J. S71009/15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
RHONDA L. BRILLA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
WILLIAM M. BRILLA, : No. 2063 WDA 2014
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order, November 14, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County
Civil Division at No. 2002-1648-CD
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN AND OTT, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 1, 2016
William M. Brilla appeals, pro se, from the order entered
November 14, 2014, by the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County,
finding him in civil contempt for failing to make payments to his ex-wife
Rhonda L. Brilla as required in the trial court’s April 12, 2013 order. We
affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history as follows:
The present appeal is the latest in a long series
of appeals in a divorce and custody matter. To say
that this case is litigious grossly understates the
matter. The initial divorce complaint was filed in
2002, and has now grown to include more than three
hundred and thirty three docket entries, and multiple
appeals to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. So
voluminous is the file, that it cannot be maintained
with the rest of the files in the local Prothonotary’s
office. Indeed, this file has its own shelf.
J. S71009/15
It is unnecessary, if not impossible, for the
Court to recite the entire factual and procedural
history of this case. Suffice it to say that this time,
[appellant] is claiming that the Court erred in finding
him in contempt on November 13, 2014 for failing to
make payments in accordance with an Order entered
on April 12, 2013. The [a]ppellant has alleged eight
errors on the part of the Trial Court in his Concise
Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal.
However, they are mostly duplicative or irrelevant,
and can simply be summarized as the Appellant feels
that the Trial Court abused its discretion in failing to
find him unable to comply with the Court’s Order of
April 12, 2013.
In an Order of January 28, 2010, the Court
ordered that both parties share an equal fifty percent
share of the marital debt at the date of separation.
Therefore, the [a]ppellant was ordered to pay
$14,363.00 in monthly installments of $400.00
beginning in April of 2010. Brilla v. Brilla, 100 A.3d
309 (Pa.Super.Ct. 2014) (table). Appellant failed to
comply with the January 28, 2010 Order; upon
[a]ppellee’s petition, in an Order dated April 12,
2013, [a]ppellant was found in contempt.
In the Order dated April 12, 2013, judgment
was entered against the [a]ppellant in the amount of
$15,363.00[,] plus the statutory interest rate of 6%
per annum. At the time of the Order, the [a]ppellant
was unemployed and struggling financially, so the
Court did not Order him to make any payments on
the judgment until he secured employment. Upon
obtaining employment, the Order then required
[a]ppellant to make payments of $250.00 per
month. Not only did the Court not require the
[a]ppellant to make payments while he was
unemployed, but the $250.00 per month amount he
was required to pay once he obtained employment
was a significant reduction from the $400.00
monthly amount he was originally ordered to pay per
the January 28, 2010 Order.
-2-
J. S71009/15
In any event, the [a]ppellant successfully did
secure employment. However, he only made
nominal payments; most of which were less than
twenty dollars. Consequently, in October of 2014,
the [a]ppellee brought a contempt petition against
the [a]ppellant.
At the contempt hearing, the Court reviewed
the [a]ppellant’s payment history regarding the
April 12, 2013 Order, as well as financial information
offered by the [a]ppellant, and other evidence
presented by the parties. The financial information
offered by the [a]ppellant himself, reveals that he
had ample funds available to make payments in
accordance with the April 12, 2013 Order. This is
particularly true when the Court disregards obviously
inflated and irrelevant expenses such as $100.00
monthly expense for an “Animal,” $100.00 monthly
expense for “Kristin,” and $35.00 monthly expense
to pay for his paramour’s fine. The [a]ppellant made
payments ranging in the amount from $1.00 to
$25.00. These payments are not in compliance with
the Court Order. Rather, these payments appear to
be meant to antagonize the [a]ppellee.
Simply put, the Court heard testimony from
both parties at the contempt hearing, considered all
of the evidence presented, and found that
[a]ppellant was able to comply with the April 12,
2013 Order. However, for whatever reason, the
[a]ppellant chose not to comply. Therefore, the
Court found him in contempt.
Trial court opinion, 4/23/15 at 1-4.
Appellant frames his statement of questions involved as follows:
1. Did the trial court demonstrate partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill-will toward the
[a]ppellant?
2. Was the trial courts [sic] order of
November 14, 2014 unreasonable when
viewed in light of it’s [sic] own order of
-3-
J. S71009/15
September 23, 2013, finding that the
[a]ppellant was complying “consistent with his
financial situation”?
3. Was the [a]ppellant denied the right to
respond to the trial courts [sic] allegations of
“obviously inflated” and “irrelevant
expenses” contained in its Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(1) opinion? (emphasis in original)
4. Does the evidence and testimony presented by
the [a]ppellee show that the [a]ppellant was
attempting to make some sort of payment
“consistent with his financial situation” and
keeping them informed regarding his financial
situation?
5. Does the evidence and testimony presented by
the [a]ppellant show progress made on the
issue of his mortgage, and that a settlement,
in compliance with the trial courts [sic] order
of April 12, 2013, was imminent?
6. Was the evidence and testimony given by the
[a]ppellant, and his witness, presented to the
trial court without objection or refute?
7. Did the trial court deliberately disregard a
possible settlement proposed by the [a]ppellee
for an amount less than $250.00 specified in
the April 12, 2013 order?
8. Did the [a]ppellee present any evidence or
testimony at the November 12 [sic], 2014
hearing that demonstrated the [a]ppellant had
any ability to strictly comply with the trial
courts [sic] order of April 12, 2013, or show
that he acted with wrongful intent? (emphasis
in original)
9. Did the trial court dispute any of the evidence
or testimony presented during the
November 14, 2015 hearing?
-4-
J. S71009/15
Appellant’s brief at 5-6.
At the outset, we note that pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), the trial
court ordered appellant to file a concise statement of matters complained of
on appeal. (Order, 3/17/15; R.R. at 376.) In his concise statement,
appellant set forth the following two issues:
1. The [c]ourt erred in finding the [appellee] not
in contempt and dismissing [appellant’s]
complaint.
2. The [c]ourt’s decision appears to stem from
bias and ill will directed toward the [appellant].
Concise statement of matters complained of on appeal, 4/6/15; R.R. at 318.
Clearly, appellant’s Rule 1925 statement does not raise, or even hint at,
issues 2 through 9 raised in his brief, and we find these issues waived.
Moreover, his Rule 1925 issue alleging error by the trial court in not finding
wife in contempt and dismissing his complaint does not relate to the
November 14, 2014 order that is the subject of this appeal. The only issue
preserved for our review is appellant’s first issue which alleges prejudice and
bias on the part of the trial court.
In considering an appeal from a contempt order, we place great
reliance upon the trial court’s discretion. Bold v. Bold, 939 A.2d 892, 894-
895 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citation omitted). As such, appellate review of a
contempt finding is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its
discretion. Id. (citation omitted).
-5-
J. S71009/15
Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with
law on facts and circumstances before the trial court
after hearing and consideration. Consequently, the
court abuses its discretion if, in resolving the issue
for decision, it misapplies the law or exercises its
discretion in a manner lacking reason. Similarly, the
trial court abuses its discretion if it does not follow
legal procedure.
Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, we will reverse an order granting or
denying a civil contempt petition only upon a showing that the trial court
misapplied the law or exercised its discretion in a manner that lacked
reason. MacDougall v. MacDougall, 49 A.3d 890, 892 (Pa.Super. 2012)
(citation omitted). Moreover, we defer to the trial court’s credibility
determinations with respect to witnesses who have appeared before it
because that court has had the opportunity to observe their demeanor.
Habjan v. Habjan, 73 A.3d 630, 644 (Pa.Super. 2013).
Generally, in civil contempt proceedings, the complainant bears the
burden of proving that the defendant failed to comply with a court order.
MacDougall, 49 A.3d at 892 (citation omitted). To sustain a finding of civil
contempt, the complainant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that (1) the contemnor had notice of the order that she alleges the
contemnor disobeyed; (2) the act constituting the alleged violation was
volitional; and (3) the contemnor acted with wrongful intent. Id. (citation
omitted).
Here, appellant does not dispute notice, volition, or wrongful intent.
Moreover, he does not contend that the trial court misapplied the law or
-6-
J. S71009/15
exercised its discretion in a manner that lacked reason. Rather, appellant
complains that the trial court had already formed its conclusions regarding
contempt prior to the hearing. (Appellant’s brief at 14.)
However, our careful review of the record finds no indication of any
partiality or bias on the part of the trial court. It is clear that the trial court
was aware of the long and litigious history of this case. The court gave
careful consideration to appellant’s ability to pay the judgment owed and
even modified its original order of April 12, 2013, to allow appellant relief
while he sought employment. The court reviewed appellant’s financial
circumstances and payment history before entering this order on appeal,
and we find its exercise of discretion free of any prejudice against appellant.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/1/2016
-7-