J-S15028-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.T.B.-R., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: S.T.B., MOTHER
No. 2368 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered July 6, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000133-2015
and CP-51-DP-0000209-2013
IN THE INTEREST OF: E.T.H., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: S.T.B., MOTHER
No. 2369 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered July 6, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000132-2015
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON AND PLATT,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MARCH 15, 2016
S.T.B. (“Mother”) appeals from the order which granted the petition
filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”). The
subject order terminated Mother’s parental rights to her minor children,
E.T.H. and S.T.B.-R. (hereinafter, collectively, “the Children”), and changed
the permanency goal to adoption. We affirm.1
____________________________________________
1
The trial court terminated the parental rights of the Children’s fathers on
March 26, 2015. E.T.H.’s father, E.D.H., did not file an appeal. S.T.B.-R.’s
father, J.M.R., appealed from this order, and we affirmed the termination of
his parental rights on February 2, 2016. See In the Interest of S.T.B.-R.,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S15028-16
The trial court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history
as follows:
On January 29, 2013, DHS received a Child Protective
[S]ervices (“CPS”) report alleging that [E.T.H., born in
April 1999], was afraid to return home due to Mother’s
unrelated mental health issues. The report also alleged
that Mother showed erratic behavior, suffered from
anxiety, and appeared to be under the influence of drugs.
On January 29, 2013, DHS went to [E.T.H.’s] school and
learned that she was not enrolled in school. . . .
On the same day, DHS visited Mother’s home[.] Mother
was present and stated to DHS that “she could not leave
home because Michelle Obama was on her way to pick her
up and escort her to the White House.” DHS also learned
that [S.T.B.-R., born in January 2007], had not been
enrolled in school and that Mother had stabbed [S.T.B.-
R.’s] father in the past. . . .
DHS obtained an Order for Protective Custody (“OPC”) as
to [the Children]. On January 31, 2013, at a Shelter Care
hearing, the OPC was lifted and the temporary
commitment to DHS was ordered to stand. At the
adjudicatory hearing, on March 8, 2013, the court
discharged the temporary commitment, the Children were
adjudicated dependent and were placed in foster care
[through] Friendship House. Mother was granted
supervised visitation. [E.T.H.’s] physical custody was
ordered to be with [E.T.H.’s] eldest brother while [S.T.B.-
R.’s] physical custody remained with [S.T.B.-R.’s] oldest
sister. . . .
On May 21, 2013, a Family Service Plan (“FSP”) was
developed for Mother. On May 28, 2013[,] DHS obtained a
new OPC for [E.T.H.] due to the fact that [the paramour of
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
___ A.3d ___, 2016 WL 416875 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished
memorandum) at 1-15.
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E.T.H.’s custodian] threatened to physically injury [E.T.H.].
On May 30, 2013, at a Shelter Care hearing, [E.T.H.] was
placed in foster care. . . .
At the [P]ermanency [R]eview [H]earing, on June 5, 2013,
the trial court found Mother in moderate compliance with
her FSP. Mother was ordered to sign releases, to continue
with weekly supervised visitations[] and with mental
health treatment. Mother was also referred to the [Clinical
Evaluation Unit (“CEU”)]. . . .
At a Permanency Review Hearing on October 4, 2013, the
trial court again found Mother in moderate compliance with
her FSP. Mother’s visitation remained supervised at the
agency. Mother was referred to Philadelphia Mental Health
Services, to a parenting capacity evaluation as well as a
bonding evaluation. In addition, the trial court ordered
Mother to comply with her FSP and to sign releases.
At [a] Permanency Review Hearing[] on January 31, 2014,
Mother was found in moderate compliance and did not
attend mental health services. On February 12, 2014, a
FSP meeting was held[;] Mother did not attend. On May 2,
2014, the trial court found Mother in moderate compliance
with her FSP. Mother was ordered to sign all the
necessary releases, was referred to Behavioral Health
Services (“BHS”), was to contact Assessment and
Treatment Alternatives (“ATA”) and rescheduled her
second half of the parenting capacity evaluation. Mother’s
visits remained weekly supervised. . . .
On July 2, 2014, at [a] Permanency Review Hearing, the
trial court found Mother in minimal compliance [with her
FSP]. Mother’s visitation remained weekly supervised.
Mother was again referred to the CEU for an evaluation,
full drug & alcohol screen, and referred to BHS for
consultation and evaluation. . . .
On October 3, 2014, the trial court found that Mother was
minimally compliant with her FSP. Mother was referred to
the CEU and ordered to confirm visitation in advance, to
sign releases, and to contact ATA and to reschedule the
parenting capacity evaluation. . . .
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DHS filed the petition for [] termination of [Mother’s]
parental rights and [for a] goal change on March 4, 2015.
On March 26, 2015, at a Permanency Review Hearing, the
trial court referred Mother to the CEU. Mother completed
the second half of the parenting capacity evaluation
ordered by the trial court on April 9, 2015, after the date
in which the petition for [] termination of [Mother’s]
parental rights was filed. . . .
On July 6, 2015, [at the conclusion of an evidentiary
hearing,] the trial court terminated Mother’s parental
rights [to E.T.H. and S.T.B.-R. pursuant to the Adoption
Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(8) and (b)].
Trial Court Opinion, 10/15/15, 1-3 (internal citations omitted).
This timely appeal followed. Mother presents the following issues:
1. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its
discretion by terminating the parental rights of [Mother]
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) where evidence
presented to show that Mother is now capable of caring
for [the C]hildren after she completed parenting
classes, drug treatment and obtained suitable
housing[?]
2. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its
discretion by terminating the parental rights of [Mother]
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) where evidence was
presented that established the [C]hildren had a close
bond with their Mother[?] Additionally, Mother
consistently attempted to visit with [the C]hildren for
the entire time [the C]hildren were in placement.
Mother’s Brief at 7.
We review an order terminating parental rights in accordance with the
following standard:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of
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fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they
are supported by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47
A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012). “If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
court made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id.
“[A] decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion
only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The trial court’s
decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result.” Id. at 827.
We have previously emphasized our deference to trial
courts that often have first-hand observations of the
parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., 9
A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). Additionally, the trial court is
free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise
free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the
evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004).
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that its asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We
have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is
defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of
the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citations omitted).
The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and (b) which provide:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
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(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
...
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed
from the date of removal or placement, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
...
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(8) and (b).
“In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) The child has
been removed from parental care for 12 months or more from the date of
removal; (2) the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
child continue to exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best
serve the needs and welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825
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A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2003); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8). “Section
2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to remedy the
conditions that led to the children’s removal by the court.” In re A.R., 837
A.2d 560, 564 (Pa. Super. 2003). Once the 12-month period has been
established, the court must next determine whether the conditions that led
to the child’s removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable good faith
efforts of DHS supplied over a realistic time period. Id. Termination under
Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent’s current
willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused placement
or the availability or efficacy of DHS services. In re Adoption of T.B.B.,
835 A.2d 387, 396 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Instantly, Mother argues the trial court erred in terminating her
parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8) because “[e]vidence presented at
trial indicated that [she] has taken substantial steps in dealing with her drug
problem through treatment.” Mother’s Brief at 9. Additionally, Mother
argues that she “has complied with her FSP goals, including taking parenting
classes and obtaining suitable housing” and that “[t]hese efforts show
Mother is ready for reunification with her children.” Id. Finally, Mother
asserts that “DHS did not provide Mother with reasonable efforts to reunify
[her] with her children.” Id.
The trial court found no merit to Mother’s claim. Initially, the court
found that DHS met its burden by clear and convincing evidence that
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“[E.T.H.] and [S.T.B.-R.] have been continuously under DHS custody for a
period of [28] and [25] months, respectively.” Trial Court Opinion,
10/15/15, at 3. With regard to the second element of Section 2511(a)(8),
the trial court concluded that the conditions which led to the Children’s
removal continue to exist. It explained:
In this case, the trial court found that Mother had failed to
remedy the conditions that led to the removal of the
Children, particularly her failure to successfully complete
her mental health therapy, parenting classes, and obtain
safe shelter. As to Mother’s mental health, the record
reflect[s] that Mother was diagnosed with schizophrenia
and has a long history of mental health issues. Mother
admitted that she suffers from anxiety, panic attacks[,]
and sleeping issues. Mother has been hospitalized many
times, the most recent at Mercy Fitzgerald [H]ospital for
an overdose of prescription drugs. Five different
substantiated [General Protective Services (“GPS”)]
reports, during the last [20] years, established that Mother
has not overcome her mental health issues and that her
mental illness has been an obstacle to her acquiring
sufficient parental skills to provide and keep the Children
safe. . . .
In 1994 Mother left [the] Children’s oldest sibling alone at
a bus stop and the police had to bring him back; in 1999
[E.T.H.] [tested] positive for methadone at birth; in 2000 a
court ordered DHS to supervise [the] Children’s oldest
sibling; in 2008 the GPS report was based on Mother’s lack
of supervision, negligence and mental health issues; and in
2013 Mother’s lack of supervision was caused by Mother’s
mental health issues. . . .
Mother was referred to the BHS several times. However,
she has been inconsistent with her attendance and did not
comply with her mental health therapy. Currently, it has
been impossible to verify if Mother is receiving mental
health therapy. As a result, throughout the life of this
case, Mother had been involuntarily committed several
times and her mental health has been unstable. Mother’s
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mental health has been an unsurmountable obstacle to
build a relationship with [E.T.H.] and to develop a proper
bond with [S.T.B.-R.].
As to Mother’s parenting skills, she was referred to [the
Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”),] but she has not
been compliant with the services offered and has not
completed her parenting classes. The record established
that Mother lacks parental skills to assume the care of
[the] Children safely. Mother’s mental health issues have
prevented [her] from acquiring the capacity to safely
parent these Children. As a result, Mother’s visits with
[S.T.B.-R.] have been supervised during the entire life of
the case. Additionally, Mother has to be frequently
redirected by the social worker during visitations with
[S.T.B.-R.] and has showed deficient judgment as to what
a parent should or should not say to [S.T.B.-R.], by
making inappropriate statements to [her]. . . .
Mother has also engaged in episodes of domestic violence
in front of the Children. The record established that during
visits[,] Mother has not shown or engage[d] in a parental
role with [the] Children. Despite Mother’s consistency with
[S.T.B.-R.’s] visits, visitation had to be stopped due to
[S.T.B.-R.] being fearful of Mother. [E.T.H.] has also
expressed being fearful of Mother and refuses to have
supervised visits with Mother. . . .
As to Mother’s housing, the record establishe[s] that
Mother lacks safe housing. A home assessment had not
been done yet, despite [assurances that] Mother lives with
her oldest daughter and her three grandchildren in a
three-bedroom house. . . .
As to [E.T.H.], [E.T.H. has] expressly manifested no desire
for visitation with her Mother due to her fear of her
Mother. . . .
Drug and alcohol has also been an old issue for Mother
since 1999, when [E.T.H.] [tested] positive for methadone
at her birth. Mother was ordered to attend the CEU but
did not comply with the referrals. . . . Mother has never
provided a valid excuse as why she refuses to attend the
CEU. Mother eventually went to the CEU for drug screens
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which showed small traces of marijuana, cocaine[,] and
opiates raising concerns for the trial court that Mother is
still abusing drugs. However, the CEU as of March 26,
2015, determined that Mother did not need any drug and
alcohol treatment.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/15/15, at 4-5 (internal citations omitted).
Our own review of the hearing testimony amply supports the trial
court’s conclusions. Mother fails to support her contrary assertions with
specific reference to testimony. Indeed, in making her conclusory
statements that she met her FSP goals, Mother completely ignores her long
battle with mental illness and the concomitant problems it has created with
her ability to parent the Children.
Moreover, as noted by the trial court, Mother’s own testimony
regarding available housing and her current mental health treatment had yet
to be verified. Trial Court Opinion, 10/15/15, at 5; see also N.T. Hearing,
7/6/15, at 36-38. As fact finder, the trial court is free to believe all, part, or
none of the evidence presented, and therefore need not accept Mother’s
self-serving testimony. In re M.G., supra. Finally, a review of the record
readily refutes Mother’s assertion that “[a]dditional support from the
agencies that were supposed to help her would have allowed her to reunify
with her children.” Mother’s Brief at 12. Mother again provides no specifics,
and the record establishes the efforts made by DHS and other service
providers. Thus, for all these reasons, our review of the record supports the
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trial court’s conclusion that the conditions that led to the children’s removal
continue to exist.
As for the third element of Section 2511(a)(8), we have observed as
follows regarding the “needs and welfare” analysis pertinent to Section
2511(a)(8) and its interplay with similar inquiry under Section 2511(b):
[I]nitially, the focus in terminating parental rights is on the
parent, under Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in
Section 2511(b) is on the child. However, Section
2511(a)(8) explicitly requires an evaluation of the “needs
and welfare of the child” prior to proceeding to Section
2511(b), which focuses on the “developmental, physical
and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” Thus, the
analysis under Section 2511(a)(8) accounts for the needs
of the child in addition to the behavior of the parent.
Moreover, only if a court determines that the parent’s
conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights,
pursuant to Section 2511(a), does a court “engage in the
second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under
the standard of best interests of the child.” Accordingly,
while both Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct
us to evaluate the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are
required to resolve the analysis relative to Section
2511(a)(8), prior to addressing the “needs and welfare” of
[the child], as proscribed by Section 2511(b); as such,
they are distinct in that we must address Section 2511(a)
before reaching Section 2511(b).
In Re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008-1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en
banc) (internal citations omitted).
With regard to the third element of Section 2511(a)(8), the trial court
concluded that DHS proved by clear and convincing evidence that
termination was in the best interests of the Children. It explained:
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The Children have been in their respective pre-adoptive
home for a long time. The Children are in a safe home and
[a] stable environment with [their] foster parent providing
for all of their needs. [The] Children are doing very well in
school, are up to date on their medical and dental
appointments and immunizations. Foster parent was able
to address [S.T.B.-R.’s] eye issues and enroll [her] at the
school for the blind. All [of the] Children’s needs have
been satisfied. The Children need permanency.
Termination of Mother’s parental rights and adoption would
best serve the needs and welfare of the Children. [E.T.H.]
expressly manifested that she wants to be adopted by her
foster parent. The testimony of the DHS witnesses was
unwavering and credible.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/15/15, at 5-6 (citations to notes of testimony
omitted).
Our review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusions that the
current needs of both E.T.H. and S.T.B.-R. are being met by their foster
parent. Within her brief, Mother does not challenge any of the trial court’s
findings. Thus, because DHS established, by clear and convincing evidence
all three elements required pursuant to Section 2115(a)(8), the trial court
did not err in terminating Mother’s parental rights to E.T.H. and S.T.B.-R.
In her second issue, Mother claims that the trial court erred and/or
abused its discretion in terminating her parental rights to E.T.H. and S.T.B.-
R. pursuant to Section 2511(b). According to Mother, “the social worker
testified that there was a bond between Mother and both of her children,”
and that she “should have been provided with realistic goals that would have
permitted her unsupervised visitation with her children.” Mother’s Brief at
13. For this reason, Mother asserts that termination of her parental “rights
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does [not] serve the children’s physical and emotional needs and welfare.”
Id. We disagree.
With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court explained the relevant
analysis as follows:
[Section] 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of
parental rights would best serve the developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. In
In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this
Court stated, “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security,
and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and
welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed that the
trial court must also discern the nature and status of the
parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on
the child of permanently severing that bond. Id.
However, in cases where there is no evidence of a bond
between a parent and a child, it is reasonable to infer that
no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa.
Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect
analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the
particular case. Id. at 763.
In re: Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Here, the trial court discussed the “bond-effect analysis” in the
following manner:
The record established that [E.T.H.] would not suffer any
irreparable harm by terminating Mother’s parental rights.
Mother and [E.T.H.] do not have a parent/child bond due
to lack of visitation and contact. [E.T.H.] continues to
refuse visitation with Mother due to being fearful of her.
As to [S.T.B.-R.], the record established that there is a
weak bond that does not constitute a parent/child bond
and [S.T.B.-R.] does not show emotion when Mother visits
her. Termination would not destroy a necessary and
beneficial relationship with Mother. [E.T.H.] expressly
manifested that she wants to be adopted by her foster
parent. [S.T.B.-R.] would not suffer irreparable harm if
Mother’s parental rights were terminated. Children are
bonded with their foster parent[] and both Children call her
“mom.” [S.T.B.-R.] has special needs as established by
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her Comprehensive Biopsychological evaluation report
from October 31, 2013. Accordingly, [S.T.B.-R.] suffers
from astigmatism and a severe visual impairment. Foster
parent provides for both Children’s daily and special needs.
Children are doing very well in school, are up-to-date with
their medical and dental appointments and immunizations.
Foster parent addressed [S.T.B.-R.’s] eye issues by
enrolling her at the school for the blind. [E.T.H.] is afraid
of her Mother and [S.T.B.-R.’s] visits were stopped due to
a fear episode with [S.T.B.-R.]. As a result, it is in the
best interest of the Children to terminate Mother’s parental
rights. Mother’s parental rights are not being terminated
on the basis of environmental factors. [Children have]
been in foster care too long and [need] permanency. DHS
witnesses were credible.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/15/15, at 6-7 (citations to notes of testimony
omitted).
Once again, our review of the record supports the trial court’s
conclusion regarding the absence of any true parent/child bond with regard
to either E.T.H. or S.T.B.-R. Mother presents no argument regarding the
existence of a bond with E.T.H. At trial, Mother essentially testified that she
was unable to further develop a bond with S.T.B.-R. because she could not
enjoy unsupervised visitation. See N.T. Hearing, 7/16/15, at 55. With
regard to the possibility of unsupervised visitation, Mother’s previous case
worker testified:
To maintain a goal of reunification would be very
concerning at this point. It’s been a very long time that
[S.T.B.-R.] has been in care with supervised visits and the
fact from my experience that we weren’t able – the
department of CUA was not able to step down to
unsupervised contact shows that there’s a continued
concern in regards to [M]other’s ability to ensure the
safety of [S.T.B.-R.] and to parent [her]. And at this
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point, there is no way to know if there is a bond without
having unsupervised visits.
Id. at 17-18.
Mother’s current caseworker echoed that, before Mother’s current
visitation could transition to an unsupervised visitation, she would “need to
see more of a bond between [Mother] and [S.T.B.-R.] and there’s not a real
bond yet.” Id. at 39. Although Mother argues that, had DHS established
more “realistic goals” she could have transitioned to unsupervised visits,
once again she does not specify any particular goal she would be able to
achieve. Both caseworkers opined that Mother’s mental health issues have
prevented a parent/child bond from forming between Mother and either of
the Children. Because there was no evidence of such a bond, it can be
inferred that one does not exist. In re: Adoption of J.M., supra.
In sum, our review of the record supports the trial court’s
determination that DHS has met its statutory burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(8) and 2511(b). Accordingly, we
affirm.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/15/2016
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