March 22 2016
DA 14-0560
Case Number: DA 14-0560
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2016 MT 72N
IN THE MATTER OF:
P.H.,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District,
In and For the County of Butte-Silver Bow, Cause No. DI-14-22
Honorable Brad Newman, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Nick K. Brooke, Smith & Stephens, P.C., Missoula, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Jonathan M. Krauss,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Eileen Joyce, Butte-Silver Bow County Attorney, Michael Clague,
Deputy County Attorney, Butte, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 27, 2016
Decided: March 22, 2016
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 This case concerns P.H., a transient woman in her late forties. On August 7, 2014,
the Butte police received a call regarding a woman (P.H.) hiding in an alley. The police
brought P.H. to the Western Montana Health Center, where she received emergency
mental health services. Based on the recommendations arising from those services, the
State filed a petition for involuntary commitment on August 8, 2014. On August 11,
2014, the District Court in Butte held a hearing to assess whether P.H. should be
involuntarily committed. At the hearing, the State introduced the testimony of Michael
Sawicki, (“Sawicki”) a licensed clinical social worker and a mental health professional.
P.H. also testified at the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the District Court
granted the State’s petition for involuntarily commitment of P.H. to the Montana State
Hospital for 90 days, and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on August
12, 2014. P.H. appeals. We affirm.
¶3 We review a district court’s order for civil commitment to assess whether the
findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its application of the law is correct. In
re Mental Health of L.K.-S., 2011 MT 21, ¶ 14, 359 Mont. 191, 247 P.3d 1100.
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¶4 Involuntary civil commitment is a statutory procedure outlined in § 53-21-126,
MCA. Pursuant to that statute, the court must first determine whether the respondent is
suffering from a mental disorder, and then assess whether the condition of the respondent
requires commitment. Section 53-21-126(1), MCA; In re M.C.D., 2010 MT 15, ¶ 10,
355 Mont. 97, 225 P.3d 1214. Section 53-21-126(1), MCA, outlines four categories for
assessing the need for civil commitment:
(a) whether the respondent, because of a mental disorder, is
substantially unable to provide for the respondent’s own basic needs of
food, clothing, shelter, health, or safety;
(b) whether the respondent has recently, because of a mental
disorder and through an act or an omission, caused self-injury or injury to
others;
(c) whether, because of a mental disorder, there is an imminent
threat of injury to the respondent or to others because of the respondent’s
acts or omissions; and
(d) whether the respondent’s mental disorder, as demonstrated by the
respondent’s recent acts or omissions, will, if untreated, predictably result
in deterioration of the respondent’s mental condition to the point at which
the respondent will become a danger to self or to others or will be unable to
provide for the respondent’s own basic needs of food, clothing, shelter,
health, or safety. . . .
The court must establish facts and physical evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and all
other matters under a clear and convincing standard. However, mental disorders must be
proved to a reasonable medical certainty. Section 53-21-126(2), MCA. We have
previously held that it is incumbent upon the courts to follow the strict statutory
guidelines in cases of involuntary commitment, given the adverse effect such a procedure
has on the respondent. In re C.R.C., 2004 MT 389, ¶ 16, 325 Mont. 133, 104 P.3d 1065.
¶5 Here, P.H. argues on appeal that the District Court lacked sufficient evidence to
conclude that she suffers from a mental disorder. P.H. did not contest this issue at the
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District Court. Indeed, she accepted that conclusion at the end of the hearing.
Consequently, we decline to address that matter on appeal.
¶6 P.H. contends that the District Court lacked sufficient evidence as set out in the
statute to conclude that she was unable to take care of her own needs and thereby commit
her to the state hospital. The record shows that P.H. is homeless and has severe mental
disorders. Her initial evaluation after she was provided emergency mental health services
noted that she suffered from both physical and mental health issues. Prior to the hearing,
Sawicki reviewed the limited records, conversed with P.H., and evaluated her mental and
physical condition. At the hearing, Sawicki testified that P.H. suffered from “a very
serious mental illness” which he diagnosed as schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. She
exhibited delusions, paranoia, and reality disorientation. Sawicki further asserted that
P.H. did not appreciate her current predicament and consistently underestimated the
gravity of her mental condition and physical and medical needs. He testified there is a
risk she could decompensate because she is not on mental health medications: “[s]he’ll
become more and more psychotic, more and more delusional, more and more paranoid.”
Finally, Sawicki stated that he was seriously concerned for her well-being because “she’s
is easily victimized and vulnerable on the street.” He indicated there were no available
alternative treatments for her given her mental condition.
¶7 The District Court also heard testimony from P.H., which supported the evaluation
from Sawicki. P.H. testified that she was wealthy and that her husband was on a secret
mission and involved with the FBI, CIA, or Interpol. During her testimony she
represented a deep immersion into an alternate reality in which other people are pursuing
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her for financial purposes. She seemed to understand that her brain was cross-wired but
categorically refused treatment that could help her.
¶8 Pursuant to § 56-21-126(1), MCA, a court may order commitment if it finds that
because of a mental disorder, the respondent is substantially unable to provide for her
own basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, health, or safety. P.H. has a basic need for
treatment and although being homeless is not sufficient for commitment, being homeless
with an inability to distinguish what is real from what is not raises concerns not just for
her safety but also for her ability to care for her own basic mental health needs.
Confronted with that record we cannot agree that the District Court was clearly
erroneous.
¶9 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of
our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion
of the Court, this case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear
application of applicable standards of review.
¶10 Affirmed.
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
We Concur:
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ JIM RICE
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