UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
RAY BERNARD WILLIAMS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 15-719 (GK)
)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., )
)
Defendant. )
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Ray Bernard Williams brings this action against the
Government of the District of Columbia ("the District") ,
Metropolitan Police Officer Daniel Merritt ("Merritt"), and
Metropolitan Police Officer Cory Bines ("Bines") (collectively,
"Defendants"), alleging violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as
well as numerous common law claims, in relation to the February
22, 2014 arrest of Mr. Williams.
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Partial
Motion to Dismiss Complaint [Dkt. No. 6]. Upon consideration of
the Motion, Response [Dkt. No. 15], Reply [Dkt. No. 17], and the
entire record herein, and for the reasons set forth below, the
Motion shall be granted.
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I . Background
A. Factual Overviewl
On the evening of February 22, 2014, Plaintiff was stopped,
detained, arrested, and imprisoned by Defendant Officers Merritt
and Bines at the liquor store located at 1726 Columbia Rd NW, in
Washington, D.C. See Compl. ~ 10. Plaintiff alleges that the stop,
detention, arrest, and imprisonment were not supported by
reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or legal justification.
Id. ~ 11. Plaintiff also alleges that the officers used excessive
force in executing the detention and arrest, resulting in injuries
to Plaintiff that include but are not limited to: a broken nose,
two black eyes, and injuries to the sides of his head, face, and
body. Id. ~~ 12-13.
After his arrest, Plaintiff was charged with Assault and
Assaulting, Resisting or Interfering with a Police Officer.
Id. ~ 14. The Office of the United States Attorney entered a nolle
prosequi in the case on March 14, 2014. Id. ~ 16.
1 For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss, the factual
allegations of the complaint must be presumed to be true and
liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. Aktieselskabet AF
21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir.
2008); Shear v. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., 606 F.2d 1251, 1253 (D.C.
Cir. 1979). Therefore, the facts set forth herein are taken from
Plaintiff's Complaint [Dkt. No. 1-2].
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B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff initially filed the present case in Superior Court
for the District of Columbia on February 19, 2015. 2 See Compl.
Defendants jointly removed the case to the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia on May 12, 2015, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 1441(a). See Joint Notice of Removal [Dkt. No. 1]. Plaintiff
alleges violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as common
law claims of: assault and battery; false arrest; false
imprisonment; intentional infliction of emotional distress;
negligent infliction of emotional distress; negligence; negligent
supervision, retention, and training; and respondeat superior
liability. See Compl. ~~ 19-68.
Defendants filed the present Partial Motion to Dismiss on May
26, 2015. Plaintiff filed his Response on June 18, 2015, and
Defendants filed their Reply on June 26, 2015. On October 6, 2015,
without seeking leave of the Court, Plaintiff filed an Amended
Response [Dkt. No. 24]. Defendants filed a Motion to Strike the
Amended Response ("Mot. to Strike") on October 21, 2015 [Dkt. No.
2 8] . Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion to Strike on
2 The time stamp by the Superior Court is dated February 19, 2014,
which appears to be in error. The signature date is February 19,
2015, and appears to be the correct date.
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November 9, 2015 [Dkt. No. 29], and Defendants filed a Reply in
Support of Motion to Strike on November 19, 2015 [Dkt. No. 31].
II. Legal Standards
A. Standard of Review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6)
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a plaintiff
need only plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face" and to "nudge[ ] [his or her] claims across
the line from conceivable to plausible." Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "[O]nce a claim has been stated
adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts
consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Id. at 563.
Under the Twombly standard, a "court deciding a motion to
dismiss must not make any judgment about the probability of the
plaintiffs' success . [,] must assume all the allegations in
the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) [, and]
must give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences
derived from the facts alleged." Aktieselskabet AF 21. November
2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). The court does not,
however, accept as true "legal conclusions or inferences that are
unsupported by the facts alleged." Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign
Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted). Furthermore, a complaint which "tenders 'naked
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assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement'" will not
suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (alteration in Iqbal).
III. Analysis
A. Amended Response
As an initial matter, the Court grants Defendants' Motion to
Strike Plaintiff's Amended Response ("Amended Response") .
Defendants correctly point out that the Amended Response was filed
more than three months after the Partial Motion to Dismiss became
ripe for consideration, and without leave of the Court. Mot. to
Strike at 1. In any event, the arguments in the Amended Response
do not affect the merits or change the outcome of Defendants'
Partial Motion to Di$miss.
In response to Plaintiff's First Request for Production of
Documents, the District turned over a Use of Force Report based on
the underlying incident in this case. Amended Response at 2. The
Use of Force Report was completely blank. Id. Plaintiff argues
that the failure to complete the Use of Force Report "raises
serious concerns as to the training and supervision" of Officers
Merritt and Bines. Id. This does not change the fact that
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to plead facts sufficient to support
his negligent supervision, retention, and training claim. See Mot.
at 10; Compl. ~~ 61-65.
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In addition, Plaintiff seeks to oppose dismissal of Count 7
in the Amended Response, whereas he had conceded dismissal of
Count 7 in his initial Response. Amended Response at 5; Response
at 3. The reason for this changed position is that "Plaintiff
originally mistakenly believed that he could not bring actions for
both assault and battery and negligence arising out of the same
set of facts." Amended Response at 5. Plaintiff cites to Harvey v.
Kasco, 109 F. Supp. 3d 173, 178 (D.D.C. 2015), an opinion that was
released one day before Plaintiff's Response was filed, for the
proposition that a Plaintiff may plead alternative theories of
liability. This proposition of law is not new. Indeed, the Harvey
court cites to a 2008 case for this exact proposition. Id. (citing
Dingle v. Dist. of Columbia, 571 F. Supp. 2d 87, 99 (D.D.C. 2008)).
Plaintiff's misunderstanding of the law is not sufficient
justification to permit amending the response.
B. Claims
Plaintiff has affirmatively conceded several of Defendants'
arguments. Given that they are uncontested, the Court need only
discuss them briefly.
1. Fourteenth Amendment
First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment
claims against all Defendants fail because the Fourteenth
Amendment applies only to the States. Mot. at 5-6. Plaintiff agrees
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that the Fourteenth Amendment is inapplicable to the District of
Columbia. Response at 2.
Plaintiff maintains though, that the Fourteenth Amendment
claim alleging excessive force and violations of substantive due
process is still applicable to Officers Bines and Merritt. Id.
Plaintiffs do not explain why they concede that the District is
not covered by the Fourteenth Amendment, but maintain that Officers
Merritt and Bines, who were "acting under color of law and
authority of the District," are covered by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Response at 2; Compl. ~ 18.
The Fourteenth Amendment "applies only to the states," and
does not apply to the District of Columbia. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499 (1954). If the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply
to the District, then it does not apply to employees of the
District. Accordingly, the portions of Count 1 relying on the
Fourteenth Amendment are dismissed.
2. Fifth Amendment
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claim
is based entirely on his alleged detention and therefore must be
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. Mot. at 6. A plaintiff may
make a substantive due process claim for police misconduct so long
as his claim is not "covered by a specific constitutional
provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment." County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998). "[W]here a
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particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of
constitutional protection against a particular source of
government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized
notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing
these claims." Id. at 842 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Plaintiff agrees with Defendants' argument. Response at 2.
Therefore, Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claim in Count 1 is
dismissed.
3. Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment's protections applies only to persons
"who are subject to punishment by the government, which the Supreme
Court has defined to mean persons against whom the government has
secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due
process of law." Moreno v. Dist. of Columbia, 925 F. Supp. 2d 93,
100 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n. 16
(1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Plaintiff was never prosecuted or convicted for any crimes
stemming from the facts of this case, and thus, Defendants argue,
the Eighth Amendment does not apply. Mot. at 7. Plaintiff agrees.
Response at 2. Therefore, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim in
Count 1 is dismissed.
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4. Municipal Liability
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient
facts to find municipal liability for constitutional violations.
Mot. at 7-8. A municipality may be held liable for a constitutional
violation only if the plaintiff alleges facts that indicate his or
her injury was caused by a municipal policy or custom. See Monell
v. Dep't of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978).
Plaintiff agrees to dismiss the portion of Count 1 alleging
municipal liability against the District, Response at 3, and thus,
it is dismissed.
5. Negligence and Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Negligence and Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress claims are duplicative of his
intentional tort claims and should therefore be dismissed. In
particular, Defendants argue that Plaintiff "merely repeats his
intentional tort claims, without identifying any separate duty that
would form the basis for a negligence claim." Mot. at 10 (citing
Cotton v. District of Columbia, 541 F. Supp. 2d 195, 209 (D.D.C.
2008)). Plaintiff agrees, Response at 3, and Counts 6 and 7
alleging Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and Negligence
are therefore dismissed.
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6. Negligent Supervision, Retention, and Training
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts
in the Complaint to support his Count 8 claim of Negligent
Supervision, Retention, and Training. Mot. at 10. Instead, the
Complaint merely restates the legal requirements of the claim
itself. Id. Plaintiffs concede this argument in their Response.
Response at 3. Therefore, Count 8 is dismissed.
7. False Arrest and False Imprisonment
Under District of Columbia law, false arrest is
indistinguishable from the common law tort of false imprisonment.
Dormu v. District of Columbia, 795 F. Supp. 2d 7, 27 (D.D.C. 2011).
Defendants argue that these claims should be merged or the false
imprisonment claim dismissed. Mot. at 10-11. Plaintiff agrees that
the claims are duplicative and that the false imprisonment claim
should be dismissed. Response at 3. Accordingly, Count 4 alleging
false imprisonment is dismissed.
8. Respondeat Superior
Count 9 of the Complaint alleges that the District is liable
for the actions of Officers Merritt and Bines pursuant to the
common law doctrine of respondeat superior. Compl. ~~ 66-68. While
the District of Columbia recognizes the doctrine of respondeat
superior liability, Defendants argue that it is not a stand-alone
tort. Mot. at 11. Rather, the District can be held liable only if
it is shown that its employees committed the torts pled in the
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Complaint while working in the scope of their employment. See
Convit v. Wilson, 980 A.2d 1104, 1114 (D.C. 2009).
Plaintiff agrees that there is no stand-alone claim for
respondeat superior and agrees to dismiss Count 9. Accordingly,
Count 9 is dismissed.
9. Punitive Damages
Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in his Complaint, see Compl.
at 15, but "there can be no recovery of punitive damages against
a municipality absent a statute expressly authorizing it." Mot. at
12 (quoting Smith v. District of Columbia, 336 A.2d 831, 832 (D.C.
1975)). There is no such statute in the District of Columbia. See
Caldwell v. Hammonds, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 1999) (citing
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981)).
Plaintiff concedes this with regard to the District, while
reserving his punitive damages claim against the Officers, which
Defendants have not sought to dismiss. Response at 3. Therefore,
the request for punitive damages against the District, but not
Officers Bines and Merritt, is dismissed.
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IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Partial Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint shall be granted. An Order shall accompany
this Memorandum.
March 30, 2016
es District Judge
Copies to: attorneys on record via ECF
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