UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
JAMES J. KAUFMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 14-cv-0695 (TSC)
)
JEH JOHNSON et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff James J. Kaufman is a Wisconsin resident who seeks to renounce his
United States citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6). (Compl. ¶ 1). He commenced
this action under the mandamus statute and the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 702. The mandamus claim has been dismissed (ECF No. 14).
The remaining APA claim challenges the final agency decision issued on March 21,
2014, by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). Before
the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 18) and Defendants’
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 20). Upon consideration of the
parties’ submissions and the administrative record, and for the reasons explained
below, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion, deny Plaintiff’s motion, and enter
judgment accordingly.
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I. LEGAL STANDARD
On a motion for summary judgment in a suit seeking APA review, the standard
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) does not apply. Coe v. McHugh, 968 F. Supp. 2d 237, 239
(D.D.C. 2013). Instead the court must decide as a matter of law “whether the agency
action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the
APA standard of review.” Id. at 240 (citing Richards v. INS, 554 F.2d 1173, 1177 &
n. 28 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
Pursuant to the APA, the Court must set aside any agency action that is
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). The Court’s review is “highly deferential” and begins with
a presumption that the agency's actions are valid. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle,
657 F.2d 275, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Court is “not empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency,” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), but instead must consider only “whether the agency acted
within the scope of its legal authority, whether the agency has explained its decision,
whether the facts on which the agency purports to have relied have some basis in the
record, and whether the agency considered the relevant factors.” Fulbright v.
McHugh, 67 F. Supp. 3d 81, 89 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing Fund for Animals v. Babbitt,
903 F. Supp. 96, 105 (D.D.C. 1995)). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
the invalidity of the agency's action. Id.
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II. ANALYSIS
The Joint Appendix (“JA”) (ECF No. 19-1) establishes that Plaintiff was
serving a sentence for first-degree sexual assault of a minor when he mailed letters in
2004 and 2008 to USCIS seeking to renounce his United States citizenship. On
October 1, 2010, Plaintiff responded to USCIS’ request for information, and USCIS
held Plaintiff’s renunciation request in abeyance pending his release from prison so
that he could attend an in-person interview. Plaintiff was released from prison in May
2013 to mandatory community supervision in Wisconsin, where he was to remain until
January 2016. As a supervisee, Plaintiff agreed to a list of 28 conditions, which
included working full-time or searching for full-time employment by applying for at
least 15 jobs weekly, maintaining a Wisconsin address, and obtaining permission from
his supervising officer prior to leaving the State of Wisconsin (JA 192-93).
On October 10, 2013, Plaintiff appeared at USCIS’ St. Paul Field Office for an
interview with two senior immigration officers. Plaintiff confirmed his understanding
“of the consequences and ramifications of renunciation,” including that a loss of
citizenship “without acquiring the nationality of another country” would render him
“stateless” and “an alien with regard to the United States.” (JA 3, USCIS Mar. 21,
2014 Dec.) With that status, Plaintiff understood that he “could no longer obtain or
use a U.S. passport” and that he “would lose the right to reside . . . or work in the
United States.” In addition, he “would forfeit the other rights and privileges” he
currently enjoyed as a U.S. citizen. (Id.)
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Plaintiff’s discussion at the interview about his “post-renunciation preparation
and plans” is recounted as follows:
You stated that if you are permitted to renounce your U.S. citizenship,
you intend to depart from the United States. When asked how you would be
able to leave the United States despite the ongoing conditions of your
community supervision, you replied that if the Federal Government ordered
you to leave, the State of Wisconsin would “go along and process me out and
say to me, ‘Be on your way.’ ” You stated the Wisconsin Department of
Corrections would have to “process some things which they won’t begin to do
until they see an order from the Federal Government saying I have to leave.”
You provided no documents or information indicating that you have
independently requested or obtained permission to depart from the United
States in the event your request for renunciation is approved, or that such a
request to travel could or would be approved by the State of Wisconsin if made
in the future.
You identified steps you have taken to prepare for your departure. They
consist of conducting research on other countries’ residency and citizenship
requirements and employment and housing opportunities. You expect to have
saved approximately $3,000 from your present employment. You asserted a
belief that this sum will be minimally sufficient to buy a plane ticket and
support yourself frugally in a foreign country until you are able to obtain
foreign employment. You said you have sent written inquiries about
immigrating to several countries, including Ireland, Germany, France, Italy,
Poland, the Netherlands, Spain and Austria, but that none of the countries you
contacted has offered you a means or opportunity to establish lawful residence,
obtain lawful employment, or gain citizenship.
When asked how you intend to depart from the United States and travel
internationally without a U.S. passport if your renunciation request is
approved, you stated, “If my renunciation is approved, I would become a
stateless person, and I hope - greatly hope -that the United States is, on a case
by case basis, willing to issue [me] a stateless person’s travel document. [It's
called] a United Nations Convention on Stateless Persons 28 September 1954
Travel Document.” You reported that you have contacted the Department of
Justice Office of the Attorney General, the Department of State, and the
Department of Homeland Security in an attempt to find out how to apply for
such travel document and that you have not been provided with such
information.
If the United States does not issue you a document comparable to the
“Stateless Person's Travel Document” you referenced, you acknowledged you
would need to leave the United States without any documentation. You
expressed a belief that as a stateless person, a country that is a signatory to the
1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons will be obligated to
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allow you to enter, provide you with a travel document, work permit, personal
identification card, and residence permit. You asserted a belief that you would
be treated as any other lawfully resident alien in such foreign country.
(JA 3-4.)
The USCIS found that Plaintiff’s request to renounce his U.S. citizenship was
voluntary, but that Plaintiff had “not demonstrated” that he “possess[ed] the intention
necessary to renounce” because he had “no credible plan to sever . . . ties to the United
States following . . . renunciation.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff’s asserted plans were found to
be “based on . . . hopes and beliefs, which have no credible basis in fact.” (Id.) The
USCIS focused first on Plaintiff’s inability to leave the country legally because of his
obligations to the state of Wisconsin to complete community supervision pursuant to
the agreed-upon terms. It determined that even without that barrier, Plaintiff essentially
had no cogent plan to leave the country. The USCIS found Plaintiff’s “reliance on the
availability of a stateless travel document” to be “misplaced,” and his claims about the
role of the federal government “wholly speculative” and unsupportive of his ability “to
pursue [his] stated plans.” (Id.) USCIS concluded that Plaintiff had “presented no
documents or evidence supporting any credible plan or ability” to sever ties with the
United States and to “leave immediately” following his renunciation. (Id. at 8)
(emphasis supplied.))
As the administrative record shows, Plaintiff’s agreement with the State of
Wisconsin--particularly to: (1) reside in the State until the expiration of his supervision
term, (2) report regularly to his supervising officer, (3) maintain full-time employment
(or a schedule seeking such employment), and (4) obtain permission before traveling
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outside of the State—clashed completely with his purported intent to sever all ties to
the United States and to leave the country immediately. In addition, the administrative
record contains ample support for the conclusion that Plaintiff’s speculative exit plan
was neither plausible nor credible.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the USCIS’ March 21, 2014
Decision was reasonable, amply supported, and in compliance with the governing
statute. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted and
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied. 1 A corresponding order will issue
separately.
Date: March 21, 2016
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge
1
The parties agree that Plaintiff’s supervision term expired in January 2016. The outcome of
this action has no bearing whatsoever on Plaintiff’s ability to submit a new renunciation request
to the agency.
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