IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
THE MIRAGE CASINO-HOTEL, A No. 64535
NEVADA CORPORATION,
Appellant,
vs. FILED
BEALE STREET BLUES COMPANY
LAS VEGAS, LLC, A NEVADA APR 0 I 2016
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ci.e FRACIE K. LINDEMAN
, K OF 81,1F*RE- ME COURT
Respondent. By S • Y
DEPU FY CLERK
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE AND REMAND
This is an appeal from a district court order denying a motion
to compel arbitration. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County;
Susan Scann, Judge.
Appellant Mirage Casino-Hotel moved to compel arbitration
under an arbitration clause in its lease agreement with respondent Beale
Street Blues Company, a blues club and restaurant. The district court
determined that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because Mirage
waived arbitration when it refused to arbitrate an earlier lawsuit. The
district court also determined that Beale Street suffered prejudice
sufficient to avoid enforcement of the arbitration clause in the bankruptcy
court adversarial proceedings against Mirage. Mirage argues that the
arbitration enforcement clause in the parties' lease is enforceable,
notwithstanding its participation in proceedings before the bankruptcy
court. Mirage claims that Beale Street voluntarily dismissed the earlier
suit, so its participation there cannot be used to establish a waiver. It also
argues that Beale Street failed to prove prejudice sufficient to waive
arbitration. We disagree.
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Standard of review
An order denying a motion to compel arbitration is directly
appealable. NRS 38.247(1)(a). These orders typically involve mixed
questions of fact and law. Gonski v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 126 Nev.
551, 557, 245 P.3d 1164, 1168 (2010). Consequently, this court defers to
the district court's factual findings, but it reviews pure questions of law de
novo. Id.
"The party moving to enforce an arbitration clause has the
burden . . [to show] that the clause is valid." D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green,
120 Nev. 549, 553, 96 P.3d 1159, 1162 (2004). But the party opposing
enforcement of a valid arbitration clause must establish its defense to
enforcement. Gonski, 126 Nev. at 557, 245 P.3d at 1169.
Waiver of right to compel arbitration
Following a hearing with oral argument, the district court
denied Mirage's motion to compel arbitration. The district court found
that Beale Street satisfied this court's test in Nevada Gold & Casinos, Inc.
v. American Heritage, Inc., 121 Nev. 84, 90, 110 P.3d 481, 485 (2005)
because Beale Street proved that (1) Mirage knew of its right to arbitrate,
(2) it proceeded incompatibly with its right, and (3) its involvement in the
adversary proceedings before the bankruptcy court caused actual prejudice
to Beale Street.
Mirage claims that because voluntarily dismissed cases are
legal nullities, its participation in the bankruptcy case—that Beale Street
voluntarily dismissed—cannot establish a waiver of arbitration in the
instant case. Mirage additionally asserts that the district court also erred
because Beale Street did not prove that it suffered actual prejudice from
Mirage's participation in the bankruptcy proceedings.
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Beale Street asserts that Mirage incorrectly argues that Beale
Street voluntarily dismissed the adversary proceedings before the district
court. As a result, Beale Street contends that Mirage's participation in the
bankruptcy litigation absolutely establishes a waiver. Beale Street also
argues that it proved it was prejudiced by delays, legal expenses, harm to
its legal stance, and being forced out of business while litigating in
bankruptcy court.
The issue before us is whether the district court correctly
determined that Mirage waived the right to compel arbitration when it
litigated in the adversary proceedings without compelling arbitration. We
conclude that the district court correctly found that Mirage waived its
right.
Like any other contractual right, a party can waive its right to
arbitration. United States v. Park Place Assocs., Ltd., 563 F.3d 907, 921
(9th Cir. 2009). However, waiver is not a favored finding and should not
be inferred lightly. Clark Cty. v. Blanchard Const. Co., 98 Nev. 488, 491,
653 P.2d 1217, 1219 (1982). A party waives the right to demand
arbitration when it (1) knows of its right to arbitration, (2) acts
inconsistently with an intent to arbitrate, and (3) prejudices the opposing
party by actively litigating the dispute in another forum. Nev. Gold &
Casinos, 121 Nev. at 90, 110 P.3d at 485.
Federal courts have found that a party may waive the right to
arbitrate when it participates in litigation in a manner that is inconsistent
with an intent to arbitrate its legal dispute. Hoxworth v. Blinder,
Robinson & Co., Inc., 980 F.2d 912, 926 (3d Cir. 1992). For example, the
Third Circuit determined that parties waived their right to arbitration "by
actively litigating this case for almost a year prior to filing their motion to
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compel arbitration." Id. at 925. The D.C. Circuit held that a party "had
'invoked the litigation machinery' by, inter alia, filing an answer without
asserting arbitration as an affirmative defense, requesting documents and
deposing plaintiffs witnesses, opposing plaintiffs motion to amend its
complaint, and moving for summary judgment." Id. at 926 (quoting Nat'l
Found. for Cancer Research v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 821 F.2d 772, 775
(1987)). The Fifth Circuit also affirmed a district court's denial of a
motion to compel arbitration "where the defendant, during the seventeen
months after the complaint was filed, initiated extensive discovery,
answered twice, filed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, filed
and obtained two extensions of pretrial deadlines, all without demanding
arbitration." Id. (internal quotations omitted) (referencing Price v. Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1986)). And the Ninth
Circuit similarly found a "waiver where defendant chose 'to litigate
actively the entire matter—including pleadings, motions, and approving a
pretrial conference order—and did not move to compel arbitration until
more than two years after [plaintiffs] brought the action." Id. (alteration
in original) (quoting Van Ness Townhouses v. Mar Indus. Corp., 862 F.2d
754, 759 (1988)).
"Waiver is generally a question of fact." Nev. Gold & Casinos,
121 Nev. at 89, 110 P.3d at 484. But waiver may be determined as a
matter of law when the issue rests upon the legal implications of
uncontested facts. Id.
Knowledge of the right to arbitration
First, the record reflects, and Mirage does not dispute, that it
was aware of its right and obligation to arbitrate all disputes associated
with the lease.
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Actions inconsistent with the right to arbitration
Second, Mirage acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate
in the proceedings before the bankruptcy court. Mirage incorrectly argues
that Beale Street voluntarily dismissed the adversary proceedings before
the bankruptcy court. Beale Street did not move the bankruptcy court to
dismiss its adversary complaint against Mirage and a bankruptcy court
may retain jurisdiction of related cases even when the underlying petition
is dismissed. See In re Kieslich, 258 F.3d 968, 970-71 (9th Cir. 2001); In re
Carraher, 971 F.2d 327, 328 (9th Cir 1992) (explaining that "[s]ection 349
of the Bankruptcy Code lists the various effects of dismissal of the
underlying bankruptcy case; conspicuously absent from that list is
automatic termination of jurisdiction over related cases"). The bankruptcy
court "consider[s] economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in deciding
whether to retain jurisdiction over pendent state claims." Carraher, 971
F.2d at 328.
Here, the bankruptcy court dismissed Beale Street's adversary
complaint sua sponte; Beale Street moved to dismiss its bankruptcy •
petition but did not move to dismiss the adversary proceedings. Because
Beale Street did not voluntarily dismiss its adversary complaint against
Mirage, the bankruptcy proceedings are not a legal nullity. Mirage's
actions in the bankruptcy proceedings are therefore relevant to whether
Mirage acted inconsistently with an intent to arbitrate.
The record before us reflects that before Beale Street filed its
petition and adversary complaint in the bankruptcy court, it informed
Mirage that it intended to invoke its right to arbitrate. Mirage responded
to Beale Street by agreeing to arbitrate a discrete portion of the dispute so
long as Beale Street agreed to pay any amount awarded to Mirage within
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ten days of the American Arbitration Association's (AAA's) decision. Thus,
Mirage conditionally agreed to arbitration, and its conditional agreement
is insufficient to establish an intent to arbitrate.
Moreover, Mirage did not raise its right to arbitrate all
disputes related to the lease as an affirmative defense in its answer to the
adversarial complaint or the amended adversarial complaint. Mirage also
did not raise arbitration as an affirmative defense in the answering
documents it filed with the state district court. And for approximately two
years Mirage actively litigated in the bankruptcy court the same basic
claims as those it now seeks to arbitrate. Even further, Mirage filed a
counterclaim seeking declaratory relief along with its answer. It also
opposed Beale Street's motion for partial summary judgment and counter-
moved for partial summary judgment. Mirage additionally filed an
application for an order shortening time and an emergency motion to
convert Beale Street's petition from chapter 11 to chapter 7 or, in the
alternative, for relief from the automatic stay to proceed with termination
remedies. Mirage even filed a motion for sanctions and to disqualify Beale
Street's attorney due to alleged discovery misconduct, which motion the
bankruptcy court ultimately denied. The parties dispute whether Mirage
conducted discovery during the bankruptcy proceedings.
Regardless of whether Mirage propounded discovery, we
conclude that Mirage's actions were inconsistent with an intent to
arbitrate. More than two years after litigation commenced in the
bankruptcy court, Mirage finally asserted that the parties' dispute was
subject to binding arbitration despite filing a counterclaim and several
motions before the bankruptcy court. This is inconsistent with its right to
arbitrate.
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Prejudice from litigating the dispute in another forum
Third, we conclude that Beale Street suffered prejudice
sufficient to avoid arbitration. We have held that prejudice may be shown
"(1) when the parties use discovery not available in arbitration, (2) when
they litigate substantial issues on the merits, or (3) when compelling
arbitration would require a duplication of efforts." Nev. Gold & Casinos,
121 Nev. at 90-91, 110 P.3d at 485.
Use of discovery not available in arbitration
Beale Street fails to present any AAA rule or precedent which
will impact its ability to use its discovery from the bankruptcy
proceedings. Beale Street also fails to direct this court to any discovery
that it believes would be excluded in arbitration or how exclusion would
impact its ability to prove its case. It simply argues that a possibility
exists that its evidence could be excluded, without explaining how remote
the possibility may be. Accordingly, we conclude that Beale Street has not
proven that it would suffer prejudice because the evidence obtained in the
prior proceedings will not be available in arbitration.
Litigation of substantial issues on the merits
The parties extensively litigated the merits of this case in the
proceedings before the bankruptcy court. Both parties filed motions for
partial summary judgment and Mirage filed a motion to convert Beale
Street's chapter 11 petition to chapter 7 in order to negotiate with the
trustee and secure a resolution to the adversarial complaint. Had Mirage
agreed to arbitrate the parties' entire dispute—instead of a single, discrete
aspect—or had Mirage sought to compel arbitration at the inception of the
bankruptcy proceedings, the parties could have avoided two years of
litigation, along with its associated costs and delays.
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Mirage charges that Beale Street's sole assertion of prejudice
is its desire to avoid arbitration costs, which does not constitute prejudice.
However, prior to commencing bankruptcy proceedings, Beale Street
reminded Mirage of the arbitration clause in their contract. Mirage
responded by agreeing to arbitrate only a portion of the parties' dispute
and by requiring Beale Street to agree to additional terms. Based on
Mirage's rigid stance, Beale Street promptly filed for bankruptcy
protection.
Accordingly, we conclude that Beale Street has proved that it
suffered prejudice because the parties previously litigated substantial
issues on the merits.
Duplication of efforts
Neither the record on appeal nor the parties' arguments
clearly explain what previous litigation would be duplicated through
arbitration but not duplicated in proceedings before the district court.
As indicated, Mirage never sought an order compelling
arbitration from the bankruptcy court and instead litigated the adversary
complaint against it for approximately two years. Because Beale Street
expended hefty sums during the prior litigation and has gone out of
business, it no longer has either the assets or the cash flow to fund
proceedings that it estimates will cost $50,000 to $60,000. Therefore,
Mirage caused Beale Street to suffer actual prejudice sufficient to avoid
arbitration.
We take this opportunity to distinguish the instant case from
MB America v. Alaska Pacific Leasing, 132 Nev., Adv. Op. 8, P.3d
(2016). In MB America, we held that a prelitigation mediation provision
established a condition precedent to litigation. Id. at . We also held
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that because MB America failed to initiate mediation proceedings
pursuant to its contract with Alaska Pacific, the district court was correct
to grant Alaska Pacific's motion for summary judgment, which argued
that the complaint was premature because MB America had not complied
with the mediation requirement. Id. at . There, the parties had not
engaged in extended litigation before Alaska Pacific sought to enforce the
mediation provision in the parties' contract. Id. at . Alaska Pacific
promptly sought to enforce the mediation provision in the contract. Id. at
. Alaska Pacific did not submit to years of litigation before it sought to
enforce mediation as a condition precedent. Id. at . Although MB
America asserted that Alaska Pacific had entirely refused to mediate,
Alaska Pacific did not postpone enforcing the contractual right to mediate
once MB America filed its complaint in the district court. Id. at .
Instead, MB America sought summary judgment early in the proceedings.
Id. at .
Here, Mirage's request to compel arbitration is several years
too late and comes after Mirage indicated that it would not arbitrate all of
the parties' disputes, despite the clear language in the contract that says
"All disputes, controversies or claims. . . shall be subject to binding
arbitration. . . in accordance with the rules American Arbitration
Association." (Emphasis added). Had Mirage sought to compel arbitration
early in the bankruptcy proceedings, we would not be able to reach the
same decision.
Moreover, MB America was not in a situation where it needed
to seek immediate protection. MB America, 132 Nev., Adv. Op. 8, P.3d
at . When Beale Street informed Mirage that the parties needed to
arbitrate a resolution to their conflict, Mirage indicated that it would
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arbitrate the stewarding charges but it would continue with proceedings to
evict Beale Street, thereby rejecting Beale Street's request for arbitration.
Thus, Beale Street needed immediate protection to prevent its eviction.
Although the AAA may have been able to provide Beale Street with
immediate protection, see American Arbitration Association's (AAA)
"Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures," titled "Interim
Measures," para. R-37(a), Beale Street cannot be faulted for seeking
protection through the bankruptcy court. See Id. at para. R-37(c) ("A
request for interim measures addressed by a party to a judicial authority
shall not be deemed incompatible with the agreement to arbitrate or a
waiver of the right to arbitrate."). If Mirage wanted to preserve its right to
arbitrate, it needed to take the necessary steps to do so at the
commencement of litigation before the bankruptcy court. Asserting its
right at this point in the litigation between the parties is too little too late.
We acknowledge that Beale Street did not initiate mediation
"in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association," as
the parties' contract requires. In MB America, MB America's failure to
initiate mediation pursuant to AAA rules was a significant factor that
compelled this court to affirm the district court's decision to enforce the
mediation provision. 132 Nev., Adv. Op. 8, P.3d at . However, in
the instant case, we conclude that Beale Street's failure to follow the
provision in the contract requiring arbitration under AAA rules is
significantly outweighed by Mirage's failure to assert its right to compel
arbitration at an earlier time. Alaska Pacific did not postpone asserting
its right after years of litigation. Id. at . Mirage did and, therefore,
waived its right to compel arbitration.
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Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that Beale Street was prejudiced and did not err in denying
Mirage's motion to compel arbitration. We therefore
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED AND
REMAND this matter to the district court for further proceedings.
1 CCA-it ,
Parra uirre
J.
Douglas
aki2dift
Cherry
cc: Hon. Susan Scann, District Judge
Ara H. Shirinian, Settlement Judge
Pisanelli Bice, PLLC
Sean Claggett & Associates, Inc.
Eighth District Court Clerk
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