IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1704
Filed March 23, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
STEVEN FRANCIS SCARLETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Gregory D. Brandt,
District Associate Judge.
Steven Scarlett appeals his conviction and sentence for assault causing
bodily injury. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED
WITH DIRECTIONS.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kelli Huser, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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BOWER, Judge.
Steven Scarlett appeals his conviction and sentence for assault causing
bodily injury. On appeal, he argues the district court abused its discretion when
(1) it admitted a contract into evidence; (2) it denied a motion for judgment of
acquittal because there was insufficient evidence; (3) it erred in denying a motion
for new trial by applying the wrong standard; and (4) it did not provide sufficient
reasons on the record to support the sentencing decision and did not provide
reasons for consecutive sentencing. We affirm the district court as to Scarlett’s
first and second issues. We find the district court applied the wrong standard on
the motion for new trial and remand to allow the district court to apply the proper
standard. We also find the district court failed to give reasons for imposing a
consecutive sentence; we remand for resentencing if, after the application of the
correct standard, the district court again denies Scarlett’s motion for new trial.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Scarlett and M.H. met through a mutual friend in January 2014. Scarlett
initiated a romantic relationship with M.H. through text messaging, and the two
met for a first date on February 15. M.H. testified the relationship “got very
serious very quickly.” Scarlett moved “all of his stuff” to M.H.’s apartment “that
first night” and spent his nights there in the subsequent week. At some point
during the week, Scarlett mentioned a “master/slave” contract he wanted M.H. to
sign. Scarlett also mentioned he led a BDSM1 lifestyle, and wanted to make
M.H. his “slave.” On February 23, after drinking “a lot of beer” throughout the
1
The prosecution defined BDSM to the jury as “bondage, discipline, sadism and
masochism.”
3
day, Scarlett ordered M.H. to sign the contract before they went out for dinner.
M.H. raised a few concerns with the contract but Scarlett told her he would not
enforce the concerning provisions. M.H. thought the contract did not “pertain to
anything outside” of the bedroom, and she signed the contract to “make him
happy.”
M.H. testified she spoke with Adel law enforcement officers on
February 23 when they responded to her apartment on an unrelated matter
concerning Scarlett. She mentioned an incident where Scarlett pulled her hair
and fought to disengage her car. She noted the incident “scared her” and was
“on the verge of . . . domestic violence.” When the officers asked M.H. if she
wanted to press charges for the incident, she declined. After the officers left,
Scarlett told her “You’re going to be punished for what happened . . . for getting
the police involved and everything like that.” Scarlett made her disrobe and then
whipped her ten times. M.H. claimed the whipping was punishment and not
sexual; she cried the rest of the night. Scarlett passed out shortly after he
finished whipping her because he “was so drunk.” M.H. did not alert the police
about the incident, though she sought advice from a friend who was a police
officer.
On February 26, M.H. sent Scarlett a text message telling him she wanted
him to move out. She then made arrangements for him to remove his things
from the apartment. In subsequent days, M.H. continued to text Scarlett because
she wanted them to “stay as friends.”
4
M.H. met Scarlett at a bar on March 4 because she wanted to return a
shirt he had left and she wanted “closure” on the relationship. After getting a
drink, the two left to get dinner at a restaurant. Scarlett pressed M.H. about
getting back together, and she agreed. Scarlett then presented her with a new
“contract.” After reading through the contract, she refused to sign. Scarlett
pulled her hair and said “[I]t’s time to go.” They left in M.H.’s car since she had
driven them to the restaurant. Once they got in the car he stated: “You know
you’re going to be punished for what you did by calling the cops for the incident
on February 23.” Scarlett began punishing her by pulling her hair so hard her
ponytail holder broke. He then directed her to drive in an undetermined direction.
During the drive he slapped her and continued to pull her hair. They eventually
arrived at a deserted parking lot. Scarlett made her “get down on all fours and to
walk around him like a dog.” He also kicked her in the ribs. They got back in the
car, and he continued to pull her hair and slap her. She dropped him off at a bar,
and as he left the car he stated: “If you call the cops, I will fucking kill you.”
Two days later, M.H. decided to contact the police. After an investigation,
on April 16 Scarlett was charged with domestic abuse assault, second offense, in
violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1 and 708.2A(3)(b) (2013); harassment in
the first degree, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.7(2); and false
imprisonment, in violation of Iowa Code section 710.7. Scarlett pled not guilty
and waived speedy trial.
On August 16, Scarlett filed a motion in limine to exclude any evidence of:
his prior criminal history during the State’s case in chief, his contacts with police
5
or arrests, cell phone records and information, and the master/slave contract. On
August 22, the State filed a motion to amend a clerical error in the trial
information and a motion in limine seeking to exclude any hearsay statements
Scarlett might elicit from his witnesses at trial. A hearing on the motions was
held on August 25, and the court overruled Scarlett’s motion concerning
evidence of past police contacts, cell phone information, and the master/slave
contract. The court found the master/slave contract was admissible because it
was relevant and the probative value would outweigh any prejudicial effect.
A jury trial was held on September 10, and the jury found Scarlett guilty of
assault causing bodily injury. Scarlett filed a motion for new trial and a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict; the court denied both motions. The court
sentenced Scarlett to one year in jail, with all but forty-five days suspended. The
court ordered the forty-five days to run consecutive to a sentence imposed in an
unrelated case. Scarlett appeals.
II. MERITS
A. Master/Slave Contract Relevance
Scarlett claims the district court erred by allowing the master/slave
contract into evidence because the contract was not relevant and caused unfair
prejudice. We review the court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 152 (Iowa 2015). A district court abuses its
discretion when its decision rests on grounds or on reasons clearly untenable or
to an extent clearly unreasonable. Id. There will be no abuse of discretion found
unless a party has suffered prejudice. Id. The district court is given broad
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discretion in evidentiary matters, and we will disturb its rulings upon a showing of
abuse. Id.
Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Iowa R. Evid. 5.402. Relevant
evidence is defined as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.401.
Even relevant evidence should not be admitted when “its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues,
or misleading the jury.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. “We employ a two-part test to
decide whether evidence should be excluded under the rule.” State v. Huston,
825 N.W.2d 531, 537 (Iowa 2013). “First, we consider the probative value of the
evidence. Second, we balance the probative value against the danger of its
prejudicial or wrongful effect upon the triers of fact.” Id. (citation omitted). “A
determination of the probative value of relevant evidence focuses on the strength
and force of the tendency of the evidence to make a consequential fact more or
less probable.” Graber v. City of Ankeny, 616 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Iowa 2000)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Unfair prejudice arises when the
evidence prompts the jury to make a decision on an improper basis.” Id.
Here, in determining the contract was admissible, the district court
reasoned:
The Court finds that the slave/master contract is admissible
as it is relevant on many issues, for instance: 1) the nature of the
relationship between the parties and whether it would fall within the
requirement of a domestic relationship; 2) the issue of intent of the
defendant to assault the alleged victim and 3) concerning the issue
as to why the victim waited two (2) days to report the assault.
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While the Court recognizes the prejudicial nature of this document
the probative value to multiple issues in this case outweigh the
prejudicial effect.
Upon our review, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion as
its decision did not rest on untenable or unreasonable “grounds or reasons.” We
affirm the district court’s admission of the master/slave contract. See Tyler, 867
N.W.2d at 152.
B. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
Scarlett claims the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment
of acquittal as the evidence was insufficient to establish the victim suffered any
injury as required by statute.
“A motion for judgment of acquittal is a means of challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence, and we review such claims for correction of errors at
law.” State v. Serrato, 787 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Iowa 2010). In determining
whether the district court should have granted the motion for judgment of
acquittal, it is not our job to resolve conflicts in the record, pass upon the
credibility of witnesses, or weigh the evidence. State v. Hutchison, 721 N.W.2d
776, 780 (Iowa 2006). Those functions rest with the jurors. Id. Instead, we
decide if the evidence could persuade a rational jury that the defendant was
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We “view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, including legitimate inferences and presumptions that may
fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record.” Serrato, 787 N.W.2d at 465.
But “[e]vidence that raises only a suspicion or generates only speculation is not
substantial.” Hutchinson, 721 N.W.2d at 780.
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Here, the jury found Scarlett guilty of assault causing bodily injury. The
jury received the following instruction for assault causing bodily injury:
1. On or about the 4th day of March, 2014, the defendant did
an act which was meant to cause pain or injury or result in physical
contact which was insulting or offensive to [M.H.]
2. The defendant had the apparent ability to do the act.
3. The defendant’s act caused a bodily injury to [M.H.] . . . .
The jury was instructed “bodily injury” meant “physical pain, illness, or any
impairment of physical condition.”
M.H. provided extensive testimony concerning the multiple instances
Scarlett inflicted physical pain on her, including pulling her hair, slapping her
across the face, forcing her to crawl on her knees, and kicking her in the ribs. On
appeal, it is not our role to pass on M.H.’s credibility; we only look at the evidence
to determine if a rational jury would be persuaded of Scarlett’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Scarlett claims since M.H.’s injuries were not documented or
visible the State has failed to show she suffered a bodily injury. A “visible” injury
is not a required for this offense. See e.g., State v. Canas, 597 N.W.2d 488,
494–95 (Iowa 1999) (holding evidence that victim, who was struck in the chest
with defendant’s fist, had the wind knocked out of him and momentarily felt pain
was sufficient proof of bodily injury notwithstanding that victim had no visible
injuries and did not require medical treatment), abrogated on other grounds by
State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).
We find the district court did not err in denying Scarlett’s motion for
judgment of acquittal and affirm.
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C. Motion for New Trial
Scarlett claims the district court erred in denying his motion for new trial
because the verdict was contrary to the law or the evidence.2 He also claims the
district court applied the incorrect standard (by relying on the sufficiency of the
evidence standard used for the previous judgment of acquittal) in denying his
motion for new trial.
“A court may grant a new trial where a verdict rendered by a jury is
contrary to law or evidence.” State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 559 (Iowa 2006).
Contrary to the evidence means contrary to the weight of the evidence. See
State v. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199, 201 (Iowa 2003). “The district court has broad
discretion in ruling on a motion for new trial.” Id. at 202. Our review is limited to
the question of whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the
motion and not a decision on the merits of whether the verdict is contrary to the
weight of the evidence. See id. at 203.
In ruling on Scarlett’s motion for new trial, the district court stated:
[A]s the Court delineated also at the end of both the State’s and
defense case, the reasons for denying the judgment of acquittal
was that, in fact, a jury question had been committed—or been
created as to each of the counts that were charged by the
defendant.
The Court just relies on those prior findings by the Court and
denies both the motion for new trial and the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
As it relates to the sentencing in this matter . . . .
2
The State claims Scarlett has failed to preserve error on this claim for our appeal.
Scarlett raised this issue in his motion for judgment of acquittal and then again in his
motion for new trial. The court ruled on Scarlett’s motion for new trial at the sentencing
hearing and denied the motion. We find Scarlett has preserved error on this issue. See
Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012).
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We find the district court used the improper standard in denying Scarlett’s
motion for new trial and the case must be remanded to the district court for
application of the weight-of-the-evidence standard. See State v. Root, 801
N.W.2d 29, 31 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (noting appellate courts “have repeatedly
remanded to make certain the proper standard was applied”).
D. Sentencing
Scarlett claims the district court abused its discretion by relying on only
one factor—the violence of the offense—in sentencing him and by failing to state
on the record its reasons for selecting the particular sentence. He also claims
the court failed to disclose on the record its reasoning for ordering his sentence
to be served consecutively with an unrelated sentence he was currently serving.
This court reviews sentences imposed in a criminal case for correction of errors
at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa
2002). “We will not reverse the decision of the district court absent an abuse of
discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at
724.
A sentencing court must state, on the record, its reason for selecting a
particular sentence. State v. Barnes, 791 N.W.2d 817, 827 (Iowa 2010) (citing
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d)). “A statement may be sufficient, even if terse and
succinct, so long as the brevity of the court’s statement does not prevent review
of the exercise of the trial court’s sentencing discretion.” State v. Hennings, 791
N.W.2d 828, 838 (Iowa 2010). Generally, courts may consider a variety of
factors to justify the imposition of a sentence, including rehabilitation of the
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defendant, protection of the community from further offenses by the defendant
and others. Iowa Code § 901.5.
Here, the court made the following statement concerning Scarlett’s
sentence:
Well, Mr. Scarlett, as you’re aware, I was the Judge who
presided over your trial. I’ve also heard the statements of all the
parties, reviewed your prior criminal history in this matter. And
taking into effect and in light of all of those things, the Court has
fashioned what it believes is an appropriate sentence in this matter.
Sir, I’ve been sitting in this chair for almost eighteen years.
And, quite honestly, you, from my assessment, have the greatest
propensity for continued violence of any individual I’ve come across
in the last eighteen years, and I’ve come across literally thousands.
You relish violence. You enjoy violence. And your attempt
to get individuals to sign contracts that say the violence can go on
and you can't do anything about it is reprehensible. Those
contracts are not binding. They are not valid. They are some
creation of the Internet that you have found.
Sir, I truly believe that without significant and serious
assistance one day you will truly hurt somebody beyond even any
comprehension you might have of the violence that you are capable
of. The State is recommending that you be put in jail for 120 days.
Your victim recommends you be put in jail for a year. Although I
think probably both of them may be appropriate, I also think that
you need serious treatment, and I want to have an opportunity to
allow you the ability to do that.
....
Sir, that sentence is going to be consecutive with the OWI
sentence that you currently have. So if you are unsuccessful on
probation, you’ll be looking at going to prison for a period of two
years.
Upon our review, we find the court considered multiple permissive factors
in sentencing Scarlett, including the statements of the parties, Scarlett’s criminal
history, the protection of the community from further offenses, and Scarlett’s
rehabilitation. However, the court failed to provide reasons for its decision to run
Scarlett’s sentence consecutively with his OWI sentence. See State v. Jacobs,
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607 N.W.2d 679, 690 (Iowa 2000) (finding the district court must provide reasons
for imposing consecutive sentences); see also State v. Harrington, 349 N.W.2d
758, 763 (Iowa 1984) (same); State v. Uthe, 542 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Iowa 1996)
(same). We remand for resentencing if, after applying the weight-of-the-evidence
standard, the district court again denies Scarlett’s motion for new trial.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED WITH
DIRECTIONS.