14‐3869‐cv
Spratt v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURTʹS LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ʺSUMMARY ORDERʺ). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 21st day of March, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER,
DENNY CHIN,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
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RONALD SPRATT,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v. 14‐3869‐cv
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC.,
Defendant‐Appellee.
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FOR PLAINTIFF‐APPELLANT: RONALD SPRATT, pro se, Albany, New York.
FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLEE: MATTHEW T. MIKLAVE, Ian T. Clarke‐Fisher,
Robinson & Cole LLP, New York, New York.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Nathan, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff‐appellant Ronald Spratt, proceeding pro se, appeals the judgment
of the district court entered September 22, 2014 in favor of defendant‐appellee Verizon
Communications Inc. (ʺVerizonʺ), dismissing his claims of discrimination and retaliation
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. By Memorandum and Order entered September 17,
2014, the district court granted Verizonʹs motion for summary judgment. Spratt also
challenges the district courtʹs September 17, 2013 denial of leave to amend the complaint
for a third time to add a party. We assume the partiesʹ familiarity with the underlying
facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
We review de novo the district courtʹs grant of summary judgment, with the
view that ʺ[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when there is ʹno genuine dispute as to
any material factʹ and the moving party is ʹentitled to judgment as a matter of law.ʹʺ
Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Commʹn, 768 F.3d 183, 192
(2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). We resolve all ambiguities and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non‐movant. Gould v. Winstar Commcʹns, Inc., 692
F.3d 148, 158 (2d Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is appropriate ʺ[w]here the record
taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non‐moving party.ʺ
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Durakovic v. Bldg. Serv. 32 BJ Pension Fund, 609 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Hayes
v. New York City Depʹt of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 619 (2d Cir. 1996)). A district courtʹs decision
to deny leave to amend a complaint is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Loreley Fin.
(Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Sec., LLC, 797 F.3d 160, 169 (2d Cir. 2015).
Upon review, we conclude that the district court correctly ruled that
Sprattʹs discrimination claim failed as a matter of law because he was unable to raise an
inference of discriminatory intent in connection with his termination. The only direct
evidence of racially discriminatory animus ‐‐ a pair of racist remarks made by Sprattʹs
supervisor, Emilio Acevedo, a year and a half before the events in question ‐‐ do not raise
such an inference because the remarks were too remote from, and unrelated to, the
decision‐making process that resulted in Sprattʹs termination. Nor did Spratt present
indirect or circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found that
discrimination was a motivating factor in his discharge.
Likewise, the district court correctly determined that the record contained
insufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to retaliation. The district court
correctly identified Sprattʹs retaliation claim as a ʺcatʹs pawʺ theory of liability, meaning
that he sought to hold Verizon liable for the animus of a supervisor who was not
ultimately responsible for the employment decision. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S.
411, 421‐22 (2011) (accepting the validity of catʹs paw analysis in the context of
employment discrimination under the Uniformed Services Employment and
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Reemployment Rights Act of 1994). A supervisorʹs retaliatory actions must be the
ʺbut‐forʺ cause of the employerʹs adverse employment action. See Vega v. Hempstead
Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 90 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013)) (discussing retaliation in the context of Title VII); see
also Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that substantive
legal principles for claims under Title VII also apply to claims under § 1981). Although
the district court held that Spratt had failed to establish proximate cause between
Acevedoʹs allegedly false report of the January 14 telephone conversation and Sprattʹs
termination, application of the proper but‐for standard only buttresses the courtʹs
conclusion as it eliminates the need to weigh the relative impact of Acevedoʹs allegedly
false report.
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sprattʹs
post hoc motion to amend his complaint to re‐add Acevedo as a party two years after he
had stipulated to Acevedoʹs dismissal. Accordingly, we affirm for substantially the
reasons stated in the district courtʹs well‐reasoned and thorough orders.
Additionally, Sprattʹs contention that he was the victim of disability
discrimination will not be considered because it is raised for the first time on appeal.
See Magi XXI, Inc. v. Stato della Citta del Vaticano, 714 F.3d 714, 724 (2d Cir. 2013).
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We have considered all of Sprattʹs remaining arguments and find them to
be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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