S. and H.B. tested positive for
methamphetamine.
The county petitioned to terminate L.S.’s parental rights. After a court trial, the
district court terminated L.S.’s parental rights to I.B. and H.B. The district court granted
custody of I.B. to her father, E.B. The district court granted custody of H.B. to her father,
H.J. E.B. subsequently terminated his parental rights to I.B. L.S. appeals the termination
of her parental rights.
DECISION
Statutory criteria
When reviewing a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights, “we will
review the district court’s findings of the . . . basic facts for clear error, but we review its
determination of whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating
parental rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B.,
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805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). Clear and
convincing evidence is required to support a termination decision. Id. at 899.
A district court may terminate parental rights if the
parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child
relationship because of a consistent pattern of specific
conduct before the child or of specific conditions directly
relating to the parent and child relationship either of which
are determined by the court to be of a duration or nature that
renders the parent unable, for the foreseeable future, to care
appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental, or emotional
needs of the child.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2014). Mental illness alone is not a statutory
ground to terminate parental rights. In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn.
1996). Additionally, “substance . . . use alone does not render a parent palpably unfit;
rather, the county must demonstrate that the parent’s substance . . . use is of a nature and
duration that renders the parent unable, for the reasonably foreseeable future, to care
appropriately for the child’s ongoing needs.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750
N.W.2d 656, 663 (Minn. 2008).
Here, the district court determined that L.S. is palpably unfit to parent due to
continued methamphetamine use, her psychological disorders, and the likelihood that
each would continue for the foreseeable future. The record supports the district court’s
finding. In 2008, L.S. entered chemical-dependency treatment. On January 4, 2012, law
enforcement arrested L.S. after finding methamphetamine in her home. In July 2013,
L.S. consumed bath salts, resulting in her testing positive for amphetamine. In April
2015, L.S. was arrested and tested positive for methamphetamine. L.S. admitted to using
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methamphetamine for three to four weeks prior to her arrest. L.S. was also diagnosed
with major depressive disorder, polysubstance abuse, and borderline personality disorder.
L.S. refuses to take Lithium as prescribed and previously self-medicated with Valium,
Adderall, and methamphetamine.
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that L.S. is
palpably unfit to parent I.B. and H.B. See In re Welfare of D.L.R.D, 656 N.W.2d 247,
251–52 (Minn. App. 2003) (affirming termination of parental rights based on parent’s
“continuing problems with improving her parenting skills, her mental health and drug
abuse, and her other substantial personal issues”); see also S.Z., 547 N.W.2d at 894
(affirming termination of parental rights based on parent’s history of mental illness and
intention to refrain from taking medication).
Best-interests analysis
L.S. argues that the best interests of her children are not served by terminating her
parental rights while retaining the parental rights of their fathers.1 “We review a district
court’s ultimate determination that termination is in a child’s best interest[s] for an abuse
of discretion.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905. A district court’s decision receives
considerable deference because “[it] is in a superior position to assess the credibility of
witnesses.” In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996). We will not
1
After the district court filed its order, E.B. voluntarily terminated his parental rights to
I.B. L.S. asserts that E.B.’s voluntary termination is outside the record for this appeal.
But, even if L.S. is correct, this court can take judicial notice of that fact. See Smisek v.
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 400 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Minn. App. 1987) (“An appellate court
may take judicial notice of a fact for the first time on appeal.”).
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overturn findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Welfare of A.D., 535
N.W.2d 643, 648 (Minn. 1995).
Before terminating parental rights, the district court must find that termination is
in the child’s best interests, and it must analyze: (1) the child’s interests in preserving the
parent-child relationship, (2) the parent’s interests in preserving the parent-child
relationship, and (3) any competing interests of the child. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.05,
subd. 3(b)(3). Competing interests include maintaining a stable environment, health
considerations, and the child’s preferences. In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4
(Minn. App. 1992). “[T]he best interests of the child are the paramount consideration,
and conflicts between the rights of the child and rights of the parents are resolved in favor
of the child.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 902.
Here, the district court found that terminating L.S.’s parental rights was in her
children’s best interests because the physical, mental, and emotional needs of the children
require stability. The district court recognized L.S.’s ongoing chemical-use issues, her
children’s exposure to methamphetamine, her inability to avoid dangerous men, and her
inability to maintain a stable residence. The record supports the district court’s findings.
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that terminating
L.S.’s parental rights was in her children’s best interests. See In re Welfare of J.J.B., 390
N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn. 1986) (recognizing the importance of stability in a child’s life
when deciding whether to terminate parental rights); In re Welfare of A.J.C., 556 N.W.2d
616, 622 (Minn. App. 1996) (affirming termination when mother failed to comply with
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her parental duties due to drug addiction and a tendency to involve herself in abusive
relationships), review denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 1997).
L.S. asserts that the district court erred because it did not specifically consider her
ability to retain a role as a “visitational parent.” But district courts are not required to
make such a finding. See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.05, subd. 3(b)(3). District courts are
not required to go into “great detail” when determining the best-interests factors. In re
Welfare of Child of W.L.P., 678 N.W.2d 703, 711 (Minn. App. 2004).
L.S. also asserts that we should follow the reasoning of appellate courts in
jurisdictions that have hesitated to terminate the parental rights of only one parent. L.S.’s
argument is unpersuasive. Decisions from other jurisdictions are not binding on appellate
courts in this state. First Constr. Co. v. Tri-S. Mortg. Inv’rs, 308 N.W.2d 298, 300
(Minn. 1981). Moreover, Minnesota permits terminating a person’s parental rights when
the other parent retains parental rights. See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 42.10, subd. 1(b)
(recognizing the ability to terminate one parent’s rights but not the other’s).
L.S. also asserts that the district court erred by failing to adequately address the
best-interests factors pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2014). Section 518.17,
subdivision 1(a) applies “for purposes of determining issues of custody and parenting
time.” District courts are not required to consider these factors in other proceedings. See
In re Paternity of B.J.H., 573 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. App. 1998) (recognizing that Minn.
Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1 (1996) applies to custody determinations).
L.S. finally relies on In re Child of Evenson to support her argument that district
courts must consider the least restrictive alternative to terminating parental rights. 729
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N.W.2d 632, 634 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn. June 19, 2007). But Evenson
addressed the transfer of legal and physical custody, not termination of parental rights.
Id. Moreover, in Evenson, we did not adopt a rule requiring district courts to consider the
“least restrictive alternative.” Id. Thus, Evenson is unpersuasive.
The record supports the district court’s findings of fact, which support its
conclusions of law terminating L.S.’s parental rights.
Affirmed.
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