Opinion issued March 3, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-15-00689-CV
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W.F.S., Appellant
V.
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES,
Appellee
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NO. 01-15-01028-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF F.S., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 315th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2015-00499J
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, W.F.S., proceeding pro se, attempts to appeal from the trial court’s
order, purported to be signed on August 10, 2015, regarding a mediated settlement
agreement in the underlying suit affecting the parent-child relationship (“SAPCR”),
which was assigned appellate cause number 01-15-00689-CV. Appellants, W.F.S.
and H.B., both proceeding pro se, also attempt to appeal from any orders signed for
the hearing date of November 2, 2015, in the same underlying SAPCR, which was
assigned appellate cause number 01-15-01028-CV.1 Both appellants have filed
motions to recuse the trial judge and H.B. filed a motion for an extension of time to
file her brief in 01-15-01028-CV in this Court. We dismiss both related appeals for
lack of jurisdiction.
Generally, this Court has jurisdiction over appeals only from final orders
arising under the Texas Family Code unless a statute authorizes an interlocutory
appeal. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(b) (West Supp. 2015) (“An appeal
may be taken by any party to a suit from a final order rendered under this title.”);
see also CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2011) (“Unless a statute
1
We refer to the minor’s parent in 01-15-00689-CV using his initials. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 9.8(b)(2). Because the trial clerk’s assignment letter had designated 01-15-
01028-CV as an accelerated appeal from a parental termination, the Clerk of this
Court changed the style from H.B. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. Prot. Services to the above
style.
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authorizes an interlocutory appeal, appellate courts generally only have jurisdiction
over appeals from final judgments.”).
In a SAPCR, the trial “court may make a temporary order, including the
modification of a prior temporary order, for the safety and welfare of the child,
including an order: (1) for the temporary conservatorship of the child;” but any such
“[t]emporary orders rendered under this section are not subject to interlocutory
appeal.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.001(a)(1), (e) (West Supp. 2015); see also In
re Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d 327, 335 (Tex. 2007) (noting that mandamus was an
appropriate remedy in SAPCR because “trial court’s issuance of temporary orders
[was] not subject to interlocutory appeal”) (citations omitted).
Here, after reviewing the notices of appeal, the clerk’s records, and the
supplemental clerk’s records filed in this Court in each appeal, there are no final or
appealable orders regarding a mediated settlement agreement on or after August
10, 2015, or a termination. Although the trial court signed a “Temporary Order
Following Adversary Hearing” on November 3, 2015, regarding a hearing held on
November 2, 2015, for temporary managing conservatorship over the child, F.S.,
that order is a temporary order which is not appealable via interlocutory appeal.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.001(a)(1), (e). Thus, we lack jurisdiction over the
appeal because the clerk’s and supplemental clerk’s records do not include or refer
to any final termination orders or reflect that any other appealable order has been
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rendered in either appeal. See, e.g., Smith v. Robertson, No. 01–15–00538–CV,
2015 WL 9311431, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 22, 2015, no pet.
h.) (dismissing for want of jurisdiction appeal of refusal to sign an order in a
SAPCR because records did not include final order) (citations omitted).
On January 26, 2016, the Clerk of this Court notified appellants, in both
appeals, that their appeals were subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction unless
they timely responded and showed how this Court had jurisdiction over their
appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), (c). Appellants failed to file any response.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we dismiss both of these appeals for want of jurisdiction. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), (c); 43.2(f). We dismiss all pending motions as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Keyes and Higley.
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