Vaughn v. McDonald

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________ BURDELL VAUGHN, Claimant-Appellant v. ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent-Appellee ______________________ 2016-1064 ______________________ Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in No. 14-2462, Chief Judge Bruce E. Kasold. ______________________ Decided: March 18, 2016 ______________________ BURDELL VAUGHN, Waukegan, IL, pro se. ZACHARY JOHN SULLIVAN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., SCOTT D. AUSTIN; CHRISTINA LYNN GREGG, BRIAN D. GRIFFIN, Office of General Counsel, 2 VAUGHN v. MCDONALD United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washing- ton, DC. ______________________ Before REYNA, WALLACH, and STOLL, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. Burdell Vaughn appeals a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”), which affirmed the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) decision finding no clear and unmistakable error (“CUE”) in the Regional Office’s (“RO”) decision denying service connection for residuals of a back injury. Vaughn v. McDonald, No. 14-2462 (Vet. App. Aug. 13, 2015). For the reasons below, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. BACKGROUND Mr. Vaughn served on active duty from May to No- vember 1972. In November 1991, Mr. Vaughn submitted a claim to the Department of Veterans Affairs (“DVA”) seeking compensation for a service-connected back injury. The RO denied his claim in May 1992, determining that “this condition existed prior to service and was not aggra- vated during [Mr. Vaughn’s] military service.” Supple- mental Appendix (“S.A.”) 44. The RO also noted that Mr. Vaughn had failed to attend scheduled medical exam- inations. Id. Mr. Vaughn did not appeal the May 1992 decision, and it became final. Mr. Vaughn later filed CUE claims, alleging that (1) the May 1992 RO decision incorrectly found that he suffered a pre-service spine injury that was not aggravat- ed during service; and that (2) his notice for the scheduled examination was sent to the wrong address. The RO rejected Mr. Vaughn’s CUE claims in a September 2010 decision, and the Board affirmed. On Mr. Vaughn’s first argument, the Board deter- mined that the RO failed to apply the presumption of VAUGHN v. MCDONALD 3 soundness under 38 U.S.C. § 1111, which arises where a condition is not noted at the time of entry into service. Nevertheless, the Board concluded that “in the May 1992 decision, it is not clear and unmistakable that the out- come would have been manifestly different if the error had not been made” because “there was at that time, no evidence whatsoever of a then-current spine disability as of May 1992.” S.A. 10. Addressing Mr. Vaughn’s second argument of an incorrect address, the Board determined that even if the notice was sent to an incorrect address, which the record did not support, such error would amount to a failure to comply with the duty to assist, which “cannot be the basis for a CUE claim.” S.A. 8 (citing Caffrey v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 377, 384 (1994)). Mr. Vaughn appealed to the Veterans Court, which af- firmed the Board’s decision. Mr. Vaughn now appeals to this court. DISCUSSION The scope of our review in an appeal from a Veterans Court decision is limited. We may review a Veterans Court decision with respect to the validity of a decision on a rule of law or the validity or interpretation of any stat- ute or regulation that was relied upon by the Veterans Court in making the decision. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). Un- less a constitutional issue is presented, we have no juris- diction to review questions of fact or the application of a law or regulation to a particular set of facts. Id. § 7292(d)(2). To be eligible for disability compensation, a veteran must show: “(1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravat- ed during service.” Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166–67 (Fed. Cir. 2004). As we have explained, “the presumption of soundness relates to the second element 4 VAUGHN v. MCDONALD required to establish a right to disability compensation— the showing of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury.” Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009). “The presumption of soundness . . . does not relieve the veteran of the obligation to show the presence of a current disability and to demonstrate a nexus between that disability and the in-service injury or disease or aggravation thereof.” Id. Here, Mr. Vaughn challenges the Board’s finding that there was no evidence of record at the time of the May 1992 decision that he had a then-current back disability, the first requirement for service connection. S.A. 10. But as a factual determina- tion, “we cannot review the VA’s finding that [Mr. Vaughn] did not prove a compensable present disa- bility at the time of his . . . claim.” See Conley v. Peake, 543 F.3d 1301, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Mr. Vaughn further argues that the Board should have obtained and considered additional medical records and that the notices of medical examination were sent to an incorrect address. He also argues that the VA was “negligent” in failing to escort him to medical appoint- ments as a patient in a VA medical facility. These argu- ments raise issues with the factual application of the duty to assist, and it is “impossible for a breach of the duty to assist to form the basis for a CUE claim.” Cook v. Princi- pi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc). CUE must “be outcome determinative and be based on the record that existed at the time of the original decision.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, the Veterans Court merely applied established law in finding no CUE, which “is fact- based and hence beyond our jurisdiction.” See Yates v. West, 213 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Mr. Vaughn’s remaining arguments likewise fall out- side our limited jurisdiction because he only disputes the Board’s factual findings or the application of law to fact. For example, his argument that that Board unreasonably delayed issuing its decision is a factual dispute that we VAUGHN v. MCDONALD 5 lack jurisdiction to review. See Spain v. Principi, 5 F. App’x 874, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2001). CONCLUSION We have considered Mr. Vaughn’s remaining argu- ments and determine that they fail to raise any legal issue within our jurisdiction. For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. DISMISSED COSTS No costs.